

Party and Pressure Politics

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Preface

WHEN LORD BRYCE PUBLISHED the first edition of his *American Commonwealth* in 1888 he complained in his chapter on the party system: "Nor have I the advantage of being able to cite any previous treatise on the subject; for though books and articles dealing with the public life of the United States may be counted by hundreds, I know of no author who has set himself to describe impartially the actual daily working of that part of the vast and intricate political machine which lies outside the Constitution, nor, what are more important still, the influences which sway the men by whom this machine has been constructed and is daily manipulated."¹ Were he writing today he could not make this complaint, because a great variety of excellent books have been published over the years since 1888. I am conscious of my own debt to many of those who since Bryce have written on the fascinating subject of American politics; of them all, I have felt most influenced by the work of the late Edward M. Sait.

In teaching any course an instructor may emphasize materials in ways different from those in the books he finds at hand; perhaps because of my own experiences in politics I have wanted a treatment that seemed to me more realistic, more practical than anything I could find; and because of a long interest in and some experience with propaganda I have sought to show students its relationship to party and pressure politics beyond the usual treatment of campaign methods.

In attempting to teach a course in American politics I have found myself giving less and less attention to party history as such, because many students come to college with some acquaintance with it; because

¹ Vol. 1, p. 637.

many take college courses in American political history; and because the separate treatment of the topic in most textbooks on politics leads to a dichotomy between the chapters on party history and the chapters on politics as process. An attempt has here been made to work the history and the functional discussion together, and consequently the amount of space allotted to straight party history is much less than will be found in most books. The arrangement of chapters in the order in which they appear has also been the result of teaching experience; my students have seemed to grasp pressure politics better after they have had an introduction to party politics.

In dealing with the highly controversial issues and groups discussed herein, it would be miraculous if I have not somewhere written something that someone will think unfair, in spite of my best efforts to follow the standard Bryce set, "to describe impartially the actual daily working of that part of the vast and intricate political machine which lies outside the Constitution." The danger of seeming to be unjust to some group or party is the greater because it is impossible to marshal in one volume all the evidence; I have undertaken to cite in footnotes the materials upon which I have relied, but I cannot hope that everyone will agree that they were the best or the only ones that might have been used. Of course no man deals with these matters — or writes or teaches about them — without a bias of some sort. Mine I believe to be in favor of popular government, opposed to autocracy, whether of a boss, a dictator, or an interest; and my hope would be that my country will advance toward more responsible and responsive parties and groups than we have had.

I am under obligation to Professor Robert K. Carr of Dartmouth College for reading and criticizing Chapter 3 on the suffrage and to Dr. William A. Lydgate for his help on the chapters on public opinion polls. I am particularly indebted to Dr. George Gallup of the American Institute of Public Opinion for permission to use his poll material freely, and I have taken full advantage of the opportunity.

D. D. M.

I

The Bases and Nature of Party

Politics and the Nature and Function of Party

THERE IS NOTHING INEVITABLE about democracy.) As we know it in terms of representative government, it is the youngest of the institutional forms by which men have sought to regulate and adjust their diverse or conflicting interests. Rule by force is much older than rule by consent of the governed, and indeed it is much more common throughout the world today — probably not one tenth of mankind enjoys at present anything approaching real self-government. The peoples of the world have had both much less extensive experience and much shorter experience with popular government than they have had with government by the rule of the stronger; and as the sad record of the twentieth century has already shown, they all too readily lapse from self-government to dictatorial government. Even in the United States there are bosses and machines which, operating within the forms of representative government, are as ruthless and irresponsible as Franco, Perón, or Stalin.

The politics of the United States, like the politics of any other state, result from the social forces which flow through its constitutional forms. Politics in the United States are different from politics in Great Britain because different sectional, traditional, economic, and other interests operate through a different type of constitution. And the different clusters of interests in the American states, flowing through state constitutions which are essentially alike, produce wide differences in politics: Vermont and South Carolina, New York and California, for instance. Many of the differences in state politics will be discussed in the chapters that follow. These interests which shape American politics are organized in two principal ways, in group and in party, and these two react upon each other and

upon the electorate within the federal and state constitutions to produce the politics characteristic of the United States.

THE CHALLENGE OF AMERICAN POLITICS

To understand these forces and how they operate in what Woodrow Wilson called the rough ways of democracy is necessary before any attempt to improve them can hope to be successful. The "good citizen" may be appalled when he finds a politician who makes promises but does not keep them, a party which seems to stand for nothing except the hope of office, a minority group which obtains its objectives regardless of majority will, and other abuses; and he may then turn to some political panacea, such as the direct primary, the short ballot, or proportional representation. When these fail he may turn away from politics or from democracy in disgust. It is the challenge of American politics not to turn away but to improve the institutions, constitutional and statutory, through which the forces of interest flow so as to facilitate effective and responsible government by the consent of the governed. We may hope with Charles E. Merriam that "governmental processes are not merely wormlike squirmings, in which men are enslimmed without gains or goals, but are parts of the process of transition from darkness to light, from slavery to freedom, from drift to mastery."¹

THE STUDY OF POLITICS

The study of politics must take account of both stability and change — of the long-established interests of men, such as the ways by which they make their livings, as well as the never-ending adjustments between these interests, which are necessary that men may live and work together in relative peace. The study of American politics needs to be grounded upon an understanding of the Constitution of the United States, which, perhaps more than any other factor, conditions the behavior of the groups and parties in the American political scene. Nonrational as well as rational elements also enter into the study of politics; men do not always know their own best interests, but there is a wide variation among them in intelligence, education, information. Few citizens can act upon full or reasonably full information; and even those who can do not always do so; they

¹ *Systematic Politics* (1945), p. ix.

may, rather, follow Bilbos, Thompsons, or Longs and vote against their own best interests; or they may vote as their grandfathers did, joining the same party and the same groups, regardless of their own real interests. In spite of the nonrational aspects of politics, it is the hope of American democracy that an increasing application of intelligence to political decisions may carry ahead the social values of liberty and the pursuit of happiness to the improvement of the common life of man, for, as Lord Bryce wrote, "No government demands so much from the citizen as democracy and none gives back so much."¹

The study of politics, however, is no exploration of bloodless abstractions. Rather, it is the examination of "the endless adventure of governing men." It throbs with human life; and while other disciplines, such as economics, psychology, sociology, and statistics affect it, still its central theme is the behavior of people in political situations. It is the study of power, to be sure, and leadership and subordination and deference; but it is also the study of the means by which human co-operation can be attained along with the preservation of the integrity and the dignity of the individual citizen.

Rule by the people, except in the smallest units such as little New England towns, must usually be representative government. This type of government cannot be expected to work without political parties, so that the central problem of majority rule is the establishment and maintenance of parties responsive and responsible to the electorate. But the rise of great pressure groups has complicated this problem, because the groups are not responsible to the voters. As will be shown in later pages, these groups perform useful and even indispensable functions; and governments deal more readily with clusters of citizens than with individuals, but the Great Democracy cannot in fact be democratic if minorities are able to control its processes.

THEORIES OF POLITICAL PARTIES

Such terms as *party*, *pressure group*, and *interest* have already been used in these pages. They must be used again and again. An understanding of the processes of American politics may well begin with an examination of what a party is, what causes parties to arise, what they do, and what rival organizations they face.

¹ *Modern Democracies* (1921), vol. 2, p. 608.

THE HUMAN NATURE THEORY

One explanation of the existence of political parties, which has been so long and so widely held as to deserve our notice is the "human nature" theory: that people instinctively or automatically divide into parties which correspond to the basic drives or instincts of mankind. This cleavage is often described as running, roughly, between those drives that make for preservation of the status quo and those which seek change in the hope of improvement. Thus the sentry in Gilbert and Sullivan's *Iolanthe* sang

Now let's rejoice
That Nature wisely does contrive
That every boy and every gal
That's born into the world alive
Is either a little Liberal
Or else a little Conservative.

The theory of parties here implicit has a most respectable ancestry. Thomas Jefferson, for example, wrote to John Adams:

Men have differed in opinion, and have been divided into parties by these opinions, from the first origin of the species, and in all governments where they have been permitted freely to think and to speak. The same political parties which now agitate the United States, have existed through all time. . . . The terms of whig and tory belong to natural as well as civil history. They denote the temper and constitution of mind of different individuals.¹

And Adams agreed with Jefferson:

It is a fine observation of yours that whig and tory belong to natural history. Inequalities of mind and body are so established by God Almighty in his constitution of human nature, that no act or policy can ever plane them down to a level.²

Jefferson was not always consistent in his political thinking, but he was consistent in his view that men naturally divide into parties, and what is more, into two parties. In letters to Lafayette, to John Melish, and to Henry Lee he expressed the same idea, although he gave the parties different names. The difference between parties, he wrote, was "the question

¹ *Correspondence of John Adams and Thomas Jefferson, 1812-1826*, Paul Wiltach, editor (Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1925), p. 59.

² *Life and Works of John Adams*, Charles Francis Adams, editor (1856), vol. 10, p. 52.

of preference between monarchy and republicanism." He also wrote that "The appellation of aristocrats and democrats is the true one, expressing the essence of all."¹ The view that people divide between aristocrats and democrats was common in the United States in the early eighteenth century; Alexander Hamilton believed in it, and left no doubt that he stood with and for the aristocracy, or what he called "the rich and well born." That penetrating French observer of American life, Alexis de Tocqueville, writing in the same period, thought that the division of Americans into Federalists and Republicans was perfectly normal, because there are "two opinions which are as old as the world and which are perpetually to be met with, under different forms and various names, in all free communities, the one tending to limit, the other to extend indefinitely, the power of the people."²

Lord Macaulay, in a much-quoted passage in his *History of England*, based British parties upon the human nature hypothesis:

Everywhere there is a class of men who cling with fondness to whatever is ancient, and who, even when convinced by overpowering reasons, that innovation would be beneficial, consent to it with many misgivings and forebodings. We find also everywhere another class of men, sanguine in hope, bold in speculation, always pressing forward, quick to discern the imperfections of whatever exists, disposed to think lightly of the risks and inconveniences which attend improvements, and disposed to give every change credit for being an improvement.³

Difficulties with the Theory. But to political thinkers of today, the human nature theory of parties is too simple. It places all the emphasis upon heredity as the prime factor in the formation of parties and none upon environment; it would not, for example, explain the Solid South, where most of the voters do not divide into parties but cling to a single party. There must be environmental elements at least as powerful as any innate tendencies in mankind. Nor does the theory account for the evolution of parties, unless it be assumed that parties are always the same, while only their names change: and such an assumption is untenable in view of the rise of parties with distinctly different programs, such as that of the Communists. The human nature theory does not adequately explain the single-issue parties, such as the Prohibition or Free Soil parties;

¹ *Works of Thomas Jefferson* (Ford edition, 1898), vol. 9, p. 374 and vol. 10, p. 318.

² *Democracy in America*, Phillips Bradley, editor (1945), vol. 1, p. 175.

³ Edition of 1879, vol. 1, p. 76.

for clearly men are not born attached to one of these political issues. Moreover, even if conservatives and liberals were born and not made, the tendencies are, even in the same individuals, inconsistent; for ordinary observation will reveal many people who are radical in politics and conservative in religion; or who are liberal in their educational theories and reactionary in their economic views. There are no simple, clear-cut lines of distinction, and indeed the complications are all but endless.

It will be noticed that the adherents of the human nature theory are compelled to read their hypothesis back into all human history, to say that the parties they discern have always existed. To do so, however, is to distort history. To be sure, there have always been groups of followers attached to one leader or another, a chief, a lord, or a prince. But as often as not there was no clear difference between the policies or beliefs of the conflicting leaders. Each wanted all he could win, and got his adherents on a geographical rather than a doctrinal basis. In the modern sense, parties cannot be traced back in England before 1641 nor in the United States before 1765. A political party is a modern social phenomenon, associated with the rise of representative government.

THE ORTHODOX THEORY OF PARTY DIFFERENCES

Some historians writing in the nineteenth century and some students of American politics have thought that they discerned a permanent basis for American parties and an adequate explanation of party behavior in the division between those citizens who favored a strong central government and those who urged states' rights. Spectacular party battles, such as that between Hamilton and Jefferson, offer many convenient examples to illustrate this theory, which Charles A. Beard has labeled "the orthodox theory of American party differences."¹

If the theory is valid, it should of course explain party differences in other countries as well as those in the United States. Lord Bryce in his classic work, *The American Commonwealth*, wrote that "in the United States, the history of party begins with the Constitutional Convention of 1787."² Upon this assumption he found it easy to believe that American parties were based upon different interpretations of the nature of the Union — a centralized government versus states' rights. It then required but one more step for him to universalize this difference:

¹ *The American Party Battle* (1928), p. 4.

² First edition (1888), vol. 1, p. 638.

In every country there are centrifugal and centripetal forces at work, the one or the other of which is for the moment the stronger. . . . English history shows several such alternations. But in America the Federal form of government has made this permanent and natural opposition specially conspicuous. The salient feature of the Constitution is the effort it makes to establish an equipoise between the force which would carry the planet States off into space and the force which would draw them into the sun of the National government. There have always been minds inclined to take sides upon this fundamental question. . . . [States' rights] has been the watchword of the Democratic Party. The [national view] was seldom distinctly avowed, but was generally in fact represented by the Federalists of the first period, the Whigs of the second, the Republicans of the third.¹

It may be doubted whether the centrifugal-centripetal forces that Bryce observed have amounted to enough in the politics of European states to account for much of the development of their politics. Clearly the multiple-party system recently characteristic of continental countries does not illustrate any such tendency toward local versus national division. The split is along entirely different lines.

The orthodox theory would be more persuasive as an explanation of American party divisions if the two parties had been consistent in their positions. The Jeffersonians were adherents of states' rights until Jefferson needed federal powers to purchase the Louisiana Territory. His party imposed an embargo upon foreign commerce — an act of the national government that the Federalists most vehemently denounced. The party that under Hamilton and Marshall had built up federal authority over interstate commerce resisted the enforcement of the federal embargo. It is needless to repeat examples, but it may be noted that the current attachment of the Republican Party to states' rights dates only from March 4, 1933, when the Democratic Party abandoned its long opposition to federal expansion except for purposes of campaign rhetoric. States' rights versus national power, like some other doctrines of constitutional exegesis, have been convenient party positions to conceal more fundamental differences.

THE BASES OF PARTY

INTEREST

These differences are of many kinds, though most of them stem from special interest, tradition, or principle. James Madison, in Number 10

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 650.

of *The Federalist*, advanced the concept of interest as the principal basis of party:

The most common and durable source of factions [parties] has been the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests in society. Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under a like discrimination. A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views. The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the government.

Although Madison considered economic interest arising from the "various and unequal distribution of property" to be "the most common and durable source" of parties, he did not consider it to be the only basis. He noted other interests, such as religion, attachment to particular forms of government, adherence to different leaders, and even opposition for the sake of opposition. A century and a half of party history since Madison's day enables us to clarify his analysis and to observe additional interests that lie at the basis of party.¹

Economic Interest. As a basis for party groupings economic interest takes many changing forms, which will be discussed in detail in subsequent chapters. It is by no means simply a conflict of rich versus poor. Sectionalism is partly a reflection of the varying economic interests of the people living in different areas of a country and their contentions for relative advantage. The conflict of urbanism versus agrarianism is an economic struggle, as is the opposition of labor and capital. Different types of industry have different and often conflicting economic interests, so that a party program that may help one industry may injure another. Labor, although an economic interest, is not a unified one in the United States. Economic interests mix readily with other interests to move groups to political activity; persons engaged in the various professions, for example, are motivated to seek restrictive legislation both by desires for better economic status and for better educational (and hence social) standing for their

¹ "When a number of men unite for the defense, maintenance, or enhancement of any more or less enduring position or advantage which they possess [or seek] alike or in common, the term interest is applied both to the group so united and to the cause which unites them." — R. M. MacIver, *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 8, p. 144.

professions. Veterans' groups display a mixture of motives — the desire to maintain the memories and traditions of their part in war is mingled with their economic interests in insurance, bonuses, veterans' preference in employment, and the like.

Parties representing single economic interests, such as the Agrarian Party or the Workingmen's Party, have never been successful in the United States, but other countries have had and still have peasants' parties, labor parties, and conservative parties — the last of which have been led by an aristocracy of birth or wealth. Each of the two major parties in the United States represents a complex of interests. But in so far as each represents an economic interest, the Republican Party tends to reflect business, wealth, and some types of agriculture; while the Democratic Party tends to reflect the desires of labor, city dwellers, the poor, and exporting agriculture. It is conceivable, but under the Constitution it does not appear likely, that the United States might sometime have parties based principally upon economic interest.

Nationality as an Interest. Nationality, as a sentiment arising from the possession of a common cultural heritage and usually associated with a common language, has been a distinct basis of party in some European states. Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, for instance, in the period before World War II had some of their parties based upon the nationalities from which the countries had been made up by the peace treaties. Until independence was granted to Eire, the British Parliament always had in it representatives of parties expressing Irish nationalism.

In American politics no nationality or language group has ever formed a distinct party, although these interests have constituted influential segments within each of the major parties. The Irish, for example, were welcomed by the political machines of the Eastern cities, which were Democratic during the period of Irish immigration, and most of the Irish have since remained in the Democratic Party. The Negroes attributed their freedom and their right to the suffrage to the Republican Party and a majority adhered faithfully to it until the advent of the New Deal, when there were important defections. Nationality has also been the basis of many pressure groups in the United States.

Religion as an Interest. European countries are familiar with parties that represent primarily the interest of some religious group, notably the Roman Catholic Church. Almost every continental nation has had its Catholic party, under one name or another.¹ The Bloc Populaire in con-

¹For a survey of these Catholic parties see Ludwig Bergsträsser, "Catholic Parties," *Encyclopædia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 3, pp. 271-274.

temporary Canadian politics is essentially a Catholic party, although it has other interests arising from its representation of the French-speaking population, particularly in Quebec. In European and Latin-American countries anti-clerical parties have grown up, again using various names and titles. Where Catholic parties are strong there is an observable tendency for some party to take an anti-Catholic position. The world-wide opposition of communist and Catholic interests is well known.

No important political party in the United States has ever represented primarily a religious group, and no significant anti-clerical party has arisen. The interests of religious organizations have, rather, been reflected either in pressure politics or within the major parties.¹ One recent study points out that

The Catholics have traditionally been affiliated with the Democratic party through the waves of Irish, Italian, and Polish immigration. Many Democratic party leaders have been Catholics — note these recent chairmen of the national committee: Raskob, Farley, Flynn, Walker, Hannegan — and Al Smith, the Democratic candidate in 1928, is the only Catholic nominated for president in recent years.²

The concentration of Catholics in the Democratic Party is, however, characteristic primarily of the northern states. The Solid South was broken only when the Democratic Party nominated a Catholic for president in 1928. On that occasion four states of the solid ten voted for Hoover, indicating that the Democrats of the South, far from being sympathetic to Catholic interests, were positively hostile.³ The country over, the Republican Party is predominantly Protestant.

Special Interests. In the United States and in most other modern nations parties have been formed to represent groups of people who adhered so tenaciously to some single issue or who felt so strongly about some particular interest that they were unwilling to enter any existing major

¹ For a description of the pressure activities of religious organizations see Chapter 14.

² Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, *The People's Choice* (1944), p. 23. In their intensive study of the voting behavior of the people of Erie County, Ohio, for 1940, these authors found that regardless of economic or social status "religious affiliation splits the vote sharply." At various economic levels the Catholics were 71 per cent to 86 per cent Democratic (p. 22). The Protestants were correspondingly Republican.

³ It is significant that, although these four states went Republican, they overwhelmingly returned Democratic senators and representatives to Congress. It is further notable that all of the border states, where the Democratic Party is normally the majority party, voted for Hoover.

party. The National Woman's Party, the Prohibition Party, the Anti-Masonic Party, are American examples. All of these were minor parties, and like most single-issue and special-interest parties, have been short-lived.

TRADITION AS A BASIS FOR PARTY

Most parties arise during times of national crisis or contention when groups of citizens feel that their interests are inadequately recognized by the existing parties. A new party may then be formed from fragments of the old ones, as the Republican Party in 1854 was formed from the "conscience Whigs," the "anti-Nebraska Democrats," and the Free Soil Party. Or a faction may secede from an older group, as the Progressives, following Theodore Roosevelt, withdrew from the Republican Party in 1912. Again, a party may be made up of the followers of some particular political leader, as the Republican-Democratic Party was formed in 1792 from the adherents of Thomas Jefferson. Whatever the catalyst, parties seem generally to arise with issues and program rather sharply defined.

The Institutionalization of Parties. As the years pass and a party accomplishes some of its objectives and abandons others, it does not pass out of existence. Rather, it becomes a political institution with a hierarchy of officers, a group of candidates and public officials, and a membership more or less loyal. It establishes habits of behavior in its adherents, so that they will follow their party with little regard for the party's record (if any) and even sometimes in spite of the partisans' economic or other personal interests. During campaigns the more intense partisans take the party struggle with a seriousness that is inexplicable to independent voters. Madison attributed this tendency of parties to outlive the issues that produced them and to remain as institutions to "a propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, [so] that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their most violent conflicts."¹ Certainly some presidential campaigns in American history have been conducted either in disregard of the issues (if there were any) or upon the most trivial and personal issues. The log-cabin and hardcider campaign of 1840 was an extreme but not unique example.

¹ *The Federalist*, No. 10. Ostrogorski in his *Democracy and the Party System in the United States* (1912) wrote of the "fetish-like" worship of party that he observed in the United States, and he thought that party loyalty was "a patriotism of the second degree" (p. 408).

Two motives or tendencies may be observed that contribute to the institutionalization of parties, so that they are enabled to exist beyond the issues upon which they were formed. First is the personal, chiefly economic, motive held by the leaders of the party who occupy public offices of power and pay. They naturally dislike any prospect of their party's dissolution and the loss of their positions and prestige. Hopeful candidates for public office likewise desire party continuity and success regardless of the issues of the day. The party managers are attached to the organization either because they desire authority or because of economic interest. All these groups within a party have strong motives for desiring party success. "The real terrors of both parties," wrote John Adams, "have always been and now are, the fear that they will lose the elections, and, consequently, the loaves and fishes, and that their antagonists will get them."¹

The Brokerage of Issues. The desire of persons in power to maintain their party leads to a kind of brokerage of issues. If its issues are successfully legislated, the party never voluntarily dissolves; rather, with the pride of accomplishment, it points to its record as a reason why it should be returned to power. Then it seeks new issues, much as a merchant who has conducted a successful sale seeks new merchandise. When the Republican Party after the Civil War had attained the objectives for which it was formed, it did not dissolve. Instead it took on new issues, such as hard money and the encouragement of business. If a party, on the other hand, fails to sell its merchandise — if its issues are not accepted — it may, like an unsuccessful corporation, go through bankruptcy and disappear. The Greenback and anti-Masonic parties are examples. Or an unsuccessful party may sell out to a larger competitor, merging its interests with those of a former rival, as the Populist Party virtually merged with the Democratic Party in 1896. When a major party fails on an important issue it need not collapse; it may simply abandon the plank on which it found it could not win, as a merchant may throw away spoiled or unsalable merchandise. The Democratic Party failed, for example, to win success in 1896 for the unlimited coinage of silver at a ratio of sixteen to one with gold; so it dropped that issue and turned to anti-imperialism. That merchandise, incidentally, did not sell very well either, but the party always did enough business to stay alive with its then exclusive possession of the states' rights issue.

Strength of Tradition. The tradition of party allegiance varies in its

¹ Letter to Thomas Jefferson, June 30, 1813, *Works*, vol. 10, p. 48.

intensity from one state to another. Adherence to the Republican Party, for example, is so strong in Vermont that no Democratic candidate for President has carried the state since the Civil War. The Solid South illustrates similar adherence to the Democratic Party. Clearly, so far as Vermont and Arkansas are concerned, political issues may come and go, and the parties to which their loyalties are attached may trade sides on issues, but nothing shakes the tradition of attachment to their respective parties.

Within the complex of attitudes forming the personality of an individual voter, the tradition of following one party or another may arise from family pressures or from habit. Traditional voting is likely to coincide in most of the states with social and economic status, the wealthy and upper middle class tending to be Republican, the lower middle class and the poor tending to be Democratic.¹ But party tradition sometimes surpasses economic interest as a motive for party membership. For instance, the middle western farmers, who have to sell in a world market and buy in a protected market, are clearly disadvantaged by a protective tariff but nevertheless have clung to the Republican Party.

PRINCIPLE AS A BASIS FOR PARTY

Edmund Burke, in a famous definition of the ideal party, written in 1770, based party upon political principle. "Party," he wrote, "is a body of men united, for promoting by their joint endeavors the national interest, upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed."² But parties have too tenuous a connection with issues and principles to make Burke's definition fit the facts of political life. Parties may refuse to touch issues rather than unite upon them: both major American parties, for example, dodged the issue of woman suffrage. And the purpose of most parties seems not so much to promote the national interest, unless indirectly, as it is to promote the interests of the party itself and of the groups upon which the party must rely for success.

PARTY DEFINED

A party may better be defined as an organized group of the electorate that seeks to direct some policies and furnish the personnel of government.

¹ Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet, *op. cit.*, p. 19, found that for Erie County, Ohio, those in the highest social and economic class were 71 per cent Republican, those in the upper middle class 68 per cent, in the middle class 56 per cent, in the lower middle class 46 per cent, and in the lower class 35 per cent.

² "Thoughts on the Present Discontents," *Works* (1823 edition), vol. 2, p. 345.

The first of these purposes is commonly subordinate to the second, especially in the states; but to obtain control sufficient to place its partisans in office a party usually must make such appeals to issues as is necessary to get its candidates elected. A party, then, is interested both in policy and personnel.

Legal Definitions of Party. State legislatures, in writing election laws, have not based legal definitions of party upon function or purpose but upon demonstrated party voting, usually for governor. The statutes use either an absolute number of votes or a percentage. The New York law, which uses the absolute number, defines a party thus:

The term "party" means any political organization which at the last preceding election for governor polled at least twenty-five thousand votes for governor, or at an election for governor after January first, nineteen hundred and thirty-six, polled at least fifty thousand votes for governor.¹

A party that fails to poll the required number of votes is in the New York law termed an "independent body" and must nominate its candidates by petition.

Massachusetts may serve as an example of the states that define party in terms of percentage of votes cast:

"Political party" shall apply to a party which at the preceding biennial state election polled for governor at least three per cent of the entire vote cast in the commonwealth for that office.²

Parties that fail to reach the three per cent are designated as "political committees" or "caucuses." Such statutory definitions of party in terms of size are of course arbitrary, because what was a party last year may not be one this year, and *vice versa*; yet the objectives, organization, management — even the candidates — may be identical.

PRESSURE GROUP AND OTHER TERMS

The distinction between a party and other groups in politics is sometimes hazy, but the term *pressure group* has come to be applied to organizations interested primarily in policy and which do not ordinarily nominate candidates. An organization might come into existence as a pressure group and then become a party, as the Nonpartisan League did in South

¹ 13 *McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York*, 4.

² *General Laws*, chapter 50, section 1.

Dakota in 1924. The Political Action Committee of the Congress of Industrial Organizations announced in 1944 that it would endorse candidates but would reserve the right to nominate candidates of its own where no satisfactory ones were nominated by the regular parties. Most pressure groups, however, have insufficient members and their objectives are too narrow for them to undertake to nominate candidates; they are content with a politics of policy.

In the eighteenth century the term *faction* was used interchangeably with *party*, but in contemporary usage *faction* has come to mean a section or segment of a party. The word is more common in state and local than in national politics and is often used to designate the followers of some political leader, as "the Hague faction," "the Tammany faction," "the Vare faction."

The word *bloc* arose in European politics to designate the combinations of groups and parties within a legislative body that were formed to attain a majority. In American politics its use has been somewhat narrowed to designate temporary coalitions of legislators formed outside of their parties to advance some particular interest, such as "the farm bloc," "the labor bloc," and in some state legislatures, the "city bloc." The essential characteristic of a bloc is that its members do not give up their normal party membership to join it. If its objective is attained, the bloc dissolves.

TYPES OF PARTY SYSTEMS

THE ONE-PARTY SYSTEM

A characteristic of the second and third decades of the twentieth century was the rise in many countries of a one-party system. Russia was the first major state to set up such a régime, with the Communist Party as the only one permitted to exist. The Communist Party was the instrument for the dictatorship of the proletariat — or of Lenin and later Stalin, in the name of the proletariat. In other countries where the one-party system was adopted, the party was the means by which individual dictators ruled. Thus the Fascist Party was dominated by Mussolini, the Nazi Party by Hitler, the Falange by Franco. The party in the one-party states has had a monopoly of the government, and with varying degrees of thoroughness all non-members have been excluded from public positions. In these countries the party has also controlled the armed

forces of the state. Membership in the party has not been open to all citizens, so that in some cases as little as one per cent of the population has constituted the governing élite. Candidates for members of the party have commonly been required to apply for membership, to pay dues, to pass through a period of probation, and to take certain oaths of personal allegiance to the dictator before being admitted to full membership. Once admitted, members have been subjected to a considerable discipline, and purges have been conducted from time to time to weed out members whose zeal cooled or whose loyalty to the dictator wavered.

THE MULTIPLE-PARTY SYSTEM

Much older than the one-party system is that in which a number of parties have seesawed back and forth in the struggle for control of government. A multiple-party system prevailed in the representative governments of continental Europe during the period from the middle of the nineteenth century to World War II, when most of the countries were overrun by German armies, and later, as representative government was restored, numerous parties sprang up as before. Systems of proportional representation in European states encouraged minorities and made it possible for almost any sizable political group to obtain one or more seats in the national legislature.¹ The normal result was that no party obtained a majority in the legislative body, and a coalition cabinet had to be formed to govern. Indeed, the parties themselves tended to be so ephemeral that they came to be described by the places they occupied in the chamber: the most radical to the left of the presiding officer; next the liberals; in the center the moderates and religious parties; beyond them the conservatives; and to the right, the reactionaries.

Advantages. In spite of the weakness and transiency of the parties themselves, the multiple-party system is alleged to have certain advantages. It tends to force the necessary compromises of politics to be made in the open, in outright coalitions. It admits to the national forum every important minority group, and so makes possible a sharper reflection of public opinions than the one- or two-party system. It is so flexible that changes in the executive may be made without waiting for election years to arrive. Finally, there is little party discipline, and consequently members are free to represent their constituents rather than their party. Supporters of the system argue that all these things make it a sensitive instrument for democratic rule.

¹ Arthur N. Holcombe, *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 11, p. 593.

Disadvantages. But there are also important disadvantages to the system. The multiplicity of parties is confusing to the electorate; it is almost impossible to expect the average citizen to follow the programs and personalities in a dozen or more constantly changing parties. And there are complications for the government itself. The compulsion to produce in the open the compromises necessary to national action makes satisfactory compromise difficult. Coalitions are so unstable that continuity of policy is difficult or uncertain. Leaders of coalitions are not necessarily leaders of national parties, so that there is likely to be no one person who, like the British Prime Minister or the American President, can speak authoritatively for the nation. A coalition government, moreover, takes office with no mandate from the majority of the whole people but with a mere mandate from the legislature, so that it has less unity, coherence, and prestige than a majority government in England or the United States. Finally, the representation of every splinter minority leads to such endless squabbles about party doctrine and such bitter animosities that often pressing public problems can be brought to a decision only with difficulty.

THE TWO-PARTY SYSTEM

No completely satisfactory explanation appears to make clear why a two-party rather than a multiple-party system has grown up in England, the British dominions, and in the United States. Some writers have attributed the Anglo-American preference for two major parties to a political maturity, which at best is a vague concept to serve as cause, and at worst ignores the fact that the two-party system arose when the peoples were immature in representative government. Professor Arthur N. Holcombe thought that general agreement upon fundamentals (e.g., devotion to the Crown or to the Constitution) was a cause; yet the British Labour Party and the Conservative Party are far apart on many political and economic fundamentals.¹ He also thought that exclusion from American and British politics of questions of race and religion had contributed to the bi-party division, but these questions have not in fact been excluded from American or Canadian politics; rather, the two-party system has adjusted itself to them.² Constitutional forms, such as the electoral college or the

¹ *The Political Parties of Today* (1924), and *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 11, p. 593.

² Somewhat the same view as Holcombe's is expressed by Charles E. Merriam and Harold F. Gosnell, *The American Party System* (1940 edition), pp. 5-7.

office of President, may harden the two-party system, once it is established, but can hardly be considered to be causes when the British Constitution has also been accompanied by the bi-party system. The late Professor Edward M. Sait, one of the most acute academic students of politics, considered and rejected these alleged causes, and seemed inclined to the view that the two-party system arose because of "historical accident."¹

When the two-party system is functioning, tradition grows up around it, and statutory and constitutional forms are adapted to it until the rise of third parties becomes difficult. The tradition may be illustrated by the sentiment common in the United States that to vote for a party other than one which has a chance to win is to waste one's vote. Perhaps it is needless to say that the two major parties encourage this sentiment whenever they can. The legal situation is shown by the recognition of two and only two parties on election boards.²

Whatever the causes that lead most Americans and Englishmen to gather into two rather than into many political parties, it does appear that whenever a new party arises which becomes a serious contender for power, there is a tendency for one of the old parties to wither away. The Whig Party in the United States, though always torn by internal conflicts, survived until the new Republican Party arose; and in England the Liberal Party, which under Macaulay's analysis of the reasons for party, was based upon a fundamental characteristic of human nature, has steadily lost ground since the rise of the Labour Party.

The Tendency toward Similarity. The two-party system has been the subject of much criticism, particularly as it has developed in the United States. The sharpest criticism, perhaps, has been that the two parties

¹ *American Parties and Elections* (1942 edition), p. 230.

² A plurality of the American people apparently believe that the two major parties stand "mainly for the same things," but the people prefer them as they are to a new alignment. A poll by Elmo Roper, published in *Fortune*, vol. 30, p. 266, October, 1944, gave the following questions and answers on the matter:

"Do you feel that the Republican and Democratic parties mainly stand for the same things or that they stand for quite different things?"

Mainly the same things, 46.2 per cent, quite different, 41.7 per cent, don't know, 12.1 per cent.

"On the whole, how do you feel about the present setup of the political parties in the United States: do you find that you are usually satisfied with the stands taken by one or the other of the present big parties, or would you like to see a strong new party entirely different from either of the present parties?"

Usually satisfied, 77.7 per cent, new party, 14.3 per cent, don't know, 8 per cent.

tend to stand for indistinguishable principles. Their platforms, over the years, are markedly alike. Both parties quote Hamilton and Jefferson, Washington and Lincoln. In recent years, although the Republicans violently denounced the measures of the New Deal, their candidates for President, during the campaigns from 1936 through 1948 accepted a great majority of the enactments and merely complained of their administration.

The similarity of the policies of American parties has been especially striking to European observers accustomed to a fairly clear-cut cleavage among conservatives, liberals, and labor, or among right, center, and left. Lord Bryce quoted with approval an unnamed American newspaperman to the effect that the two American parties were like two bottles, bearing different labels but both empty. Bryce's own judgment was that

Neither party has any principles, any distinctive tenets. Both have traditions. Both claim to have tendencies. Both certainly have war cries, organizations, interests enlisted in their support. But these interests are in the main the interests of getting or keeping the patronage of the government. Tenets and policies, points of political doctrine, and points of political practice have all but vanished. They have not been thrown away but have been stripped away by Time and the progress of events, fulfilling some policies, blotting out others. All has been lost, except office or the hope of it.¹

All that Bryce could discern was "a difference of spirit or sentiment" which could be detected only by mixing for some time with politicians of both parties. Nevertheless, such a concession indicated that the bottles were not entirely empty.

Other Criticisms. Other observers have objected to the two-party system on grounds that there are more than two sides to many public questions, and the representation of only two parties tends to suppress minority views. This argument, of course, is the one advanced by advocates of proportional representation. In point of fact, the two parties are themselves the composite reflection of many minority points of view, and under a dual-party system many of the necessary compromises of politics take place within the parties themselves, rather than in the legislative body.

A variety of the same criticism is the objection that the two parties tend to blur issues, so that the voter cannot know before he votes the exact position of the candidates. If the two parties avoid certain issues, there is no way that a citizen can cast his vote to make his opinion felt in one of the major parties. When the parties seize upon some trivial or

¹ *American Commonwealth* (1888), vol. 1, p. 653.

irrelevant issue, the intelligent voter is frustrated. In American politics the parties often distort or inflate issues, such as the tariff, creating a furor about them out of all proportion to their real importance, while issues of a more fundamental nature are avoided or obscured.

Bi-partisan politics has these defects, but their importance has not seemed to the voters sufficiently great to move the electorate toward a different or more precise alignment of interests. The two-party system does seem to work, and its advocates usually call attention to its workability as compensation for its failure to meet issues squarely. Professor Arthur N. Holcombe summarized the merits of the American system of two major parties thus:

Political principles are doubtless subordinated too much to mere partisan expediency . . . but partisan expediency serves an important public purpose. It serves to mitigate the violence of political controversy by compelling such compromises between conflicting interests within the party as will enable the party to agree upon candidates and enter upon campaigns with a fair prospect of commanding the confidence of a majority of the voters. The wide extent and diverse interests of the major parties afford the best guarantee which the people of the United States can possess that the power to govern will be used with moderation. Since the practical business of government consists largely in the adjustment of the conflicts of interest arising among the people, it follows that politicians, who understand the nature of the people's interests and are responsible for their use of power to either of the major parties may well be the most serviceable rulers that the people may reasonably hope to obtain.¹

An objection to the two-party system as it has developed in America that is less readily answered than any of those heretofore mentioned is that it forces itself upon states and localities where it has no logical justification for existence. Upon state questions, such as whether a governor shall or shall not have a cabinet, the parties tend to line up, one for and one against. In county government purely administrative problems may become matters of party controversy, with Democrats, perhaps, advocating a single highway supervisor, and Republicans urging a highway commission. The council-manager plan of municipal government has usually been opposed by local units of both parties, and where the plan has succeeded, its advocates have had to fight off the two party organizations.²

¹ *The Middle Classes in American Politics* (Harvard University Press, 1940), p. 266.

² See H. A. Stone, D. K. Price, and K. H. Stone, *City Manager Government in the United States* (1940), especially Chapter 12.

Proponents have best succeeded where, as in Cincinnati, they have been able to establish and maintain what amounts to a city party. There has so far been no comparable state party confining its attention to strictly state problems. While it is true that the federal government touches state and local governments at hundreds of points, still the real reason for the bi-partisan alignment in state and local politics is not principle but patronage.

THE FUNCTIONS OF PARTIES IN THE UNITED STATES

The framers of the Constitution regarded all parties as evils. Washington, in his Farewell Address, warned "in the most solemn manner against the baneful effects of the spirit of party generally." He thought that the spirit of party was the worst enemy of popular government, and he mentioned a list of evils that he felt arose from parties. Hamilton, who is commonly supposed to have drafted the Farewell Address, had already expressed his disapproval of parties in Number 9 of *The Federalist*, and he and Washington were probably confirmed in their views by the untempered criticism of the Washington administration by the Republican newspapers. They also attributed the excesses of the French Revolution to factional strife.

In spite of this once widespread feeling, it would be difficult today to imagine how representative government could work without parties. With all their defects and shortcomings they are indispensable to the operation of popular government. That the parties perform their services primarily from the selfish motive of desiring to stay in or get in office makes their functions no less valuable. Minor parties sometimes perform services that major parties do not, and major parties can do what minor parties cannot. But the whole party system fulfills an impressive list of functions.

SYNTHESIS OR COMPROMISE OF CLASHING INTERESTS

Any modern nation includes in its society a vast array of opposed interests, each seeking to direct public policy to its own advantage. There are thousands of organizations representing these interests. Some of these groups, and their effects on parties, will be examined in more detail in the chapters that follow. In the United States there are oppositions between North and South, East and West, city and country, labor and capital, wets and drys, Catholics and Protestants — to name but a few. The par-

ties serve as the only vehicle through which their disparate interests may be reflected in representative bodies and their conflicting claims adjusted. The parties try to compromise group demands, or to postpone action upon them, and in doing so they perform an indispensable service. For in a world where all groups cannot have their way, some must be refused, some have their demands reduced, and a few may have their wishes fully granted. The parties give in a little one year, a little more another year, seldom satisfying a group completely, but still keeping government peaceful.

The record of American parties at compromise and synthesis is really excellent. In the national history there has been only one great problem that they failed to adjust, the problem of slavery. Even on that issue it is notable that the parties succeeded for more than half a century in keeping the Union together and in postponing, even if finally failing to prevent, a civil war. Had they failed to postpone the war until the North had become the stronger of the two sections, the rebellion would have succeeded. When the issue could no longer be compromised or postponed, the parties were the last to split; the churches, for example, divided into northern and southern wings before the parties did. Without the important contribution of American political parties in compromising important issues, there might now be no United States of America.

CATALYSIS OF PUBLIC OPINIONS

Closely akin to the function of compromise and adjustment is the service that parties perform in the reduction of various and conflicting opinions into a yes-or-no alternative upon which either the citizens themselves or their representatives may vote. Many contemporary public questions — social security, for example — are so complicated and concern so many different interests at so many different levels of political action that the electorate cannot pass upon them until they are simplified. The question is not merely whether social security is desired, but how much, what kinds, how financed, what exemptions, how administered — and there are many other related sub-problems. After the stage of compromise and adjustment, parties may serve as catalysts, one accepting and the other rejecting the final proposal. Sometimes, to be sure, they refuse or fail to perform this function, as for a long time they refused to meet the issue of prohibition. In such cases the issue is said to “cut across party lines.” Such issues may occasionally be adjusted by group

interests aside from the parties; the parties may split and re-form over such questions; or civil war may result. Even though the parties are imperfect and uncertain catalysts, they do perform the service, which in a popular government is indispensable in the process of reaching a consensus on public questions.

CRITICISM BY PARTIES OUT OF POWER

Another valuable function of political parties is that when one party has control of the government, its policies are subjected to criticism from the major party out of power and from such minor parties as exist and are interested. This criticism, needless to say, is often carping and partisan, but it is valuable, nevertheless. The parties, wrote Jefferson, "are censors of the conduct of each other, and useful watchmen for the public."¹ The public recognizes that much of the criticism is merely opposition for the sake of opposition, and discounts it accordingly. Without criticism, however, any official or party would be free to do anything with public funds and public policy. Freedom of government from criticism is the essence of dictatorship — and one of its most serious weaknesses.

EDUCATION OF THE PUBLIC

In their criticisms of their opponents, in their defense of their records and programs, and in election campaigns, parties do something to interest the voter in the processes and problems of government. The propaganda is of course partisan, but it is still useful. Without it few voters would know as much as they do about their government. The educational process is imperfect in that it arouses loyalties to individuals that should be attached to issues, but it may be argued that only by the identification of leaders with issues can public interest be stirred.

PARTIES AS NATIONALIZING AGENCIES

One of the most unusual functions which parties in the United States have served has been to welcome the immigrant, introduce him to the ward club, and assist him with his naturalization. More than any other agency or influence, the parties have warmed the new material in the melting pot and made it melt. In their desire to make voters out of

¹ Letter to Henry Lee, 1824, *Works* (Ford edition, 1898), vol. 10, p. 317.

immigrants they have done more than any other agency to make Americans of them. Parties have "recognized," in the politician's use of the word, various nationality groups, running some of their leaders for office, appointing others to jobs. Selfish but not snobbish, parties have advanced men born in other countries to the highest offices for which they are constitutionally eligible. A few immigrants, like Richard Croker, have even made fortunes in American politics and retired to their native countries.

LIAISON BETWEEN CITIZEN AND GOVERNMENT

Party leaders have always sought to cushion the impact of the law upon members who get into trouble and to assist members with various public regulations. As American society has become more and more complicated with the development of the machine age, and as government has therefore affected the life of the citizen in more and more ways, this work of the parties has increased. With the development of what is today called the service state, more of these difficulties will arise. Some ward clubs provide free advice on the income tax; others provide assistance in obtaining veterans' benefits. A poor man seeking a peddler's license can go to his political leader to find out where to apply, and perhaps obtain a letter of recommendation to the issuing agency that will produce the license. A rich man seeking a ship subsidy or an air-mail route will also seek out the politician, who can smooth his way for him.

CHARITY AND INDIVIDUAL ASSISTANCE

Parties also cushion the impact of the economic system upon individuals. Every political machine does some direct charity work, providing turkeys for poor families at Thanksgiving and baskets of groceries at Christmas. Enoch ("Nocky") Johnson, long the boss of Atlantic City, used to provide a coal pile where any Negro might go and get as much coal as he could carry or wheel away in a boy's express wagon. William S. Vare boasted in his autobiography of the charity work of his machine:

The Philadelphia [Republican] Organization is in fact one of the greatest welfare organizations in the United States. . . . In every election precinct of the city of Philadelphia there are two representatives of the Organization, elected directly at the Republican primaries, who are known as committeemen. They maintain contacts with the voters and are at their beck and call for twenty-four hours of each day of the year.

In times of stress, the poor or other unfortunates always turn to these Organization representatives to assist them. It is they who see that the sick are cared for and that the poor are provided for, and that even in death aid may be rendered. The Philadelphia Organization gives a real social service, and one without red tape, without class, religious, or color distinction.¹

The depression that followed the stock-market crash of 1929 overwhelmed the political organizations with appeals. The parties turned to legislation to provide public funds for relief, and the Democratic Party, coming into power in 1933, controlled much of the distribution of the money through the CWA, FERA, and WPA. Long-established Republican organizations, such as the one in Philadelphia, were defeated when they could neither provide sufficient party charity nor control public relief funds. The charity and welfare work done by parties is haphazard and uneven, and professional social workers are inclined to think that often it does the recipients more harm than good; but it is done, nevertheless, and the poor are grateful for it. In return, such people yield back to the party their votes on election day.

PARTIES AND ELECTORAL MACHINERY

Some persons who seek office advance their own candidacies, but the parties try to adjust differences as much as they can to hold intraparty conflict to a minimum. Sometimes a man who is eager to run for United States Senator can be persuaded to try for a lesser office, if he can be assured of party support. The parties also try to have candidates for all the offices that are to be filled by election, "to offer a full ticket," in the language of practical politics. In order to get candidates for the unpaid or poorly paid offices (which often involve a great deal of work for the incumbent) party organizations seek to persuade men to run, often by promising party support for higher offices in future elections. Thus they build up in the population a valuable body of political experience.

Parties provide campaign funds for candidates, arrange meetings and publicity, and give candidates assistance in the complexities of election laws. They also hire election day workers, who get out the vote. In short, they are almost solely responsible for keeping the electoral machinery running.

¹ *My Forty Years in Politics* (Rowland Swain Company, 1933), p. 29.

PARTIES AND SELF-GOVERNMENT

Finally, political parties in the United States perform an extremely valuable service in seeking ways to overcome legal and constitutional obstacles to self-government. Laws and constitutions are not uniformly designed to make government reflect the popular will. The electoral college, for instance, was designed to take the selection of the President out of the hands of the people, but parties have in effect practically nullified the function of the electors and have thus made the Constitution more democratic than its framers intended it to be. The parties have, in general, sought to broaden and extend the franchise, making government more and more democratic.

All things considered, if parties be evils, they are the best evils that popular government can have.

Parties under the Constitution

"WE LIVE under a written Constitution," said Chief Justice Hughes, "but the Constitution is what the judges say it is." True as this much-quoted statement is, the Constitution is, in part, also what the parties say it is; and, on the other hand, the form and function of American parties are in part what the Constitution has made them. Under a different type of constitution — one establishing a parliamentary government, for example — American parties would undoubtedly have developed in a way quite different from the way they did. Politicians recognize the importance of constitutional forms to party, and before they advocate amendments always consider carefully the effects that proposed changes might have upon party organizations.

PARTIES AND GOVERNMENT

EFFECTS OF FEDERALISM ON PARTIES

Under the Constitution the forty-eight states retain sufficient powers so that the control of their governments is the foundation of national party strength. Civil service has made less progress in state and local governments than in the federal government, and it is in state and local jobs that the majority of the professional politicians find their livelihoods. It is in the states that bosses and their powerful political machines have grown up. Party organizations in the states are so important that American national parties have been described as loose alliances of state parties. No party could have any hope of success as a national party if it had control of no state government. In the long period from Buchanan to Wilson,

when the Democratic Party, except for the eight years of Cleveland's administration, wandered in the wilderness, it still retained a base of operations in the southern states. Had the party lost the South, it is reasonable to suppose that it would have passed out of existence.

It is from the states — generally from the state governorships — that the parties select their candidates for the presidency. The ability to get elected and re-elected as governor in the large and doubtful states of New York or Ohio establishes a man's reputation as a "vote-getter," a reputation which is generally necessary to command the respect and support of state politicians in other commonwealths. Each election of a governor in New York or Ohio is a sort of trial heat for the presidency. Our chief executives ordinarily come to the White House, not from positions of national or international importance, but from state executive mansions.

The national conventions are not so much congregations of national party leaders as they are assemblies of state leaders. It is the state organizations that select the delegates and instruct them as to which candidate to vote for — that is, if they are instructed. The combinations and deals at the conventions which finally produce a nominee are worked out by the real leaders of the state parties, many of whom may not be delegates at all. When a party is in power the views of the President whom it succeeded four years before in electing generally have great weight, and a President has almost always been able, after his first term, to obtain another nomination; but a President against a powerful state combination cannot always dictate his successor to a convention. Cleveland, for example, was helpless in the convention of 1896 before the southern and western state organizations that Bryan and the silver interests had produced. They repudiated the economic views of their own President. In a British party conference the Prime Minister is the leading figure; in an American party convention a President is not even present, unless he goes to accept a renomination, as Franklin Roosevelt went to Philadelphia in 1936 and Harry Truman in 1948. The power of state organizations in American political parties springs ultimately from the powers retained by the states under the Constitution.

THE SEPARATION OF POWERS

The constitutional separation of the powers of government into the three great departments, executive, legislative, and judicial, has also affected political parties in this country. For this separation makes it

necessary for parties to establish more powerful organizations than they would require if electing a majority of the legislative body were sufficient to produce party control of the government. A party which elects a President but fails to elect a majority in each house of Congress — or *vice versa* — has a barren victory. It is necessary to elect both President and Congress to carry out any party program. Having to appeal to the diverse interests necessary to produce this double victory contributes to the tendency of the parties to be vague on all important issues.

The separation of powers authorized by the federal Constitution has its counterpart in every one of the forty-eight state constitutions. Even though some cities, under the council-manager plan, have merged legislative and executive functions, no state has yet attempted the experiment. It is as important, therefore, to a state party to capture the legislature *and* the governorship as it is for a national party to elect both President and Congress. State parties consequently generally behave toward state issues with the same cautious vagueness that national parties exhibit toward national issues.

The separation of powers conditions the behavior of political bosses. A boss may get himself or a henchman elected to the position of the executive — mayor or governor — but he finds that to obtain funds and jobs for his machine he must also control the legislative branch — the city council or the state legislature. Even control of these two branches is not enough to protect the boss and his followers from prosecution; so he must in self-protection go as far as he can toward control of the judiciary and the machinery of law enforcement. In order to attain power over all three branches, his political machine must have ample funds; it must have numerous connections with business, labor, and every other group; it must be able to dispense many favors of protection or law enforcement; it must have influence with state and national parties — and above all it must be free from any close attachment to issues or principles.

THE JUDICIARY

The Supreme Court. The doctrine of judicial review, now firmly embedded in the Constitution, makes control of the judiciary as important to party success upon some issues as does the election of the executive and the legislative bodies. Presidential campaigns have been fought on issues of constitutional interpretation. No party can attain final success upon many measures until the acts have been passed upon by the courts.

President Theodore Roosevelt said to Sir Edward Grey that a budget bill in the United States like the Lloyd George bill of 1909 would "depend upon whether a Judge of the Supreme Court came down heads or tails." Naturally, therefore, the selection of the justices of the United States Supreme Court is a matter of great moment to a national party. Many Presidents, among them Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, and Franklin Roosevelt, have criticized or clashed with the Supreme Court. Alone among the Presidents Franklin Roosevelt attempted, unsuccessfully, to obtain legislation in 1937 to increase the membership of the court and to force justices' retirements in order to obtain a court whose constitutional interpretation was more consistent with his views. He failed to obtain passage for his bill, but his attempt did produce marked changes in the constitutional opinions of the justices, and no additional important legislation was struck down.

The State Courts. Although judges of state courts are selected by seven different methods, the two most common means are election by popular vote and appointment by the governor.¹ Where the governor appoints the judges, the same political considerations enter his choice as enter into a President's choice for the federal judiciary. In the one-party states only Democrats or only Republicans are nominated, as the case may be. In some states, however, there is a tradition that the places on the bench of the highest court shall be divided between the two major parties. In those states party regularity is a normal requirement for candidates for nomination from the governor's party, and extreme hostility to his party would disqualify a candidate from the other. In such states there is always criticism such as that "the governor has nominated a captive Republican" or that a nominee "is not a real Democrat."

Only in Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island do judges of the state supreme courts serve for life. In all the others they serve for terms that vary from two years in Vermont to twenty-one years in Pennsylvania.² The most common term is six years. Judges will naturally show varying degrees of independence from the party and governor to whom they owe their appointments. Some men will permit no interference whatever; others will bend as far as did Chancellor Luther A. Campbell of New Jersey. In 1935 Campbell sent letters to members of the legislature opposing an anti-injunction bill; but in 1937 his sponsor, Mayor Frank Hague, needed the support of organized labor in a state cam-

¹ See *The Book of the States* 1948, p. 501, for a table showing the devices now in use for the selection of state judges.

² *Ibid.*, p. 499.

paign; so at a meeting with labor leaders in the locker room of the Deal Golf Club, Hague promised that he would get the chancellor to change the rules of the court to limit the issuance of injunctions in labor disputes. And this was done.¹

In the states where judges are elected, their nominations are commonly in the hands of the party leaders. Total or notorious political independence is not a usual qualification for party support. More common is party service in the legislature, or on some commission, or a record of regular contributions to campaign funds. If the party elects the governor, it will usually elect the judges whose names appear on the same ticket; if the candidate for governor is defeated, they will be defeated also.

When judges or justices pass upon the constitutionality of statutes, it is only natural to expect that state political parties will take an interest in the selection of judges. Attempts to elect judges on a nonpartisan basis have not been uniformly successful. Proposals to limit a governor's choice of nominees to men named by a bar association have not met with great favor, because it is expected with reason that the parties would then turn to attempts to control the bar association. Political interest in the judiciary seems unavoidable under both our state and federal constitutions.

THE SYSTEM OF CHECKS AND BALANCES

The framers of the Constitution did not trust the mass of the people; indeed, for years after the Constitution was in force the word *democrat* was used as an epithet having much the same force that *demagogue* has today. In the first number of *The Federalist* Alexander Hamilton wrote that "a dangerous ambition . . . often lurks behind the specious mask of zeal for the rights of the people," and he thought that history would show that republics have commonly fallen because ambitious men "have begun their careers by paying an obsequious court to the people; commencing demagogues and ending tyrants." The belief that the people could not be trusted to tell a statesman from a demagogue runs through Hamilton's writings. The opinion was shared by others among the Fathers, and they hoped that what the constitutional separation of powers did not do to cool off popular feelings, the system of checks and balances would. "Se-

¹ See *Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary on the Nomination of Thomas F. Meaney*, 77th Congress, 2d session, May 13 and 26, 1942, pp. 116-118.

curity," wrote the authors of Number 51 of *The Federalist*, "consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. . . . Ambition must be made to counteract ambition."

The framers provided, therefore, various devices by which one department may check another. The President, for example, may veto acts of Congress, but his veto may be overcome by two thirds of the members of each house. He may nominate justices and members of the executive department, but the Senate must confirm them. He and all members of the executive and judicial departments are subject to congressional impeachment and removal. It is needless here to multiply examples. The whole system of checks and balances is calculated to delay or even to prevent action.

But the scheme has distinct drawbacks, especially as its operation becomes a party affair. The system makes it extremely difficult for a party to be held responsible for the inaction of government. It encourages further the tendency of parties to avoid clear-cut issues which, reduced to legislation, will run into some check. And it encourages the development of powerful party organizations that are not embarrassed by the impedi-menta of issues, for politicians feel that an attachment to a program leads to friction between the departments which can check one another and that this friction prevents patronage and other party matters from being adjusted smoothly. The result of all this is to scatter public attention and to prevent parties from being held accountable for what happens or does not happen.

THE PRESIDENCY AND PARTY LEADERSHIP

THE PRESIDENCY AND PARTY POLITICS

"The President," wrote Woodrow Wilson, "is at liberty, both in law and conscience, to be as big a man as he can."¹ The Constitution makes the presidency such an immense office that it is the chief prize of American party politics. The concentration in the President of authority over the executive establishment with its millions of jobs attracts the interest of all politicians. The President is commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy; with this authority he can involve the United States in war, even if Congress must declare it. He conducts foreign affairs, and because he alone

¹ *Constitutional Government* (1908), p. 70.

has access to all information on the international relations of the United States, he has a control over foreign policy that no other agency of the government can approach. His veto over acts of Congress can in practice be overcome only by a combination of the congressional members of both parties against him. While members of Congress speak for states or for congressional districts, the President alone speaks for the whole country. His is the only national voice. The framers of the Constitution did not expect the President to be a national leader so much as an arbitrator between the two houses, but the powers of his position are such that a special message of his, a fireside chat, or a speaking tour may arouse a public opinion that Congress cannot resist.¹

The Presidency and State Politics. Over state and local political parties the President has great power. He may distribute federal patronage or withhold it. To refuse patronage may starve out a political organization, as Franklin Roosevelt starved out Tammany Hall; to grant it may preserve a machine, as the same President preserved the machines of Hague, Kelly, Flynn, and Crump. The President's power over the Department of Justice and its enforcement of federal criminal law is so great that he may break up any political organization that has not proceeded with the most scrupulous care under the income-tax laws, the statutes covering the use of the mails, the clearing of checks in interstate commerce, and all other matters coming under federal jurisdiction. It was by such means that the powerful machine of Huey Long was crushed and that Tom Pendergast, boss of Kansas City, and Enoch ("Nocky") Johnson, boss of Atlantic City, were sent to federal penitentiaries. The very threat of a federal investigation is often enough to make any political machine do anything that a President wants done or to refrain from doing anything he does not want done.

The President as Leader of his Party. The immense powers of his office, if he wishes to exert them, make the President the leader of his party for the term for which he is elected. The chairman of the national committee is his creature; cabinet officers serve at his pleasure, and the "Cabinet is not a party council but a meeting of administrators." No man in the President's party may challenge him while his term lasts. Members of his party may refuse to follow him, but they cannot displace him. They cannot refuse to follow him except at the risk of his withholding their federal patronage. Popular appreciation of the powers of the President has led to the naming of periods of political history for the Presidents in office, disregarding the party in control of Congress.

¹ See Pendleton Herring, *Presidential Leadership* (1940), especially pp. 1-20.

Through personal weakness or because of previous obligations, a President may allow party leadership to pass to some other individual, as McKinley allowed it to pass to Mark Hanna, and Harding to the senatorial cabal. But these instances are exceptional. The powers of his office are so great that a President need not lose his leadership over his party until near the end of his second term, and since the third-term tradition has been broken, perhaps not even then. Once out of office, however, his party leadership is likely to be negligible, and his voice will carry merely the authority of an elder statesman. Only John Quincy Adams and Andrew Johnson ran for other offices after their days in the White House had ended.

In sharp contrast to the constitutional prestige and position of the President is the status of a governor. The powers of state governors are not generally comparable to the powers of the President. Governors usually serve for short terms, and often they cannot succeed themselves. Their control of the executive department is limited, and they do not have strong veto powers. They are not ordinarily the real state leaders of their parties. Rather, leadership is commonly vested in some boss, in a combination of bosses or local leaders, in a powerful newspaper or business interest, or in a legislative group.

LEADERSHIP OF THE MINORITY PARTY

While the Constitution gives the President such powers that he is, if he wishes to be, the leader of his party, it makes no provision for the leadership of the party out of power. A defeated candidate for President or governor is called the "titular leader," but he has no shadow of authority. There is no equivalent under the Constitution to the leader of His Majesty's Loyal Opposition in the British House of Commons. In spite of his most strenuous efforts, Wendell Willkie was unable to maintain his leadership in the Republican Party after his defeat in 1940. And when he was defeated in the Wisconsin primary and withdrew as a candidate for the 1944 nomination, he was not even invited to the national convention. Herbert Hoover, Alfred M. Landon, James M. Cox, John W. Davis, and Alfred E. Smith are recent examples of defeated candidates who preserved no control over their parties. Cox and Davis, in fact, soon dropped almost entirely from public view.

William Jennings Bryan stands out as an exception to the general rule that a party out of power is essentially leaderless. From the election

of 1896 to the election of 1924, he was dominant in the Democratic Party. He was three times its candidate for President, and he was able when he was not the candidate either to obtain the nomination for a man of his choice or to prevent the nomination of a candidate he did not want. Bryan was able to attain this leadership and to preserve it because of his extraordinary ability as a speaker and because of personal qualities that attracted to him an unusual following. But his was a rare case.

In a thoughtful editorial the *New York Times* of January 28, 1945, reviewed the constitutional difficulties in the way of the development of leadership and, therefore, of a unified program by a party out of power:


Because of the peculiar nature of our constitutional set-up . . . it is very difficult for an American party out of power to achieve . . . sound organization, leadership, and a constructive program. . . . Mr. Willkie's leadership was only that which the prestige of his previous nomination or the intellectual prestige of his program could bring him. He suffered from the fact that he did not hold official office either within the party or within the government. Mr. Dewey is somewhat better off in holding the office of governor of New York. But that office carries only local responsibility. It does not carry with it any responsibility for national policy. On the contrary, it imposes local duties and tasks upon Mr. Dewey which tend to prevent him from giving to national policies the full attention they deserve. . . .

THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE AND PARTY POLITICS

As is well known, the framers of the Constitution thought that by setting up the device of an electoral college they had taken the presidency out of politics. Hamilton wrote in Number 68 of *The Federalist*:

The election of the President is pretty well guarded. . . . It was . . . desirable that the immediate election should be made by men most capable of analysing the qualities adapted to the station [of President]. A small number of persons, selected by their fellow citizens from the general mass, will be most likely to possess the information and discernment requisite to such complicated investigations.

The indirect selection of the President, Hamilton thought, "affords a moral certainty that the office of President will never fall to the lot of any man who is not in an eminent degree endowed with the requisite qualifications." It is perhaps superfluous to observe that neither of Hamilton's expectations was justified by events. The electoral college operated only



ELECTORAL VOTES:

■ TRUMAN

(D).....304

▨ DENEY

(R).....189

▤ THURMOND (SR).....38

Proportional map showing the electoral vote in the presidential election of 1948.


Courtesy of the New York Times

twice as its framers intended, and while some great men have been elected President, the emphasis has not been upon greatness in the candidate but upon "availability."

Effects on the Selection of Nominees. The constitutional provision (Article II, section 1) that each state shall have as many presidential electors as it has senators and representatives has inclined each party to select its candidates for president and Vice-President so as to obtain the largest number of electoral votes. It is absurd for a party to nominate a man from a state it has no hope of carrying — those electoral votes are lost anyway. And it is equally absurd to nominate a candidate from a state the party is certain to carry — those electoral votes are sure no matter who the candidate is. Neither major party, therefore, has since the Civil War nominated for President a candidate from the South. For the Republican Party those electoral votes are lost, and good strategy requires that an attempt be made to offset them by nominating a man with such a following that he may carry his own state, preferably a large and doubtful one. The Democratic Party, with its most solid strength in the South, does not nominate Southerners for President, because it expects to get the electoral vote of the southern states regardless.

A candidate for nomination from a state with few electoral votes has little chance in the convention of receiving his party's designation against a candidate from a state with many, for even if he carries his home state — and it must be assumed that he can — he does not add enough to the electoral total. With the exception of Blaine, the Republican Party has always drawn its candidates from states with many electoral votes. The Democratic Party has in the last century followed the same policy, with the exception of Bryan. The fact has not escaped the attention of political managers that neither Blaine nor Bryan was elected. Conceivably a candidate with unusual qualities of party leadership or with the backing of some extraordinary combination of forces within his party might some day overcome the handicap of residing in a small state with few votes in the electoral college and obtain nomination and even election. Rhode Island or Connecticut may yet provide a President, but the odds are heavily against their doing it.

If either major party nominates for President a candidate from an eastern state it tries to "balance its ticket" by nominating for Vice-President a man from a western state. In both cases it tries to obtain candidates who can win large blocks of electoral votes. The two major parties showed this tendency in 1944 with both candidates for President from New



The popular vote since 1912. Note the increase in the number of non-voters. *Courtesy of the New York Times*

York and with both candidates for Vice-President from middle western states.

The institution of the electoral college, which the framers of the Constitution thought was morally certain to turn up only the men most eminently fitted for the presidency, has, under its operation by parties, closed the door to statesmen, however eminent they may be, who do not happen to reside in one of half a dozen states. To put the matter in another way, except under the most extraordinary circumstance, the citizens of the United States are limited to choosing candidates for President from the residents of a few eastern and middle western states.

Minority Presidents. On several occasions men have received a majority of the votes in the electoral college when they did not receive a majority

of the popular vote. Indeed, it is usually necessary for a Democratic candidate, because of the concentration of Democratic strength in the South, to obtain at least 52 per cent of the popular vote to obtain a majority of the electoral vote. Every four years there is some agitation to amend the Constitution in order to abolish the electoral college and to provide for the election of President and Vice-President by a plurality of the popular vote. Politicians have viewed the proposals coolly, because they have not been able to foresee with certainty the effects of such an amendment upon the parties. The agitation dies down between elections.

Without attempting to predict all the effects of electing the President by popular vote, it would seem that much of the emphasis upon doubtful states would be lost. The concentration of party funds upon those states would cease. The Democratic vote in the Solid South does not ordinarily come out in full, because the choice of electors is no real contest; but if the President were popularly elected, every effort would be made to get out the maximum southern vote. There would probably be a tendency to make voting easier by reducing residence and other requirements. Since the Constitution cannot be amended without the support of both major parties, and since it appears that the Democratic Party would stand to win the presidency more often if the President were popularly elected, there seems to be no immediate prospect of such an amendment being accepted.

PARTIES AND THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH

BICAMERALISM AND THE PARTIES

The division of Congress into two houses was, as is well known, the result of a compromise in the Constitutional Convention between the interests of the large and the small states. The compromise was probably necessary to obtain the ratification of the Constitution and was therefore defensible. But what was a political necessity in the national government has been elevated into a doctrine of constitutional virtue by the states. The result of this attitude is that among the states only Nebraska has today a unicameral legislature.

This prevalence of the bicameral system gives the political parties a certain freedom from the consequences of their actions which they could scarcely enjoy otherwise. It is difficult enough to hold a party responsible for its record in one house; when the party has representatives in two

houses, it is clearly much more difficult to hold it responsible. The members of the party in each chamber are jealous of their prerogatives as senators or as representatives. Neither wants to yield to the other. There is in practice no means of making the members agree upon a party program. There is no constitutional requirement, state or national, of joint caucuses, and no tradition to strengthen co-operation between the two houses. On one occasion, when both houses of Congress were Republican, the House of Representatives passed a tariff bill, but the Senate struck out everything after the enacting clause and passed a bill of its own. Time and again anti-lynching bills have passed the House to die in the Senate. Examples could be multiplied endlessly.

Bicameralism makes party responsibility still more difficult because the members of the two houses are elected on different bases. Since United States Senators represent states, and members of the House of Representatives stand for congressional districts, a party program satisfactory to them both may not be easy to achieve. Even within a single state the interests of one or more congressional districts may clash with those of the rest of the state, and the senators and the congressmen may throw off party discipline to engage in intraparty disputes. Such clashes occur in state legislatures when one house is elected by counties or by senatorial districts and the other house by districts of equal population.

Bicameralism also makes it possible for the two houses to be controlled by different parties at the same time, so that no party can translate its program into law. The voters cannot under these circumstances fairly hold either party responsible for the conduct of the government. Deadlock is almost inevitable, unless some interparty deal or compromise can be worked out. During the long period of Republican supremacy from the beginning of Lincoln's first administration to the beginning of Wilson's, there were only eight years out of seventy-two during which a Democratic President was in office. But for twenty years out of that period the House was Democratic, and in several other Congresses the Republican majority in the House was too small to permit effective party control.¹ Even though the Republican Party held the presidency for sixty-four out of seventy-two years and the Senate for seventy out of seventy-two, much of the time the party was not in a position to put through a party program. The political history of the period is full of partisan bickering and maneuvering, of opposition merely for the sake of opposition. The same conditions commonly obtain in state legislatures when one house is Re-

¹ Paul D. Hasbrouck, *Party Government in the House of Representatives* (1927), p. 239.

publican, the other Democratic. In many ways the bicameral system operates to defeat party responsibility in the legislative branch.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL NATURE OF CONGRESS

"Congress is the motive power in the government," observed Woodrow Wilson, "and yet has in it nowhere any representative of the nation as a whole."¹ Each senator is elected from his own state, each representative from his own district; and for prospects of re-election they tend to look not to their national parties nor to the national interest, but to the people of their own constituencies. The Constitution requires that both senators and representatives be inhabitants of the state from which they are chosen, though it is not a constitutional requirement that representatives be residents of the congressional districts that elect them. Since the national party organization has no authority over the selection of members of Congress, it cannot compel them to accept a party program; it may denounce its unruly members as "sons of the wild jackass," but it cannot really discipline them in any important way.

For example, the Republican National Committee attempted in 1930 to discipline Senator George W. Norris of Nebraska, who was unquestionably guilty of many breaches of party discipline; he had even gone into Pennsylvania and campaigned against the Republican nominee for the United States Senate. An unnamed "field representative" of the national committee was sent to Nebraska, and he, with local anti-Norris Republicans, in the words of the senator, "concocted a very clever scheme to defeat me." As he described it,

They discovered another man, bearing my name, George W. Norris, and they induced him [with a \$500 Liberty Bond] to become a Republican candidate for United States Senator in the regular primary election.

He was a clerk in a grocery store at Broken Bow . . . in the fringes of the sand hills in the old cattle domain. He appeared to be a quiet, untutored, and gullible young man, lending himself easily to pliant manipulation. . . . Even among the people of Broken Bow, he was known personally by comparatively few. . . .

Of course the Republican machine did not anticipate he would either be nominated or elected.

The object of the machine's plan simply was to make it impossible to

¹ *Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson, College and State* (1925), vol. 1, p. 357.

count any votes cast in the primary for any senatorial candidate who bore the name George W. Norris.

It would have been absolutely impossible for any honest local election board to discriminate between the votes cast for Senator George W. Norris and those for "Grocer" Norris of Broken Bow.

There would have been no way legally to canvass this vote.¹

The scheme failed only because "Grocer" Norris filed his nominating petition one day too late.

The American people do not expect members of Congress to follow their party programs; in other words, the people do not insist upon party discipline. A Gallup poll published on April 26, 1946, showed that party irregularity has wide public acceptance:

If a Congressman is elected on the Democratic ticket and does not vote with his party on all major issues, should he be prevented from running for office again as a Democrat?

	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No Opinion</i>
National vote	21%	69%	10%
Democratic voters only . . .	25	64	11

The net result of the way in which Congress is set up by the Constitution is that it becomes not a national forum where two disciplined major parties contend with each other, but a sort of no-man's land of American politics, as E. E. Schattschneider aptly put it.

Party Discipline and Responsibility. In his keynote speech to the Republican National Convention of 1924 Congressman Theodore E. Burton said, "Most of the blame which is visited upon Republicans in the present Congress is not deserved, because on many major questions their party has not commanded a majority in either branch." In other words, the party would not accept responsibility for what had happened, because it had not been able to maintain discipline. The leaders of a party in either house are not leaders of a national party, as are the members of a British Cabinet. Their leadership does not extend beyond the chamber of which they are members, and they have, therefore, no special national standing that will compel other members to follow them. They may advise, suggest, cajole; but they have no real authority.

Residence Requirements and Party Leadership. The residence require-

¹ George W. Norris, *Fighting Liberal* (1945), p. 291. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

ments of the Constitution make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for a national party to obtain seats in Congress for men who are merely distinguished members of the party. There are states from which Democrats only are always elected, but the Democratic Party cannot obtain one of those seats for a nonresident no matter how outstanding he may be or how much his voice may be needed in Congress. The same is true, of course, of the Republican Party. Statesmanship, unfortunately, is not distributed uniformly throughout the population, and the constitutional residence requirements prevent parties from correcting the situation.

Residence requirements also protect members of Congress from party discipline. If they refuse to follow their party leaders in the White House or in Congress, the party cannot deny them re-election: they are as safe as their personal holds upon their states or districts are secure. At the Republican caucus on February 27, 1925, for example, thirteen insurgent members of Congress were read out of their party, but this action, instead of injuring them at home, rather enhanced the prestige of some of them. And following the election of 1926, when the votes of the insurgents were needed to organize the House, they were read back in again.

Not even a President as popular as Franklin Roosevelt could exert his party leadership in states or congressional districts. The so-called "purge" of anti-New Deal Democrats failed in 1938. The implications of this, says Pendleton Herring, go deep; "The chief executive is denied the possibility of building up a unified party held together by common profession to a program or set of principles."¹

The Special Position of Senators. The members of the United States Senate have peculiar party authority because of the constitutional requirement that nominations be confirmed by the Senate. Under the tradition of "senatorial courtesy," the Senate will not confirm a nominee who is "personally obnoxious" to a senator from the state of the nominee's residence. Over all nominations except to the Cabinet, senatorial tradition requires that the President consult in advance of the nomination the senior senator from the state where a nominee resides, provided that the senator and the President are members of the same party. If they are not, then the junior senator must be consulted, and if neither senator is a member of the President's party, then a representative, if there be one.

When a nomination is made upon the recommendation of a senator from the state where the nominee resides, confirmation is virtually certain.

¹ *Presidential Leadership* (1940), p. 24.

For the President to defy the senators of his own party and to nominate men of his own choice may open up a bitter and harassing party battle. A President may, however, delay sending in nominations, using them as bait to catch votes in the Senate for legislative measures in which he is interested. Neither the Constitution nor party tradition sets up any hard-and-fast rule to cover the relations of President and Senate under the appointive power. Strong Presidents have tended to dominate their parties and the Senate; weak ones have been dominated by the Senate.

The six-year terms of senators and their strategic position at the gates of patronage combine to make them important party leaders, if they wish to be. A political boss may obtain the election of a senator, but once in office the senator stays for six years, no matter how he and the boss may get along. By interfering with the boss's federal patronage the senator may merely annoy him, or he may do him great harm, depending upon what vacancies occur. The appointment of a federal district attorney, for example, may determine whether the boss will thrive and prosper or go to the penitentiary. For these reasons, and also because of the prestige attached to being a senator, many bosses have got themselves elected to the Senate; Penrose, Platt, and Vare are examples.

EFFECTS OF PARTIES ON THE CONSTITUTION

AMENDMENT BY PARTY PRACTICE

The Constitution is not self-executing, and party practice may, in effect, repeal a provision by the neglect of Congress to pass the legislation necessary to enforce it. The second section of the Fourteenth Amendment, for instance, has been said to be "as worthless as a counterfeit note drawn on a broken bank," because neither party wants to see it enforced. The framers of the amendment provided that the representation of any state in the House of Representatives shall be reduced in proportion as any such state shall deny to citizens of the United States the right to vote. The provision was intended to apply to the southern (and Democratic) states which might deny Negroes the right to vote, but any legislation would of necessity have also to apply to northern (and Republican) states which impose literacy, educational, or other tests. The resulting inaction by agreement has in effect altered the Constitution.

PARTY AND THE COMMITTEE SYSTEM

Likewise, the whole committee system of Congress has altered the Constitution. Neither house, except for unusual circumstances, is a great forum where parties struggle over issues of public policy. "The House sits," said Woodrow Wilson, "not for serious discussion but to sanction the conclusions of its committees as rapidly as possible."¹ While the debates are poorly attended by the members of the houses, the real work of the Congress is done in its committees. Within the requirement that the majority party is entitled to the majority of the members of each committee, assignments are made on a basis of seniority, and members work up to the powerful position of chairman by seniority. This rule tends to place in positions of authority party members who come from safe constituencies, not necessarily men who reflect the dominant sentiment of the party; indeed, because of their assurance of re-election they are even less susceptible to party discipline than are most members.

Committees usually reach their decisions to amend, to report, or to kill a bill in their executive, that is in their secret, sessions. There is no time limit on a committee's right to suppress a bill. There is, wrote Hasbrouck, a "scattering of responsibility under the committee system. It is difficult to punish or reward a political party when each separate committee has a character and a policy of its own."² Hasbrouck illustrates the point by an instance in the Sixty-Ninth Congress. In two separate messages President Coolidge had recommended legislation for the regulation of the coal industry, which proposal was seemingly approved by the Republican Steering Committee. But the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce refused to act, notwithstanding all that party leadership could do.

PARTIES AND RESPONSIBILITY

During his campaign for the presidency Warren Harding "pledged the Republicans to 'party government, as distinguished from personal government, individual, dictatorial, autocratic, or whatnot.'"³ This is a campaign argument often used against strong Presidents, such as Jackson, Lincoln, Wilson, and Franklin Roosevelt. Party government, in the

¹ *Congressional Government* (1900 edition), p. 79.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 195.

³ Quoted by Hasbrouck, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

sense that when a party is given a majority in the legislative body it is then to be held responsible to the electorate for the enactment of a positive party program, is sometimes impossible under the Constitution, and always difficult. Practical politicians know this fact and seldom make claims that if their party is selected it will stand responsible for what is done or not done.

Difficult as it is fairly to hold a party responsible for legislation, it is apparently equally difficult to hold it responsible for corruption. After the oil scandals of the Harding administration, for example, the Republican Party did not assume responsibility; it alleged, rather, that "guilt is personal," and in its platform for 1924 called attention to the "thousands of earnest, conscientious, and faithful officials and employees in every department," while it promised to prosecute "official dereliction."

That same year the Democratic Party in its platform and in the campaign asserted that corruption was the issue, but in the election it went down to the worst defeat (in terms of its percentage of the popular vote) that it had sustained since the Civil War. There were other complicating factors — "prosperity absorbs all criticism" wrote Frank R. Kent — but whatever they were, the election of 1924 determined that party responsibility does not extend to responsibility for corruption.¹

Uninformed but well-intentioned citizens sometimes blame the American political parties for the behavior of their recalcitrant state organizations and for the obnoxious candidates who sometimes are nominated; American public life, it is said, loses something when a Huey Long, a William Hale Thompson, or a Warren G. Harding occupies an important place in a party. But in truth it is not so much the party as federalism that is to blame. Either or both parties may be severely criticized when a state government or the national government fails to act to meet some obvious public need, but again the fault more often than not lies in the separation of powers, in the check and balance system, or in bicameralism; the parties have done the best they could under the circumstances. Both foreign and domestic critics have inquired why great men are not elected President — or why mediocrities so often occupy the White House. It is all too easy for the critics to lay the blame on the perverse politicians who manage the parties and to forget that these very politicians are limited by

¹ See Frank R. Kent, *Political Behavior* (1928), pp. 108-128, for a journalistic account of Democratic efforts to hold the Republican Party responsible in 1924 for the oil scandals. Kent lays it down as a rule of politics that "corruption is not a party liability."

the electoral college in their choice of presidential timber, which usually is to be found growing only in half a dozen states. The Constitution of the United States has been much admired, and certainly in many respects it is admirable. But it was not intended to provide for party government, and it does not; rather, it makes responsible party government often impossible and always difficult.

The Suffrage and Parties in America

IMPORTANCE OF THE SUFFRAGE

WHILE THE MOST IMPORTANT SINGLE INFLUENCE in shaping the forms and behavior of parties is the constitutions of the states in which the parties operate, perhaps next in importance is the right to vote. The very membership of any party is confined to those who possess the right of suffrage, and state laws commonly define political parties in terms of the number of votes cast for their nominees. Control of the party machinery is always in the hands of voters. The size of the electorate largely determines the degree of complexity and elaboration of the party organization: a party that seeks fifty million votes requires a much more complete and detailed hierarchy of committees and officials than a party that seeks one million. As the suffrage has widened in the United States, the party organizations have grown with it. The difference between parties in the country's infancy and parties now is the difference between Jefferson's management of the Democratic Party by means of personal letters written in longhand and McGrath's staff with suites of offices in Washington and New York; it is the difference between the congressional caucus and the presidential preference primary.

The tactics parties use and the appeals they make are in large part determined by the character and extent of the electorate. When the suffrage was restricted to a relatively small group of men who met the property qualifications, parties naturally tended to shape their policies to the interest of those voters who held property and to the neglect of laborers and others who did not vote. In those states in the South today where Negroes do not vote, the schools and other public services allocated to the Negroes are inferior to those of the whites, who do vote. Any group

within the electorate that cannot vote is likely to have difficulty in impressing its needs upon the parties, because parties are primarily interested in voters.

Contemporary democratic theory rejects the idea of classes or grades of citizenship, but citizens who cannot vote are in fact clearly in a subordinate status, whether they are minors or incompetents or because they belong to a racial group. They do not govern; they are governed. Their interests may or may not be adequately promoted by those who can govern. In either event they have no effective voice.

Perfect democracy, conceived as government resting upon universal participation by citizens, has doubtless never been anywhere attained, and may never be. Democracy and oligarchy shade into each other and are chiefly distinguished by the degree of the citizens' participation in government, which participation in any modern state is bound to be chiefly in voting. Hence the suffrage, once regarded as a privilege extended by the state to certain favored classes, is now better considered as a function of government — as an office which certain citizens may exercise.¹

CHANGING CONCEPTS OF SUFFRAGE

SUFFRAGE IN THE COLONIES

The English colonists in North America regarded the suffrage as a vested right depending upon the citizen's status. In all the colonies the right to vote was severely restricted.² Only males twenty-one years of age or over could vote, and during the eighteenth century most of the colonial legislatures restricted the suffrage to whites. Aliens were universally excluded. Various religious tests were imposed, and Jews, Catholics, Quakers, and Baptists were at one time or another denied the right to vote in most of the colonies. Some "good character" requirements, as vague in their way as the contemporary clauses of a few of the southern states, were common in colonial New England. In order to be eligible to vote a man had to be in Massachusetts "not vicious in life";

¹ For a recent scholarly study of the suffrage and representation, see Harold F. Gosnell, *Democracy: The Threshold of Freedom* (1948).

² See C. F. Bishop, *History of Elections in the American Colonies* (1893), especially pp. 46-97 and 219-225; A. E. McKinley, *The Suffrage Franchise in the Thirteen English Colonies in America* (1905); and Kirk H. Porter, *History of the Suffrage in the United States* (1918), pp. 1-19.

in Connecticut "of peaceable and honest conversation"; and in Pennsylvania of "sober and honest conversation." Ten of the thirteen colonies had residence requirements, which differed from time to time during the colonial period, but which ran from three months to a year in the colony and in the town or county in which the elector resided.

Property qualifications for voting were universal in the colonies at the time of the Revolution, though the amount and kind of property required differed from one colony to another and (for voting for various officials) even within the same colony. Sometimes the qualification was expressed in terms of acres of land. Again, a voter was sometimes vaguely required to be "worth" some set number of pounds sterling, from ten to a hundred. Income from property or the payment of taxes upon property were other possibilities in lieu of the ownership of land of certain size or value. Various combinations of these requirements were permitted with some substitutions and exemptions.¹

Unless an actual survey of the electorate is conducted, such as the study by Merriam and Gosnell of non-voting in Chicago in 1923, it is impossible to distinguish with accuracy the number of persons who fail to vote because of absence, apathy, illness, and other reasons from those who are barred from voting by various requirements. It is therefore impossible to determine how many of the colonists were eligible to vote under their complex requirements. The voting records of many towns and counties were, in addition, poorly kept, and others have been lost or destroyed. Only estimates can be made of the number of potential voters in the colonies.

A. E. McKinley examined the surviving records of several elections and summarized his findings thus:

In Virginia in several elections between 1744 and 1772 there appeared to be about nine per cent of the white population actually participating as electors. In New York City, in the elections of 1735, 1761, and 1769 the actual voters numbered about eight per cent of the population. In Pennsylvania the tax-list figures give only potential voters, but they show about eight per cent of the rural population qualified for the suffrage, and only two per cent in the city of Philadelphia, a condition quite in contrast to that in New York City. In New England the actual voters appear to be less proportionally than in the middle and southern colonies. Massachusetts, for instance, shows only one person in fifty as taking part in elections,

¹ For convenient tables of the colonial suffrage qualifications see F. N. Thorpe, *Constitutional History of the American People* (Harper & Brothers, 1898), vol. 1, pp. 68 ff.

and Connecticut, in elections immediately preceding the Revolution, had about the same proportion. . . . The potential voters seem to vary from one-sixth to one-fiftieth of the population, and the actual voters show an almost equal variation. . . . At best, however, the colonial elections called forth both relatively and absolutely only a small fraction of the present percentage of voters. Property qualifications, poor means of communication, large election districts, and the absence of party organization combined to make the most sharply contested elections feeble in their effects upon the community as compared with the widespread suffrage of the twentieth century.¹

Charles A. Beard examined the surviving evidence on the number of votes cast in the state elections for delegates to the conventions to ratify the Constitution and concluded that

not more than 5 per cent of the population in general, or in round numbers, 160,000 voters, [in a population of approximately 3,900,000] expressed an opinion one way or another on the Constitution. In other words, it is highly probable that not more than one-fourth or one-fifth of the adult white males took part in the election of delegates to the state conventions.²

AT THE TIME OF THE REVOLUTION

While the Continental Congress subscribed to the sentiment that "all men are created equal," the members did not mean that all men had or should have an equal right to vote; in fact, the right to vote is not mentioned in the Declaration of Independence. Later, sentiment in the Constitutional Convention strongly favored property qualifications for the suffrage. According to Madison's record, the question of who should be entitled to vote was rather freely discussed in the meeting of the Convention of August 7, 1787. He reported that he said in part:

Viewing the subject in its merits alone, the freeholders [owners of land] of the Country would be the safest depositories of Republican liberty. In future times a great majority of the people will not only be without land, but any other sort of property. These will either combine under the influence of their common situation; in which case, the rights of property and the public liberty will not be secure in their hands: or which is more probable, they will become the tools of opulence and ambition, in which case there will be equal danger on another side.³

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 487.

² *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States* (1925), p. 250.

³ *Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 which Framed the Constitution of the*

Gouverneur Morris stated similar views more forcefully:

Give the votes to people who have no property and they will sell them to the rich who will be able to buy them. We should not confine our attention to the present moment. The time is not far distant when this Country will abound with mechanics and manufacturers [factory laborers] who will receive their bread from their employers. Will such men be the secure and faithful Guardians of liberty? . . . Children do not vote. Why? because they want prudence, because they have no will of their own. The ignorant and the dependent can be as little trusted with the public interest.¹

The question of the suffrage came up on various occasions during the convention, but there never seemed to be any sentiment for broadening the right to vote, much less for making the right universal. Several members expressed their views, of whom one of the most outspoken was Pierce Butler of South Carolina. "He contended strenuously," wrote Madison, "that property was the only just measure of representation. This was the great object of Government: the great cause of war; the great means of carrying it on."² But because of the great variety of property and other qualifications in the states, no agreement was reached upon what federal requirements should be imposed. There was, in addition, Madison noted, some doubt about "the probable reception that such a change would meet with" in the states, and the framers of the Constitution left the suffrage where they found it. They provided that each state should appoint its presidential electors in such manner as its legislature might direct, and probably they expected that the legislators would themselves choose the electors, as they were to choose the senators. The selection of the members of the House of Representatives was the only other point at which the question of suffrage had to be considered, and for representatives the new federal Constitution accepted the state requirements that "the electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislature."³

In the first election that was held under the new Constitution only five

United States of America, reported by James Madison, Gaillard Hunt and James Brown Scott, editors (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1920), p. 353.

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 352.

² *Ibid.*, p. 215. The belief in the virtue of property on the part of the framers was natural enough. They were all of the upper or middle class. There was not one wage-earner or mechanic among them. See Arthur N. Holcombe, *The Middle Classes in American Politics* (1940), pp. 124-157.

³ Article I, Section 2.

states permitted the voters to select the presidential electors.¹ In the other states the legislatures chose them. Basing his conclusions on such statistics as are available, Charles O. Paullin estimated that 3.6 per cent of the free population voted. In the first election for members of the House of Representatives the total vote cast did not exceed 125,000, or 3.5 per cent of the population.² Under such a limited suffrage it is not astonishing that the Federalist Party was successful. What is surprising is that the Anti-Federalists won ten of the sixty-five seats in the first House of Representatives. Neither party had any organization, in the modern sense; committees of correspondence carried on such campaigns as there were. Only in Virginia, apparently, did the Anti-Federalists under the leadership of Patrick Henry seriously challenge the party that was to be victorious. James Madison, for example, had to work hard to obtain a majority of three hundred votes for representative out of the 1290 votes that were cast in his district.

SUFFRAGE AFTER THE REVOLUTION

As soon as the Revolution was over, a struggle for broader suffrage took place in each state, as the states wrote or revised state constitutions. New Hampshire in 1784 substituted a taxpaying qualification for the ownership of property. Georgia in 1789 abandoned its ten-pound property qualification in favor of the payment of a tax within a year, and when Vermont was admitted to the Union in 1791 her constitution was the first to establish full manhood suffrage. Only a year's residence and "quiet and peaceable behavior" were required of voters.³

But the property test for voting weakened and disappeared very gradually, and it was not until 1865 that it was finally abandoned by North Carolina, the last of the states to retain it. The normal process was first a reduction of the property requirement to a very nominal amount, then the substitution of the payment of a tax and finally the abolition of all property and taxpaying tests.

BROADENED SUFFRAGE IN THE JACKSON PERIOD

Several factors combined during the early nineteenth century to widen the suffrage by the removal of these requirements. The veterans of the

¹ Massachusetts, Maryland, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. — Charles O. Paullin, "The First Elections under the Constitution," *Iowa Journal of History and Politics*, vol. 2 (1904), p. 4.

² *Ibid.*, p. 31.

³ Porter, *op. cit.*, pp. 22–23.

War of 1812 were indignant to find that many of their number were ineligible to vote, and they made their resentment known to sympathetic members of state legislatures and conventions. As the states of the Middle West were settled, the inhabitants sought additional settlers whose coming increased business and improved the value of land. Partly as an inducement to settlers, all of the western states except Ohio joined the Union without tax or property requirements. As a result of this western liberality, the eastern states felt that they had to broaden their suffrage or lose to the West the skilled labor they did not wish to see migrate for fear that wages would rise in the seaboard states. Professor Sait thought that the most impressive of the factors operating during the period was the social equality that arose from equality of possessions. Land in the West

was plentiful and easily acquired. The homesteading pioneers were alike in the privations that they suffered and in the rude comforts that they won from the soil. Social conditions assumed a remarkable uniformity; and the equality of economic life reflected itself in politics. Where men were substantially equal in possessions there was no reason to discriminate in defining political rights.¹

Although the doctrine that "all men are created equal" was often cited in state constitutional conventions of the early nineteenth century to imply that all men were by natural right entitled to the vote, probably such political abstractions had less to do with the broadening of the suffrage than the gradual increase in education, which brought with it more acute political consciousness. As various classes advanced, they demanded a share in their government, and, except in the case of Dorr's Rebellion in Rhode Island in 1842, their claims were granted without violence. First, the middle classes broke down the real property requirement by obtaining the substitution of taxpaying. Later the rise of the common man — the rural wage-earner and the factory worker — ended the taxpaying qualification. Not all areas, of course, went through these stages. The Federalists made a last stand in the eastern states, but in the frontier states they never had any influence, so that most of the western states entered the Union with no restrictions upon manhood suffrage.

The rapidly broadened suffrage of the Jackson period produced the turbulent politics for which the age is well known and encouraged the early

¹ Edward M. Sait, *American Parties and Elections* (3d edition, 1942), p. 25.

city political machines. The whole trend appalled conservatives like Daniel Webster and Chancellor Kent, who feared that the rights of property and hence the future of civilization were threatened.

THE RISE OF DISQUALIFICATIONS FOR VOTING

As property qualifications fell away one by one, the states found it expedient to exclude from the suffrage by other means various groups which until then had been indirectly prevented from voting by the property requirements. Thus criminals, the mentally incompetent, and paupers commonly did not own property and had not earlier been a voting problem. But with the removal of the property requirement they became eligible to vote and had to be excluded by law. Students, soldiers, and sailors — where they were in fact only temporary residents — occasionally presented a local problem, with the result that by 1860 most states barred them from the polls. When a person resided in a community long enough to acquire property or to pay taxes, it was assumed in some states that he had become sufficiently familiar with state and local affairs to cast an intelligent vote, and moreover that he had a financial interest which would move him to inform himself about candidates. But with the disappearance of the tax and property qualifications, the matter of residence could not be left to take care of itself, and the requirement of a period of residence — varying from six months to two years in the state, county, or town — became almost universal. In 1860 only Indiana and New Hampshire, among the thirty-four states then in the Union, had no residence period.¹

Another disqualification soon introduced was illiteracy. First adopted by Connecticut in 1855, a literacy test was soon required of voters in Massachusetts and later in other states. The present New York test, as administered by school authorities, appears to be the best and fairest.²

ALIEN SUFFRAGE

Moved by a desire to attract settlers, twenty-two states and territories of the west and Southwest at one time or another permitted aliens to vote, commonly upon their declaration of intention to seek citizenship.

¹ Porter, *op. cit.*, p. 148.

² See Arthur W. Bromage, "Literacy and the Electorate," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 24 (November, 1930), pp. 946-962.

While Ohio in 1803 was apparently the first state to grant aliens the right to vote, six states had alien suffrage by 1860. But the movement had reached its peak by 1875 and shortly began to recede. The wave of national feeling brought about by World War I led to a rapid withdrawal of the right from non-citizens, but not until 1926 did the last state, Arkansas, close the polls to aliens.¹ With the free land now gone, there seems to be no great desire on the part of the states to attract population, and it appears probable that alien suffrage is gone forever.

NEGRO SUFFRAGE

BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR

The fretting problem of Negro suffrage has existed since the early days of the republic — indeed, since colonial times. In the states of the Deep South the Negro was always forbidden the vote either by law or by political practice. Among the border states, Delaware in 1792 amended its constitution to exclude free Negroes from the polls, and it was soon followed by the other border states and even by Connecticut (1818), New Jersey (1820), and Pennsylvania (1838).² In fact, there were only six states in which the Negro was never barred.³ Even in New York, though a free Negro was always allowed to vote, he was required until 1874 to meet a special \$250 property qualification, and on three separate occasions (1846, 1850, and 1867) the white voters of New York refused to approve referenda to remove this discrimination. However strong abolitionist sentiment was in the North and West, it did not extend to equal political rights for the Negro. The Republican Party did not advocate them in 1856 or in 1860; instead, it came into power on the platform of no extension of slavery in the territories. Even Lincoln never advocated Negro suffrage. His constitutional theory was that the southern states had never been out of the Union and that their legal systems (including their suffrage laws) had not been terminated but simply suspended. It is worth noting that in none of the northern states where the Republican Party was dominant after 1860 was the suffrage extended to Negroes by state action.

¹ See Leon E. Aylsworth, "The Passing of Alien Suffrage," *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 25 (February, 1931), pp. 114-116.

² Porter, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

³ Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont.

THE RECONSTRUCTION PERIOD

President Johnson tried to carry out Lincoln's plans for the reconstruction of the South, but he was overpowered by the Radical Republicans in Congress. These men insisted upon the acceptance of the Fourteenth Amendment as a condition for readmission to the Union, and in this position, wrote Porter, they "were not without ulterior motives":

The Republican politicians . . . wanted to make sure of Republican majorities and permanently cripple the Democratic Party. As early as December, 1866, Mr. Blaine complained in Congress about the possibility of the southern states returning with the same measure of representation enjoyed by them previous to the war. . . . He seemed to be more intent on reducing their representation than on securing suffrage for the Negro. But later on the latter view to the same end became popular. It was soon evident that a large Negro electorate would give the Republican party enormous prestige, and many congressmen were exultant over the prospect.¹

THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

The Fourteenth Amendment, adopted in 1868, made the Negro a citizen, but it did not make him a voter. In an indirect and awkward fashion the amendment proposed to compel the states to allow the Negro to vote upon penalty of having the states' representation in the House of Representatives reduced. No act was passed by Congress then (or later) to enforce this clause of the amendment. Since most northern states still did not permit Negro suffrage, Congress could not bring itself to invoke the penalty clause against the South. There seemed at the time to be little sentiment in the North for giving the vote to the Negro. Charles Sumner urged the northern states to let down their legal or constitutional barriers, but his plea was without effect. A referendum in the District of Columbia produced a vote of 6556 against Negro suffrage to 35 in favor.

THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT

The weakness of the Fourteenth Amendment as a means of obtaining Negro suffrage was quickly seen by the Radical Republicans in Congress, and the year following the adoption of that amendment, Congress passed

¹ Porter, *op. cit.*, pp. 179-180.

another, which became the Fifteenth. Much shorter than the Fourteenth, the Fifteenth Amendment went directly to the point:

The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.

This amendment, like the Fourteenth, was forced upon the South; and it would not have been accepted, it seems safe to say, had not federal armies still been in control of most southern states. Congress undertook to enforce it by a series of "Force Bills."

When any extension of the right to vote has been made in the United States or in almost any other country where popular government prevails, the broadened suffrage has been permanent. The reason has been that the vote has not been given to classes or groups until their education and political consciousness made them ready for it. The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, however, suddenly conferred the suffrage upon a million men just released from slavery, most of whom were illiterate and all of whom were politically inexperienced. The Negro's enfranchisement, says Professor Porter, "had been secured by artificial means and not by the normal process of building up popular support." The results of the premature and partisan grant of the suffrage were disastrous to the Negro himself. Had he been allowed to attain the franchise as others attained it, gradually and when he was ready for it, infinite social friction might have been avoided. As it was, Negro suffrage was blamed for all the ills of reconstruction, and the reaction was so great that the results affect American politics to this day.

Historians disagree upon the relative responsibility of the Negro, the carpetbagger, and the scalawag for the evils of reconstruction. Perhaps historical justice among them can never be correctly assessed, but because the southern whites saw at the same moment the Negroes in offices and the misgovernment of their states, they have always considered the first to be the cause and the second to be the effect.

For eight years in some states, for a shorter period down to two years in others, the Radicals ruled supreme in the South. Thus had the mighty fallen; "thus our political subjugation has been made complete." In the first South Carolina legislature, "The Speaker is black, the Clerk is black, the doorkeepers are black, the little pages are black, the chairman of Ways and Means is black, and the Chaplain is coal black. At some desks sit colored men whose types it would be hard to find outside of the Congo;

whose costumes, visages, attitudes, and expression only befit the forecandle of a buccaneer. It must be remembered that these men, with not more than half a dozen exceptions, have been themselves slaves, and that their ancestors were slaves for generations." Upon these blacks depended the hated power of the carpetbaggers and scalawags, and for these blacks, in return for the opportunity to rule, the Radicals provided offices and a flattering "social equality" in law. Thus a powerful Negro political machine came into being . . . which it required a revolution to turn out.¹

NEGRO SUFFRAGE AS A SYMBOL

It is probable that even though the Negroes were suddenly enfranchised and quite as suddenly placed in political control of the southern states, they did not have a record in office as venal and extravagant as was pictured by some historians. They did establish school systems and make other reforms, and at the least it may be said for them that they were no worse than the white politicians of the time who formed the Tweed Ring, the Whiskey Ring, and the Crédit Mobilier. But the southern whites needed the stories of misrule during reconstruction to bolster the opinion they had already formed that the Negro was racially unfit to participate in democratic processes. "These memories," wrote Gunnar Myrdal, "are in a sense cherished. They serve a vital defensive function to the White South. Even the liberal Southerner . . . has to express his abhorrence of the Reconstruction atrocities. They are, in fact, symbols of regional allegiance."² The stereotype is used to rationalize and justify subsequent southern election practices.

Opposed by the South, officered largely by adventurers, manned and supported increasingly by the inexperienced and untrained Negro, the new régime could but produce inefficiency, corruption, and oppression. It could but solidify the South behind the old leaders who cried "I told you so!" It could but end in revolution, and a dogged determination to keep the Negro in subjection.³

THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION

The Thirteenth Amendment, abolishing slavery, was accepted by the South, but the Fourteenth and Fifteenth, in so far as they conferred

¹ Paul Lewinson, *Race, Class, and Party* (1932), p. 45. By permission of Oxford University Press, New York.

² *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy* (1944), vol. 1, p. 446.

³ Lewinson, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

social and political rights upon the Negro, never were. The amendments were approved by the reconstruction legislatures, which were supported by federal bayonets, but the white people of the South never accepted them in fact and set about at once seeking means to circumvent them. Their activities took two forms: legislative enactments to modify constitutions and statutes in order to exclude the Negro from the suffrage; and the administration of the laws to exclude in practice those who came within the terms of the constitutions and statutes. The prospect of violence has always been in the background should these measures fail; and violence has been used often enough to convince Negroes that it would be used more often if necessary.

Even before President Hayes withdrew the federal troops from the South in 1877, a majority of the southern states had returned to white (and Democratic) control. When the army left, the remaining Negro-carpetbagger political machines collapsed. In the twenty-five years that followed, the southern states revised their constitutions and amended their election laws so as to keep the Negro from voting, being sure, however, that constitutions and laws did not violate the letter of the Fifteenth Amendment. The spirit of the disfranchising laws and constitutions was well expressed by Carter Glass, later United States Senator from Virginia, in the debates on the suffrage clauses in the Virginia constitutional convention of 1901, when he was asked whether the Negro would not be excluded under the proposed clause by "fraud and discrimination." He replied, "By fraud, no; by discrimination, yes. But it will be discrimination within the letter of the law. . . . Discrimination! Why, that is precisely what we propose; that, exactly, is what this convention was elected for — to discriminate to the very extremity of permissible action under the limitations of the Federal Constitution, with a view to the elimination of every Negro voter who can be gotten rid of legally. . . ." ¹

It is not necessary here to trace the history of each disfranchising device in every southern state. One state learned from another, and provisions invented in one were often copied by others. In general, the devices used sought to exclude the Negro by taking advantage of his poverty, his lack of education, his inexperience with public documents, or his racial characteristics.

THE POLL TAX

No device to bar Negroes from the polls has in recent years received

¹ Quoted by Lewinson, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

more attention than the poll tax. Attempts have been made to obtain national legislation to forbid poll-tax requirements for participation in elections at which federal officers are chosen.¹ Anti-poll-tax bills have frequently passed the House of Representatives, only to be killed in the Senate by filibuster or by the threat of filibuster on the part of southern senators. The poll tax in the South differs from the tax of the same name in the North in that it is not imposed in the South upon all citizens over twenty-one years of age; it is, rather, a voluntary tax or fee paid only by those persons who seek to vote.² In some southern states it is cumulative — that is, it must be paid by the voter for every year after he attains the age to vote — and in a few states the tax, if unpaid, bears compound interest and penalties. It commonly must be paid months before the date of an election, sometimes during a limited number of days at some inconvenient place; and a poll-tax receipt must be preserved to be shown to registration and election officials. The amount of the tax is not great — from a dollar to two dollars in different states — but even this amount is important to Negroes with low cash incomes. It is usually illegal for one person to pay the tax for another, but politicians sometimes evade this part of the law by buying poll-tax receipts from poor white voters at the amount of the tax; they then keep the receipts and reissue them on registration or election day.³

¹ These attempts rely upon Article I, Section IV, par. 1 of the Constitution, which authorizes Congress to “make or alter” such regulations as the states may establish regarding the “times, places, and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives.” The opponents of anti-poll-tax legislation point to Article I, Section II: “The electors in each state shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the state legislature.” This requirement is repeated in the Seventeenth Amendment. If the payment of a poll tax is a qualification to vote for a state legislator, then, say the southerners, it is a qualification to vote for congressmen. In *Breedlove v. Suttles* 302 U.S. 277 (1937), the Supreme Court held that in the absence of federal legislation the Georgia poll tax was valid.

² In South Carolina the tax is not required of voters in the Democratic primary, but it is required of those who would vote in the general election.

³ For other uses of the poll tax by politicians see *The Poll Tax* (1940), a pamphlet published by the American Council on Public Affairs, Washington, D.C., especially pp. 9–12. National sentiment on the poll tax was revealed by a Gallup poll of July 25, 1948. The question was asked thus: “Some southern states require every voter to pay a poll tax amounting to about a dollar a year before they [*sic*] can vote. Do you think these poll taxes should be abolished?” The results were:

	<i>Abolish</i>	<i>Retain</i>	<i>No Opinion</i>
National	65%	24%	11%
South	48	43	9
Outside South	67	21	12
Poll-tax states	36	56	8

The poll tax would, of course, exclude poor whites as well as Negroes if it were equitably enforced, but it appears that sometimes election officials forget to ask white voters to show their receipts, while they always remember to ask would-be Negro voters for theirs. With the Negroes' inexperience with documents, the receipts are often lost, or scheming whites may induce the Negroes to part with them. In one North Carolina county, for example, the Democrats engaged an itinerant circus for one day and admitted any Negro who would surrender his poll-tax receipt; the result was that almost all of the Negroes in the county were disfranchised for that year. Only seven southern states now require the payment of a poll tax as a prerequisite for voting.¹ Georgia recently repealed her tax, and some other southern states will probably follow, relying upon other devices for disfranchising the Negro.

LITERACY AND "UNDERSTANDING" CLAUSES

Eighteen states impose some sort of literacy test, but in the South these tests have been administered so as to exclude Negroes. Under the laws, citizens seeking to vote may be asked to read and explain any article in the state or federal constitutions *to the satisfaction of the election officials*. Even professors in Negro universities have not always been able to accomplish this feat, and less educated Negroes are readily failed on the tests when they are asked to explain some uncommon term, such as *eminent domain* or *excess condemnation*. Josephus Daniels told of one instance in which he, as a leader of the dry forces, invoked these tests:

Every Negro who came up to vote in the local option election in Raleigh, N. C., in 1903, having been challenged, was compelled to stand in the middle of a ring with scores of people looking on and read parts of the constitution. None on trial knew what an *ex post facto* law was, and none could correctly pronounce "Lieutenant Governor." There were plenty of white voters who, with a curious and critical crowd looking on, would have been embarrassed by that public test. I justified my act by reflecting that these Negroes were being used by the liquor forces to their own undoing . . . But it was cruel.²

Even more susceptible to discrimination in administration are those

¹ Alabama, Arkansas, Mississippi, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia. — *The Book of the States* (1948 edition), p. 96. Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, and North Carolina have repealed their poll taxes since 1920.

² *Editor in Politics* (1941), p. 423.

clauses in southern election laws and constitutions that require the voter to "understand the duties and obligations of citizenship under a republican form of government" or require him to explain state statutes. As the chairman of the committee that wrote the "understanding" clause of the Virginia constitution of 1902 said, "I expect the examination with which the black man will be confronted to be inspired by the same spirit that inspires every man upon this floor and in this convention. I do not expect an impartial administration of this clause."¹ If the poll tax should fall before the onslaughts of northern liberals, the literacy and "understanding" clauses would by themselves suffice to exclude Negroes, as long as they are administered by whites who wish to use them as barriers. Probably nothing short of federal supervision or administration of elections could get any significant number of Negroes past the "understanding" clauses.

REVIVAL OF PROPERTY QUALIFICATIONS

In the post-Civil War state constitutional conventions the property and taxpaying requirements were reconsidered and in some states revived. The object in view was to take advantage of the Negro's poverty in order to disfranchise him. The amount of property required nowhere exceeds \$500 or forty acres of land, but in some states all taxes assessed against the property must be paid before the owner can vote. Property and tax-payment requirements obviously bar the poor white as well as the poor Negro; so they are commonly tied up with literacy, educational, or "understanding" tests in such a way as to let the white fish through the net but not the black ones.

THE "GRANDFATHER" CLAUSE

The most famous of these devices for admitting the illiterate or impoverished whites while excluding the educated and property-holding Negroes was the "grandfather" clause. Both Louisiana and Mississippi

¹ Quoted by Porter, *op. cit.*, p. 218. The famous Boswell Amendment added to the Alabama constitution in 1946 combined the good character and understanding clauses; it provided that "no persons shall be allowed to register as electors except those who are of good character and who understand the duties and obligations of good citizenship under a republican form of government." See O. Douglas Weeks, "The White Primary: 1944-1948," *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 42 (June, 1948), pp. 500-510.

claim to have invented this device. The clause was not a restriction upon the suffrage, but an exemption from other tests for those who had fought in any war in which the United States had engaged, or who had voted before the Civil War, or who were legitimate lineal descendants of men who had voted. Negroes with white grandfathers of course could not qualify, because their white grandfathers could not legally have been married to black grandmothers. The grandfather clauses were all presumably struck down by the Supreme Court in 1915 when it held that the Oklahoma clause was merely a subterfuge for violating the Fifteenth Amendment.¹ But the clauses had already served their purpose in that persons eligible to use them had by this time placed their names on the permanent registration rolls.

"GOOD CHARACTER" TESTS

In order to take advantage of what were thought to be the Negro's peculiar tendencies to commit (or to get convicted of) certain offenses, such as chicken stealing, wife beating, or adultery, the postwar election laws in the South barred from voting persons convicted of these and other crimes or misdemeanors. For those who had never been convicted, "evidence of good character" could be required by election officials. This evidence for white applicants turned out to be in practice the officials' own knowledge; for Negroes it meant the production of two to ten witnesses to swear that they had known the applicant for a certain number of years, that he was regularly employed, of good habits, had never been known to violate a law, and so forth. The "good character" clauses are susceptible of as much administrative abuse as the literacy and "understanding" tests; and if the whites in control of the election machinery are determined to use the "good character" clauses to exclude Negroes, it is probable that only federal administration of elections could effectively prevent their doing so.

OTHER OBSTACLES TO NEGRO SUFFRAGE

The southern states show a kind of defense in depth against the would-be Negro voter; if one barrier falls before courts or legislatures there is

¹ *Guinn v. United States*, 238 U.S. 347 (1915). The Oklahoma grandfather clause read: "No person who was on January 1, 1866, or at any time prior thereto, entitled to vote under any form of government, or who at that time resided in some foreign nation, and no lineal descendant of such person, shall be denied the right to register and vote because of his inability to so read and write sections of such constitution."

another behind it. It would seem that the great variety of requirements and tests could be used to rule out all Negroes, but just in case any should get by them all, some southern states require the filling out, unassisted, of complicated registration application blanks. The statements on these have then to be sworn to, and the slightest error — such as the day the applicant moved into his precinct — constitutes perjury, for which fines and imprisonment (not to mention disfranchisement) may be imposed. To make assurance ten times sure, South Carolina provides that the voter shall receive separate ballots for federal officers, for state and county officers, and for referenda; and each must be put in its own box, or it will not be counted.

EFFECT OF THE RESTRICTIONS

These devices, and a few others less important, adopted in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, excluded the Negro from voting in all the states of the Solid South. Really satisfactory statistics to show the results of the whites' counter-revolution are not available. The various restrictions on the suffrage are overlapping, so that it is impossible to show how many citizens are disfranchised by the poll tax, how many by the "understanding" clauses, how many by the "good character" tests, and so on. It is also impossible to show exactly how many whites are barred by the poll tax. There is a tradition among upper-class white women in the South that politics is not for ladies, and consequently they do not pay the tax and do not vote; but it cannot be said that they are barred from voting, for they could vote if they wished.

Apparently only in Louisiana were registration and voting statistics ever made up by race, and there the total result of the various restrictions was quickly shown. In 1896, before the disfranchising clauses were adopted, 130,334 Negroes were registered voters. In 1900, after they were in effect, only 5320 remained on the books, and in 1938, the number was down to 1123.¹ In Virginia, where Negroes were not separately registered, the vote in 1896 was 295,000; in 1904, after the new constitution was adopted, it dropped to 130,000, and presumably the difference was due to the exclusion of the Negroes.²

Here and there in the Far South educated Negroes are permitted to

¹ H. F. Gosnell, *Grass Roots Politics* (1942), p. 107.

² George C. Stoney, "Suffrage in the South," *Survey-Graphic*, vol. 29 (March, 1940), p. 167.

get through all the meshes of the election laws and to vote, but many Negro professional men feel that the struggle is not worth while for them, because even after all their trouble, their votes are overwhelmed in the election. A few "good" Negroes (whom the other Negroes call "Uncle Toms") are sometimes eased through all the tests and requirements by whites and allowed to vote.

Since the adoption of the disfranchising clauses, the only organized attempt to lower the barriers occurred during the agrarian revolt that produced the Greenback and Populist Parties and the Granger Movement. The farmer-radicals of the South objected to the tests, not because they disfranchised the Negroes, but because they could be used by the Bourbon Democrats to disfranchise the poor and ignorant whites. In the factional fights of the period each side charged the other with allowing Negroes to vote, "and during the eighties and nineties, renewed attempts were made on the part of both groups to tighten the statutory restrictions, already described, which kept the Negro from the polls. It is difficult to determine whether this legislation originated wholly in the dislike of all groups for 'political niggerism,' or in a desire to lessen the hazards and expense of the internecine white struggle."¹ But with the defeat of the agrarian revolt, there were no further attempts to broaden the suffrage in the South until the depression that followed the stock market collapse in 1929.

NEGRO SUFFRAGE AND THE SUPREME COURT

Until very recent years the Negro did not find in the United States Supreme Court any bulwark to the rights and liberties extended to him by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The court sustained his legal right to vote but also sustained the tests that in fact barred him from voting. In *Ex parte Yarbrough* and other cases the justices upheld congressional prohibitions against the use of violence to prevent Negroes from voting.² The Mississippi literacy and "understanding" clause was upheld in 1898 by a unanimous court on the grounds that the constitution and the statutes of Mississippi "do not on their face discriminate between the races, and it has not been shown that their actual administration was evil, only that evil was possible under them."³ The literacy test was

¹ Lewinson, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

² 110 U.S. 651; see also *Strauder v. West Virginia*, 100 U.S. 303 (1879), and *Ex parte Virginia*, 100 U.S. 339 (1879).

³ *Williams v. Mississippi*, 170 U.S. 213 (1898), at 225.

again approved when the court declared the Oklahoma grandfather clause unconstitutional.¹ In an opinion delivered in 1902 Justice Holmes, for a unanimous court, seemed to tell the Negroes that their rights under the Fifteenth Amendment were unenforceable, because the questions were not legal but political: "Equity," he said, "cannot undertake now, any more than it has in the past, to enforce political rights." It had been charged that in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment some five thousand Negroes had been refused the right to register. For them, said Justice Holmes, "relief from a great political wrong, if done, as alleged, by the people of a state and by the state itself must be given to them by the legislative and political department of the government of the United States."²

THE WHITE PRIMARY AND THE SUPREME COURT

Texas and Party Membership. Aside from their success in 1915 against the grandfather clauses, the Negroes made little headway before the courts until *Nixon v. Herndon* in 1927. Texas had adopted a state law denying Negroes the right to participate in the Democratic primary. In defense of the statute attorneys for the state of Texas argued before the court that the matter was political, relying upon Justice Holmes's opinion in *Giles v. Harris*; but Holmes this time dismissed the contention as "little more than a play upon words," and the court held that "color cannot be made the basis of a statutory classification affecting the right set up in this case" — that is, the right to vote in a Democratic primary.³

Texas immediately repealed the statute and passed a new one, which allowed the state executive committee of each party in Texas to determine party membership. Nixon was again denied the right to vote in the Democratic primary, and brought another action. In *Nixon v. Condon*, Justice Cardozo, for the majority of the court, held that party membership could not be determined by an executive committee, that the proper place for such a decision was the state convention.⁴ With the way thus pointed for it, Texas allowed state party conventions to determine party membership, and that same year the Democratic state convention adopted

¹ *Guinn v. United States*, 238 U.S. 347 (1915).

² *Giles v. Harris*, 189 U.S. 475 (1902), at 487 and 488.

³ *Nixon v. Herndon*, 273 U.S. 536 (1927), at 540 and 541.

⁴ 286 U.S. 73 (1932). At page 84 he wrote, "Whatever inherent power a state political party has to determine the content of its membership resides in the state convention. . . . There platforms of principles are announced and the tests of party allegiance made known to the world."

a resolution confining membership in the party to whites. This resolution was passed upon by the Supreme Court two years later and unanimously upheld.¹

Eligibility in Oklahoma. Congress earlier had seemed to be barred from regulating primaries by the decision in the *Newberry Case*,² and for ten years the law seemed to be settled that a primary was not an election within the meaning of the Constitution, and consequently that state parties could keep Negroes out of primaries if they used the proper procedure. But Oklahoma, in attempting to recapture the benefits of its now unconstitutional grandfather clause, had passed an act permanently disfranchising all citizens eligible to vote except those who had registered before 1914 (while the grandfather clause was in effect) or between April 30 and May 11, 1916. This attempt to get around *Guinn v. United States* was declared void by the Supreme Court in 1939, but more important, Justice Frankfurter used language in his opinion that seemed to reopen all the state suffrage requirements for further litigation:

The [Fifteenth] Amendment nullifies sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of discrimination. It hits onerous procedural requirements which effectively handicap exercise of the franchise by the colored race, although the abstract right to vote may remain unrestricted as to race.³

Louisiana: a New View. A new phase of the battle began four years later, for when a Louisiana election fraud case reached the Supreme Court in 1941, precedents went down right and left.⁴ The holding in the *Newberry Case* was reconsidered and overruled; primaries were again elections, and, moreover, the right of a citizen to vote in them and the right to have his ballot honestly counted was held to be a federal right, protected by the Constitution "against the actions of individuals as well as of states." Under the decision the Texas white primary was, of course, insecure, and a new case on it, *Smith v. Allwright*,⁵ reached the Supreme Court in 1944. Justice Reed for the majority of the court then said, "It may now be taken as a postulate that the right to vote in a primary for the nomination of candidates without discrimination

¹ *Grovey v. Townsend*, 295 U.S. 45 (1934).

² *Newberry v. United States*, 256 U.S. 232 (1921).

³ *Lane v. Wilson*, 307 U.S. 268 (1939), at 275.

⁴ *United States v. Classic*, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).

⁵ 321 U.S. 649 (1944). For a discussion of this case see Robert E. Cushman, "The Texas 'White Primary' Case—*Smith v. Allwright*," 30 *Cornell Law Quarterly* 66 (1944).

by the state, like the right to vote in a general election, is a right secured by the Constitution." This new postulate overturned *Grovey v. Townsend*, as the court recognized: "We are not unmindful of the desirability of continuity of decision in constitutional questions. However, when convinced of former error, this Court has never felt constrained to follow precedent," and a long list of overruled decisions was cited. The rule now seems to be that the Fifteenth Amendment "is not to be nullified by a State through casting its electoral process in a form which permits a private organization to practice racial discrimination in the election." Such is the position of the court today, but its uncertainties and reversals in the past gave point to Justice Roberts's remark in his dissenting opinion that "The instant decision, overruling that announced about nine years ago, tends to bring adjudications of this tribunal into the same class as a restricted railroad ticket, good for this day and train only."

The first challenge to the decision of the Supreme Court in *Smith v. Allwright* came from South Carolina. Twelve days after the decision was announced, the legislature met in special session and decided to repeal the entire primary law of the state. "Within six days the legislature adjourned, having repealed approximately 130 statutory provisions regulating the primary. . . . In addition, a constitutional amendment was proposed, subsequently ratified, which eliminated all mention of the primary from the state constitution."¹ South Carolina was thus left with no law regulating parties, which were permitted to operate as freely as the Elks or the Baptist Church. As far as the state law was concerned, they could determine their own membership, and of course the Democratic Party at its biennial convention restricted its membership to whites. But when a case arose, Judge J. W. Waring of the eastern district of South Carolina ruled that repeal made no material difference in the governance of the Democratic Party in South Carolina, which did not in fact become a private club and could not therefore exclude Negroes. This decision was upheld by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court refused to review it.² The administrative difficulties of enforcing such a decision without supporting state or federal legislation appear, however, to be formidable.

The new mood of the Supreme Court seems to indicate that it is ready to enforce not only the letter but the spirit of the Fourteenth and Fif-

¹ "Negro Disenfranchisement — A Challenge to the Constitution," a note in 47 *Columbia Law Review* 76, January, 1947, at p. 80.

² *Rice v. Elmore* 165 F. 2d 387 (1947), 68 S. Ct. 905 (1948).

teenth Amendments. It may be that property requirements, poll taxes, literacy and "understanding" tests, and "good character" clauses are all endangered. A court may declare these and all other devices for discrimination unconstitutional; but as long as the whites of the Deep South are determined to keep the Negro from voting, some means, legal or illegal, will be found to do so. That they are determined was shown by a resolution passed after the decision in *Smith v. Allwright* by the South Carolina House of Representatives, which said in part:

We reaffirm our belief in and our allegiance to established white supremacy as now prevailing in the South. . . . In so far as racial relations are concerned we firmly and unequivocally demand that henceforth the damned agitators of the North leave the South alone.¹

This stereotype that the Negroes are content in their disfranchisement except when Northerners stir them up is common in the South; it is as necessary as the myths of reconstruction to the rationalization of the southern election laws. Although the suffrage was given to the Negroes before they were ready for it, and although great social frictions resulted from this mistake, the race has now advanced to the point where no real evidence can be adduced to show that the ballot is not just as safe in their hands as it is in the hands of the whites. Nevertheless, violence and fraud are still used in the Far South — just how widely it is impossible to say — whenever courts utilize their processes to permit Negroes to register and vote. In Georgia, for example, after the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1946 opened the polls to Negroes:

In counties where they have been able to vote in strength their votes don't count [because of the Georgia county unit system of representation]; in the counties where they have their greatest political strength they are hardly allowed to vote at all. . . . In only one of the 39 counties which comprise Georgia's Black Belt — those counties where Negroes actually outnumber whites — were Negroes allowed to vote in strength. They were restrained by fear, intimidation, threats of violence, and (most effectively) by illegal purging of the registration lists. . . . A Taylor County Negro who was murdered by a white man the day after the election was the only Negro in the county who had voted.²

¹ *New York Times*, March 1, 1944.

² Calvin Kytle, "A Long Dark Night for Georgia?" *Harper's Magazine*, vol. 197 (September, 1948), pp. 61-62.

EFFECTS OF NEGRO DISFRANCHISEMENT

Disappearance of Two-Party Politics. The disfranchising constitutions accepted by the states of the Deep South in the counter-revolution that followed the adoption of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments deprived the Republican Party in those states of its most substantial block of voters, the Negroes. From being an active party, it rapidly faded away, until today in ten southern states there is, for all practical purposes, only one political party. This condition has given the name "Solid South" to these ten states — they are solidly Democratic. The general election is only "a formal ritual to satisfy the demand of the federal Constitution."¹ With the general election no contest — in some of the states the Republican Party does not regularly nominate candidates for the state offices to be filled — the vote at general elections has fallen in every state in the Solid South. The margin of Democratic victory differs from one election to another and from one state to another; in North Carolina and Virginia, for example, the Democratic candidate for President usually wins by about two to one, in Mississippi and South Carolina, by about thirty or forty to one. The extent of Democratic dominance in Mississippi and South Carolina is so great that in 1940 Willkie received only 7364 and 1727 votes in the two states; Dewey in 1944 received 3742 and 4610. Republicans are so rare in these states that in 1927 Senator Cole Blease of South Carolina said in Congress, "I think Mr. Coolidge received 1100 votes in my state. I do not know where he got them. I was astonished to know that they were cast and shocked to know they were counted."²

When one party has such an overwhelming preponderance of strength, neither political organization normally makes any effort to get the vote out. There is no use in spending the necessary money. Mississippi and Connecticut — to point the contrast — each had in 1940 about a million citizens who were twenty-one years of age and over; the total vote cast for Roosevelt and Willkie was 175,616 in Mississippi, 778,642 in Connecticut.

When the general election is a perfunctory performance it, naturally, produces no public interest. Attention shifts to the primary of the dominant party, where the real contest takes place. Frequently the vote in the Democratic primary in the Solid South exceeds the vote in the

¹ Myrdal, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 474.

² Quoted by Lewinson, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

general election by four to one, or more. For example, the highest vote in the Democratic primary in Alabama in 1942 was 279,454, but for the general election the highest vote was 69,212. In South Carolina the highest primary vote was 234,942, and the highest general election vote, 23,877 — almost ten to one.¹

Importance of Demagogues. It would be reasonable to expect that politics in one-party states would take the form of factions that would represent the various interests of the voters, economic, geographical, religious, and so on; and that these factions would have a continuing existence and identifiable programs. Factional clashes in the Democratic Party in the Solid South can indeed be occasionally observed: the tide-water areas (especially cities) versus the back country (the piedmont), for example. But most observers seem agreed that the dominant characteristic of Democratic politics in the Solid South is not principle or interest, but personality. All state politics, as Professor Harold F. Gosnell has pointed out, "in themselves, are nowadays singularly free from major issues."² This condition is intensified in the Far South by the "gentleman's agreement" that once the Democratic candidate has been selected in the primary, opposition to him must be suspended until he comes up for renomination at the end of his term. Under such arrangements, while primary contests may be fought around personalities who stand for different interests or issues, no permanent organization of a faction can be built upon issues. Some southern election laws contribute to this politics of personality by requiring that no one who runs in a primary and is defeated can run independently in the general election. The object of the rule (and of the "gentleman's agreement") is to remove any temptation that an unsuccessful candidate may have to appeal to the Negroes in the general election. There is a general sentiment among white politicians in the Solid South that whatever the costs to interests and issues, the Negroes must never be allowed to form a balance of power between contending white factions; to do so would endanger white supremacy. No matter what the Supreme Court may say, the Democratic primary in the Far South is a white primary.

Demagogues may be turned up in the politics of any state: Illinois had one whose great issue was opposition to King George V of England. But it does seem that the South with its one-party system has in recent years turned up more than its share of them — Bilbo, Blease, Heflin, Long,

¹ *Statistical Abstract of the United States* (1943), pp. 236-237.

² *Grass Roots Politics* (1942), p. 113.

and Talmadge are only a few examples. One of the stock appeals of southern politicians — beyond hillbilly songs and potliquor — seems to be opposition to the Negro. It is dangerous to a southern Democratic candidate to be charged with friendliness to the Negro in general, and it is an asset to him to oppose federal legislation intended to carry out the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. When, for instance, Senator Theodore G. Bilbo of Mississippi announced in 1945 that he would seek re-election, he said that among his planks would be “to fight the Fair Employment Practices Committee, the anti-poll-tax laws, and other anti-legislation introduced by the Yankees.”¹

There are exceptions, such as the Long machine in Louisiana and the Byrd machine in Virginia, but the general rule in the Solid South is that there is no state Democratic organization that can control the local organizations.

These are the courthouse gangs, the county cliques, which are the main props of the southern political structure as it exists today. . . . Though they are technically subject to the controls of the county and state Democratic party committees, in their own domain they are supreme.²

Such state-wide organizations as exist are generally the personal organizations of successful candidates, such as those of Pepper in Florida, Lister Hill in Alabama, O'Daniel in Texas.³ Although there are exceptions, these personal organizations appear to be most successful when built up by conservative politicians. As Gunnar Myrdal put it, “The future might belong to liberalism, but the South of today is mainly ruled by its conservatives.”⁴ Nothing else should be expected, for any real liberalism would not be long content with Negro exclusion from the suffrage.

The “Lily-White” Republican Movement. For many years every Republican National Convention adopted a platform plank deploring the disfranchisement of the southern Negro. The platform of 1900, for example, stated:

It was the plain purpose of the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution to prevent discrimination on account of race or color in regulating the elective franchise. Devices of state governments, whether by statutory

¹ *New York Times*, August 24, 1945.

² Myrdal, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 1322.

³ For a highly popularized discussion of some of the contemporary southern personal organizations see Charles W. Van Devander, *The Big Bosses* (1944), pp. 212-231.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 474.

or constitutional enactment, to avoid the purpose of this amendment are revolutionary, and should be condemned.¹

At the next election the platform demanded that representation of the southern states be reduced under the Fourteenth Amendment.² But condemning and demanding was as far as the party ever got. No anti-poll-tax bill, no bill to reduce the representation of the southern states, was ever passed, not even when the party elected a succession of Republican Presidents and controlled both houses of Congress.

The truth seemed to be that the Republican Presidents were early attracted to the "lily-white" movement in the Republican Party. The term seems to have been coined by a Texas Negro Republican leader, Norris Wright Cuney, in 1888. Theodore Roosevelt in 1901 said that "the Republican Party in the South was made up of politicians, mostly Negro, 'who make not the slightest effort to get any popular votes, and who are concerned purely in getting Federal offices and sending to the national convention delegates whose venality makes them a menace to the whole party.'"³ In the campaign of 1912 the Roosevelt supporters in the southern states broke away from the "black-and-tan" regulars and excluded Negroes from the bolting conventions. By 1928, according to Lewinson, there were lily-white Republican organizations rivaling the regulars in all the southern states except Kentucky and West Virginia. During Herbert Hoover's campaign his managers worked wherever possible through the lily-white organizations; and perhaps Mr. Hoover attributed his breaking the Solid South in part to this tactic. At any rate, shortly after he became President, he announced, without using the odious term, that the Republican Party was going to distribute federal patronage through the lily-white factions in the hope of building up a permanent white Republican Party in the South. The policy was followed, more or less consistently, while he was President.⁴

The lily-white movement enraged many Negro Republicans in the North and perhaps contributed in the national elections that followed to the partial defection of the northern Negro vote from its traditional Republican allegiance. But it is impossible to separate the causes of the shift, because the depression followed, and the employment of Negroes

¹ Kirk H. Porter, *National Party Platforms* (1924), p. 232.

² *Ibid.*, p. 263. Using only different words the same demands were included in the 1948 platform.

³ Lewinson, *op. cit.*, p. 171.

⁴ For details see Lewinson, *op. cit.*, pp. 166-185; and Myrdal, *op. cit.*, pp. 477-479.

by CWA, WPA, PWA, and other relief agencies broke down some of their old hostility to the Democratic Party. President Franklin Roosevelt, furthermore, expressed his friendliness for Negroes by appointing more than a hundred of them to federal offices, by establishing the Fair Employment Practices Committee, and in many other ways; and President Truman's civil rights program continued the Democratic effort to attract Negro voters. It seems apparent, however, that the lily-white movement failed to dislodge many white Southerners from their traditional adherence to the Democratic Party. Even when they were opposed to the New Deal they remained in the party, convinced that white supremacy is the first political principle of southern politics and that the restoration of the two-party system would be its greatest danger. Without the sustenance of federal patronage, moreover, the Republican lily-white organizations are now discernible in only three or four southern states.¹

WOMAN SUFFRAGE

If the ballot was granted to the Negroes too soon, votes for women were not granted soon enough. Women were socially competent for the suffrage long before 1920, when the Nineteenth Amendment forbade the United States or any state to deny or abridge the right to vote on account of sex.

EARLY AGITATION

The agitation for woman suffrage began in the 1830's, and from that time until the Civil War it was coupled with the antislavery crusade. After the war it was long associated with the prohibition movement in which women were active. As women were gradually released from legal, social, and economic subordination to men, the chief group or interest opposing woman suffrage was the liquor trade, for the men engaged in it feared that women would vote for prohibition.

AFTER THE CIVIL WAR

After the Civil War, militant women sought to vote under the Four-

¹ In certain northern cities the Negro vote is sufficiently large and independent so that a presidential election might turn upon it, especially in the states of New York, Ohio, and Illinois. See Harold F. Gosnell, *Democracy: The Threshold of Freedom* (1948), pp. 102-106.

teenth Amendment, but in 1875 the Supreme Court unanimously held that the amendment did not confer the vote upon them,¹ and it was forty-five years before the woman suffrage movement was to be nationally successful. Meanwhile a campaign of education and agitation was carried on in the states and territories which brought one victory after another, although, naturally, the victories did not come with sufficient rapidity to please the leaders. This long campaign is now primarily of historical interest, and perhaps secondarily to students of pressure and minority tactics.² State-wide woman suffrage first appeared in the West when the territorial legislature of Wyoming granted the ballot to women in 1867, apparently without any effort on the part of women's organizations. Colorado (1893), Idaho (1896), and Utah (1896) followed. A period of discouragement for the suffragettes ensued, and it was not until the Progressive Era from 1910 to 1917 that other states extended the franchise to women. Not once, when extended to women, was the right withdrawn by popular or legislative action. By the time the Nineteenth Amendment was submitted to the states, more than half the women of voting age had full suffrage by state law. President Wilson urged Congress to approve the amendment and then exerted his full influence to have the states ratify it. With his assistance, final victory was won.

CHIEF ARGUMENTS FOR WOMAN SUFFRAGE

Over the century of agitation, the women's groups used every conceivable argument and every tactic that seemed to have promise. They claimed that disfranchisement was unjust to them, in that they were "being classed with idiots, children, criminals, and paupers." They asserted, with justice, that women were every bit as competent citizens

¹ *Minor v. Happersett* 21 Wall. 162 (1875).

² Kirk H. Porter, *A History of the Suffrage* (1918), carries the story to the date of publication; Edward M. Sait, *American Parties and Elections* (3d edition, 1942), pp. 76-106, is a good short summary; but there is no definitive history of the woman's suffrage movement. The accounts of the campaign by the participants, and their biographies and autobiographies, are interesting, although often biased by the opinion that women were kept from the vote merely because the professional politicians feared their influence. Notable among these works are Elizabeth Cady Stanton and others, *History of Woman Suffrage* (6 vols., 1881-1922); Carrie Chapman Catt and Nettie Rogers Shuler, *Woman Suffrage and Politics* (1923); Elizabeth Cady Stanton, *Eighty Years and More* (1898); Anna Howard Shaw, *The Story of a Pioneer* (1915); Doris Stevens, *Jailed for Freedom* (1920); and Inez Haynes Irwin, *The Story of the Woman's Party* (1921).

as many male voters, and yet were not allowed to vote. In the Illinois constitutional convention of 1869, wrote Porter,

The full significance of the Fourteenth Amendment had not yet dawned upon . . . the delegates [who] were inclined to argue long and bitterly on the merits of Negro suffrage. It was decided to admit Negroes to the ballot, and this step aroused the advocates of woman suffrage to furious indignation. With biting sarcasm and bitter contempt they upbraided the convention for taking in the debased, vicious black man and repudiating their own women. A large number of delegates were vigorously working for alien suffrage, and toward them was directed a double charge of obloquy. Here were men throwing open public offices and franchise privileges to half-civilized Africans and ignorant, stupid foreigners and yet closing the door upon their own wives and daughters.¹

The other important argument, repeated thousands of times and in thousands of forms, was that women voters would cleanse and purify American politics, destroying the boss system and ending all forms of corruption. "Woman suffrage, it was said [by the suffragettes] would rid the cities of vice and prostitution, prohibition would soon follow, crime would be reduced to a minimum, and all manner of reform would come."²

RESULTS OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE

It is impossible to assess the results of the Nineteenth Amendment by the use of election statistics, since nowhere in the United States are the votes of men and women registered separately. Practical politicians in the East and South commonly assume that fewer women than men register and vote and that those who do vote follow the advice of their husbands, fathers, or brothers. In the West, where woman suffrage has existed longer, the politicians think that about as many women as men vote and that they show a certain independence, particularly concerning referenda on social and welfare legislation.

Such evidence as is available tends to bear out these conclusions. In Illinois women were allowed to vote in 1913, but according to Merriam and Gosnell, by 1923 not half of them had "established voting habits," and "there were twice as many female non-voters as there were male

¹ Porter, *op. cit.*, p. 241.

² *Ibid.*, p. 235.

non-voters.”¹ About 9 per cent of the women non-voters interviewed expressed disbelief in women’s voting by some such remark as that they thought of politics as a “dirty game” that “the men are wont to play.”² The passage of twenty years seems not to have greatly changed this attitude of women toward politics. Paul Lazarsfeld reported several similar remarks collected by interviewers for the study of voting in Erie County, Ohio, in 1940, such as, “I have never voted. I never will. . . . Leave politics to the men.” Of those interviewed, about three times as many women as men expressed no interest in the election, and even where both men and women expressed “great” interest in the election, twice as many women failed to vote as men. Some women “actually consider their aloofness [from voting] a virtue. . . . Although legal restrictions upon women’s participation in politics were removed some twenty-five years ago, the attitude of women toward politics has not yet brought them to full equality with men.”³

In spite of the suffragettes, modern public opinion polls show no very significant difference between the political opinions or party preferences of men and women. They do seem to indicate that women are less interested than men in political questions, because almost always a larger percentage of women answer “no opinion” or “don’t know” to the interviewers. It is quite possible, however, that the differences between men and women in this respect may in the future tend to diminish as women have more leisure and more interests outside the home, and as they work in organizations such as the League of Women Voters.

Perhaps no promise ever made in politics fell flatter than the one that women would clean up the corruption in government, especially in city government. There is no instance of any important political boss being overthrown by women’s votes. On the contrary, Thompson, Long, Hague, Crump, and others have flourished since the adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment. The bosses give “recognition” to women by having women on slates of candidates and by having them as co-chairmen of party committees. Some women have been appointed to jobs in the boss’s gift, and there is no instance of any woman then using her authority to undermine the machine. Instead, women members of the organization seem about as loyal to it as men. Mayor Hague, for example, had women

¹ Charles E. Merriam and Harold F. Gosnell, *Non-Voting: Causes and Methods of Control* (1924), p. 250.

² *Ibid.*, p. 110.

³ Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, *The People’s Choice* (1944), pp. 48-49.

legislators, freeholders (county supervisors), and a woman member of Congress. There is no evidence that any one of them ever gave the boss any trouble or cast a vote he did not like.

Nationally, the major parties have established women's divisions during each campaign. These bureaus get out printed matter supposed to be addressed particularly to women, and they try to get women political speakers for women's meetings. There are as many women as men on the national committees, but whereas the male members of the committee are often real political leaders in their states, the women almost never are. There have been thirty-three women in the House of Representatives, five in the Senate, a great majority of them married women appointed when their husbands died in office. Huey Long's widow, Rose McConnell Long, was a typical example.¹ None has risen to leadership in either house.

Even if the average woman displays little interest and less activity in politics, the enfranchisement of women was nevertheless well worth while. It removed their grievance, it opened to the ardent spirits among them opportunity for political activity, and perhaps it gave all women more confidence in themselves, more of a feeling of full citizenship. There is at present no movement anywhere to hamper or restrict the right of women to the ballot; on the contrary, there is widespread effort to get more women to register and to vote.

"TEEN-AGE" VOTING

Since the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment the only extension of the suffrage to a group previously unable to vote took place in the South. In Georgia Governor Ellis Arnall obtained in 1943 the passage by the Georgia legislature of an amendment to the state constitution reducing the voting age from twenty-one to eighteen. The amendment was approved the same year by the voters of the state by a majority of more than two to one. In 1945 in South Carolina the voting age in the Democratic primary (the real election) was reduced to eighteen.

Governor Arnall believes that among the newly enfranchised young citizens a somewhat higher proportion have voted than among the older people, but there is no statistical evidence on the point. He believes that

¹ Annabel Paxton, *Women in Congress* (1945), contains a roster of women who have served in Congress. See also Gosnell, *op. cit.*, pp. 50-77 for a summary of the evidence on women in American politics.

enfranchisement has stimulated interest in government among young people, and he observes no special "teen-age" voting behavior.¹

The American public is not ready to approve suffrage for eighteen-year-olds, to judge from the Gallup polls. There was strong opposition before World War II, which gave way during the war to a slight majority in favor when young men of eighteen were being drafted, but opinion soon returned to the prewar opposition. The trend may be seen from the results of successive polls:

Would you favor changing the law to allow persons of 18, 19, and 20 years old to vote?

	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No Opinion</i>
June, 1939.....	17%	79%	4%
January, 1943.....	39	52	9
April, 1943.....	42	52	6
September, 1943.....	52	42	6
February, 1947.....	35	60	5

The gradual broadening over the years of the right to vote in the United States has demonstrated that a democracy can become more and more democratic. The process of extending the suffrage, aside from Negro suffrage in the South and teen-age voting, seems to be nearly complete; the United States has attained virtually universal suffrage. No important group in the electorate now clamors for the suffrage, and only the Negroes are in practice partially denied the right that the Constitution grants them.

The total vote cast in presidential elections now runs from 45,000,000 to 48,000,000. The estimated potential vote (persons over twenty-one years of age) is now approximately 95,000,000 and constantly increasing. For the future, therefore, the parties have an immense public to which they must appeal, and to reach this public they must maintain publicity organizations of great size and complexity, a far cry from the Committees of Correspondence. The size of the actual and potential vote is something of a measurement of the task of the political parties.

¹ Letter to the author.

The Sectional, Traditional, and Class Bases of Party

THE UNDERLYING PATTERN of American politics has been sectional. "Statesmanship in this nation," wrote Frederick Jackson Turner, "consists, not only in representing the special interests of the leader's own section, but in finding a formula that will bring the different regions together in a common policy." It has always been necessary for a party that hoped to win to find such a formula, because no single section has ever commanded enough congressional districts, electoral votes, and states to control the federal government; deals and combinations among sections have — perhaps fortunately for the country — always been necessary to the attainment of a majority. On the only occasion in our history when such a combination of compromises could not be worked out, the result was civil war.

THE IMPORTANCE OF SECTIONS IN AMERICAN POLITICS

When the leaders of a national party gather in a smoke-filled hotel room during a national convention to "balance the ticket" or to write platform planks that will please as many sections as possible and offend as few as possible, their activities are not necessarily pernicious. While the delegates are howling and conducting their "demonstrations," the leaders may be quietly engaged in the highest statesmanship — although they are themselves sure it is the most practical kind of practical politics — the reconciliation of conflicting sectional interests so that a popular majority may be peacefully attained.

WHAT SECTIONALISM IS

Sectionalism is a consciousness by the people living in one area of a country that they possess a set of common interests, ideals, opinions, customs, or social traits different from those possessed by other people in the same country. Sectional feeling is often intensified by differences of language, dialect, or accent. In American life the existence of sections is so widely understood that the common names for the sections have passed into ordinary speech: New England, the South, the Northwest, and so on. People recognize without needing explanation that the New Englander has not only different economic interests from the Southerner, but also a different attitude toward life. For political purposes these sections must be regarded as combinations or groups of states, because the federal constitutional system operates only within state lines: presidential electors and senators are chosen by states, and members of the House of Representatives are selected from districts, none of which may cross state lines. The state boundaries themselves, however, are largely artificial; almost all of the states were laid out without regard to any economic, cultural, or geographical considerations. Political sections are, therefore, bound to be rough approximations of interest or sentiment.¹ In order, for example, that a party may carry three congressional districts in a state with four, it may have to accept a program that will win three but lose the fourth, and in order to carry three states in a section with four it may have to give up one to win the others. Even within a state where one party is dominant there may lie counties that cannot be carried; Gillespie County in Texas, for example, is persistently Republican in a predominantly Democratic state.² Such compromises are the essence of sectional politics.

COLONIAL SECTIONALISM

Sectionalism in American politics is older than the Constitution. In the colonial period there were three distinct sections, New England, the

¹ Sociologists have preferred the word *region* to describe areas. See Howard W. Odum and Harry E. Moore, *American Regionalism* (1938), especially pp. 3-51; but historians and political scientists have found themselves more confined to state lines; see, for example, Frederick Jackson Turner, *The Significance of Sections in American History* (1932), especially pp. 22-51, and Arthur N. Holcombe, *The Political Parties of Today* (1924), especially pp. 82-129.

² For other examples see the maps in Charles O. Paullin and John K. Wright, *Atlas of the Historical Geography of the United States* (1932), and in E. E. Robinson, *The Presidential Vote 1896-1932* (1934).

Middle Colonies, and the South. They were distinguished not only by economic differences, but by divergent social traits as well. They were never able to get together in a union, even during the Revolution. The assertion of the sovereignty of individual colonies, like the later assertion of states' rights, was a cloak for sectional interests. No colony or state was ever able to hold out against national authority except with the support of other states in its section. When, for example, the other states in New England accepted the Constitution, Rhode Island had to join the Union too; and when in Jackson's administration South Carolina was not supported to the point of secession in her opposition to the tariff by the other southern states, she had to give in.

THE WEST, THE FRONTIER

There has also always been a West in American politics, though the location of the West has constantly moved farther and farther from the Atlantic coast. In colonial times the West constituted a kind of sub-sectionalism, in that the western area of each colony had a set of interests different from the seaboard, chiefly the interests of debtor against creditor, or in the South, of the independent farmer against the slaveholding eastern planter. In Washington's administration this conflict of western versus eastern interests broke out in violence during the Whiskey Rebellion. Indeed, from Bacon's Rebellion to the Farmers' Holiday of the 1930's, there have been almost constant manifestations of the diversity of interests between East and West, which have sometimes taken the form of forcible resistance to legal processes. A frontier society, wherever located, has been friendly to economic and political innovations, and all of the indigenous radical parties that have made an impression upon American politics have arisen, not from the city proletariat, but from the West — the Greenbackers, the Populists, the La Follette Progressives, and others. "The West, almost from the beginning, wherever it lay at the time, thought of itself as an entity, a substantial and separate section in the Union, and as destined to rule the nation in the future."¹

SECTIONALISM WITHIN STATES

Within most states some kind of sub-sectionalism in politics may be observed. This may take the form of east versus west, as in Massachu-

¹ Turner, *op. cit.*, p. 197.

setts, Pennsylvania, and North Carolina. Separate parties may dominate different parts of the state, as in Massachusetts; or factions within one party may contend with each other, as in Pennsylvania, where there has been an almost constant struggle between the Republican bosses of Philadelphia and Pittsburgh. When sectionalism exists within a state, it need not, of course, be an east-west clash; it may be an upstate versus downstate division, as in New York, New Jersey, and Illinois. Or it may be the mountain areas versus the plains, as in Colorado. These divisions tend to be reflections of different economic interests, complicated by differences of tradition, as in Illinois, or of religion, as in Massachusetts.

Some of these differences within states were produced by the interstate migration that followed the Revolution and the opening of the West. The general direction of this movement was from east to west, so that people from New England and the middle states settled in Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, and the other states in the northern part of the Mississippi Valley. Later, they or their descendants went on to Montana, Oregon, and Washington. New England Federalism was diluted but became Whigism and later Republicanism. Migration from the southern slave states also moved from east to west, so that the states that composed the Confederacy formed a band across the southern part of the United States. Here and there the southern population movement crossed into one of the northern territories, so that, for example, southern Ohio and Illinois have each had a strong Democratic element.

ECONOMIC INTEREST AND SECTIONALISM

Economic interest has always been the chief support of sectionalism. In the colonial period and in the early years of the Republic conflicts of economic interests arose among different types of agriculture, because, with the exception of 5 per cent of the population living in towns or cities, the whole population was engaged in some sort of farming or was dependent upon farming. New England and the middle colonies (and later states) were principally engaged in grain-growing, with some fishing industry and mercantile establishments in the seacoast towns. The grain-growing area extended like a peninsula below the Appalachians and into the South. Tobacco was the chief crop of Virginia and the Upper South; and rice and later cotton of the Lower South. The conflicts of interest arising out of these different agricultural interests affected the politics of the Constitutional Convention. The Lower South, for exam-

ple, felt that slavery was absolutely essential to the cultivation of rice and therefore obtained the constitutional provision barring Congress from prohibiting the importation of slaves before 1808. Madison, in fact, recognized in the convention that sectional economic interests were far more important to political attitudes than the interests of individual states.

SECTIONALISM AND AMERICAN PARTIES

WINNING SECTIONAL COMBINATIONS

Federalist, Whig, Republican. Washington received a unanimous electoral vote in 1789 and again in 1792. But sectionalism in party politics clearly appeared in the next election. John Adams, *Federalist*, obtained in 1796 the electoral vote of New England and most of the middle states, while Jefferson carried the section south of the Potomac. By 1804 Federalism had retreated into New England, where the party made its last stand in 1816. The combination of West and South won most of the elections for the Democrats until 1856, when the new Republican Party, under Frémont, showed that a new alliance of the Northeast and the West had possibilities. Lincoln won on that combination in 1860, and the Republican Party has sought to continue it ever since. From Lincoln to Hoover it has drawn its successful candidates for President from the Middle West or Far West. From Blaine to Dewey's defeat in 1948, on every occasion when it nominated in the first instance an Easterner for President, he was defeated, a fact which has led many Republican politicians to feel that the party, which arose in the West, is now stronger in the East, and to win the presidency must nominate a Westerner.¹ The typical winning Republican sectional combination seems clearly to be a western or middle-western candidate for President (usually from Ohio), with an eastern candidate for Vice-President.

The sectional alliance that was successful for the Republicans was primarily an alliance of economic interests: the grain-growers and dairy farmers who produced chiefly for the domestic market, plus the eastern

¹ When two Republican Presidents, McKinley and Harding (both from Ohio), died in office, the Vice-Presidents, Theodore Roosevelt and Calvin Coolidge, were nominated to succeed them in the next elections, perhaps because the country was at both times strongly favorable to the Republican Party. When Garfield (from Ohio) was assassinated, Vice-President Chester A. Arthur (from New York) was not nominated to succeed him.

manufacturers who also produced for the domestic market. These groups all expected to benefit by a protective tariff. In recent years they have been joined by the producers of beet sugar. This economic alliance was strengthened by the memories and traditions of the Civil War.

Democratic. Before 1860 the Democratic Party was always strong in the South, but it was not the dominant party there that it later became. The Whigs divided the vote from 1836 to 1856. The election of 1860, with its clear-cut issue of the extension of slavery in the territories, was the first that showed a solidifying South. The South was in secession during the election of 1864, so that the electoral votes of the southern states were not counted; but in spite of that loss, Lincoln defeated McClellan by only 412,000 votes out of 4,016,000 cast. By 1868, although three southern states were still unreconstructed, the sectional pattern of the postwar Democratic Party had begun to emerge: the party carried all of the southern states not under military rule, three border states, and New York and New Jersey. This combination, however, did not result in victory until 1884, when Cleveland (of New York) defeated Blaine by carrying the South, the border states, and New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut. The same strategy produced a plurality of the popular vote for Cleveland in 1888, but he did not carry New York, and Harrison won a majority of the electoral vote. Cleveland won again in 1892, however, when he carried New York.

In the election of 1896 the Democratic Party under Bryan tried a different combination, the South plus the West. It almost succeeded. Bryan carried twenty-two of the then forty-five states, and in a two-party vote of 13,504,000 he received only 568,000 fewer popular votes than McKinley. In succeeding elections, however, the South-plus-West combination failed by wider and wider margins, until the division of the Republican Party in 1912 gave Wilson a plurality. Wilson barely won in 1916 on the sectional alliance of South and West that had failed in 1896 and thereafter. Although the Democratic Party carried the South in 1920 and in 1924, it was unable to carry either the North or the West. Its most severe defeat in terms of electoral votes came in 1928, when Smith received the electoral vote of only eight states — six in the South, plus Massachusetts and Rhode Island. The election of 1928 was notable in two respects — it was the only one after the Civil War and before 1948 in which the Democratic Party was unable to keep the South solid, and in the midst of a great defeat it showed the Democrats a new combination that might win, an alliance between the South and the urban states of

the Northeast. The Solid South has 115 electoral votes; there are ten other states, chiefly border, having a Democratic deviation — they lean Democratic, a Gallup poll would say — with 73 more votes, or 198 in all. Therefore, if a Democratic candidate could be found who would not offend the South and who could also carry the five states of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, and New Jersey, he would need to win only the vote of one other large state, such as California, Illinois, or Ohio. Such a candidate was Franklin D. Roosevelt, who had carried New York in 1928 when Smith could not. Although the depression contributed to the result in 1932, it is more than possible that Roosevelt would have won without it.

The sectional alliance that Bryan attempted was a combination of the agricultural areas of the South with the West. The South, long engaged in production for export, desired a low tariff, and the debtor West wanted cheap money. But the relative importance of agriculture in the national economy continued to decline, while the number of factory workers continued to rise, so that the Bryan combination could not form an adequate base for the party. The present coalition of the agricultural, anti-labor, anti-Catholic states of the South with the urban, pro-labor, Catholic states of the North and Northeast is as queer a combination of antithetical elements as American politics ever produced; and it has in it great elements of instability, as the politics of 1948 clearly showed, when Truman lost four southern states to the Dixiecrats. Franklin Roosevelt held these sections together — always with difficulty — by the extension of farm relief and lowered tariffs to the South; of unemployment relief, social security, and labor legislation to the urban states. Organized labor is the cement of the sectional alliance. Since political gratitude is a lively appreciation of favors still to come, the party must at the same time offer a program and candidates to satisfy both labor and the South if it is to continue winning. When President Truman was elected in 1948 it was the first time in the history of the Democratic Party that it won with a candidate for President from west of the Mississippi, the first time since the Civil War that it has won without a candidate from either New York or New Jersey. While in the Northeast Truman carried only Massachusetts and Rhode Island, he made up for this loss by carrying five states in the Middle West, all of the Rocky Mountain states, and all of the Pacific states except Oregon.


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
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
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
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THE STABILITY OF PARTIES

To consider the results of a single national election, or even two or three elections, may give an observer the erroneous impression that the American public is fickle and that parties are consequently unstable. In 1928, for example, the Republican Party won an overwhelming victory when its candidate, Herbert Hoover, received 444 electoral votes to 87 for the Democratic candidate, Alfred E. Smith. The Republican victory was so crushing that William Hard, a well-known journalist, asserted that there was no future for the Democratic Party as a national organization. In the following national election, however, the Republican candidate for President received only 59 electoral votes, the Democratic candidate, 472. And the party that had received 444 electoral votes in 1928 obtained only eight in 1936. But a shift of only 9.5 per cent of the two-party popular vote had produced this landslide in the electoral vote. Thus the electoral college on occasion not only frustrates a party by denying it a victory when it has won a majority of the popular vote, but its operations may also turn relatively small changes in the total vote into electoral landslides. A comfortable majority of the popular vote may bring all or almost all of the electoral votes with it, giving a distorted picture of party strength; in 1936, for instance, Franklin D. Roosevelt obtained only 12.2 per cent more of the two-party vote than did Alfred M. Landon, but Roosevelt received 523 of the 531 electoral votes.

DEMOCRATIC SECTIONALISM

The sectional coalitions upon which our parties are formed are much more stable than electoral votes would indicate. The most notable aspect of American parties, as Professor Holcombe observed, is their long lives. Democratic orators commonly trace their party back to Jefferson's campaign in 1796; the Republicans date their party from 1854. The battlegrounds which the major parties have occupied over their long histories are better shown in maps than in tables of electoral votes. A map showing the average of the two-party vote in each state, for the years from 1900 through 1948, expressed in terms of the Democratic vote, is shown on page 94. The two-party vote is more significant than the total vote as a means of showing the positions of the two major parties in the twentieth century.

It will be observed that the most partisan of the forty-eight states is

AVERAGE DEMOCRATIC PERCENTAGE OF THE TWO-PARTY VOTE
BY STATES, PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, 1900-1948¹ (INCLUSIVE)

Ala. ²	76.2	Me.	40.5	Ohio	46.8
Ariz. ³	59.0	Md.	52.8	Okla. ³	56.8
Ark.	69.8	Mass.	45.6	Ore.	45.1
Calif.	49.1	Mich.	40.6	Pa.	42.3
Colo.	49.4	Minn.	45.7	R.I.	47.6
Conn.	45.0	Miss.	91.9	S.C.	95.2
Del.	48.0	Mo.	52.8	S.D.	45.0
Fla.	71.1	Mont.	52.0	Tenn.	58.2
Ga.	79.9	Nebr.	46.2	Tex.	77.2
Idaho	46.6	Nev.	54.5	Utah	50.7
Ill.	45.5	N.H.	45.2	Vt.	43.8
Ind.	49.0	N.J.	45.7	Va.	63.4
Iowa	43.8	N.M. ³	53.1	Wash.	45.1
Kan.	43.3	N.Y.	46.9	W.Va.	51.2
Ky.	53.8	N.C.	63.3	Wis.	44.5
La.	82.1	N.D.	42.5	Wyo.	45.1

South Carolina, with an average Democratic percentage of 87.9; no Republican candidate for President has ever carried South Carolina. The other states that formed the Confederacy are strongly Democratic, but in varying degrees. Only in the extraordinary elections of 1928 and 1948 was their solidarity broken. Normally, the Republican Party has no organization in the states of the Solid South. In the election of 1942, for example, no Republican candidate was nominated for any federal or state office in ten southern states.⁴ Clearly the Solid South is a well-defined political section; barring religious or states' rights issues, the behavior of the section is definitely predictable.


Lying to the north of the Solid South are six states with Democratic deviations that have been called the border states: Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and West Virginia. The most Democratic of these is Oklahoma, which has gone Republican only twice since it was admitted to the Union in 1907. The least Democratic is West Virginia, with 51.2 per cent; in 1932 and since, it has been strongly Democratic, but from 1900 to 1932 the Democratic Party got a majority

¹ 1948 figures used were unofficial.

² Alabama 1900-1944 because Truman electors in 1948 did not get on the ballot in the state.

³ Averages since admission to the Union.

⁴ *Statistical Abstract of the United States* (1943), p. 237.



The political "color" of the states, in terms of the percentage of the two-party vote represented by the Democratic vote, 1900-1948.

of its two-party vote only in 1912. The border states are connected with the Solid South by economic and cultural ties; many people in them have the same political traditions and the same attitudes toward the Negro. If the Democratic Party can get a majority of the popular vote in a presidential election it can count on carrying the border states by a safe margin. On the whole, the border may be called a Democratic section.

West of Texas are two states usually Democratic, Arizona and New Mexico. They are sometimes called Southwest border, and sometimes they are classed with the Mountain States. In the seven presidential elections since they were admitted to the Union, each has gone Democratic six times.

There are three states in the Rocky Mountain area that lean toward the Democratic Party: Montana, Nevada, and Utah. They can hardly be classified as a Democratic section, however, both because they are non-contiguous and because their consistent devotion to the party began only in 1932. There seems to be no clear-cut reason why these three should be Democratic while other states in the same area may go Republican.

The sectional position of the Democratic Party may be summarized thus: the states in which it has during the present century obtained, on the average, more than half of the two-party vote form a rough band across the continent south of the fortieth parallel from the Atlantic coast to the California line. Montana alone among the Democratic states lies entirely north of the fortieth parallel. As a general rule, the farther south a state is, the greater the percentage of its vote is Democratic. Eight states with Republican deviations varying from 7.0 per cent for Kansas to 0.9 per cent for California lie within the area generally occupied by the Democratic Party.

REPUBLICAN SECTIONALISM

No section of the United States can be called as strongly Republican as the Solid South is Democratic. There is no state as strongly Republican as Georgia is Democratic. Until the election of 1928 the six New England states — Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont — were steadfastly Republican. But in 1928 Massachusetts and Rhode Island went Democratic, and they have been Democratic since, not only in national but in many state and local elections as well. Franklin Roosevelt carried all of the New England states except Maine and Vermont in 1936, 1940, and 1944. The New

England states still have strong economic ties, but they no longer have the cultural and traditional unity that once characterized them. It may well be doubted, therefore, whether New England is any longer a solid political section.

The four middle Atlantic states of Delaware, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania have Republican deviations, but none is any longer "safe" in national elections. Even Pennsylvania, long the stronghold of Republicanism, went Democratic in 1936, 1940, and in 1944.

The eleven central states of the upper Mississippi Valley, on occasion divided by writers on politics in various ways, show no sufficiently different political pattern to justify their separation.¹ All have Republican leanings, but none is so extremely Republican that it has not been carried by the Democrats in recent years. The elections from 1940 through 1948 seemed to show most of these states, particularly the tier from North Dakota south through Kansas, returning to their normal Republican deviation.

The states in the Rocky Mountain area, as has been said, are divided between the two parties. Colorado, Idaho, and Wyoming tend toward the Republican Party, but they hardly form a political section.

The three states on the Pacific coast — California, Oregon, and Washington — are more Republican than Democratic, though never "safe." California, in fact, is Republican by an average of less than 1 per cent in thirteen presidential elections; and for the Roosevelt elections it was almost as Democratic as North Carolina. When President Truman barely carried California in 1948, it seemed to have returned to its normally close political behavior.

The sectional position of the Republican Party may be summarized thus: the Republican states, except for Delaware and Kansas, lie in whole or in part north of the fortieth parallel. But only two of these states, Maine and Vermont, can be relied upon to go Republican every time. With a few exceptions, notably Montana, the farther north a state lies, the greater the percentage of its vote is Republican. But in no state has the Republican Party consistently obtained more than 60 per cent of the two-party vote, as the Democratic Party has done in the Solid South.

¹ Professor Edward M. Sait divided them into central (Illinois, Indiana, Ohio), north central (Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Wisconsin) and west central (Kansas, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota). *American Parties and Elections* (1942 edition), pp. 11-12. Their political behavior does not appear significantly different in these combinations.

In other words, there is no Solid North; on the contrary, the uncertain strength of the Republican Party is spread, never very deep, across the continent from Maine to Oregon. Certainly the thinness of its vote weakens the party, because in the event of national victory it is apt to carry some of its states by such narrow margins that it loses senators, members of the House of Representatives, governors, and all the host of lesser officials necessary to a going political organization. In the event of defeat, on the other hand, it suffers a disaster, as it did in 1932 and again in 1936, when hosts of faithful party adherents were swept out of office. After 1936, in fact, it was left with no really "available" candidates for the election of 1940, and going against the lessons of its experience, it nominated Wendell Willkie, a man who, whatever his fine qualities, had never proved that he could get elected to anything, much less that he could carry any of the large and doubtful states.

THE DOUBTFUL STATES

Between the North and the South lies a band of states which either party may carry. It is in these that the great struggle takes place every four years; it is into these states that both parties pour their campaign funds and send in their speakers. It is usually futile for either party to spend money in Maine, Vermont, or in any of the states of the Solid South.

The precise identification of the doubtful states is difficult. Considered in terms of the number of times that a state has departed from its usual allegiance since 1900, all are doubtful except Arkansas, Georgia, Maine, and Vermont. Forty-four of the forty-eight states have, on one or more occasions in the last thirteen national elections, switched sides. Although politicians recognize the fact that only four are absolutely dependable, they still do not consider such states as Texas or Florida doubtful just because once in forty-eight years they went Republican.

A somewhat better, but still not completely satisfactory, criterion is the average percentage of the two-party vote. The closer a state approaches 50 per cent, the more likely it is, empirically, to go either way; Utah and West Virginia, for example, have an average Democratic deviation of less than 2 per cent over thirteen elections, and in each the Democratic Party has received a majority of the two-party vote six and seven times, respectively, out of thirteen. Similarly, California and Colorado have an average Republican deviation of less than 1 per cent; in California the Republican Party has in six instances out of thirteen received

a majority of the two-party vote; in Colorado in seven out of thirteen. Clearly these four are doubtful states. How many others are?

Professor Arthur N. Holcombe studied extensively the sectional characteristics of American parties. Writing early in 1936, he chose a deviation of 2.5 per cent over the elections from 1920 through 1932 as the criterion for an average, or doubtful, state.¹ The elections that followed, however, may be said to have taken some states out of his Republican column and put them in the doubtful category — California, for instance. And two that he regarded as strongly Republican, Michigan and Pennsylvania, went Democratic two and three times, respectively. In view of the political shifts, whether permanent or not, that took place as a result of Franklin Roosevelt's four elections and the election of 1948, it would probably be reasonable to consider as doubtful those states with an average deviation of 3.5 per cent since 1900. The degree of their deviation from 50 per cent may best be shown approximated in tabular form:

1% or less	2%	2.5%	3%	3.5%
California	Delaware	Rhode Island	Maryland	Idaho
Colorado	Montana		Missouri	New York
Indiana	West Virginia		New Mexico	Ohio
Utah				

These states are not only doubtful in that the percentage of the two-party vote in each of them approaches 50 per cent, but they are also doubtful in that every one has changed sides at least twice in the last thirteen presidential elections. But this measurement tends to emphasize the long-term behavior of states, rather than their votes since 1928, which in some cases are markedly different — Massachusetts and Washington, for example. It must remain to be seen whether the strong Democratic tendency shown in these and other states in recent elections will continue. These fourteen doubtful states have a total of 170 electoral votes, 96 short of a majority in the electoral college, but enough to assure victory to either party that carries them, or even most of them, while also carrying its "safe" states.

SECTIONALISM AND CONGRESS

Sectionalism in American politics appears not only in presidential elections but also in the votes in Congress. Maps of the United States

¹ *The American Political Scene*, Edward B. Logan, editor (1936), pp. 22-24.

showing these votes, such as those in Paullin and Wright's *Atlas of the Historical Geography of the United States*, seem to indicate that there was a clear-cut sectional division on slavery every time and in every way it came up; that the tariff bills have consistently divided the country into North and South; and that the West and South have commonly favored easy credit and soft money, while the East has preferred the gold standard. Woman suffrage was adopted in the West, then in the East, and finally accepted in the South. The liquor questions have had sectional bases, the South and the West tending to be dry, the East generally wet. Sectional interests often cut across party lines. Thus both Republican and Democratic senators from the states that felt that they might be injured by the proposed St. Lawrence waterways project have opposed it on every occasion. Even on the tariff, in the days before the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, Democratic senators and congressmen would often vote in favor of amendments to a pending bill extending higher protection for goods produced in their states, and then would vote against the bill on final passage. Thus they were able to say that they were consistent on Democratic doctrine and at the same time to vote so as to protect the interests of their sections. But it is the persistent sectional interests that tend to hold parties together, and political leaders deplore the rise of issues that confuse or cut across the well-understood lines of these interests.¹

SECTIONALISM IN PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS

Sectionalism is also reflected in the patronage policies of a national administration. A President is well advised, as vacancies occur, to nominate judges of the Supreme Court so as to represent as many sections as may be. The West and the South have, in recent years, complained when their cases were passed upon by justices from New England and New York, and late in his third administration President Franklin Roosevelt nominated two justices from the West and one from the South.

The President's Cabinet, by tradition, must reflect sectional interests. No one area should supply all, or even a majority, of the Cabinet officers. Because of the national parks, monuments, forest preserves, and public lands in the western states, the West always wants the Secretary of the

¹ It will be possible to study sectionalism in congressional votes more fully as successive volumes of *The Atlas of Congressional Roll Calls*, edited by Clifford L. Lord, appear. The first, published in 1943, gives roll calls only through 1788.

Interior to come from that section. Josephus Daniels discussed this aspect of Cabinet making:

Republican papers, because [Secretary of the Interior] Smith was from Georgia, said that the South was in the saddle [during the second Cleveland administration] and that Smith was from a strong Confederate family and his course was actuated by sectional feeling. Smith's position was the same as that of other courageous officials, [but] the recollection of the denunciation of a Southern man as head of the Interior Department caused Wilson in 1913 to decline to consider a Southern man for that portfolio.¹

It is obvious, then, that a President will invite criticism if he appoints too many people from his own state to federal positions. The manna should be made to fall on all states and sections, especially those that contributed to his election. Franklin Roosevelt displeased many Democrats because he nominated numerous New Yorkers to various positions. Early in the Truman administration politicians said, "Yes, he recognizes the claims of sections; half his nominees come from St. Louis and half from Kansas City." Even in state and local governments a sectional distribution of appointments is politically advisable; some states have well-established traditions that state boards and commissions, such as highway and utility commissions, shall be composed as equally as may be of upstate and downstate, or east and west, appointees.

TRADITION AND SECTIONALISM

The adherence of the people in a section to one or the other major party, however, is not fully explained in terms of the citizens' sectional economic interests. If it were, when people move into states where different economic interests are dominant they would change parties. Thus, if a Democrat abandoned the production of cotton in Alabama to engage in the production of sugar beets in Colorado, he should logically leave the Democratic Party and become a high-tariff Republican. But in fact he is likely to remain a Democrat all his life, and his children will likely be Democrats after him. Commonly people take their party membership with them as they move about the country; they do not change parties as their economic interests change.

Perhaps the most that can be said for economic interest as a basis for sectional allegiance to party is that sometimes the tradition is the result

¹ *Editor in Politics* (University of North Carolina Press, 1941), p. 14.

of some ancient party battle, some struggle long ago, which had then an economic basis. The cause may have been forgotten, but the traditional line-up remains. There are, for example, little enclaves of Democrats in New Hampshire who trace their political ancestry back to Andrew Jackson, although individually they may have no clear idea what it was that Jackson stood for. The economic interests of these Democrats, so far as anyone can tell, are identical with those of their Republican neighbors, and have been for generations. They are Democrats by tradition, not by interest.

Sectional traditional allegiance to a party is social as well as economic. It is not good form to be a Democrat in Vermont, nor a Republican in Mississippi. At the early age when political allegiance may begin to form, a Vermont youth will hear Republicans praised and Democrats condemned; he will read Republican newspapers and perhaps become acquainted with Republican politicians; family adherence to the party will reinforce the other pressures until he will look upon a Democrat as a person not quite rational, not fully trustworthy. The reverse of this process, in terms of the political parties concerned, will be taking place among young men in Mississippi. Tradition may be so strong that they can say that they were born Democrats — and *blackrepublican* is as much one word in their vocabularies as *damyantee*.

No adequate statistics exist to differentiate traditional from economic interests in the make-up of the allegiances that produce sectionalism. Merriam and Gosnell estimated that “the percentage of ‘hereditary’ voters runs from 65 per cent to 85 per cent, averaging about 75 per cent.”

If the proportion of the traditional voters cannot be exactly determined, “the strength of party tradition may be studied by examining the extent to which the popularity of parties remains the same in given districts over a period of time. If a [state], a county, or a sub-division of a city remains loyal to a given party over a long period of time, it may be assumed that the traditional vote is strong in that area.”¹ The percentages of the two-party vote over the last thirteen elections shown on page 93 will bear this out, and at the extremes it would appear certain that the allegiance of Georgia to the Democratic and Maine to the Republican parties is due chiefly to tradition. Basing the prediction upon their past behavior, it would be safe to forecast that in the election of 1988 Georgia will be overwhelmingly for the Democratic candidate for President, even

¹ Charles E. Merriam and Harold F. Gosnell. *The American Party System* (3d edition, 1940), p. 107.

though he may be as yet unborn; and Maine will be strongly in favor of whatever candidate the Republican Party may produce.

RISE OF CLASS POLITICS

Although most students agree that the influence of sectionalism upon American parties has been profound, some have professed to see its end approaching. "The old sectional interests are changing," wrote Professor Holcombe in 1933, "and the old sectional alliances are breaking down. The old party politics is visibly passing away." And for the future he predicted that "There will be less sectional politics and more class politics."¹ This prediction has also been made by persons who have been impressed by the rise of the great labor unions, the leaders of which are class conscious.

THE CONSTITUTION AND CLASS POLITICS

Before any consideration of the nature of class politics, it should be noted that the Constitution is hospitable to sectional politics but inhospitable to class politics. The representation of areas in Congress is established in the Constitution, but there is no means of representing classes unless they happen to coincide with states or congressional districts. The electoral college also operates to select not a President favored by a class, but a President favored by a section or a combination of sections. Chiefly because of these constitutional facts, parties representing economic classes, such as the Farmer-Labor, the Socialist, and the Communist Parties have made little progress in American politics. Class politics under our constitutional system is necessarily reflected in the influences of class upon major parties, rather than in the rise of class parties.

For purposes of political study, it is difficult to identify the classes in society. Not merely differences in income are involved, but also the ways in which the income is obtained. In addition to the economic elements, such social matters as common descent, degree of education, and attitudes go to form a class. Aristotle described three classes, upper, middle, and lower, a division which apparently blended both economic and social elements. Marxists usually distinguish two classes, capitalists and proletariat. Bukharin, for the Communists, described five classes.² For his public opinion polls, George Gallup has sometimes used a set of seven

¹ Arthur N. Holcombe, *The New Party Politics* (1933), p. 11.

² Nikolai Bukharin, *Historical Materialism* (New York, 1925 edition), pp. 282-284.

classes, and at other times fewer, depending upon his purpose.¹ Elmo Roper, who has conducted the polls upon which the *Fortune* survey is based, has used four classes, and has treated Negroes separately, or as a fifth class. Any class lines are so tentative and shifting, so complicated by the difficulties involved in attempts to assign important segments of the population (e.g., physicians, public employees) to one class or another, that the best basis for examining political behavior seems to be subjective — people belong in the class where they think they do, and in politics tend to act accordingly.

IDENTIFICATION OF CLASSES

If the future of American politics is class politics, the American people have yet to show the necessary class consciousness. When asked to name the class to which they thought they belonged, 27.5 per cent said they did not know, and others gave a wide scattering of answers, such as "average," "moderate," "good citizen," or "unfortunate." But approximately 3 per cent used words that indicated that they thought of themselves as upper class; 47 per cent as middle class; and 15 per cent as lower class.² A Gallup poll that gave the respondents five possibilities led to their classifying themselves, in terms of income, thus:

Upper income group.....	1%
Upper middle.....	6
Middle.....	41
Lower middle.....	21
Lower.....	31

This would give a total for the middle class of 68 per cent. The great majority also think of themselves as middle class socially:³

Upper class.....	6%
Middle class.....	88
Lower class.....	6

Class lines are naturally so indistinct that certainty seems impossible, but the inference appears to be justified that the great majority of the American people — in so far as they think of the matter at all — feel that they are middle class. "In contrast to many European countries," wrote Lydgate, "there is no self-conscious class of any size which feels itself so inferior or so circumscribed as to have no opportunity to better

¹ George Gallup and Saul F. Rae, *The Pulse of Democracy* (1940), pp. 110-111.

² *Fortune*, vol. 21 (February, 1940), p. 14.

³ Both tables from William A. Lydgate, *What America Thinks* (1944), p. 159.

itself in the eyes of its fellow men. There is lacking that sense of social despair among economically depressed groups which provides the fuel for revolution.”¹ The political attitudes of the mass of the American people, discussed more fully in Chapter 8, show this predominantly middle-class point of view. They are, for example, opposed to the closed shop and wish to see government regulation of unions; they favor thrift in government and a balanced budget; and they prefer private business to government as an employer. Political organizations everywhere prefer middle-class candidates or men of middle-class origin for the great majority of the offices to be filled. Merely rich men are not desirable candidates, unless their money is needed for campaign funds. To “come from an old family” is, generally, no great advantage in American politics, though there are exceptional areas in New England and in the South where family connection brings political prestige.

The differences by classes in political attitudes toward President Roosevelt were shown by a *Fortune* poll in 1940. The respondents were asked, “Which one of the following statements comes closest to describing your feelings [toward the re-election of Franklin D. Roosevelt]?” The statements and the responses were:²

	Pros- perous	Upper Middle Class	Lower Middle Class	Poor	Total	
Roosevelt's re-election for a third term is essential.	4.8%	7.6%	11.0%	17.4%	11.6%	} 41.2%
Roosevelt may have made mistakes, but there is no one else who can do so much good in the next four years.....	16.8	22.6	30.7	38.1	29.6	
Roosevelt did many things that needed doing, but most of his usefulness is now over.....	34.2	33.1	29.5	20.2	28.3	
About the worst thing that could happen to the U.S. is another Roosevelt administration.....	37.0	29.0	19.3	11.7	20.8	} 49.1%
Don't know.....	7.2	7.7	9.5	12.6	9.7	

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 160.

² *Fortune*, vol. 21 (May, 1940), p. 77. Southern Negroes were omitted from the poll.

It is perfectly obvious from these figures that President Roosevelt, while retaining strong support among the poor and the lower middle class, was not generally liked by the prosperous and the upper middle class. He could not have been re-elected, however, without some middle-class support. It is unfortunate for the student of class political behavior that *Fortune* did not publish similar analyses of sentiment in 1936 and 1944. The popularity of the New Deal also varied with classes:¹

"What would you like to see the next administration do about the New Deal?"

	<i>Total</i>	<i>Pros- perous</i>	<i>Upper Middle Class</i>	<i>Lower Middle Class</i>	<i>Poor</i>	<i>Negro</i>
Go further with the New Deal.....	10.0%	3.3%	6.8%	10.1%	13.7%	25.5%
Keep it as it is.....	14.4	6.9	8.9	15.2	20.3	22.7
Modify it.....	39.4	53.2	48.1	40.1	25.9	25.5
Repeal most of it.....	20.4	30.0	26.5	18.4	16.4	12.7
Don't know.....	15.6	6.6	9.7	16.2	23.7	13.6

Here again, the popularity of the New Deal varied with class: the higher in the scale the respondents came, the less they liked the New Deal. The single largest group expressing an opinion was that segment of the prosperous who wanted the New Deal modified.

With the increasing concentration of industry in great units, with the resulting mass employment rather than self-employment, it may well be that the future of American politics will be more class politics and less sectional and traditional politics. The process, if there be one, has not yet advanced to the point where the emergence of classes in politics has resulted in clear-cut cleavages. Our understanding of the behavior of classes in politics is further hampered by the lack of uniformity in the categories for the classes and by a lack of statistics based upon class. Further studies of class and politics are needed.

URBANISM AND POLITICS

There is no question that the United States has become an urban nation. Although the census of 1790 showed only 5.1 per cent of the population

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 169. Southern Negroes were omitted from the poll.

living in towns, the census of 1940 showed 56.5 per cent. World War II undoubtedly accentuated the movement of people to the cities. Today probably somewhat less than the 36.4 per cent shown by the census of 1940 live in rural, unincorporated places.

The concentration of people in great cities is also notable. In 1940 there were 140 metropolitan districts which contained 47.8 per cent of the population, or 62,965,773 people. Approximately two thirds of these people lived in the central cities of the metropolitan areas, and one third in the suburbs.

Twenty states now have a majority of their population living in cities. These twenty have a total electoral vote of 299, or thirty-three more than the necessary majority in the electoral college. All but two of them, moreover, may be said to be doubtful states, though the eighteen differ in their Democratic and Republican deviations. These urban states have not acted as a unit in the electoral college; rather, sectionalism and tradition cut across the urban-rural line. But if, in some future presidential election, one candidate should appear who stood clearly for some policy to which city people were opposed, they could surely defeat him.

In the presidential election of 1944, the majorities in seven cities were enough to determine the result for their respective states. These were: New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Detroit, Baltimore, St. Louis, and Jersey City. President Roosevelt carried them, and with them their states. Had he failed to do so, Governor Dewey would have been elected with 267 electoral votes. In New York State, in fact, Dewey received a majority of the two-party vote; but the vote of the Liberal and American Labor Parties, chiefly in New York City, carried the state for Roosevelt. Rather than a clear-cut division of the electorate into rural and urban parties, it seems more reasonable to expect for the immediate future that the city vote will be determining in close elections.

The twenty urban states have only forty of the ninety-six members of the United States Senate, but they have 259 members of the House of Representatives, forty-two more than a majority. Not all congressional districts in the urban states are composed, of course, of strictly urban areas; but on a city versus country vote in the House, the urban districts could probably command a majority.

Within the states the country counties tend to be Republican, the city ones Democratic, so that in the state legislatures the urban-rural separation approaches coincidence with the Democratic-Republican. There are, of course, exceptions, particularly in the South, where both city and

country are Democratic. But the normal tendency is apparent in most of the doubtful states. The result has been that the country counties usually control the Republican Party in the legislatures, and through it they hold fast to constitutional provisions or to obsolete apportionments that give them legislative majorities that they could not obtain if population constituted the basis for representation. As Governor Smith once said, it is unconstitutional for the Democrats to elect a majority of the New York legislature.

In a study of the representation of all the cities in the United States of 250,000 or more population (except Washington, D.C.), Douglas H. MacNeil found that of the sixty-seven large and big cities, forty-five received substantially less representation in the legislatures than their populations would entitle them to; seventeen received somewhat less; and five received slightly more. "All of our ten largest metropolitan centers are under-represented. New York and Chicago fall short by a quarter of the representation they would be entitled to if population were the criterion. Baltimore and St. Louis have only a little more than half of the quota of legislators which an apportionment based on population would give them; Detroit and Los Angeles have less than half."¹

The result of these rotten-borough arrangements is that in the urban states a Democratic governor is often elected with a Republican legislature. Or the house that is based upon population is Democratic, the one based upon counties or outdated districts is Republican. Responsible party leadership is impossible under such conditions. The states fail to act at all on many pressing problems, but the federal government does act, and the states give up more and more of their authority.

The mob politics that Jefferson feared from the rise of cities has not materialized. Rather, the dominant characteristic of American city politics has been the growth of powerful political machines, dominated by bosses. The conditions of urban life and politics (discussed more fully in Chapter 12) that have produced these machines show no present indication of fundamental change. It would be reasonable to expect more, rather than fewer, bosses in the future.

If labor unions continue to increase in strength, class politics and urban politics will probably tend more and more to coincide. Dave Beck, the labor boss of Seattle, may be more of the prototype of the future boss

¹ "Urban Representation in State Legislatures," *State Government*, vol. 18 (April, 1945), p. 60. See also Harold F. Gosnell, *Democracy: The Threshold of Freedom* (1948), pp. 174-183.

than Frank Hague or Ed Crump. This does not mean that sectional politics is disappearing. But it does mean that with the growth of industrial cities and the increasing power of organized labor groups, class as an element in American politics will probably become more and more important.

II

Public Opinion and Parties

Parties, Public Opinion, and Propaganda

UNCLE JOE CANNON said that William McKinley kept his ear so close to the ground that he was always getting it full of grasshoppers. Successful politicians before and since McKinley have paid the closest attention to public opinion. Today if their ears are not close to the ground, their eyes are fixed upon the latest public opinion poll. For today as always they know that the movements of public opinion may decide their destiny.

RELATION OF PARTIES TO PUBLIC OPINION

Political parties have a multiple relationship to public opinion, for they are both a result and a cause of it, each in a variety of ways. They exist because of widely held opinions of two kinds, those approving of parties in general, and those approving of a particular party program, platform, or combination of party opinions and interests. As creators, causes, or shapers of public opinion parties seek to influence the general mind in order that they may gain and keep adherents; in other words, parties engage in propaganda. But in addition, parties themselves are publics, the recipients of propaganda from various interest groups that seek to influence their behavior, more particularly the behavior of those party members who are the holders of legislative and other offices. Thus party is both result and cause of public opinion, and may in turn be influenced by all the variable tides and currents within this larger sea of thought.

THE CONCEPT OF PUBLIC OPINION

Although there has been much controversy about the concept of public opinion, the argument need not concern us here.¹ The word *public* is

¹ See, for example, Paul A. Palmer, "The Concept of Public Opinion in Political

used to refer to the people, generally, as the American public; or, when modified by an adjective, to some particular collection of persons, as the radio public. An opinion is a belief or attitude that can be expressed in words. If a feeling or sentiment cannot be expressed in words, it cannot be identified, whether as an opinion, judgment, view, or any other mental state.

The term *public opinion* is used to designate any collection of individual opinions, as in the expressions "public opinion on labor unions" or "Southern opinion on the poll tax." The particular opinion is designated by coupling the general term with the subject on which the opinion is expressed.¹ Such a public opinion need not represent a majority, need not coincide with the electorate, and may or may not be well advised, depending upon the observer's standards or point of view. Not all public opinions have to do with politics; polls have indeed been taken on whether men liked cuffs on their trousers and on whether people would like to have the Duke and Duchess of Windsor live in this country. Public opinions need not be (and often are not) consistent one with another; for them to be considered public opinions, it is enough that they exist and are identifiable.

The term *public opinion* is also used in a metaphorical sense in such expressions as "government by public opinion," or "the responsiveness of officials to public opinion." Here there is a tendency to personify the general public or some collection of public opinions. The metaphorical use of the term is, of course, inexact. It is nevertheless often useful and sometimes necessary, just as many other terms, such as *liberty*, *due process*, or *social science*, are inexact but indispensable.² The reasonably intelligent reader, seeing this usage in books and newspapers, will not assume that any "crowd mind" or super-organic being is implied but will recognize the metaphor for what it is.

Theory," *Essays in History and Political Theory in Honor of Charles Howard McIlwain* (1936), pp. 230-257; Floyd H. Allport, "Toward a Science of Public Opinion," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 1 (January, 1937), pp. 7-23; Harwood L. Childs, "By Public Opinion I Mean," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 3 (April, 1939), pp. 327-336.

¹ The concept of public opinion here followed is that of Professor Harwood L. Childs. He explains and illustrates his views in *An Introduction to Public Opinion* (1940), pp. 35-48.

² Professor Floyd H. Allport, *op. cit.*, p. 8, calls this use of the term *public opinion* "The Group Fallacy of the Public." There is danger, he thinks, that the part will be taken for the whole, and that "facts concerning minorities" will be concealed "which it is the business of research to uncover."

PROPAGANDA IN POLITICS

PROPAGANDA REDEFINED

Political parties, then, seek to develop public opinions favorable to themselves, and in doing so they propagandize, or engage in propaganda. Agnes Repplier once aptly said that *propaganda* is a good word that has been in bad company. It came from the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith (*Congregatio de Propaganda Fide*) of the Roman Catholic Church, established sometime between 1572 and 1585 by Pope Gregory XIII.¹ Thus the word *propaganda* originally meant no more than missionary work. But it gradually broadened to cover the dissemination of other ideas as well as religious opinions. It got its bad reputation in World War I, when it was linked in common usage with the unpopular word *German* in the now famous phrase "German propaganda." But the Allies conducted their own highly successful attempts to influence opinion at home and abroad, and to avoid the horrid word, their activities were called publicity, education, or the distribution of public information. Only when engaged in by the enemy were these efforts propaganda. After World War I the word came to be applied to "what you don't like of the other fellow's publicity," as Edward L. Bernays said; but *publicity* is too narrow a term to include the variety of activities that are used to influence public opinion. There is no word other than *propaganda* to cover the spreading of ideas and doctrines. If *propaganda* is used to refer only to "bad" opinions, methods of spreading them, or ideas spread for ulterior motives, who is to say what is good and what is bad? Some Supreme Court of Propagandas — or some Fair Propaganda Practices Committee — would be needed, and the body would require of its members superhuman intelligence and omniscient foresight, for it is only as some plans are tested that their effects can be determined. Until some new term is coined and accepted as including all attempts to influence opinion — good, bad, indifferent, and unpredictable — there is no logical alternative to using the word *propaganda* in its original and innocuous sense and not merely as a term of reproach.²

¹ Harwood L. Childs, *An Introduction to Public Opinion* (1941), p. 75.

² For a concise survey of the attempts to define propaganda see Childs, *op. cit.*, pp. 75-88. The best bibliographies are *Propaganda and Promotional Activities: an Annotated Bibliography*, by Harold D. Lasswell, Ralph D. Casey, and Bruce L. Smith (1935), and *Propaganda, Communications, and Public Opinion: a Comprehensive Reference Guide*, by Bruce L. Smith, Harold D. Lasswell, and Ralph D. Casey (1946).

PARTY PROPAGANDA AND INDIFFERENCE

In seeking to arouse a public opinion favorable to its candidates or issues, any political party faces the primary problem of the great indifference, or perhaps inertia, of the public. Theorists of democracy often appear to assume that the citizen is intensely interested in his government. Actually, the typical citizen is not; politics, in fact, is one of the least of his interests.

There is a mass of evidence on this indifference. After a hard-fought presidential campaign, perhaps half of the eligible voters will go or be taken to the polls, and after local and off-year campaigns often as few as 5 per cent will vote. Outside of the South, where the Democratic primary is the real election, only 10 to 20 per cent of the registered voters take part in the primaries; but if the citizens were really interested in politics they would know that a vote in the primary is of crucial importance, because the primary sets the choice that can be made in the general election.

All surveys of newspaper reader interest put an interest in political news far below sports, "comics," human interest, and other categories of newspaper content.

The natural tendency of the Managing Editor and the Circulation Manager is to give their readers what they want, and there have been many evidences that politics is among the last things they want in the way of reading matter. The space given to crime, comics, sports, fiction, and features has increased; that to Congress and even to local politics has decreased. . . . There is in the United States today hardly a paper that does not give four times the space to sports it does to national and international politics.¹

George Gallup found that "More adults read the best comic strip on an average day than the front-page banner story"; that "the average reader *The Public Opinion Quarterly* has from time to time published supplements, using the same categories as these bibliographies. It should be noted that most writers in sociology adhere to the view that propaganda is something evil, and attempts to influence opinions of which they approve they call education or publicity. See, for example, Frederick E. Lumley, *The Propaganda Menace* (1933), and Leonard W. Doob, *Public Opinion and Propaganda* (1948). At page 240 Doob writes, "Propaganda can be called *The attempt to affect the personalities and to control the behavior of individuals toward ends considered unscientific or of doubtful value in a society at a particular time.*" (Italics in the original.)

¹ Frank R. Kent, *Political Behavior* (1928), p. 78.

of a metropolitan daily spends more time on the features than on the news"; that only about 5 per cent of adult readers read all the editorials, while about 20 per cent read one or more; that even during a presidential campaign only about 10 per cent of all adult readers follow the Washington correspondents; and that "a great many women read no news at all."¹ No magazine devoted exclusively to political news and events has any great circulation, and when the mass circulation magazines, such as *The Saturday Evening Post*, print articles on political topics, the editors dilute the subjects or have the discussion built around personalities — preferably some clash of personalities.

Nor do people like to listen to political speeches or political discussion. They do not attend political meetings as they attend football games or movies. Even though millions listen to the President, they do not, in general, like to listen to political speeches on the radio. Of the many surveys and polls which show this attitude, one example will suffice. The question was asked for the March, 1936, *Fortune* poll, "Would you like to hear more, less, or no political speeches on the air? The responses were:²

	<i>More</i>	<i>Same</i>	<i>Less</i>	<i>None</i>
Men	20.3	34.3	29.4	16.0
Women	11.2	41.6	26.8	20.4
Total	15.8	38.0	27.9	18.3

Few campaign years had seen as much interest as 1936, but even in that year close to one fifth of the population wanted to hear no political speeches on the radio; more than one fourth would have preferred to have the number reduced; and less than one eighth wanted to hear more.

The campaign of 1944 was also intense, but on November 3 a Gallup poll reported that 14 per cent did not know who was the Republican candidate for President; 46 per cent did not know the Republican candidate for Vice-President; and the man who was to become President upon the death of Franklin Roosevelt was unknown to 45 per cent. The transitory nature of political fame was further shown by the fact that 23 per cent could not recall who had been the Republican candidate for President four years before.³

When so few know the major candidates, of course fewer still know the

¹ George Gallup, "A Scientific Method for Determining Reader-Interest," *Journalism Quarterly*, vol. 7 (March, 1930), pp. 9-12.

² *Fortune*, vol. 13 (March, 1936), p. 104.

³ *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 8 (Winter, 1944), p. 571.

lesser ones. For example, 47 per cent could not name either United States Senator from their own state, and only 22 per cent could name one correctly.¹ When asked to rate the job their congressman had been doing, 44 per cent admitted they had paid no attention to him, and 6 per cent said they did not know.² If so few people know their senators and congressmen, the number who know their state legislators or follow their work must be insignificant.

Long before the day of public opinion polls, politicians were aware that the public is not much interested in politics, and that the most intense effort is needed if a party is to arouse enough interest to have party propaganda make any effect upon the electorate. This general indifference to government and politics is the most fundamental fact affecting political propaganda. Americans will fight for democracy, and if need be will die for it; but they have very little interest in following the democratic process.

POLITICS AS A FUNDAMENTAL INTEREST

An important reason that the people show so little interest in politics is that in the ordinary individual many other impelling motives, drives, fundamental interests — whatever they may be called — come ahead of politics. Lord Bryce, in fact, placed politics last among the five chief interests of the average man. He wrote:

The several kinds of interest which the average man feels in the various branches or sides of his individual life come in something like the following order:

First, the occupation by which he makes his living, which, whether he likes it or not is a prime necessity.

Secondly, his domestic concerns, his family and relations and friends.

Thirdly, but now only in some countries, his religious beliefs or observances.

Fourthly, his amusements and personal tastes, be they for sensual or for intellectual enjoyments.

Fifthly, his civic duty to the community.

The order of these five interests of course varies in different citizens. . . . But the one common feature is the low place which belongs to the fifth, which for more than half the citizens in certain countries scarcely exists at all.³

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 281.

² *Ibid.*, p. 574.

³ James Bryce, *Modern Democracies*, vol. 2, p. 547. Copyright 1921 by The Macmillan Company and used by their permission.

Psychologists also have compiled lists of primary interests, and while the lists differ and the nomenclature is various, politics or government is always placed well below health, wealth, family, sentiments, and other concerns. Floyd H. Allport, a leading psychologist of the behaviorist school, put politics fifth among eleven "major drives of human beings."¹ For the politician and the political scientist, the lesson to be drawn from such evidence is clear: it is futile and absurd to rail at human nature and to complain because people in a democracy are not more interested than they are in the platforms and behavior of parties. The citizen has many other things to do besides governing, and many of these other activities seem to him more pressing.

COMPETITION AMONG PROPAGANDAS

In addition to the handicap of public indifference to politics, party propaganda must compete with many other propagandas. The essence of democracy, in fact, is a *laissez-faire* attitude toward propagandas. Thousands of associations, committees, leagues, societies, unions, and other groups contend with each other and with the parties for access to the attention of the citizen. Some, like the Masons, have no program that can be called political; others, like churches, are only occasionally or casually interested in political issues; but still others, like the National Association of Manufacturers or the Political Action Committee, are intimately associated with one party and engaged in combat with the other. Many of the strategies of propaganda may be, and of course are, utilized by other groups just as well as they can be used by parties. Thus the competition for the attention of the public is intense.

Government versus Party Propaganda. Governments engage in propaganda and have always done so. Government propaganda may either run counter to party propaganda or may merely compete with it for access to the means of communication. In a dictatorship the government and the official party possess a monopoly of propaganda, and by censorship or suppression permit only one interpretation of events or policy to be spread. Free governments employ the statements and speeches of officials, publicity "handouts," government documents, the management of events (e.g., parades, holidays), the manipulation of symbols (e.g.,

¹ *Social Psychology* (1924), p. 111. See also Doob, *op. cit.*, pp. 11-32. Teachers of public speaking, from Aristotle to the present, have sought to identify these motives or interests so that speakers might adapt their appeals to them. See, for example, A. E. Phillips, *Effective Speaking* (1924), pp. 48-62; and James A. Winans, *Speech Making* (1938), pp. 146-154.

flags, honors, medals), advertising, posters, movies, and many other devices of propaganda. Some governments publish official newspapers or other periodicals. Some governments own and operate as national monopolies the radio networks, and where they do there is always at least the suspicion that the radio news is colored or slanted in the way the government desires. For instance, Mayor La Guardia was frequently attacked by opposition groups and parties for his use of radio station WNYC, owned by New York City.

The increasing activities of government have led to an increase in government propaganda. The newspaper press, the radio news agencies, and the wire services have been increasingly compelled to accept the news as it has been handed out to them. As Arthur Krock of the *New York Times* wrote:

Able newspaper men are in charge in every department and agency. The press sheets are of great value, and rarely has any statement been disproved in fact. Newspaper bureaus in Washington could not, for example, have covered the multifarious open activities of the NRA code authorities without using the NRA press department as an auxiliary. There are not enough reporters in Washington to keep any one newspaper or press association in touch with all these matters.¹

In the United States the wire services, such as the Associated Press and the United Press, are not owned, operated, or controlled by government; but foreign governments, even democratic ones, have either owned or subsidized news-gathering services, so that the charge can always be made that such agencies slant the news in favor of the government. The propaganda resources of government are so great, as compared with the resources of any political party, that if propaganda alone won elections the party in control of the government could not be defeated by the party out of power. As it is, the party out of power operates at a great disadvantage in the competition of propagandas.

DEVICES OF PROPAGANDA

PUBLIC SPEAKING

The device of propaganda most extensively used by politicians and political parties is public speaking. Only a few men have been successful

¹ *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 1 (April, 1937), p. 46. Cf. Harold W. Stoke, "Executive Leadership and the Growth of Propaganda," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 35 (June, 1941), pp. 490-500, and James L. McCamy, *Government Publicity* (1939).

in American politics without having more than ordinary ability to address an audience. Jefferson, Cleveland, and Hoover reached the presidency for other reasons than their oratorical talents, and some first-rate speakers such as Clay, Webster, and Bryan failed to attain the chief prize of American politics, though they did establish party leadership. Lincoln and Wilson, however, were great speakers by any standards, and Franklin Roosevelt and his cousin Theodore, whether great or not, were highly successful at attracting and holding audiences. Among recent and unsuccessful candidates for the presidency Cox, Davis, and Landon were not particularly effective speakers. Candidates for offices lower than the presidency have found in the ability to speak well an immense advantage, not only in getting elected but also in establishing and maintaining leadership.

Of all the devices of propaganda, speaking is the least expensive to a candidate, a party, or a pressure group. The speaker reaches not only his immediate audience but sometimes a newspaper audience as well. Uncounted thousands of clubs, societies, racial associations, fraternal orders, and similar bodies have meetings at regular intervals. Most of them welcome political speakers, either inviting them or being receptive to suggestions from the party speakers' bureau or from group headquarters that speakers are available. People like to see and hear a man they may be voting for. No fees are paid to speakers, and usually they are not even given their expenses. In an urban constituency a candidate for almost any office from assemblyman up will receive invitations to speak, sometimes dozens for a single day. Candidates for major offices will receive hundreds. In rural areas the audiences are fewer and smaller, but every candidate for governor or for Congress will find that he can speak to one or more audiences almost every night. If he is elected, the requests continue to pour into his office.

The Campaign Tour. The campaign tour is an integral part of American party politics. Candidates for state-wide offices, unless they are certain of election, tour their states, making speeches to every audience, big and little, that will listen. In most states the tour takes place during the summer of the election year, between the primary and the general election. But in the one-party states, candidates for the nomination cover as much of the state as they can before the primary. Huey Long and W. Lee O'Daniel used for their state campaign tours cavalcades of automobiles which carried the hillbilly bands used to attract crowds for the speaking, and because most of their meetings on the tours were held in the open

air, they also took along trucks equipped with loudspeakers. Such cavalcades, of course, are expensive; a tour of thirty days can easily cost \$50,000. But candidates have covered a state at very little cost. "Alfalfa Bill" Murray, for example, went around Oklahoma in a battered old automobile and sat on the running board to eat his meals of cheese and crackers. He spoke whenever he could get anyone to listen, and he was elected.

It is usual for presidential candidates to tour the country, unless they are physically unequal to the ordeal, unless they are notoriously poor speakers, or unless they or their managers feel very confident of election. When they do not go on the stump, they are said to conduct a "front-porch campaign," a phrase that sprang into existence when William McKinley spoke from the front porch of his home in Canton, Ohio, to people who were brought to hear him. It was once thought to be beneath the dignity of Presidents who were candidates for re-election to tour the country seeking votes. Woodrow Wilson, for example, refused to campaign in 1916. But President Hoover made what amounted to a tour in 1932; President Roosevelt made one in 1936 in the guise of a trip to visit the drought-stricken areas, another in 1940 when he visited defense plants, and a third in 1944 to military installations. The old tradition, if it still exists, is threadbare; indeed, it is almost too much to expect that a President will remain quietly in the White House while the man who is seeking to replace him is speaking at various places over the country.

Hundreds of tales of presidential campaign tours form part of the lore of American politics. Of all the men who have gone on these tours none has equaled William Jennings Bryan. He was the ideal campaigner. Gifted with extraordinary physical attributes for a speaker, he had such a powerful voice that he was easily heard by the 20,000 people at the Chicago Convention in 1896, and the quality of his voice was pleasant. It was said of him when he was still in college that "he had a mouth so wide he could whisper in his own ear." But that wide, thin-lipped mouth enabled him to make his enunciation clear and distinct. This most unusual voice was untiring; Bryan could make speeches until he was too tired to stand, whereupon he would sit on a chair and go on talking — and still be heard throughout a large hall. He traveled thousands of miles, often by day coach, and in those days before radio and loudspeakers he was heard by millions of people. His ability to speak at all times and under all conditions was the despair or amazement of contemporary

politicians. Arthur Mullen, long Democratic national committeeman from Nebraska, wrote of one of his campaigns:

Bryan had carried Nebraska in 1896 by 12,000 votes but had lost it in 1900 by 7000. . . . The only way [to win Nebraska in 1908] was to show him at his best, a convincing but not an embittering speaker.

To do that we put on a special train campaign. In one week Bryan went a thousand miles, speaking in every important town from the Kansas line to South Dakota, from the Missouri River to Wyoming. Sometimes he spoke thirteen times in a day. After a speech he would sometimes fall down on the bed from exhaustion and sleep awhile. We would throw cold water on his face to wake him, and he would get up, go out on the platform, give 'em hell, then tumble back to sleep until the next performance. I have never seen such magnificent physical endurance, never heard so tireless a voice. He deserved to win Nebraska, and he won it by 6000 votes.¹

All sorts of accidents happen on campaign tours. Speeches get mixed up. Trains pass up towns where speeches are scheduled. Landon's train was wrecked. Willkie lost his voice. People heckle and even throw things at the speaker, as eggs and tomatoes were thrown at Henry Wallace in 1948. Theodore Roosevelt was shot at and wounded. Bryan once found that Republicans had carted away the speaker's stand from which he was to address a crowd at a county fair. Josephus Daniels tells of an accident during Bryan's campaign in 1896:

Bryan had been speaking in Nash Square [in Raleigh, N.C.] but a few minutes under an electric light when a great bug with fangs entered his throat, and he was compelled to seek the assistance of a surgeon to remove the clawing bug. Consternation ensued until the varmint was removed and Bryan was able to continue.²

Rallies. During campaigns party rallies are held by the thousands. Huge mass meetings in big cities will be addressed by presidential candidates, governors, senators. Other political meetings are held at all levels down to precincts and neighborhoods. The total number of speeches made to all of these meetings in a hard campaign must be astronomical. Americans can listen to an immense amount of talk. In off years active party organizations continue to hold as many meetings as they can. Party rallies serve many purposes: they give party workers an opportunity to hear and meet candidates, officials, and party leaders, so that these

¹ *Western Democrat* (1940), p. 132.

² *Editor in Politics* (1941), p. 191.

workers get a sense of belonging and a feeling of importance; and they also give party workers a place to bring possible converts where they may be exposed to party propaganda. Non-party groups such as labor unions use meetings for much the same reasons. Some city machines use rallies as a means of checking up on party workers. Mayor Hague always had such a rally, which he addressed, just before election day. The Kelly-Nash rallies in Chicago were equally well planned and generated. As one writer describes them,

The 30,000 "organization" employees on the city and county payrolls are expected to do their parts. Before every election day the machine stages several huge rallies, purely for the payrollers, in large sections of the city. Every employee, whether on the civil service list or not, receives a card of admission bearing his name. These cards are collected at the door, so that both the department heads and the machine leaders can check upon whether or not any individual employee put in an appearance. The candidates appear at the rallies and make pep talks, similar in purpose to that of a football coach to his team before it takes the field. (The Republican city machine in Philadelphia uses the same system to make sure the payrollers do their part on election day.)¹

The rally is an important cog in the party machinery.

Radio Speaking. Since the invention of the radio, parties have been cutting down on the amounts of money they spend on various kinds of advertising while they are putting more and more into buying radio time. Politicians are not fully agreed, however, upon the value they get for their money, at least at different levels of government.

Those who favor the wide use of the radio point to the political success of Franklin D. Roosevelt, and it is true that the possession of a good radio voice is now one of the most important factors of "availability." Charles Michelson, long publicity director for the Democratic National Committee, gave great credit for Franklin Roosevelt's success to his radio speaking:

We had [wrote Michelson] the best radio voice in the world, which added to the prestige of the presidency, his gift of phrases, and the quality of his speeches, insured him audiences larger than the opposing candidate could hope for. I have sometimes thought that we might have dispensed with all radio speeches and programs except those of the President without diminishing the majority that elected him.²

¹ Charles W. Van Devander, *The Big Bosses* (Howell, Soskin, 1944), p. 276.

² *New York Times*, November 15, 1936. Michelson said that the Democratic National Committee spent \$540,000 in 1936 buying radio time. Expenditures have

Radio in State and Local Campaigns. In state and local politics there have been some spectacularly successful uses of the radio. Mayor La Guardia developed a very considerable following for his speeches, so that he could win without having a complete political organization. Huey Long, opposed by what he called the "lying newspapers," reached many of his people by radio; a person who is unable to read may still listen to the radio and be persuaded.

Perhaps no politician in American life has equaled former Senator W. Lee ("Pass the Biscuits, Pappy") O'Daniel of Texas in his successful use of the radio in politics. Born in Ohio, he had lived most of his life in Kansas; he had never voted in Texas and could not vote in 1938, the year he was first elected governor, because he had not paid his poll tax. He was a flour salesman who had never held any public office. These handicaps would ordinarily be sufficient to defeat any man in his first campaign, but in addition to them, O'Daniel entered against a field of twelve candidates, some of whom were highly respected and experienced. But in selling flour by radio he had discovered what radio audiences, at least in Texas, liked:

In addition to hillbilly music, sacred songs, and religious talks, there were memorial programs of every sort, programs on the Constitution of the United States, and programs commemorating Texas heroes. Erring husbands were advised to correct their behavior, school children were given good advice on thrift and conduct, traffic safety was emphasized, childless couples were advised to adopt babies, and religious and humanitarian movements and organizations were supported.¹

O'Daniel also advocated the Ten Commandments and the Golden Rule. His campaign slogan was "More smokestacks and business men, and less Johnson Grass and politicians." He was an easy winner; in the Democratic primary (the real election) he carried 231 of Texas' 254 counties. One authority on Texas politics attributes O'Daniel's success to his use of the radio:

More than 94 per cent of the people lived in the counties in which O'Daniel led all the other candidates. A study of the returns will show since risen. For the 1944 campaign the Democratic National Committee spent \$925,000, or approximately 40 per cent of its disbursements, on radio time. The Republican National Committee spent \$841,600, or about 30 per cent of its disbursements. See Louise Overacker, "Presidential Campaign Funds, 1944," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 39 (October, 1945), p. 901.

¹ S. S. McKay, *W. Lee O'Daniel and Texas Politics, 1938-1942* (1944), p. 34.

that O'Daniel plurality counties are in all cases those which were served most efficiently by the radio stations over which he had been broadcasting his programs regularly for ten years immediately prior to the campaign. One may go even farther in this analysis. Most of the counties in which the O'Daniel pluralities were largest are in the immediate vicinity of Fort Worth, indicating the probability that many of their citizens had the advantages of the early broadcasting programs and personal appearances of the Light Crust Doughboys [O'Daniel's radio troupe]. . . . It seems evident that the O'Daniel following knew their candidate through his broadcasts. He had no political organization of any kind, no campaign manager except Mrs. O'Daniel, no newspaper support in the earlier part of the contest, and was totally lacking in political experience. The only possible conclusion is that the O'Daniel victory in 1938 was due to the power of the radio.¹

After an undistinguished term as governor, O'Daniel was re-elected, and when Senator Morris Sheppard died, he was elected to the Senate. After his first election he was opposed by powerful interests, by the regular politicians, and by all of the most influential newspapers in Texas. But his radio audience was loyal to him. He retired undefeated.

In addition to full speeches, parties have been experimenting with other devices, such as the recorded "spot announcement," a one- or two-minute statement put on the air between programs in which a single argument is presented or a single charge is made. Political radio dramas have been tried, but so far without great success, perhaps because the propaganda shows too strongly. In 1940 Senator Vandenberg tried to stage radio debates with President Roosevelt by playing recordings of the President's earlier addresses, which he then proceeded to refute; but the radio companies objected because of a rule of theirs against the playing of records in sponsored programs. It is probable that the use of radio in American politics is still in its infancy, that more extensive use will be made of it and new techniques will be worked out.

Difficulties of Radio Speaking. While the successes of radio speaking are well known, the failures are much less so. For every La Guardia there are a thousand mayors who have not been able to build up a following by speaking on a local radio station. Franklin Roosevelt was the only one among recent presidential candidates who had a thoroughly satisfactory radio voice and manner. In spite of the gigantic potential radio audience — there are estimated to be some sixty million radio sets in use

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

— the radio has some disadvantages to the political speaker. In the first place, some distinctly successful political speakers, such as Alfred E. Smith, do not make equally successful radio speakers, and may even make an unsatisfactory impression upon their hearers because all of their personality is lost except what can be conveyed by voice alone. In Smith's case, "broadcasting seemed only to intensify his native Bowery accent; and the mild dislike of New York prevailing in the rest of the country served partly to nullify the wit, force, and close reasoning of his campaign speeches."¹

Another difficulty is that when an audience cannot see a speaker they are not ordinarily content to listen for more than fifteen minutes unless the man addressing them is a President or a Prime Minister, or unless he has some momentous message. Some contemporary speakers, such as Norman Thomas, can hold an audience, face to face, for two hours, but few if any could hold a radio audience for so long. Yet many complicated political issues and problems cannot be adequately explained and defended in the fifteen minutes or half hour that a radio audience will listen. Still another difficulty is in the kind of attention that a radio speaker gets. When a man talks to an audience in a hall, with all the people facing him, he gets their attention focused upon him and upon what he has to say; whereas the radio audience is scattered in many homes, and the people are only half listening while they read the newspaper, wash the dishes, play with the children, or doze in an arm chair. The radio speaker must be able to turn verbal handsprings to get the undivided attention of his potential audience. Furthermore, people develop habits of radio listening, just as they develop habits of reading certain newspapers or magazines.² The surveys show that most people listen to the radio in the three evening hours after six o'clock, and it is these periods that the broadcasting companies most readily sell to the commercial advertisers, so that a political speaker has difficulty in getting the best time. If he succeeds in displacing a program with a following, he is likely to arouse animosity among those who tuned in to hear it and got a political speech instead. On the other hand, to go on a local station during one of the periods when a popular program is being broadcast by a big station or by a network is almost to talk to nobody but the technicians. It may be true, as Job Hedges once said, that "It is the man who hires the hall who makes

¹ Will Irwin, *Propaganda and the News* (1936), p. 249.

² For a recent analysis of these listening habits, see Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Patricia L. Kendall, *Radio Listening in America* (1948).

public opinion"; but it is not necessarily true that it is the man who hires the radio facilities who makes public opinion.¹

The Speakers' Bureau. Any party that is well organized has a speakers' bureau during campaigns. Each major party has a national speakers' bureau which may have branches in various parts of the country. The parties in the larger and doubtful states have them, and there may also be bureaus for cities, counties, congressional districts, and other units, depending upon circumstances.² The bureau receives and sorts the requests that come to the party for speakers, and it assigns men or women appropriate for the audiences. Often speakers have to be obtained who can be eloquent in Italian, Greek, French Canadian, or some other language besides English. In addition, the bureau tries to get party speakers before nonpartisan groups that have not requested them, because it is in these meetings that converts may be made. The bureau commonly has charge of any radio program the party may be conducting, and it provides men to speak on the radio. Usually the bureau also has charge of street-corner, sound-truck, and other open-air speaking that the party undertakes.

Every speakers' bureau has difficulty in preventing its speakers from contradicting one another and from taking positions that are inconsistent with party platforms. Such blunders give openings for an attack by the opposition. The problem is beyond complete solution because of the composite nature of parties and the compromise character of platforms, but the bureaus do what they can by offering advice, outlines, even complete talks, to speakers. They do not, of course, send to important meetings speakers who have not been tested. Some bureaus even have speakers' schools where teachers instruct without charge would-be party orators.

Unless the expense of radio programs is charged to the speakers' bureau, the cost of operating such a bureau is not high. An immense amount of propaganda may be obtained for only a few hundred dollars for office

¹ Walter H. Wilke, after an experiment on college students to test the relative effects of propaganda by means of speeches, radio, and print, concluded, "Several independent indices of the results of the propaganda used showed the speaker technique to have the most striking positive effects, the loudspeaker technique to be less effective, and the printed technique to have only slight effect. Shifts from neutral points to a position of agreement with the propaganda are large and statistically reliable." — *Archives of Psychology*, No. 169 (1934).

² For an excellent description of an efficiently planned speakers' bureau, see William J. Walsh, "How to Use a Speakers' Bureau in a Political Campaign," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 3 (January, 1939), pp. 92-106.

rent, other overhead, and perhaps for the expenses of out-of-town speakers. Minor and local parties which do not have enough money for advertising or radio may, through a well-run speakers' bureau, put on a good campaign with almost no funds. Very few political speakers are paid even their expenses. Most are willing to contribute their services — with a view, perhaps, to their advancement in the party — or because they are devoted to its principles. For a single evening a speakers' bureau may send out men and women who will address 100,000 people at nominal cost, possibly fifty dollars, whereas to reach that many people by direct mail or by newspaper advertising would cost at least five thousand dollars, and probably would be less effective.

The Use of Speaking by Pressure Groups. Pressure groups, like parties, find speaking the least expensive device of propaganda. Edward L. Bernays has called attention to the lecture platform as a means of propaganda that public relations counsel may suggest to their clients, and he has pointed to some of his own propaganda successes by using this device.¹ All churches use the spoken word as their chief instrument for influencing opinion. The Anti-Saloon League owed most of its success to the fact that it had thousands of speakers who went all over the country, attacking the saloon and the liquor interests. Most taxpayers' associations and business groups have speakers available who will address any audience. Reform groups commonly have little or no funds for any form of propaganda, so that they rely upon speaking, which is not only the most inexpensive, but one of the most effective means of developing a favorable public opinion.

NEWSPAPER PUBLICITY AND SUPPORT

Next most important to public speaking is the support of the press, but the newspapers have such a complex relationship to politics that they will be separately discussed in the chapter that follows.

MISCELLANEOUS PUBLICITY

No political party or pressure group with sufficient funds is content to rely upon speaking and newspapers alone for its publicity. Rather, every conceivable device of publicity is utilized. Each major party has from time to time published a combination clipsheet and newspaper which is

¹ *Crystallizing Public Opinion* (1923), pp. 201–203.

sent free of charge to party workers and to commercial newspapers. For many years the Republican National Committee published *The National Republican*. When this bulletin was allowed to die others were published. The current one is called *The Republican News*. During campaign years each party gets out a campaign textbook, as it is called, which contains among other items the party platform, biographies of the candidates for President and Vice-President, a summary of party history, and, if the party has been in power, a record of its accomplishments. Book-length campaign biographies of the candidates — always laudatory — are usually published, and sometimes collections of their speeches.

There is a bewildering variety of other publicity, often difficult to classify. Professor Bone listed the following:¹

Franked mail	Pamphlets
Handbills	Leaflets
Dodgers	Booklets
Broadsides	"Open letters"
Windshield stickers	Personal letters
Envelope stickers	Billboards
Newspaper advertisements	Calling cards
Election newspapers	Postal cards

In addition may be mentioned the lithographed pictures of candidates that are pasted on fences or hung in windows of clubhouses; store window displays; campaign buttons; posters and cartoons; sky writing; balloon-borne messages; banners to suspend across streets, and book matches carrying on the cover a picture of the candidate or a brief message. The devices seem almost innumerable.

In the campaign of 1944 the Publicity Division of the Democratic National Committee spent on publicity other than radio \$264,438.² This figure apparently did not include publicity issued by other divisions, such as the Women's Division or the Negro Division; nor did it include overhead, which was separately itemized. Although the Republican expenditures were not published, they undoubtedly equaled or exceeded those of the Democrats. In addition to the amount of this sort of publicity issued by the national committees, perhaps as much or more is generally issued by state and local committees and by such collateral organizations as the Willkie Clubs or the Political Action Committee.

Probably a great part of the money spent on such publicity is wasted,

¹ Hugh A. Bone, *"Smear" Politics* (1941), p. 7.

² Overacker, *op. cit.*, p. 901.

although it is impossible to measure the effectiveness of one form or device of propaganda when many are being employed simultaneously. Many of the pamphlets and leaflets are poorly edited and unattractively printed. No political party has yet produced a series of campaign pamphlets as interesting or as well illustrated as those issued by the PAC in the campaign of 1944.¹ The publicity material is also poorly distributed; the headquarters staff is always temporary and often inexperienced. Moreover, their mailing lists are inadequate, so that material is sent in bundles to the faithful, who are already converted. Persuasion by such means is at best doubtful; as Plunkitt of Tammany Hall observed, no one wants to receive "a lot of printed politics." In the campaign of 1936, when all records were broken, the Republican Party sent out from its Chicago and New York headquarters 310,000,000 pieces of printed propaganda, under 196 separate titles, and yet the election was a Republican disaster.² Billboard publicity is, of all kinds, perhaps the most ineffective. No voter will stop his car and few will stand on a street corner to read a long billboard political argument. About all that can be done with billboards is to reproduce a candidate's picture and some simple phrase, such as "Vote for Jones for Governor." Even though most practical politicians are aware that almost all of the expenditures for publicity are futile, and that they would get many more votes for their money by hiring canvassers and election-day workers, still there is such a strong feeling among them that prestige requires keeping up with the other party that they will continue to buy match books, billboard space, and all the rest if the other side does too. They often get credit for being more practical than they are.

MOTION PICTURES

As a device for direct political propaganda the motion pictures have not been particularly useful to parties. Such pictures as *Lincoln in Illinois* or *Wilson* may have an indirect propaganda effect by identifying the hero with his party; at any rate Republicans charged that the appearance of *Wilson* just before the campaign of 1944 was politically inspired.

¹ The pamphlets are reprinted in Joseph Gaer, *The First Round: the Story of the Political Action Committee* (1944).

² Ralph D. Casey, "Republican Propaganda in the 1936 Campaign," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 1 (April, 1937), p. 43. For an account of Democratic activities in a recent campaign see Theodore Milton Black, *Democratic Party Publicity in the 1940 Campaign* (1941).

But theater patrons will not tolerate advertising or other overt propaganda "shorts." They have bought tickets to an entertainment, and they resent being forced to look at anything else. The production of a commercial motion picture which would have the political propaganda well enough integrated with the entertainment features so that voters would pay to see it is such an expensive, uncertain, and long-drawn-out business that no party has yet attempted it. More promising is the use of short movies, issued from party headquarters, that can be shown at political meetings by means of portable projectors. The Democratic National Committee got out a very effective picture of this sort in 1944. In the campaign of 1936 the Republican Party got out an 800-foot, twenty-minute picture called *Let's Look at the Record*, prepared for them by the commercial department of Pathé. They also used three-minute shorts for Negro theaters. As far as it is possible to judge from the election results, the pictures were not particularly effective.¹ Politicians believe that the use of such moving pictures brings people to political meetings who would not otherwise attend.

SYMBOLS

All human institutions seek to build up for themselves a sort of public personality that will win them favor. Expressed in psychological terms, the directors of the institution try to set up in the public preponent reflexes or attitudes advantageous to the institution. One device for attaining this result is the use of symbols: the Blue Cross, the college colors, distinctive articles of dress, and so forth. The Roman Catholic Church has proved itself masterful at the use of symbolism. Political parties to some extent use the same general device of propaganda. Each has a set of party heroes whose names are symbols of party victories. The Democrats have Jefferson, Jackson, and Wilson; the Republicans have Lincoln, McKinley, and Theodore Roosevelt; the Socialists have Eugene Debs. Ceremonies to honor party heroes (as well as to raise funds) are held on or near Jackson's and Lincoln's birthdays. Lincoln's birthday is always an occasion for a burst of Republican oratory in Congress and in northern legislatures. Such symbolism tends to reinforce party loyalty by connecting a contemporary political party with a national hero. Conversely, each party tries to label its opponents with an unpopular symbol such as Teapot Dome or the depression. The

¹ Casey, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

symbols of the donkey and the elephant were attached to the two major parties by cartoonists, but the Communists seem to have picked the hammer and sickle for themselves. The cartoonist Thomas Nast fastened upon Tammany Hall the symbol of the tiger. Parades, conventions, and rallies also have their symbolic aspects.

The process of campaigning has been compared to "political evangelism." Each party tries to establish a messiah symbol for itself and to fasten a satan symbol on the other party or parties. It has been well said that

Human beings in the mass are stirred not by statistics but by symbols of salvation, not by facts but by appeals to faith. *Share the Wealth, Save the Constitution, The New Freedom, A New Deal for the Forgotten Man, A More Abundant Life* — these and other symbols rationalize the private wishes of the voters and inspire them to sing and shout. . . . The rival candidates resemble evangelists whose task is not only to win converts but to renew the faith of their followers in the symbols of the party.¹

Symbolism is particularly necessary to American parties because in the United States elections take place not when issues arise, but by the calendar; so party loyalty must be maintained by other than logical appeals. The composite and compromise character of parties also makes campaigns upon issues difficult, but appeals to symbols produce unity and cover up internal differences of interest. Symbols, moreover, have such vague meanings that party loyalty may be aroused by them in the most unintelligent or uninformed voter, who will, perhaps, work night and day for the Democratic Party but who could not to save his life explain the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act.

The political symbolism that has been compared with that in religious institutions has been carried further by the Fascist and Communist Parties than by any others. The Communists, for example, have their prophets, Marx and Lenin; their sacred book, *Das Kapital*; and the theology that has been built upon the sacred writings. They have their heroes and their martyrs. Membership in the party is a sort of priesthood, attained only after a probationary period, tests, and oaths. There is a hierarchy of party officials comparable to that in religious groups. The party line is no more based upon logic and consistency than is a body of religious dogma: each must be accepted, in large part, on faith, and changes in the

¹ Peter H. Odegard and E. Allen Helms, *American Politics* (Harper & Brothers, 1938), pp. 562-563.

party line must be followed by the faithful as new dispensations must be obeyed in religious groups. The party has its own discipline, as a religious order has. Earl Browder's expulsion in 1945 may well be compared with excommunication. The German Nazis also used many of these symbols, and in addition they used the device of uniform articles of dress employed by many religious institutions.

DEVICES OF ORGANIZATION

Not always easily distinguishable from symbolism is the device or strategy of organization. It is a tactic of ancient lineage, and one as widely used as associations of people are common. An organization binds members together, gives them responsibility and a feeling of importance; and thus cements allegiance. So political parties have many and large committees, official, advisory, financial, and so on. Committees are appointed to attract racial, religious, labor, and other groups. Each member of each committee may thus feel that he has an office, perhaps not one fitting to his talents and influence, but still an office. Parties promote the formation of collateral organizations such as Willkie Clubs, Democrats-for-Dewey Clubs, Businessmen-for-Roosevelt Clubs, Colored Democratic Clubs, Young Republican and Young Democratic Clubs, Good Government Associations, and any number of others. Perhaps the bottom was touched in a recent gubernatorial campaign in New Jersey with the formation of the Harolds-for-Harold Hoffman Club. Most of these organizations are, of course, temporary; and their purpose is only temporary — to get as many people as possible to do something to promote success at an election.

A financial stake in an organization — a contribution, however small — not only brings some money into the party treasury, it also binds the contributor to the party. Even though it may cost a party more to obtain donations of one and two dollars than the total sum collected, still the effort is worth while because of its propaganda effects. Non-political organizations, such as fraternal groups, use the same device, and they are sometimes able to add to its effectiveness by setting up some benefit plan, such as life insurance, an old members' home, annuities, or even funeral funds.

A skillful party leader will persuade as many members as possible to take some action, to do something no matter how little — to address a few envelopes, distribute some leaflets, hand out some campaign buttons,

make a speech to some group. Parties commonly attempt to obtain unnecessary thousands of signatures to nominating papers because each signature represents a person who by an overt act has committed himself.

LIMITATIONS OF PROPAGANDA

So much has been written and said about propaganda that many people, in spite of the facts, believe it to be all-powerful. It has, and always has had, its limitations. "Thus in 1932 all the propaganda in the world could not have offset the accumulation of insecurity, resentment, and fear resulting from the depression and associated willy-nilly with the Hoover administration."¹ And Simeon Strunsky of the *New York Times* attributed the failure of Republican propaganda in 1936 to what he called the propaganda of facts: no amount of publicity could persuade the mass of the people that they were worse off under the New Deal than they had been under Hoover. It is possible for a party to manufacture consent, but only within the limits of what is debatable. It may seek to put its own interpretation upon facts, but if the facts are within the grasp of the voter (such as whether he has or does not have a job) no propaganda can overcome them.

The party that can produce the facts — can provide jobs, pass a social security act, or do whatever is tangible — may have responded to various propagandas, but its record then forms a bulwark against its opponents' propagandas. So George Creel, as a result of his experience with propaganda in World War I, concluded that the truth is the strongest propaganda. And it was the experience of the Nazi propagandists that even the strictest censorship cannot entirely persuade people to believe the official version of events if the evidence of their own senses runs counter to it. In the absence of censorship no amount of propaganda will lead people to disbelieve things which they can see themselves.

It is possible on occasion to lead people to believe what is untrue, but truth usually has a unity and consistency that error does not have, so that the results of such persuasion are likely to be unstable and impermanent. Someone is always likely to expose the contradictions or to call attention to the truth. It is likewise possible occasionally to sway people so that they will vote or act against their own real interests, but such behavior may lead to a violent reaction against the propagandist when

¹ Peter H. Odegard and E. Allen Helms, *op. cit.*, p. 638.

the effect of the vote or act on interest is discovered. Yet it can happen that without propaganda even the truth will find no listening ear. Hence parties and politicians wisely make use of every publicity device they can afford or command to influence public opinion in their favor.

The Press and American Politics

"THE NEWSPAPER," wrote Walter Lippmann, "is in all literalness the bible of democracy, the book out of which a people determines its conduct. It is the only serious book most people read. It is the only book they read every day."¹ That they do read it seems to be borne out by all available statistics. The average urban family reads more than one newspaper a day. Only one urban family in twenty reads no daily paper.² There are approximately 1870 daily newspapers in the United States with a total circulation of about fifty million copies a day, and there are in addition perhaps nine thousand weeklies, semiweeklies and triweeklies.³ It is not surprising that such a circulation influences opinion. It could not help influencing opinion.

¹ *Liberty and the News* (1920), p. 47. From the Revolution until about 1872 most American newspapers were financially supported by some party or politician. In their treatment of news they were, of course, bitterly partisan, the period 1801-1833 Professor Mott has called "The Dark Ages of Partisan Journalism." For histories of the American press see Frank Luther Mott, *American Journalism* (1941), and James Melvin Lee, *History of American Journalism* (1917). For a sociological study of the press as the evolution of a social instrument see Alfred McC. Lee, *The Daily Newspaper in America* (1937). For a recent analysis of the press from the point of view of psychology and sociology see Leonard W. Doob, *Public Opinion and Propaganda* (1948), pp. 423-461.

² Chilton R. Bush and Darwin L. Teilhet, "The Press, Reader Habits, and Reader Interest," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (cited hereafter as *Annals*), vol. 219 (January, 1942), p. 7.

³ For contemporary lists and circulation figures see the annual *Directory of Newspapers and Periodicals in the United States*, published by N. W. Ayer and Sons, and the *Yearbook of Editor and Publisher*. The number of papers and their circulation constantly changes.

WHAT PEOPLE READ IN THE NEWSPAPERS

Many surveys have been made in recent years of what people read in the newspapers they buy. Because different categories are used by different investigators, the results are not comparable. It is nevertheless clear that almost no one reads all of his newspaper; rather, the reader omits those parts of it that do not interest him. Men, for example, read sports and business news and do not read at all or pass over quickly the fashion and society news; the reverse is true of women. Although almost all readers look at the so-called "comics" — which are not really comic, but rather for the most part illustrated melodramatic episodes, frequently fantastic — the younger readers (those under twenty-nine) are the ones most interested in them. All readers seem to have the highest interest in photographs, cartoons, and other forms of graphic presentation. Political news comes well down in all lists of reader interest. Differences in education, however, naturally affect what is read.¹

An introduction to the influence of the press upon politics may be observed in this summary of the readership of editorials and columns: "Neither men nor women are greatly interested in comment and interpretation. Fewer than two men in five and only one woman in five read any editorial. The leading columnist in each paper is read by about one third of both men and women."² It is not surprising, therefore, that editorials have only a slight influence upon political behavior. William L. Chenery, editor of *Colliers' Weekly*, wrote, "When I was a reporter in Chicago, Roger Sullivan, the Democratic boss, used to say that the *Chicago Daily News* . . . could influence about 14,000 votes by its editorial position. Mr. Sullivan was expressing his cool judgment and not trying to underrate the power of the press."³

¹ Paul F. Lazarsfeld, *Radio and the Printed Page* (1940), especially pp. 135-154 and 221-254. As a general rule, the higher a person is in the educational scale, the more he reads all sorts of printed materials, the more newspapers he reads, and the more of each paper, and the less he listens to the radio.

² Bush and Teilhet, *Annals*, *op. cit.*, p. 9. Also women readers "tend to slight the news about things that matter in the social sense, and are most interested in the commonplace, ephemeral, and human-interest sides of life. . . . The statistics also suggest that women tend to personalize the data of life which the daily newspaper presents."

³ *Freedom of the Press Today*, a collection of papers assembled by Harold L. Ickes (1941), p. 78.

THE BUSINESS OF NEWSPAPER PUBLISHING

NEWSPAPERS AS MERCHANDISE

With such rare exceptions as the *Christian Science Monitor*, the publication of a newspaper in the United States is a private business intended to yield the owner a profit. It is not a public service enterprise, even though as an agency of mass communication the newspaper is vested with quasi-public functions. The fact that American newspapers are subsidized by perhaps as much as four hundred millions of dollars a year through free mail service in the county of their publication, and low second-class mailing charges beyond that area, does not distinguish them from other businesses. Many industries, such as ocean shipping and airlines, are also subsidized. Some of the critics of newspapers seem to forget that publishing them is a private enterprise, and these critics apply to the press standards they would not apply to other businesses. "The publisher" of a newspaper is, as Frank L. Mott says, "a merchant, and the editorial art is largely one of merchandising, as respects general newspaper content."¹ He aims, in general, to sell those items of his merchandise — news, features, sports, fashions, and the rest — that the people will buy; in a competitive situation he must do so or lose circulation and hence advertising. If the publication of lottery numbers is worth 75,000 daily circulation to a New York City newspaper, editors are going to be strongly tempted to publish them.² "Outsmarting a competitor in a deal involving a comic strip was of greater consequence to mass readership than years of training in interpreting significant happenings. Signing up the exclusive services of 'Mickey Mouse' in New York was considered a master stroke. . . ."³

EFFECT ON THE NEWS

The merchandising aspect of newspaper publishing leads editors, in their treatment of political news, to play up elements of conflict, until after years of reading, the reader acquires the stereotype that government

¹ *Annals*, *op. cit.*, vol. 219, p. 60.

² Emile Gauvreau, *My Last Million Readers* (1941), p. 276. This book, written by a former Hearst and Annenberg editor, is most illuminating on the day-to-day business of a newspaper and the practical considerations of editing. The author's conclusions are well supported by concrete examples.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 174. In order to get a comic strip called "Betty Boop," an "interesting column" by Hendrik Willem Van Loon was bartered, and "We had to throw in a cartoon strip called 'Pete the Tramp' with Van Loon's essays to corral the 'Boop'" (p. 265).

is mostly strife. Headlines require short words, so that an investigation becomes a "probe," a public statement on foreign policy a "blast," an Easter sermon on communism a "fight," a speech objecting to a policy a "hit," and so forth. Since most readers do not go below the headlines, they acquire no other views of government or policy. There is not as much news value in a hundred thousand public employees who do their work conscientiously, even brilliantly, as there is in the story of one clerk who mailed his Christmas cards at public expense. The Commission on the Freedom of the Press has called attention to this tendency to treat news so as to play up the sensational:

To attract the maximum audience, the press emphasizes the exceptional rather than the representative, the sensational rather than the significant. Many activities of the utmost social significance lie below the surface of what are conventionally regarded as reportable incidents: more power machinery; fewer men tending machines; more hours of leisure; more schooling per child; decrease of intolerance. . . .

In most news media such matters are crowded out by stories of night-club murders, race riots, strike violence, and quarrels among public officials. . . . The press is preoccupied with [this kind of news] . . . to such an extent that the citizen is not supplied with the information and discussion he needs to discharge his responsibility to the community.¹

It is to be feared that the commission expected too much. Editors must aim their papers at what they think their publics want, if they are to show a profit. And editors have both their own experience and the statistical studies of reader interest to prove to them that most people do not buy newspapers in order to read about what is socially significant. William Randolph Hearst did not make his millions publishing what the reporters call "think pieces"; rather, he once urged his editors to publish what is interesting and not what he called "merely important" news. To blame a merchant of news for not offering a type of commodity that his customers do not want is like blaming a manufacturer of silk stockings for not making cheaper, longer-lasting cotton ones. Perhaps the public could be educated to want to read about political developments that lie below the surface, but newspapers produced for profit can hardly be expected to give up profit, even solvency, to engage in this educational work.

¹ *A Free and Responsible Press* (1947), p. 55. In 1937, 86.6 per cent of the Washington correspondents interviewed by Leo C. Rosten (*The Washington Correspondents* [1937], p. 345) thought that "comparatively few papers give significant accounts of our basic economic conflicts," and 60.5 per cent thought that "the press devotes too much space to trivialities: scandals, sensations, divorces, etc."

ADVERTISING AND THE PRESS

The relationship of advertising to newspaper editing is not as simple as some critics of the press assume.¹ There have been and are advertisers who have sought to keep items of news out of the papers, or to get them in, and they often succeed in both. They are more successful, however, with the country papers than with the city dailies. But as William Allen White often said, it is not advertisers so much as advertising that determines press policy. It is the desire to maintain the economic system which produces advertising revenue that influences editorials and the treatment of news. "The publisher takes his place in the community along with the banker, the merchant, and the manufacturer. He dines at the same clubs, plays golf on the same course, and thinks in the same political and economic climate of opinion. . . . Circulation — advertising — profits is the circle around which the business of newspaper publishing revolves." ²

Thus, in view of the general relationship of newspaper publishing to business, the behavior of the press in the campaign of 1936 was rather to be expected than to be surprised at. As against an individual merchant who may seek either unwarranted publicity or the suppression of an item of news, a strong daily paper, well supported by diversified advertising, clearly has the upper hand. When the New York City paper *PM* accepted advertising, it stated that it did so to protect its independence. On the other hand, newspapers are vulnerable against groups of merchants who may in concert withhold advertising, or who may themselves produce and distribute newspapers circulated without charge, called "throwaways." When advertisers thus combine against newspapers they almost always do so because they think advertising rates are too high, and not to produce a change in newspaper content or policy.

When advertisers insist that their advertisements shall be published alongside columns of news they may, in effect, force a newspaper (or magazine) to print more news than it otherwise would offer to its readers. This situation is particularly notable in the one-newspaper cities, where competition does not compel a paper to cover the news fully. Another aspect of newspaper advertising is that it is itself news; when *PM* did not publish advertising it found that it had to summarize the advertisements in the other New York City papers because readers, particularly women,

¹ See, for an extreme example, Upton Sinclair, *The Brass Check* (1919).

² Raymond Lawrence, *Annals*, vol. 219, p. 159.

wanted to see what the department stores had for sale. Surveys of reader interest also show that advertising comes high among the categories of materials that people like, in spite of an immense amount of it that is inane and purely competitive.¹

The newspapers never had a monopoly on advertising, and in recent years they have had to compete with new devices, notably radio. Newspapers still receive the bulk of department store advertising, but the national advertising of packaged foods, tobacco, and liquor appears to be going in increasing proportion to radio. This competition with radio is gradually changing the newspapers' treatment of news; for example, they cannot beat the radio with "spot" news (unexpected events) nor can they equal the radio at reporting events in progress, such as a President's inaugural. The newspapers, therefore, are turning more and more to "background stories" and to the interpretation of the news. This tendency to compensate for radio competition is often given as one of the reasons for the contemporary proliferation of columnists.

CONCENTRATION OF NEWSPAPER OWNERSHIP

The economics of newspaper publishing in the United States have since about 1910 produced a constant decline in the number of daily newspapers. We live in "an era of dying dailies." From about 2600 dailies in 1909, the number has declined to about 1870 (under about 1300 separate ownerships) until there are only 117 cities left where there are competing dailies. Between 1918 and 1944, as many as 576 dailies were suspended, merged, or reduced to weeklies, while the total daily circulation went up from 39,000,000 to 46,000,000.² "Ten states have not a single city with competing daily papers. Twenty-two states are without Sunday newspaper competition. Fourteen companies owning eighteen papers control about one quarter of our total daily circulation. More than a quarter of our daily circulation is absentee owned. . . . One company dominates 3000 weeklies."³ The decline in the number of weeklies, biweeklies, and triweeklies seems not to have been studied statistically, but it probably parallels the decline in the number of dailies. A person familiar with the

¹ It is curious that newspaper readers want to read advertising; radio listeners do not want to listen to it.

² Raymond B. Nixon, "Concentration and Absenteeism in Daily Newspaper Ownership," *Journalism Quarterly*, vol. 22 (June, 1945), pp. 98-99.

³ Morris L. Ernst, *The First Freedom* (The Macmillan Company, 1946), p. xii.

situation in any state can point to many towns and small cities, sometimes to a number of counties, where no newspaper of any kind exists.

It is obvious that the maintenance of two or more competing newspapers in one town or city means a duplication of editorial and reporting staffs, wire service charges, business offices, usually printing plants, and other costs. Competition also keeps down advertising rates, and hence profits. According to the study made by Dr. Raymond B. Nixon, there seems to be a tendency for rates to go up as soon as competition is removed, and the advertisers naturally do not like being subject to a newspaper monopoly: "Unless postwar expansion brings a reversal of the trend toward one-publisher communities, it is possible that those who have been urging governmental action to maintain multiple outlets of news and opinion may find their ranks reinforced by an unexpected ally: the newspaper advertiser."¹ In a monopoly situation there is nothing to prevent a publisher from charging for advertising space all that the traffic will bear. That point will be just under the rates which would drive advertisers to use other existing media or to start their own throwaways.

When all the newspapers in one city have been combined into one, it would, of course, be possible for a new competing paper to be established. But Dr. Nixon found no instance in which this had happened, although in recent years a few new papers have been started in cities where the monopoly was not quite complete. New papers are rare because the rapid technological developments in newsgathering, printing, and distributing newspapers have made great accumulations of capital necessary to successful publishing. A thriving daily newspaper in a city of one hundred thousand people will be worth about a million dollars; a big city newspaper, such as the *New York Sun* or the *Los Angeles Times*, more than ten millions. Comparable amounts are, of course, necessary to establish competing journals.

NEWSPAPER OWNERSHIP OF RADIO

After about a decade of competition with radio, when newspapers and wire services in varying degrees refused to sell their news to radio stations, a new trend developed — the purchase or establishment of radio stations by existing newspapers. Newspapers are now acquiring radio stations as

¹ Nixon, *op. cit.*, p. 113. It is difficult to imagine what governmental action could be taken to prevent one newspaper publisher from selling out to another.

rapidly as possible until about one third of all the stations in the United States have come to be owned by newspapers. In 111 cities (1941) where the only newspaper owns the only radio station, there is no competition.¹ The concentration of newspaper holdings into some 1300 ownerships, which are also acquiring radio stations, led Harold L. Ickes to call these owners America's House of Lords. Ernst, Ickes, and others have called attention to the possibility that under the present highly concentrated ownership of the means of communication — a concentration that appears to be continually narrowing — there may easily be a blackout of news and opinion when they do not agree with the views of the owners. The Commission on the Freedom of the Press put the matter thus:

The right of free public expression has therefore lost its earlier reality. Protection against government is not now enough to guarantee that a man who has something to say shall have a chance to say it. The owners and managers of the press determine which persons, which facts, which versions of the facts, and which ideas shall reach the public.²

VARIETY AMONG NEWSPAPERS

The economic forces that operate upon all newspapers do not produce absolute uniformity. Among newspaper readers there are various publics, and different papers will appeal to these different segments of the population — the *New York Times* to one, the *Journal-American* to another. Even though the attitudes of the owners may be fundamentally similar, still their different versions of what constitutes news and what kind of editing will best satisfy their particular publics will produce newspapers with different personalities. Hearst papers, wherever published, are clearly stamped with the personality of their publisher; the Scripps papers were different from others, and changed again when Roy Howard came to dominate them.

COMMON INTEREST AMONG NEWSPAPERS

When the interests of the press as a business are threatened, newspaper owners act like any other pressure group. They have their own organiza-

¹ Ernst, *op. cit.*, p. 155.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 15. A British royal commission is at present engaged in an investigation of the concentration of ownership of the press in Britain. The late Joseph M. Patterson, publisher of the *New York Daily News*, urged a similar investigation in the United States and offered his own paper as the first paper to be examined.

tion, the American Newspaper Publishers Association, which meets once a year with secret as well as public sessions. The publishers, even the publishers of Republican papers, opposed a tariff on Canadian wood pulp. They generally opposed child-labor legislation that would limit their employment of newsboys. Most labor legislation, from Section 7-a of the National Industrial Recovery Act to the Wagner Act, was opposed by the press, and the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 was as strongly supported. Bills to limit the sale or advertising of proprietary medicines, such as the Cope-land Bill or the Tugwell Bill, have been opposed by the newspapers.

In addition to the national association of the big publishers, there are forty-seven state associations.¹ Dailies are members of these groups, but on the whole they are dominated by the still more numerous weeklies. These state associations follow all proposals in state legislatures that would affect their economic interests. For example, they oppose laws to limit "trial by newspaper"; they seek laws to limit actions of libel against them; and they oppose laws to regulate political advertising. For several years the state press associations have been seeking "newspaper confidence" laws; i.e., statutes which make newspaper reporters privileged from having to testify in court concerning the sources of their information. In this drive, however, they have run into the opposition of bar associations.²

Both national and state associations have an advantage over other businesses in the devotion the American people have to the freedom of the press. Whenever any economic interest of publishing is endangered the publishers are quick to assert that the freedom of the press is threatened; thus they may favor a tax on billboard advertising while opposing a tax on newspaper advertising which, they assert, is a violation of the freedom of the press.

THE PRESS AND CAMPAIGN SUPPORT

"It simply is not true," wrote Simeon Strunsky of the *New York Times*, "that the press molds public opinion as it sees fit, swinging the mobile vulgus hither and thither according to whim, or party interest, or class interest, or the newspaper owners' individual profit."³

¹ *Annals, op. cit.*, vol. 219, p. 156.

² W. A. Steigleman, "Newspaper Confidence Laws — Their Extent and Provisions," *Journalism Quarterly*, vol. 20 (September, 1943), pp. 230-236.

³ "The Power of the Press," *The Saturday Review of Literature*, vol. 21 (October 28 1939), p. 13.

THE PRESS VERSUS FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT

If the press controlled, or even strongly influenced, political opinion, Franklin Roosevelt would never have been elected President nor would he have been re-elected. Only estimates, of course, can be made of press support, and these estimates differ in whether the number of newspapers is counted or the total circulation. The intensity of support is probably even more important but is much more difficult to measure. But for whatever it may be worth, *Editor and Publisher* estimated in terms of circulation that Franklin D. Roosevelt was supported in 1932 by 40 per cent of the press; in 1936 by 36 per cent; in 1940 by 20 per cent; and in 1944 by 17 per cent.

In the 1936 election President Roosevelt polled a vote almost exactly in inverse proportion to his newspaper support. In the nation he had 63 per cent of the votes and between 35 and 40 per cent of the newspaper circulation. . . . In other cities [than New York] the ratio was four to one against Mr. Roosevelt. In some cities it was much higher. In one or two cities Mr. Roosevelt had no newspaper support at all. Yet his majorities everywhere ranged from decisive to crushing.¹

It may be added that in Massachusetts in 1940 not one daily newspaper supported Roosevelt, but he carried the state by 53.3 per cent of the two-party vote.

The campaign of 1936 showed the most intense newspaper attempt to defeat a candidate since the election of 1896. The most unbridled attacks were made upon the President in a majority of the papers in the North. The Hearst papers once addressed him as "You and your fellow communists." A small box was run on the front page of many dailies: "Only 63 days remain to save the country. Only 63 days to save the American way of life. What are you going to do about it?" Each day, of course, the number of days from national disaster was reduced by one.

The *Chicago Tribune* charged that the *New Deal* was communism, and that if the President were re-elected he would establish a secret police to hound Americans who had opposed him. The *Tribune* probably reached the nadir of headline writing when the story of an investigation of vice conditions in two Wisconsin cities was headed "Roosevelt Area in Wisconsin Hotbed of Vice." The *Tribune* also failed to report a Democratic parade that took hours to pass the *Tribune* building. It even faked a pic-

¹ Strunsky, *loc. cit.*

ture of a street sweeper gathering up Roosevelt buttons alleged to have been thrown away, but which actually were scattered by a *Tribune* employee for the purpose of getting the picture.

"Violating all standards of journalistic ethics were papers like the *Chicago Tribune* and the Hearst chain. These papers not only prevaricated editorially, but distorted and discolored news."¹ All but two of the leading syndicated columnists opposed Roosevelt, some violently. And yet after all this newspaper campaign against him, the President carried forty-six of the forty-eight states and obtained 62.2 per cent of the two-party vote, 3.1 per cent more than he had received in 1932.

OTHER CASES

Dozens of examples could be cited of the election and re-election of demagogues, such as William L. Thompson or Huey Long, against overwhelming newspaper opposition. If newspaper opposition could have done it, Tammany Hall would have been put out of business a century ago. In spite of newspaper advice to the voters of Boston, they re-elected Mayor James M. Curley in 1945 while he was under indictment (he was later convicted) for mail fraud. Mayor Hague frequently elected his candidates when they were opposed by almost all of the newspapers in New Jersey. On the other hand, excellent public officials have been elected and re-elected when they were constantly attacked by newspapers; the late Mayor Robert W. Speer of Denver, always hated by the yellow *Denver Post*, is one example. Jefferson, Jackson, and Cleveland were all elected President in spite of an unfavorable press.

The astute politician knows that it is possible to win without newspaper support, to win even in spite of newspaper opposition. But he does not therefore disdain publicity. "When they stop writing about you, you're dead" is an aphorism which has been attributed to many politicians. Most practical politicians are chain readers of newspapers. In some circumstances newspaper support is very valuable; for instance, in what is called the "build up." Alfred M. Landon was built up by newspaper publicity in 1936 and Wendell Willkie in 1940. Newspaper support may be necessary to the propaganda for some particular issue, especially if it is a complicated matter, such as a revised state constitution. A friendly news-

¹ "The Press and the Public," *New Republic*, vol. 90 (March 17, 1937), p. 185. This article contains many more examples than can be cited here of news suppression, manufacture, and distortion in the campaign of 1936.

paper may help a young or unknown politician up the ladder of offices by praising his performance at every opportunity; and, conversely, it may injure him. But a well-established politician like Mayor Hague cannot be helped by newspaper support and may be immune to newspaper attack.

USE OF THE OPPOSITION PRESS

It is possible for an alert political organization to utilize even the opposition press. Perhaps no one ever succeeded so well at this undertaking as did Charles Michelson, former director of publicity of the Democratic National Committee. John J. Raskob had been one of the chief financial backers of Governor Alfred E. Smith in his unsuccessful campaign for the presidency in 1928, and he wanted the party to keep up its propaganda during the interval between elections so that his friend Smith might be more successful in 1932. Raskob provided the necessary money, and the national chairman, Jouett Shouse, hired Michelson.

The general objective was to prevent President Hoover's re-election. In Michelson's estimation, Republican publicity had built Hoover up as a "miracle-man . . . whose wisdom encompassed all branches, whose judgment was never at fault, who knew the answers to all questions, and who could see in the dark."¹ This stereotype had to be broken down. Michelson said of himself that he was the "composer of the music for the distinguished trumpeters who proclaimed our activities." In other words, he was the ghost writer of speeches and statements for Democratic governors, senators, and congressmen in a persistent series of penetrating attacks upon the President's policies. The speeches and statements were so pointed and so interesting that Republican papers had to print them, even though they undertook to answer them on the editorial page. But since editorials are not read by 95 per cent of the people who buy papers, Michelson obtained among newspaper readers the public opinion on Hoover that he wanted. Had Michelson issued his propaganda as a series of statements from Democratic headquarters, they would have gone into newspaper wastebaskets; but he made news of them which all papers had to carry. He got out a clippingsheet, of course, but he did more; he made his propaganda news. The Republicans turned from defending Hoover to attacking Michelson and his "smear Hoover" campaign, as they called it. This fundamental error of tactics enabled Senator Pat Harrison to say that

¹ Charles Michelson, *The Ghost Talks* (1944), p. 27.

“ ‘the whispering campaign of 1928’ had been succeeded by ‘the whimpering campaign of 1930.’ ”¹

Michelson and the politicians who spoke the words he wrote were soon able to replace the miracle-man stereotype of Hoover with another, that of a quarrelsome and uncertain President, first unable to foresee and then unwilling or unable to do anything about the great depression — a great expert who would not take the advice of experts, on for instance, the Hawley-Smoot Tariff.

This, then, was the picture we at Democratic headquarters thought it would be useful to our cause to impress upon the people. . . . A man sat in the president's chair who did not fit. His undoubted genius in certain directions did not run along the lines of the chief executive of a great nation. . . . Uncertain of himself, he could not boss nor cajole, nor influence with his logic.²

THE COUNTRY NEWSPAPERS

The tradition of personal journalism, almost dead among the dailies, survives in the thousands of small-town and “country” weeklies. The editor is usually the chief, and often the only, reporter; he is both business manager and office boy; sometimes he is the linotype operator and proof-reader; he is usually (subject to the mortgage) owner of the paper. Much more than the city dailies, these local newspapers are reflections of the personalities of the editors: they reveal clearly the editors' opinions, prejudices, politics — and degree of literacy. Many country papers are so poorly written and edited that only the readers' interest in the personal items maintains what circulation remains.

The rise of radio and the extension of the circulation of city dailies into country districts has weakened the economic position of the country press. A daily in a medium-sized city may maintain a correspondent (usually a part-time employee) in every village within a radius of a hundred miles, and may every day deliver to the inhabitants of each town the news that they would otherwise obtain only weekly from a local paper. It is obviously cheaper to maintain a correspondent in each town than to maintain a whole printing establishment. The daily can then compete for the local advertising that formerly went exclusively to the country weekly. The country weekly, in addition to these difficulties, suffers from the same economic problems that affect all publishers.

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

² *Ibid.*, p. 32.

BOILER PLATE IN COUNTRY NEWSPAPERS

The result of all this has been a weakening of the country press. In order to reduce editorial expenses and to turn out a paper that looks more like a city newspaper, more and more country papers have been buying the services of Western Newspaper Union, "now the world's biggest newspaper syndicate."¹ This business is owned by John H. Perry, often called the Boiler Plate King.² The Western Newspaper Union does a six-million-dollar annual business with virtually all the weeklies, furnishing them with features, editorials, and columns all set up. In addition:

Nearly 3000 [country papers] purchase an eight-page paper ready to go on the presses, with four pages left blank for the local editor's own news and advertising. These readi-print pages, as they are called, cost the publisher two or three times as much if W.N.U. is not granted an advertising concession. If W.N.U. is granted pages for the sale of its advertising, then of course the publisher receives no payment for the advertising, even though such ads may take up 20 per cent of the readi-print pages. Thus we have block booking of content and ads, probably one of the most insidious and disastrous marriages in our entire economy.³

Since Perry sells his service to editors who have all shades of opinion, "he takes special pains to handle religion, politics, etc., so that nothing positive is said. . . . For editors who can't be bothered with writing their own editorials, W.N.U. supplies them ready made, taking safe stands on Petrillo, famine, and Big Cities Must Go."⁴ The result is a deadly sameness in the country press; a paper published in Florida will be almost like one published in Wyoming. Perhaps one of the most insidious features of the system is that most readers are probably quite unaware of the "canned" nature of the product and assume that the content of their local paper is the work of their own neighbor, the editor.

Response to Pressure. In the pages not devoted to the innocuous boiler plate of the W.N.U., the weeklies show a response to pressures much greater than that of the city dailies. It is common for them to suppress news at the wish of local advertisers and to provide a certain amount of

¹ *Time*, vol. 47 (June 24, 1946), p. 68.

² Boiler plate is prepared matter furnished either in clipsheet form or in papier-mâché mats ready for casting into cuts. Many pressure groups give away boiler plate.

³ Ernst, *op. cit.*, p. 108. W.N.U., according to *Time*, *loc. cit.*, receives about three millions of dollars a year for the advertising.

⁴ *Time*, *loc. cit.*

free publicity in return for advertising. They also respond readily to out-of-town pressures, as a glance at a few of them will show. Many, for example, carry the propaganda of the National Association of Manufacturers, which is furnished in the form of a weekly clipsheet called "Industrial Press Service," complete with editorials, cartoons, a Washington story, and a Broadway column, all slanted toward the policies of the association. The National Electric Light Association showed that in return for an advertising subsidy the weeklies would print as news the propaganda of the association against the public ownership of utilities. The reason for this pliancy is probably twofold: the country press cannot always afford to be independent; and it often has neither the talent nor the time to write its own copy.

Country Editors in Politics. More often than his city brother, the editor of a country paper is personally active in politics; indeed, he often has to be influential in local political affairs. One of the most important sources of income to local newspapers is the publication of "legals" — matter required by law or ordinance to be published, such as town and county budgets, notices of delinquent taxes, sheriff's sales, initiated and referred measures, and similar official data. The legal requirement of publication is, for much of the material, established by state law, and the rate per column inch is set so high that publishing the legals is very profitable. Perhaps, needless to say, publication of ninety-nine per cent of the matter is perfectly useless and an unnecessary expense. Whenever an attempt is made in a state legislature to reduce the amount of legal advertising, or to reduce the rate, the state association of country editors, whatever its name, descends upon the state capitol to protest, all thoughts of public economy forgotten. The laws commonly vest in local officials discretion as to which newspaper shall receive the business, so that being "in" with the courthouse gang often means to a country editor the difference between bankruptcy and solvency. Another important item to him is job printing for local governments, which is also honest graft. Consequently the editor takes an active part in politics. Often he is a member of the legislature, a party official, or even a local boss.

Political Advertising. The Federal Communications Act and the rules of the Federal Communications Commission require that if a radio station sells time to one political organization or candidate, it must upon demand sell equal time at the same price to opponents. Licensees are forbidden to censor material. Nothing of the sort applies to political newspaper advertising in most states. Country editors have been known to have one ad-

vertising rate for candidates in their own party, but, if they permit the opposition to advertise at all, they have a much higher price for opposing candidates, who must pay cash in advance. And the editor's political friends receive good placement of their advertisements, whereas his opponents' pictures and appeals are buried in the boiler plate. Laws to forbid this sort of thing are resented by the state associations of editors as an interference with the freedom of the press, but the partiality is probably harmless except to candidates' feelings or bank accounts, because paid political advertising is virtually futile as a means of getting votes.¹

More serious than the placement of political advertising in local newspapers or the payment for it is the control of its content in the interest of honesty and fairness to readers. About half of the states have laws requiring that political advertising must be identified as political — that is, advertisements cannot be printed so as to look like news stories. But there is generally no requirement that the name of the advertiser be revealed.

Newspapers carrying political advertisements over such meaningless signatures as "A Willkie Booster" could be subpoenaed by an investigating commission and required to divulge the name of the advertiser. In such a case, however, there would be cries of violation of freedom of the press, and certain newspapers would almost surely take the matter into the courts for long-drawn-out litigation.²

In short, the country press is active in politics and is sensitive to the influences upon it. But its own effect in swaying public opinion on political matters is probably no greater than that of the city dailies.

SPECIAL PURPOSE PERIODICALS

In addition to what may be loosely called the commercial press — daily and weekly newspapers intended to appeal to the general reader and published primarily as business ventures by the owners — there are thousands of newspapers and periodicals published by and in the interest of

¹ For a short but interesting discussion of the recent political use of country papers see Ralph D. Casey, "The Republican Rural Press Campaign" [of 1940], *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 5 (March, 1941), pp. 130-132. Casey observes that "many country publishers feel that they are entitled to some paid political advertising as a *quid pro quo* for the party publicity material they use." But they will use a great deal of it without compensation.

² Hugh A. Bone, *Smear Politics* (American Council on Public Affairs, 1941), p. 33.

special groups. There are, for example, dailies devoted to a single type of business, such as *Women's Wear* or *The Bond Buyer*. There are about a thousand periodicals published in the interest of farming and of different types of agriculture; some of these are national, but the greater part are state or local. More than eight hundred newspapers and magazines are published by religious organizations. About a hundred fraternal societies have newspapers and magazines. Of these the *Elks' Magazine* with nearly 600,000 circulation is the largest. Minor parties have their own press, such as the Communist *Daily Worker*. There are about 150 newspapers devoted primarily to the interest of Negroes.¹ If the commercial newspapers frequently violate the canons of journalistic ethics, the organs of the minor parties and pressure groups seem to pay no attention to them whatever, selecting and suppressing news, mixing news and editorial opinion, printing unsupported assertions as news — whatever suits best the strategy of the moment.

The political effect of the special purpose press varies from negligible to important, and sometimes in state and local politics, to crucial. A recent candidate for governor of New Hampshire attributed his defeat in large part to an unfavorable editorial about him in a beer distributors' periodical which went out to hundreds of small grocers who also sell beer. The effect of one of these publications will depend in part upon the size and militancy of the organization that sponsors it. Some journals carry little matter that could be called political; others are full of material urging or opposing political issues, the *CIO News*, for example. No astute political leader will neglect the group publications, which always want a share of a party's advertising funds; but the influence of these papers varies from state to state and from election to election.

THE FOREIGN-LANGUAGE PRESS

The first foreign-language newspaper was established in Germantown, Pennsylvania, in 1739, when there were but five other newspapers in the colonies.² Since then, uncounted thousands of foreign-language newspapers and periodicals have come and gone. The peak, both in numbers of papers and in circulation, was reached in 1914 when there were 1300 newspapers and periodicals with an estimated total circulation of 2,600,-

¹ For current lists of the special-purpose periodicals, with estimates of their circulation, consult Ayer's *Directory of Newspapers and Periodicals in the United States*.

² Robert E. Park, *The Immigrant Press and its Control* (1922), p. 253.

000.¹ The demand for foreign-language papers has fallen off steadily since the restriction of immigration, until there are today only 138 dailies. Even though papers are published in almost every living language from Albanian to Yiddish, and in some languages that never lived, such as Esperanto, the future of the foreign-language press in this country is not promising. As the older immigrants die off, their children and grandchildren come to read and speak less and less of the language of their ancestors. The largest existing daily is the *Jewish Daily Forward*, which has about a hundred thousand circulation. The German-language papers, once largest in terms of circulation, have fallen away.

No one has ever made a complete study of the foreign-language press in American politics, and perhaps none can ever be made, because no person possesses the necessary command of the various languages and because the files of the papers are incomplete and inaccessible. It may be said tentatively that many of the papers have had a pro-labor or a Socialist slant, and during the dictatorship of Mussolini some Italian papers were pro-fascist. Almost all of the foreign-language papers have depended upon circulation rather than upon advertising for their revenue, so that many of the editors have sold their papers' influence to one party or another, especially in the smaller cities. Politicians seem agreed that, except in a few areas, the influence in terms of votes is not worth much; the readers are more likely to follow the leaders of their own nationality groups than the editors of the papers.

FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND AMERICAN POLITICS

In no country in the world is the press so free as in the United States, not even in England, where the severe British libel laws prevent many kinds of reporting that are everyday matters in the American press. Not only is the press free as against the national government under the First Amendment; it is also free as against the states under the Fourteenth.² During and after World War I some seventy-five newspapers, mostly Socialist, "felt the strong arm of the Postoffice Department," and lost their mailing privilege or had to agree not to discuss the war. The Socialist *New York Call* and the *Milwaukee Leader* lost their mailing privileges and perished.³ This interference with the freedom of the press

¹ Mott, *op. cit.*, p. 730.

² *Near v. Minnesota*, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).

³ Mott, *op. cit.*, pp. 624, 731.

was not repeated in World War II. Not only is the press entirely free from any censorship, but it receives, as has been noted, a substantial subsidy from the national government.

NO FREEDOM FROM THE PRESS

The press is nowhere in the world so free to criticize or question public officials as in the United States. As Harold L. Ickes put it, there is no freedom from the press. The trend of court decisions seems to be that a person seeking or accepting public office loses any immunity he may have had as a private individual from newspaper comments upon his character, reputation, or private life, so that in many jurisdictions it is almost impossible for a candidate or official to win a libel suit against a newspaper.¹ Although the Constitutional Convention that met in Philadelphia in 1787 held its meetings in secret, no state constitutional convention can and (if one should be called) no national constitutional convention could exclude the press. The United States Senate no longer has any secret sessions, not even for the consideration of nominations. In holding during his terms as President nearly a thousand press conferences, Franklin D. Roosevelt set a precedent that will be hard for any future President to break, however strongly he may wish to return to an older custom of holding few meetings with the press or none at all.² Cabinet officers, governors, senators, and lesser officials feel that they must, on demand, hold press conferences. These conferences fulfill much the same function as the question period in the British House of Commons, but they go further in that administrative officials and individual legislators as well as cabinet officers have to answer or be subjected to newspaper attack. This lack of freedom from the press is unquestionably annoying to many officials, but it does open the processes of government to public view.

"The American press is the best in the world today," wrote Bruce Bliven in 1941. "Our journalism has plenty of faults . . . but with all its weaknesses, no one familiar with newspapers around the world will dispute the statement above."³ It makes the most systematic attempt of any

¹ Frederick S. Siebert, "Legal Developments Affecting the Press," *Annals*, vol. 219 (January, 1942), pp. 93-106, summarizes recent statutes and judicial decisions affecting newspapers. "The American press today," says Siebert, "has fewer restrictions on its right to publish than any other press in the history of the world."

² See Rosten, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-66, and A. Merriam Smith, *Thank You, Mr. President* (1946).

³ Ickes, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

press to cover the news; none surpasses it in the rapidity of its reporting; it is by far the most advanced in the utilization of technological improvements; and no press is so independent from the government or so quick to attack the government.

PUBLIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE PRESS

The United States has maintained the freest press — which has become the best press — on the assumption that out of free competition among newspapers the truth, or some reasonable facsimile thereof, will emerge.

In theory, the press is a socially useful institution because of its concern with politics as reporter and critic of political conditions and practices [says O. W. Riegel]. The constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, reaffirmed by court decisions, have been based upon the theory that the newspaper plays an important part in democratic government by representing the will of the people, serving as a check upon political power and taking an active part in public debate. . . . The peculiar privileges the press has traditionally enjoyed [in America] have been based on the idea that the newspaper is of service to the public as counselor and advocate.¹

In spite of this theory there have been many criticisms of the American press. The misgivings of Morris Ernst and others at the increasing concentration of ownership have been mentioned. Various writers on journalism have over many years noted in the American public a distrust of the press. In 1920 Walter Lippmann wrote, "There is everywhere an increasingly angry disillusionment about the press, a growing sense of being baffled and misled; and wise publishers will not pooh-pooh these omens."² In 1935 O. W. Riegel observed the same distrust:

If one asks a group of literate Americans whether they believe in the reliability of what they read in the newspapers, he is very likely to be answered in the negative. The state of mind which such a test illustrates is extremely painful to a large number of responsible and efficient newspaper men who do not believe that the American press, on the whole, merits this shocking lack of respect. They point out . . . that the American press is a paragon of virtue compared with the corrupt and muzzled press of nearly every other country in the world.³

¹ *Annals*, vol. 179 (May, 1935), p. 205.

² *Liberty and the News* (1920), p. 75.

³ *Annals*, *op. cit.*, p. 201.

In 1946 a public opinion poll indicated that the people thought newspapers were more often unfair than fair, and that they were not as fair as radio stations.¹ The disillusionment Lippmann noted and the shocking lack of respect Riegel saw apparently go fairly deeply into public opinion. Several reasons may be observed.

OTHER INTERESTS AMONG PUBLISHERS

In view of the notorious private lives of Annenberg, Bonfils, Hearst, and some other owners of newspapers, it is difficult for the ordinary citizen to take seriously the rôle of keeper of the public conscience that many newspapers like to play.² It is widely known that many newspaper owners have other financial interests besides publishing — mines and ranches in the case of Hearst, coal in the case of Bonfils, tipsheets and other gambling services in the case of Annenberg. Others are interested in banking, insurance, real estate; and it is widely suspected that these holdings receive preferred treatment in the news. It is not illegal for a newspaper, in return for a bribe, to suppress news, as Bonfils of the *Denver Post* suppressed the information he obtained of the Teapot Dome affair.³ And the *Denver Post* was not ejected from the American Newspaper Publishers Association for this behavior.

It is also widely known that many publishers, big and little, use their papers to promote their own political ambitions. Hearst is said to have built up his chain partly to promote his chances at the presidency. Colonel Robert R. McCormick, publisher of the *Chicago Tribune*, which was rated by the Washington correspondents as the "least fair and reliable" big newspaper, has long been active in politics and is now called by some commentators the Republican boss of Illinois. Medill Mc-

¹ National Opinion Research Center, *Opinion News*, August 20, 1946, p. 2: "I'd like to ask you how fair you think radio stations, newspapers, and magazines generally are?"

	Generally		
	Fair	Not Fair	Undecided
Radio stations	81%	8%	11%
Newspapers	39	49	12
Magazines	45	22	33

² For Hearst see Oliver Carlson and Ernest S. Bates, *Hearst, Lord of San Simeon* (1936), or Ferdinand Lundberg, *Imperial Hearst* (1936); for Bonfils and the *Denver Post*, see Gene Fowler, *Timberline* (1933); for Annenberg, see Mott, *op. cit.*, pp. 657-658, and Gauvreau, *op. cit.*, pp. 401-467.

³ See Mott, *op. cit.*, p. 726, and Fowler, *op. cit.*, pp. 405-410.

Cornick, Ruth Hanna McCormick, and other members of the family were also personally in politics. Frank Gannett, owner of a chain of newspapers, has shown evidence of political ambitions. Warren G. Harding was one newspaper publisher who captured the chief prize of American politics. Without multiplying examples, it may be observed that while the owner of a newspaper has every legal right to use his property to promote his own political objectives, he cannot then complain if his readers conclude that his treatment of the news and his editorial policies are less than disinterested.

LACK OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS

Before a person may set himself up as a lawyer he is required by law in most states to submit proof of good character and to take an oath to eschew certain practices. If, after admission to the bar, he violates his oath and engages in unethical types of behavior, he may be disbarred. Other professions have similar ethical standards, either self-enforced or enforced by public authority, or by some combination of the two. But nothing of the sort applies to publishing newspapers or to the so-called profession of journalism. A saloonkeeper of dubious reputation may join with a blackmailer and a river gambler to buy and edit a newspaper that affects the public opinion of an entire region. A man with intimate connections with organized crime may make a fortune at providing services for criminals, may then use the money to buy a metropolitan newspaper, and may in turn use the newspaper to attack public officials who will not let his criminal associates operate unmolested and to defend officials who violate the law at his behest. A man may for a score of years publish a newspaper which is completely subservient to the most notorious American boss, suppressing, coloring, or manufacturing news at the boss's demand and defending editorially his most indefensible acts; and still such a publisher may rise to be president of the American Newspaper Publishers Association.¹ It will be recalled that gangsterism was brought to Chicago by the McCormick-Hearst circulation war, and that in 1897 Hearst sent a cable to his artist, Frederick Remington, who wanted to return from Cuba because there was no war: "Please remain. You furnish the pictures, and I'll furnish the war."² Between Hearst and Pulitzer an unnecessary war was furnished.

¹ Fowler and Gauvreau, *op. cit.*; and Dayton D. McKean, *The Boss* (1940), pp. 242-246.

² Mott, *op. cit.*, p. 529.

The American Society of Newspaper Editors has an admirable set of eight "canons of journalism" adopted in 1923. The canons run from "responsibility" to "decency."¹ They have never been enforced against any editor who violated them, and it is probably fair to say that they are more commonly disregarded than are party platforms.

RECOMMENDED GOVERNMENT SUPERVISION

In 1947 the Commission on the Freedom of the Press made a number of suggestions or recommendations that are of interest to students of government. The commission felt that the federal government ought to maintain competition among large units of the communications industries, or, where that is impossible, that it should "see that the public gets the benefit of such concentration" as is permitted. When the press neglects or refuses to carry government information "to inform the public of its purposes and policies," governments should employ their own facilities. This would mean government-owned newspapers or official gazettes of some sort. The commission felt that the press should cease the present conspiracy of silence with regard to criticisms of the press and instead "should engage in vigorous mutual criticism." This criticism should be assisted by the creation of a "new and independent agency" which would "appraise and report annually upon the performance of the press."² Perhaps it is needless to say that these suggestions were not well received by the newspaper world but were denounced as academic and as threatening to the freedom of the press. But they are not inconsistent with the private ownership of the means of communication, and they might make the best newspaper press in the world still better.

¹ Reprinted in Mott, *op. cit.*, pp. 726-727.

² *A Free and Responsible Press* (1947), pp. 79 ff.

Measuring Public Opinion

SPEAKING to a group of newspapermen at a meeting of the National Press Club, President Wilson once said:

You say, "All the people out my way think so and so." Now, I know perfectly well that you have not talked with all the people out your way. I find that out again and again. . . . The people of the United States . . . are thinking for themselves, every man for himself; and you do not know, and, the worst of it is, since the responsibility is mine, I do not know, what they are thinking about. I have the most imperfect means of finding out, and yet I have got to act as if I knew. . . . I am not put here to do what I please.¹

The theory of democracy Wilson followed in these remarks assumes that when men are elected to office they are put there not to do what they please but what the people please, to do what the majority wants done. Simple enough in theory, representation in practice involves endless difficulties, one of which is that the representative has, as Wilson put it, the most imperfect means of finding out what the people think and want.

ELECTIONS AS MEASURES OF OPINION

It might be assumed that an election shows what public opinion is, or at least what it was on election day. But an election is a measurement of many factors and of a confused complex of opinions. Was the Republican national victory of 1920, for example, a verdict on American participation in the League of Nations? As Walter Lippman analyzed it,

¹ *The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, vol. 4 (Harper & Brothers, 1926), p. 172.

The Republican majority was composed of men and women who thought a Republican victory would kill the League, plus those who thought it the most practical way to secure the League, plus those who thought it the surest way offered to obtain an amended League. All these voters were inextricably entangled with their own desire, or the desire of other voters, to improve business, or put labor in its place, or to punish the Democrats for going to war, or to punish them for not having gone sooner, or to get rid of Mr. Burleson, or to improve the price of wheat, or to lower taxes, or to stop Mr. Daniels from outbuilding the world, or to help Mr. Harding do the same thing.¹

To separate and weigh the factors in such a complex is never easy and sometimes impossible.

FAILURE TO SEPARATE ISSUES FROM CANDIDATES

The first difficulty with accepting elections as measurements of opinion is that they do not separate measures from men. Neither parties nor candidates will commit themselves on all pending public questions, so that a voter who wants to see a particular line of policy followed by a government may to some extent have to rely upon a guess or his general feeling concerning the broad attitudes of a candidate or a party: a pro-labor or anti-labor attitude, for example. The voter may then be disappointed when the man he has voted for turns out to be a pro-labor Republican or an anti-labor Democrat, as the case may be.

With a limited number of candidates — usually two and rarely more than three — from whom a voter must ordinarily select one man to represent him, and with an unlimited number of issues, complexities of commitment may occur that give the voter an unsatisfactory forced choice. Assume, for example, that a voter is isolationist in sentiment, pro-labor, anti-imperialist, and favors more government projects like the TVA. He may have to choose between two candidates for Congress both of whom are internationalist, one pro-labor and the other anti-labor. Moreover, neither of them may be willing to express himself clearly on imperialism, and one may favor the TVA while the other is not clear about it. Or a voter may not, on balance, like either candidate; if so, all he can do is to choose, if he can, the one least undesirable from his point of view. The same forced yes-or-no choice appears on referenda on public questions:

¹ From *Public Opinion*, p. 195. Copyright, 1922, by The Macmillan Company and used with their permission.

the voter cannot express approval of some parts and disapproval of others, or approval of some parts and disapproval of others unless amended. He must accept all or none, as they stand.

Candidates for state and local offices are sometimes candidates in fact for national office: Governor Dewey's campaign for governor of New York in 1946 was an example; his election was at least as much a trial heat for the presidential election of 1948 as it was a referendum on his administration of affairs in Albany. In such instances a voter cannot express his approval of the one and his disapproval of the other. The labor leaders who at that time had approved of Dewey's state administration were in this dilemma; they would have been willing to see him continue at Albany, but they did not want him as President; yet a vote for him as governor in 1946 was likely to be construed as a recommendation for 1948. Strictly local issues will affect voting on candidates for national offices, and *vice versa*.

ELECTIONS NOT TIMED WITH ISSUES

A second difficulty is that elections take place in the United States, not when issues arise, but by the calendar. An election may occur when no issues have aroused any particular public opinion; or when a series of events has only begun, which later will form opinion; or when some public problem has been solved but while the animosities produced by its solution are still seething; and under many other sets of circumstances. When representatives are elected for long terms, say four to six years, no one can predict what issues will arise before their terms end, or what opinion, if any, the public will hold upon the problems when they do arise. A United States senator may be elected when there is no war cloud in the sky, and yet before his term is over he may be called upon to vote on measures of war and peace for which his election could not possibly have been a mandate.

Referenda on public questions in those states that permit them are also subject to factors of timing. Questions are usually put on the ballot only at general elections because of the cost of special elections. Only matters of great importance, such as the adoption of a new state constitution, are ordinarily submitted to the people at special elections. No matter how the referred question gets on the ballot, whether by action of the legislature or by initiative, the referendum is subject to the timing of elections which only by chance will coincide with the timing of issues.

ELECTIONS ARE SAMPLES

A third difficulty with accepting elections as a measurement of public opinion is that any election is only a sample taken from the whole body of potential voters, and no one can say how representative the sample is of rich, poor, old, young, and other crisscrossing elements that make up the electorate. Only the hardest-fought national campaigns will bring out more than half the potential voters. In off-year, local, and special elections, as few as 1 per cent may vote. The author observed a special election on a bond issue in a city with about seven thousand registered voters in which the total vote cast was 154. A big vote, on the other hand, may represent, not great interest in any pending issues or candidates, but effective work by a political organization or a pressure group in getting the voters out on election day.

Votes on referenda also are samples, and are even more likely than votes on candidates to be samples unrepresentative of the opinion of the electorate. Unless an organized campaign is conducted on a referred question, the total yes-and-no vote on the question falls far below the vote on candidates. Frequently, the wording of questions in legal language repels and baffles voters, so that they do not vote on them at all. Consider the following question, for example: "Shall an act to amend an act concerning municipalities, approved June sixteenth Nineteen Hundred and Thirty-three, be further amended to permit municipal corporations to exercise the right of eminent domain outside the limits of the corporation?" Clearly the average voter will not understand such a question, and he is likely either not to vote or to vote No.

WEATHER AND OTHER CHANCE FACTORS

Such fortuitous factors as the weather on election day will affect the result, so that the sample of opinion that election returns represent is further distorted by rain, sleet, snow, or storms that may keep some voters from getting to the polls. Bad weather commonly affects the urban vote less than the country vote. Thus in New York state, snow or sleet is regarded as Democratic weather, because the city dwellers, heavily Democratic, will vote on their way to or from work, whereas many farmers, heavily Republican, will not get to town to vote.

Practical politicians recognize the great importance of election-day weather. In his first campaign for governor of Louisiana, Huey Long

was trapped between Klan and anti-Klan sentiment. He needed South Louisiana, but he was a North Louisiana man from hard-shelled Baptist territory. . . . He knew his people; he knew his odds. He predicted that he would win if the election day were clear, lose if it rained. His rustics could not get to the polls if the weather was bad. Huey turned his eye to the heavens. He was rewarded with near-cloudbursts. The first box was opened: "Sixty-one — and you got sixty!" The sage sighed: "I'm beat. Should've been one hundred for me and one against. Forty per cent of my country vote's gone."¹

Huey came in third.

Accidental factors also affect the returns on referenda. If the question is put at the bottom of the ballot, as is common practice, many voters will not notice it. The longer the ballot, the less likely they are to vote on the public questions, and the longer the list of questions, the less likely they are to vote for those at the bottom.

ELECTIONS A MEASUREMENT OF VOTING HABITS

A fourth difficulty with accepting election returns as a measurement of public opinion, particularly for any single election, is that people vote their party habits as well as their opinions. This traditional voting, already discussed in these pages, was commented upon by Walter Lippmann in his analysis of the election of 1920 as a referendum on the League of Nations:

There were [in 1920] nine million Democrats. Are you entitled to believe that all of them are staunch supporters of the League? Certainly you are not. For your knowledge of American politics tells you that many of the millions voted, as they always do, to maintain the existing social system in the South, and whatever their views on the League, they did not vote to express their views. Those who wanted the League were no doubt pleased that the Democratic Party wanted it too. Those who disliked the League may have held their noses as they voted. But both groups of Southerners voted the same ticket.²

EFFECTS OF VOTING CONDITIONS AND BALLOT COUNTING

A fifth weakness of election returns as a measurement of public opinion arises from the conditions of voting and the counting of the ballots. Regis-

¹ H. T. Kane, *Louisiana Hayride* (1941), p. 51.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 195.

tration laws may disfranchise groups of the electorate, groups whose opinions might greatly affect the results. A migration of population, such as took place in 1941 and 1942, may make large numbers of citizens ineligible to register for want of sufficient residence. Although the bribery of voters and election officials is perhaps less common than it once was, George Gallup thinks it is occasionally of sufficient importance so that some official election returns cannot be relied upon. Voting from fraudulent registration will, of course, distort election returns; for one recent instance, United States District Judge John C. Knox of the southern district of New York was criticized for his hand-picked juries, and it was

said that jurors should not be selected, but should, willy-nilly, be taken from the voting registers. That suggestion was given a try, and with this result: In some sections of the city [of New York] more than 20 per cent of the persons so summoned were found to be nonresidents of the buildings from which they were registered. A further percentage of large dimension was found to be made up of men who could neither speak nor understand the English language.¹

Presumably all these people voted — or votes were cast in their names. Other election frauds, such as ballot-box stuffing or the use of repeaters, will of course further reduce the validity of returns as measurements of public opinion. As recounts show, the counting of the vote is often careless and occasionally corrupt; some recounts in Chicago have shown a difference of 20 per cent from the first figures announced. Socialists and members of other minor parties insist that their vote is generally not properly credited to them, and other observers agree. For example: "In both city and country, the [election] officials of the two major parties often assign a nominal figure to the third-party vote, which they do not count at all."²

INTENSITY OF OPINION

Elections do not measure, unless in a very crude way, the intensity of opinions. One vote counts for just as much as another. And yet one voter might have been taken to the polls by a worker for a political organization and cast his vote as a mere favor for the district leader;

¹ John C. Knox, "Jury Selection," 22 *New York University Law Quarterly Review*, 438 (July, 1947).

² Bruce L. Smith, Harold D. Lasswell, and Ralph D. Casey, *Propaganda, Communications, and Public Opinion* (1946), p. 98.

whereas the next voter might feel so strongly about the outcome of the election that he would leave the country if his party lost. Elections cannot show strength of opinion when the votes of the interested, the uninterested, well informed, the poorly informed, and the uninformed are all counted together.

Although election returns are very crude measurements of public opinion, they have been, until recently, the only measurement available. They are, at any rate, official, binding, and final: the voters were given their chance to express their judgment on candidates or measures, and such-and-such a percentage expresses the desires of those who voted.

REPRESENTATION IN LEGISLATIVE BODIES

Even though on some occasions it could be shown that the two major parties stood for distinctly different platforms, and that all of the candidates of each party were unequivocally committed to these sets of issues, still a resulting majority in Congress or a state legislature would not necessarily reflect majority-minority opinions. The make-up of the legislative body must be considered before any conclusions on this point can be drawn. Gerrymandering is an attempt at deliberate misrepresentation, but wherever constitutions require state, county, or some other artificial lines to be used in the laying-out of districts, distortion is certain to occur; and even when districts of roughly equal population can be set up, they do not long remain equal because of differences in population growth; this type of misrepresentation is sometimes called the "silent gerrymander." Legislators may be elected by states, districts, or counties so that a bare majority in each area will win every seat for the majority party; this frequently happens in some southern states, where not a single Republican may be elected to a state legislature when there is a considerable Republican vote. In Vermont in 1944 a 42.9 per cent Democratic vote elected only 22 out of 246 members of the lower house of the state legislature. In the national congressional elections of 1942, Republican candidates received approximately 51 per cent of the vote cast but did not win a majority in the House of Representatives. The system of single-member districts used in American legislative bodies distorts party strength, so that even if parties and their candidates stood for different public opinions, the legislative body would not, unless by accident, reflect exactly the division of opinion. Minor parties are commonly not represented at all, even when they obtain a considerable proportion of the total vote cast.

In short, elections in the United States are at best a flawed mirror of the public mind. Seldom can a vote reflect the real complex of a voter's opinions — if he has opinions. An election may be swayed by the caprices of the weather, the efficiency of a political machine, or the mere habits of the voters. And in legislative bodies, representation may quite misrepresent the popular vote.

THE PREDICTION OF EVENTS

Men have always been interested in attempts to predict the future. Primitive people have sought to foretell events by the examination of the entrails of sacrificial animals or by studying the flights of birds. Because public policy is always affected by what the population thinks or expects, governments have always had an interest in prediction and divination. When, for example, during the Punic Wars crows tore gold from the roof of the Capitol in Rome, great fears were aroused at this bad omen and the government made the ritual of divining a function of the state. Today public opinion polls are not permitted in Russia or Spain, lest public opinions contrary to the policy of the dictatorships be revealed. Even in the Congress of the United States, it has seriously been suggested that polls be either prohibited or taken over by the government. In general, those persons who believe that leadership should count for more and public opinion for less in the determination of the policy of government, oppose or distrust polls.

THE USE OF CANVASSERS

As elections in countries having representative governments have come to be themselves events of great public interest, there has been an increasing desire to predict with some degree of certainty their outcome in advance. The politicians whose careers are at stake are naturally interested. Parties that have sufficient funds to hire canvassers send them from door to door a month or so before an election to learn if possible what the vote is going to be and whether anything needs to be done or can be done to change it. The canvassers are loyal partisans and seek not only to ascertain opinion but to make it. They hand out printed propaganda and use oral means of persuasion. Their reports to party headquarters are almost never made public by the party, in part because funds for use on election day are distributed with relation to what the canvass shows, com-

monly very secret business even within a party; and in part because attempts are often made to change the opinion shown by the canvass in the interval before election day.

Political leaders, even those with long experience, are not very successful at estimating opinion. The election of 1948 proved this fact once again. Politicians are bound to base their judgments upon such scattered and unrepresentative data as come to their attention. Claude E. Robinson collected the private predictions of politicians in sixteen states on the outcome of the presidential election of 1928. The average plurality error among Democrats was 18 per cent, among Republicans 7 per cent; some errors were as high as 41 per cent.¹ Both candidates and party managers tend to see more of their partisans than they see of their opponents, so they develop what Robinson called an "elation complex" that distorts their judgments. Politicians can perhaps be relied upon only to predict a landslide.²

EARLY PUBLIC OPINION POLLS

One of the earliest public opinion polls was conducted by the *Harrisburg Pennsylvanian* in 1824 on the election of Andrew Jackson.³ Other newspapers conducted polls throughout the nineteenth century, and in 1912 the *Farm Journal*, among the magazines, began a series on presidential elections. It was followed in 1916 by the *Literary Digest* and later by the *Pathfinder*. Both elections and issues were surveyed. Most of the newspapers used the ballot-in-the-paper type of poll, which required readers to clip out and mail in their ballots. Such a system of polling is almost bound to rely upon an unrepresentative sample, one that is an invitation to pressure groups to manipulate. The *Literary Digest* mailed out millions of pre-paid return postcards to persons who owned automobiles or subscribed to telephones. This mailing list was, of course, heavily weighted toward the upper income stratum of the population, but the *Literary Digest* polls showed a fair degree of accuracy until the presidential election of 1936,

¹ *Straw Votes* (1932), pp. 1-13.

² Newspaper writers are no more accurate than politicians. See Robinson, *op. cit.*, pp. 14-24. In 1948 "fifty of the nation's top political writers" surveyed by *Newsweek* unanimously predicted Dewey's election. The average of their guesses at his electoral vote was 366; actually he received 189. See *Newsweek*, vol. 32 (November 1, 1948), p. 12.

³ For a facsimile of this poll see *The Gallup Political Almanac for 1948*, p. 28.

when its prediction that Landon would be elected discredited the magazine.¹

THE GALLUP AND FORTUNE POLLS

In the early twenties of the present century market research analysts developed methods of analyzing newspaper readership as a means of checking the effectiveness of various advertising media. One of the men interested in this was George Gallup, who turned to using elections as a means of checking his other returns. In 1936 he brought down upon himself the wrath of the editor of the *Literary Digest* by predicting what that poll would show six weeks before its ballots were mailed out. His prediction, incidentally, turned out to be very close. In 1935 the magazine *Fortune* engaged the market research firm headed by Elmo Roper to make polls of public opinion for it, and the first one published in *Fortune* was on Huey Long's share-the-wealth scheme.² The Roper predictions on the percentage of popular vote in presidential elections were until 1948 extremely accurate. Since that time Gallup's American Institute of Public Opinion has conducted thousands of polls, and Roper hundreds.³ Grants from foundations established polling organizations at Denver University (National Opinion Research Center), although in 1947 the office of this group was moved to the University of Chicago, and at Princeton (Office of Public Opinion Research). To compete with Gallup, various private polling concerns have been established, and about a score of newspapers conduct polls for their own states or cities.⁴

¹ Its final poll was published in the issue of October 31, 1936, vol. 122, pp. 5-6. The magazine soon suspended publication. There is no complete history of these early polls, but some of them are discussed in George Gallup and Saul F. Rae, *The Pulse of Democracy* (1940), pp. 34-55; and in Robinson, *op. cit.*, pp. 46-57.

² Vol. 12 (July, 1935), p. 65.

³ Gallup's organization is maintained by paid subscriptions to his service by newspapers. The number of papers publishing the "Gallup Poll" has differed from time to time, tending to go up in election years and to decline in off years; it averages about 130. In addition, Gallup has established polling organizations on the same scheme in eleven foreign countries where freedom of the press is allowed. His polls appear four times a week or oftener, depending upon the questions of the day. The greatest amount of work on public opinion polls has been done by Gallup and his organization; the phrase "Gallup poll" is on the verge of becoming part of the language.

⁴ The returns of the leading polls have been reprinted in the *Public Opinion Quarterly* published at Princeton University, and in *Opinion News*, a fortnightly digest issued by the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago. Various books have summarized them, notably Jerome S. Bruner, *Mandate from the People* (1944); Gallup and Rae, *op. cit.*; and William A. Lydgate, *What America Thinks* (1944).

These polls which grew out of market research use the statistical method of sampling, which may be stated thus: if a representative sample of a whole (a "universe") be weighed or counted, the characteristics of the whole may be determined within known percentages of probable error without counting or weighing the whole. The opinions held by a whole electorate may thus be ascertained by interviewing a relatively small number of individuals. The size of the sample is less important to accuracy than its representative character; Gallup has asserted that no well-constructed sample has ever gone awry because of small size alone, and Hadley Cantril has reported samples of 233 in an electorate of 100,000 accurate within 1 per cent.¹ Depending upon the degree of accuracy desired, and on whether states or sections are to be separately reported, Gallup uses a sample of from 1500 to 60,000.² Elmo Roper for the *Fortune* survey uses approximately 3000;³ for the presidential election of 1948 he used 5200.

To be representative, a polling sample must be constructed to include only the persons whose opinions are wanted for the purpose at hand. For instance, to predict an election, probably the opinions of eligible voters who intend to vote are all that may be significant. The sample, furthermore, must reflect those variables which affect opinion: age, education, income, occupation, race, religion, sex, state or section of residence, social position, and so on. And the sample must include these variables in the same proportion that they bear to the whole; if, for example, a question is to be asked in which economic status influences opinion, then the National Opinion Research Center takes two out of every hundred respondents from the wealthy, fourteen from the upper middle class, fifty-two from the middle class, and thirty-two from the poor.⁴ The collection of the statistics on social stratifications necessary to compose the samples for various purposes is one of the major tasks of every polling organization. When the sample is determined, interviewers will be directed to seek out and question a certain number (a "quota") selected at random of Negroes, Catholics, Protestants, Jews, farmers, city dwellers, unemployed, or whatever the categories may be.

¹ Hadley Cantril, *Gauging Public Opinion* (1944), pp. 150-171. This book is the standard work on the techniques of polling.

² George Gallup, *A Guide to Public Opinion Polls* (1944), p. 22. For Presidential elections, to permit state-by-state forecasts, Gallup uses a sample of 40,000.

³ *Fortune*, vol. 12 (October, 1935), p. 58.

⁴ See *Interviewing for NORC* (1945), pp. 62-64.

THE AREA TYPE OF POLL

Another type of polling technique is that which surveys an area previously determined to be representative. This device has been used by the Bureau of the Census and by the Department of Agriculture. Its most extensive use in determining and forecasting political opinions was in Erie County, Ohio, in 1940.¹ In that instance a representative sample of 600 persons was interviewed seven times, every month beginning with May and ending the week after election day. Each person was asked approximately 250 questions.² The area sample and the random, representative sample types of polls have their respective advocates; the dispute lies beyond the scope of this book.³

TYPES OF QUESTIONS

Questions are asked in various forms. The simplest is the categorical. In this the respondent is permitted only to answer yes or no; for example, "Have you ever written a letter to your Congressman?" Almost as simple is the form in which the respondent is asked whether he intends to vote, and if so, for whom, or in which he is given two lines of public policy and asked to choose one or the other, or to say that he is undecided: "Should the United States keep the secrets of the atomic bomb, or reveal them to the world, or have you decided what you think we should do?"

Such questions suffice to measure attitudes when voters are going to be forced to choose among candidates or to vote for or against a referred proposal in an approaching election, but they do not reveal intensity of feeling or the spread of attitudes among a considerable number of possibilities.

To survey these opinions two types of questions have been used. In the multiple-choice or "cafeteria" type, the interviewer hands the respondent a card on which are printed a number of statements — three to a dozen — representing various positions toward a candidate or an issue. For instance, on the question, "Which of these statements comes closest to expressing the way you feel toward Germany today?" the statements offered might range from "Germany should be kept under permanent

¹ Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, *The People's Choice: How the Voter Makes Up His Mind in a Presidential Campaign* (1944). This was a study made by the Bureau of Applied Social Research of Columbia University.

² Paul F. Lazarsfeld, "The Election is Over," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 8 (Fall, 1944), p. 317.

³ See titles cited in Smith, Lasswell, and Casey, *op. cit.*, and files of the *Public Opinion Quarterly*.

military occupation" to "Germany should be restored to her full rights as a sovereign nation immediately." It is difficult to construct the statements so that they will represent all the possible attitudes, be mutually exclusive, and show exact intervals of gradations one from another.¹ In spite of all forethought, some attitude toward a question may be left off the list, or a respondent may be forced to take a position not precisely to his liking. It has also been demonstrated empirically that when a person is presented with various possibilities he tends to choose a middle ground, perhaps not because of any conviction but to cover up his ignorance or indecision. Questions printed on cards cannot, of course, be used with illiterates, and their reliability is doubtful when used with persons having little education. Otherwise such sets of questions will reveal shadings and intensity of opinions better than the yes-or-no type.

Another kind of question, usually called the "open-end" or "free-answer question," allows the respondent to supply any answer he pleases. For example, the replies to the question, "What do you think is the most important problem facing the country today?" will of course run from the atomic bomb to taxes. And there is likely to be much overlapping; for instance, communism, foreign policy, and the future of the United Nations all blend together.² In spite of all precautions, the open-end interview is likely to bring into the results a subjective element, in that when a respondent gives a vague answer, the interviewer may classify it to suit his own views. When such interviews are conducted by different polling organizations upon the same general topic, the results are difficult, and perhaps even impossible to compare.

HOW ACCURATE ARE THE POLLS?

Since the development of "scientific" polling in the middle thirties there has been much discussion of the accuracy of the polls.³ Only when they forecast election results is it possible to measure the polls against any exterior standard, and even election returns are not statistically satis-

¹ The pioneer work was done by two psychologists, L. L. Thurstone and E. J. Chave, *The Measurement of Attitude* (1929). See also L. L. Thurstone, *The Vectors of Mind* (1935).

² Gallup poll of August 18, 1947. Gallup has run a series of polls over several years on what the most important problem is.

³ See, for examples, Harold F. Gosnell, "How Accurate Were the Polls?" *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 1 (January, 1937), pp. 97-105; Daniel Katz, "The Public Opinion Polls and the 1940 Election," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 5 (March, 1941), pp. 52-78; and Lucien Warner, "The Reliability of Public Opinion Surveys," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 3 (July, 1939), pp. 376-390.

factory. To cite just one problem, the polls might conceivably measure with perfect accuracy the voting *intentions* of an electorate, but the weather on election day, or some last-minute work of a pressure group, might affect the result markedly. The prediction of turn-out is at least as difficult as the prediction of voting behavior. Opinions may change between the date of a poll and the election. Nevertheless, the record of the polls was until 1948 astonishingly accurate at predicting elections, and polling organizations are constantly striving to improve their methods.¹ The average national error claimed for the Gallup poll is 2.5 per cent, plus or minus (plurality error). The predictions of the Roper poll for *Fortune* have been even closer, although the two are not exactly comparable, since Gallup predicts by states and Roper estimates only the national vote. An error of 4.5 percentage points, which the National Opinion Research Center allows for itself, is statistically reasonable. The group of experts who reported to the Anderson Committee of 1944 said that "The accuracy of political predictions in close elections constitutes an unnecessarily severe test of the accuracy of public opinion polls . . ." because

An error in estimate of 1 percentage point, or even less, may place a closely contested State in the wrong party column for election purposes but would not seriously affect the interpretation and significance of the results of other polls. Moreover, in predicting elections a poll is actually making two simultaneous estimates. First, it is estimating the proportion of people who favor one or the other of the candidates, and, secondly, it is estimating which and how many of these people will vote. An error in either of these estimates will affect the accuracy of the final estimate, and the error in both may well be cumulative.²

THE POLLS AND 1948

An interesting illustration of how even a relatively small error may give completely wrong results developed in connection with the presidential election of 1948. The newspapers and magazines had almost unanimously predicted the election of Governor Dewey, and so had all the polls. Hence when President Truman won, it was perhaps human and natural for the newspapers to ignore as much as possible their own nearly 100 per cent

¹ See Edward G. Benson, Cyrus C. Young, and Clyde A. Syze, "Polling Lessons from the 1944 Election," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 9 (Winter, 1946), pp. 467-484.

² Louis H. Bean, Philip M. Hauser, Morris Hansen, and Rensis Likert to the Committee to Investigate Campaign Expenditures, House of Representatives, 78th Congress, Second Session *Hearings*, Part 12 (December 28, 1944), p. 1298.

error of prediction, to ignore the past performance record of the polls both in the United States and abroad, to assail all polls as useless, and to repudiate them. One paper even published a picture of George Gallup and his staff under the headline "Did They Poll the Wrong Country?" Cartoons ridiculing pollsters appeared in newspapers all over the nation.

For years to come there will be discussion among statisticians about what happened to upset the previous excellent record of performance by the public opinion polls. Yet it should be remembered that even though they failed correctly to predict the winner of that election, the record of the polls was not as bad as some readers of the press might have supposed. There were some unusual circumstances in the election of 1948, and in his release of October 20, 1948, Gallup had called attention to a number of them. He pointed out that 44 per cent of the voters called themselves Democrats, 35 per cent Republicans, 19 per cent independents, and 2 per cent Progressives. Had he followed these figures, prorating the independents, instead of using the poll on voting intentions, he could have picked the winner correctly and his percentage error would have been small. In spite of the heavy registration the country over, and ignoring newspaper forecasts of a heavy vote, Gallup forecast a light vote of 47,000,000, or under 50 per cent of the eligibles; the vote turned out to be about 48,680,000, a figure which makes this prediction as close as anybody could reasonably expect. Moreover, in previous years a light vote had meant a Republican victory, and empirically Gallup was justified in forecasting on that basis that Dewey would win. But for the first time a light vote turned out to yield a Democratic majority. The reasons for this shift may never be fully and satisfactorily explained. One plausible hypothesis, however, is that the light vote was the result of a want of enthusiasm for either Truman or Dewey on the part of millions of the eligible voters, many of whom therefore did not vote at all. This hypothesis is reinforced by the evidence that 683,000 voters in the 1948 election cast their ballots for state or local candidates but did not vote for any presidential candidate. This extraordinary behavior is the reverse of the usual pattern — generally the most votes are cast for the head of the ticket. Organized labor was not enthusiastic about Truman, but it was bitterly anti-Republican because of the Taft-Hartley Act passed by the Eightieth Congress over Truman's veto; and upon the Democratic promise to repeal the act, labor worked quietly but solidly for Truman and Democratic candidates for Congress. In addition, many farmers, faced with a bumper crop and a surplus, were not satisfied either with the Republican promises of agricultural price support or with Dewey's apparently late conversion to

their cause, and enough of them either did not vote or voted Democratic to tip the scales in all of the middle western farm states except for the tier from North Dakota south through Kansas.

The final pre-election forecasts of the polls, with the results, were assembled by a committee for the Social Science Research Council thus:

	<i>Gallup</i>	<i>Roper</i>	<i>Crossley</i>	<i>The Vote</i>
Truman.....	44.5%	37.1%	44.8%	49.50%
Dewey.....	49.5	52.2	49.9	45.1
Wallace.....	4.0	4.3	3.3	2.4
Thurmond.....	2.0	5.2	1.6	2.4

The Roper (*Fortune*) poll, hitherto the most accurate, was on this occasion the most inaccurate. The Gallup and Crossley polls missed Truman's percentage by 5 and 4.7 percentage points respectively, which exceed their usual margin of error, but which is by no means discreditable. The average error was 7.4. It would be difficult or impossible to establish that an election reflects opinion more closely than this, especially when about half of the eligible voters fail to vote. And for many purposes in the social sciences a 5 to 10 per cent margin of error, although higher than would be liked, will suffice.

The polling organizations will probably continue to predict elections, both because of the news interest in such predictions and because these pre-election polls serve as tests of the efficiency of the organization itself, tests which are useful for other surveys on other issues. But however accurate the polls may be over a number of elections, they constantly run the risk that on some occasions weather, a last-minute event or appeal, or some undetected shift in opinion may throw their estimates far off.¹

¹ The committee on the polls for the Social Science Research Council thought that in the last two weeks of the 1948 campaign "There was a net shift to Truman of 2 or 3 percentage points." Gallup's findings in a post-election poll published December 5, 1948, bore this out and revealed that 4 per cent of all voters made up their minds on election day. The complete results were:

WHEN VOTERS MADE UP THEIR MINDS

	Truman	Dewey	*All Voters
Before campaign started.....	46%	64%	54%
Early in campaign.....	11	12	12
First half Oct.....	4	2	3
Second half Oct.....	13	5	9
Election Day.....	5	3	4
Indefinite.....	21	14	18
	100%	100%	100%

* Includes people who voted for other candidates as well as for Truman and Dewey.

Such a miscalculation occurred in 1948, but one failure ought not to detract from the general value of the public opinion polls.¹

Polls on public questions may occasionally be checked by referenda; for example, a Gallup poll in Maine in 1937 showed 67 per cent of the voters opposed to a sales tax; it was actually defeated by 72 per cent, a 5 per cent error.² But only the yes-or-no questions can usually be tested thus. The more elaborate surveys of attitudes are not susceptible of testing by referenda. Students of polling techniques are conscious that various errors may occur in polls on questions.

TYPES OF ERRORS IN POLLS

First, errors may arise from the wording of a question. The question may, to the ordinary respondent be vague or obscure; it may be phrased in unfamiliar terms; it may prove to be leading, that is, to invite or to suggest a certain answer; its wording may arouse emotional responses not expected by the framers; too many or too few alternatives may be provided for answers; and it may produce only rationalizations or stereotyped answers instead of real opinions.³ Errors of meaning and wording may sometimes be detected by pre-testing questions on small groups and by using questions phrased in different ways to find out in advance of a test on a large sample if significant differences appear with varied wordings.

Errors of another sort may arise from the nature of the sample or area used. It may contain a geographical, occupational, religious, or other bias. Or variables not known or not expected to influence opinion may, in fact, sway it markedly. Or certain variables may be more influential than the quotas allowed for.

Faulty participation by respondents may produce errors. All polls re-

¹ The polls themselves may influence elections. Lazarsfeld, *op. cit.*, pp. 107-109, asserts that there is a bandwagon effect, that "people tend to vote for the candidate they expect to win." Gallup, on the other hand, has a considerable body of evidence from polls both on issues and on candidates to show that if there is such a thing as a bandwagon vote it is of trifling significance; indeed, on some occasions a reverse of the bandwagon effect has been noted: as polls were published, "the trend was downward and the vote for the 'popular' side declined." (See Gallup and Rae, *op. cit.*, pp. 246-256.) Gallup presents later cases in his *Guide to Public Opinion Polls* (1944), pp. 81-85. The question is not settled, but the weight of evidence seems to be against the bandwagon theory, especially in view of the election of 1948 when all the polls predicted Dewey's victory.

² Gallup and Rae, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

³ For a detailed examination of these and other problems arising from the meaning of questions see Cantril, *op. cit.*, pp. 3-50.

port, for instance, better cooperation from the educated than from the uneducated, who are likely to suspect all interviewers. Consequently, the views of the educated may be disproportionately reported. In the "open-end" type of interview, the educated, who are usually more articulate, are especially likely to have their opinions more precisely recorded. And respondents may give false answers, perhaps because they are unconvinced of the anonymity of the poll and perhaps because they think some answer is socially expedient or expected.

Errors may also arise from faulty interviewing, deliberate or unintentional. Interviewers may cheat by filling out blanks and not making the interviews, or by not making all of them, although devices to detect dishonest interviewers have been worked out by poll-takers. The interviewers may hurry the slow respondent and be too quick to put him in the "undecided" or in the "don't know" category. Few interviewers — usually persons of upper-middle-class background — like to go into the worst slums or into other unpleasant places to seek out respondents, and their reports may therefore be biased. Finally, the prestige of the interviewer may affect his rapport with the persons he questions and consequently may influence their answers.

Each type of poll carries its own possibilities of error. The ballot-in-the-paper type is loaded toward those persons deeply interested, toward the educated, toward the readers of that particular journal, and in other ways. It is, in fact, so unreliable as to be seldom used today. The secret ballot mailed to a sample is likely to be biased toward the educated and intelligent, who are the most willing to cooperate by returning the ballots. The poorly educated or the unintelligent are likely to suspect that some commitment is involved, and they do not return their ballots in proportion to their numbers. And the illiterates are likely not to be reported at all. Examples of errors that may arise from interviewing have already been cited.

No instance of outright fraud in any poll has ever been proved, but a dishonest count or the publication of false returns is always possible. Proof of any such fraud would, of course, ruin the polling organization that engaged in it. An enlightened self-interest therefore seems likely to encourage honesty and efficiency. It is possible, however, that ballot-in-the-paper polls have been manipulated in that ballots have been held back to make a race look closer than it was, and then full returns have been released just before the election.

Once the returns are reported to the headquarters of the polling organi-

zation, there may be a temptation to weight them, to correct for the known bias of the interviewers or of the sample, for anticipated turn-out, or for other factors. If the "raw," or unweighted and uncorrected, figures are published along with the revised ones, no objection can be made. Weighting brings into the matter an element of personal judgment which, if used, should be revealed.

No polling organization, of course, can be held responsible for the misuse of its reports by others. If they are misunderstood, misconstrued, or suppressed, that is not the fault of the poll. It is interesting to observe how some newspapers that publish the Gallup polls will print the reports on the front page if they agree with the editor's views, will bury them on an inside page if they do not.

There is no fully satisfactory test for the accuracy of polls on issues. If a poll made by one organization on a given question differs sharply from that made by another on the same question, an error may be presumed to exist; so one poll may to some extent check another. If the findings of a poll can be measured against some action by a public or against some event, the accuracy of the reports may be determined.¹ Such instances, of course, are rare. On the whole, the present-day polls are sufficiently accurate for purposes of the social studies. They are probably more accurate at revealing opinion than most elections, and they open up great possibilities for the study of government and public problems.

POLITICAL USES OF PUBLIC OPINION POLLS

BY LEGISLATIVE BODIES

As anyone can readily see who will pore over that compendium of Americana, *The Congressional Record*, the public opinion polls are frequently cited by congressmen as evidence of what the people think or want. The polls may thus form a sort of continuous referendum which will make the masses articulate as elections cannot do. They may also help to overcome the defects of election machinery arising from the use of single-member districts and elections at calendar intervals. The polls offer a check upon the opinions expressed by newspaper editors, columnists, and radio commentators, whose views may or may not be representative of

¹ Gallup and Rae, *op. cit.*, pp. 220-225, cite a few examples. A national survey on whether people would take free and secret blood tests for syphilis coincided within two per cent with a semi-official census of the Chicago Board of Health.

those in the whole electorate. Congress, in its dealings with other countries, can know not only the attitudes of the American public toward issues of foreign policy but, for those countries where polls are permitted, it can make a judgment of attitudes toward the United States.

Perhaps most significant at the present time is the possible effect of public opinion polls upon the relationship of pressure groups to legislative bodies. For polls offer a legislator a check upon the oral opinions expressed to him by lobbyists and a means of estimating the representative character of the opinions expressed in the mail and telegrams he receives. If a group forms a significant segment of his constituency, a legislator needs to know the facts about its membership, and he ought not to have to rely upon either the probably inflated claims made by the representatives of the group or upon the volume of noise it can make. A poll can quickly and cheaply reveal the real size of any organization. It will also show how much public following a group has. When, for example, a Gallup poll showed that less than 4 per cent of the American people favored the Townsend old-age-pension plan, the Townsend movement withered away.¹ The leaders of groups do not always reflect the opinions of the rank and file; members of labor unions, for example, are apparently less convinced than their officers of the virtues of the closed shop.² Polls will also reveal to legislators the intensity of public and group opinions of this kind and of many others.

Some opponents of public opinion surveys have asserted that polls will injure representative government by making legislators hesitate to trust their own judgments or by making them refuse to vote against a clearly expressed public opinion; it is argued that legislators will be reduced to "rubber stamps." There is little if any evidence to bear out this view. Congress, at least, has not consistently followed the polls. It allowed price controls to lapse, in spite of the fact that 74 per cent of the people wanted controls continued and only 10 per cent wanted price ceilings removed. Congress voted a postwar loan to England in spite of 60 per cent disapproval, 27 per cent approval, 13 per cent without opinion.³ It appears, then, that other pressures on legislators carry more weight than the public opinion polls, at least in some striking instances.

¹ Gallup and Rae, *op. cit.*, pp. 145-147.

² Lydgate, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

³ Gallup polls of August 31, 1945, and September 30, 1945.

NON-PARTY GROUPS

For non-party groups the polls offer various possibilities. It is feasible by means of them to ascertain the public opinion, if any, that exists toward the group or its objectives; and knowing such facts, the managers can determine whether more of the propaganda of the association is needed, and if so, where. The polls can, of course, be used to measure the effects of different devices of propaganda. Thus the popular strength of opposing groups and the relationship of these groups to the parties may be disclosed.

POLITICAL PARTIES

Leaders of political parties are coming to use the polls more and more. It is now fairly common practice for party organizations to engage one of the polling organizations to check their canvasses, or even to use them in place of a canvass. For example, if a poll shows that a state or a district is safe, there may be no reason for spending the money necessary for a canvass or for more party propaganda. The results of such polls must, naturally, be kept secret at least until after the election. Again, the devices of party propaganda may be measured by means of polls. The strength of opponents, of minor parties, and of non-party groups may be ascertained. Information concerning large groups may be of utmost importance to skillful party leadership, and polls will show which ones may safely be defied or ignored and which must be conciliated with platform planks or promises.

The public opinion polls now serve as an informal presidential preference primary. They reveal before a convention the voting strength in every state and section of every candidate who has been seriously discussed, whether or not he chooses to enter the primary contests. They should prove to be of great usefulness in estimating the vote-getting abilities of men who, like Wendell Willkie, had never been candidates for public office.

FOR ADMINISTRATIVE PURPOSES

Congressman (later Secretary of Agriculture and Senator) Clinton P. Anderson remarked at a committee hearing in 1944, "We [members of Congress] have appropriated several millions of dollars for a farm census

that will soon get under way . . . and now there is a discussion as to whether or not the facts gathered will ever be of any use to anyone because there may not be sufficient money to interpret them. . . . We could have used a polling organization and with a fraction of the expense could have gotten a substantial amount of the agricultural information" that the farmers needed.¹ Not all legislators are equally enlightened concerning the possible uses of sampling techniques instead of special censuses; but polls are probably nearly as accurate as the usual special census; they are quicker, and certainly they are much cheaper when it is necessary to measure available labor force, number of unemployed, transients, and to obtain similar kinds of data.

Polls are also useful to determine whether the services offered by an administrative agency such as the Department of Agriculture or the Veterans Administration are known to the persons for whom the government provides them; whether tax liability is understood; whether administrative orders reach the persons to whom they apply and the extent to which they are being obeyed or enforced; whether persons affected by an administrative action have complaints or suggestions; whether a field force is fully aware of headquarters policy and is carrying it out; and for many similar purposes. Sampling techniques offer a wide variety of devices for the improvement of public administration.² Although it has not published its results, the State Department is known to have engaged polling organizations to discover public attitudes on foreign policies.

OTHER USES

The development of public opinion polls has opened up new possibilities for the better understanding of social behavior. They are revealing the "areas of ignorance" in public opinion: what issues are not understood, what institutions, personnel, and policies in governments are not followed by the electorate. As these areas of ignorance are mapped it should be possible to explain and predict certain types of group action hitherto insufficiently understood.

The polls are developing a body of information upon the factors that

¹ Anderson Committee, *Hearings, op. cit.*, p. 1255.

² See Hans E. Skott, "Attitude Research in the Department of Agriculture," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 7 (Summer, 1943), pp. 280-292; David B. Truman, "Public Opinion Research as a Tool of Public Administration," *Public Administration Review*, vol. 5 (Winter, 1945), pp. 62-72; and Rensis Likert, "The Sample Interview Survey," in *Current Trends in Psychology*, Wayne Dennis, editor (1947), pp. 196-225.

influence or determine public opinion: age, sex, social-economic status, and the rest. As these facts are collected and studied, some age-old concepts of politics are likely to fall. For example, it appears that age is not as important as Aristotle and many other writers have thought in determining attitudes.¹ And the attitudes of men and women on political questions are so nearly alike that sex may be an insignificant influence on opinion.² It is also becoming possible to chart the movements of opinion, to relate changes to events, and to show the effects of one opinion upon another. The effects of different cultures upon the same opinion may be studied as polls are conducted in various countries.

The effects of the polls upon popular government may become as great as the effects of the development of representative bodies. Public opinion can now rule as well as reign.³ The knowledge of this fact has led many observers to assert that poll taking is a business affected with a public interest, and that governments should conduct their own polls and perhaps regulate or certify private organizations engaged in surveying public opinion. Elmo Roper, one of the pioneers in the business, recommended "a governmentally operated public opinion survey for the purpose of letting the people tell Congress and the Administration what they think of proposed legislation and of government administration generally."⁴ Were such a survey to become a part of the machinery of government, there would be little — or at least far less — need for future Presidents to feel as Wilson did that they had only "the most imperfect means of finding out" what the people think.

¹ Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

² Lydgate, *op. cit.*, pp. 116-118.

³ Harwood L. Childs, "Rule by Public Opinion," *Atlantic Monthly*, vol. 157 (June, 1936), pp. 755-764.

⁴ *New York Times*, September 5, 1947.

Some Public Opinions of Political Significance

"NEVER BEFORE in human history have so many facts been gathered about the formation, structure, and behavior of public opinion in the United States. No longer does the American mass mind represent a trackless and uncharted sea, to be glimpsed only by guesswork, inference, and intuition, by some flash of insight of a Bryce, a Dana, a Greeley, or a Lippmann."¹ Between two and three thousand public opinion polls have been taken on as many questions of public interest. New polls are being taken daily, and a great mass of data, not yet fully studied, is accumulating on the political attitudes of the American people. Opinions change (as they should change) with events, and new opinions emerge with new social situations; but a number of landmarks stand out — it is no longer necessary to guess at many of the current political attitudes of the American people.

OPINIONS AND POLITICAL PARTIES

INTERESTS IN THE PARTIES

One of the most important sets of political attitudes is the congeries of opinions and interests that tends to lead people into associating themselves with political parties. A majority of the manual workers, for instance, has been allied with the Democratic Party since 1936, as the following Gallup polls show:

¹ William A. Lydgate, *What America Thinks* (1944), p. 150.

	<i>Democratic</i>	<i>Republican</i>
1936	74%	26%
1940	66	34
1944	62	38
1948	50	43

Members of labor unions have also generally associated with the Democratic Party, according to Gallup's figures, although their dissatisfaction with President Truman caused a sharp drop between 1944 and 1948. Notwithstanding this dissatisfaction, union labor generally voted for Truman in 1948. The adherence of members of unions to the Democratic Party over the years Gallup has found to be:¹

	<i>Democratic</i>	<i>Republican</i>
1936	80%	20%
1940	72	28
1944	72	28
1948	50	42

Young people have tended also to vote Democratic, but it must be remembered that economic and social status cut across age as a factor, and these percentages may not be entirely reliable:²

PER CENT DEMOCRATIC

<i>Age group</i>	<i>1936</i>	<i>1940</i>	<i>1944</i>	<i>1948</i>
21-29	68%	60%	58%	35.5%
30-49	65	56	53	36
50 and over	56	51	51	37.5

On the other hand, depending upon how they are classified, business, professional, and "white-collar" persons are Republicans by about 60 to 70 per cent.

THE INDEPENDENT VOTER

A large number of voters, however — about sixteen to seventeen millions — regard themselves as independents. This proportion increased

¹ Gallup poll, August 11, 1948. Gallup (American Institute of Public Opinion) polls have been reprinted both in *Opinion News* and in the *Public Opinion Quarterly*.

² Gallup poll, September 11, 1948.

between 1944 and 1948. Using a total vote of 58,000,000 as a base, Gallup estimated the independent vote thus:

PROPORTION OF VOTERS CLASSIFYING
THEMSELVES AS INDEPENDENTS

	<i>Per Cent</i>	<i>Number</i>
1940.....	20	10,000,000
1944.....	20	9,000,000
1948.....	29	16,800,000

The 29 per cent who think of themselves as independents show some significant differences among themselves. The higher the voter is in the educational scale, the more likely he is to be independent; business and professional people are twice as likely to call themselves independent as farmers; young people are more independent than persons over fifty; and by sections the east central area is most independent, the South least:¹

PER CENT OF INDEPENDENT VOTERS

By Education

College.....	39%
High school.....	31
Grade school or no school...	23

By Occupation

Business and professional...	34%
White-collar workers.....	34
Manual workers.....	27
Farmers.....	17

By Age

21-29.....	39%
30-49.....	29
50 and over.....	21

By Sections

New England, middle	
Atlantic.....	30%
East central.....	35
West central.....	22
South.....	19
Rocky Mountain and Pa-	
cific.....	29

INTEREST IN POLITICS

To an unknown extent, however, this independence may be only a reflection of the voters' ignorance of and indifference to politics; that is, many of those who do not know or care deeply about public affairs may call themselves independents. Some evidence of this condition was cited

¹ Gallup polls, June 25, 1948. The vote of 1948 turned out to be approximately 48,680,000, and some students of the polls believe that a large proportion of the independents finally made up their minds to vote for Truman.

in the previous chapter. In addition, it may be noted that only 38 per cent of the voters can name their congressman;¹ 37 per cent think that the federal government makes the laws which determine the right to vote, 33 per cent think the states do, and 30 per cent admit they do not know;² and 52 per cent do not know what a filibuster is.³ The term *filibuster* may be sufficiently unusual so that few people see it often in print. But with all the discussion of the Bill of Rights that there has been in newspapers, on the air, and among organized groups, it might be thought that more people would know the meaning of that term than apparently did in 1946, according to the results of an NORC question. It was asked, "What is the Bill of Rights?" and the answers were as follows:⁴

- 31 per cent had never heard of it or were not sure if they had;
- 36 per cent claimed to have heard of it but could not identify it;
- 12 per cent gave confused or incorrect identifications;
- 21 per cent gave responses indicating that the term refers to the first ten amendments to the Constitution.

It might be presumed that if there is any one political fact which all the voters would know, it would be the names of the major party candidates for President and Vice-President in an election year. But they do not, and naturally still fewer know the names of the candidates of the minor parties:⁵

PERCENTAGE ANSWERING CORRECTLY

Democratic

Harry S. Truman, President	91%
Alben W. Barkley, Vice-President	49

Republican

Thomas E. Dewey, President	88
Earl Warren, Vice-President	58

¹ Gallup poll, August 13, 1947.

² National Opinion Research Center poll, January 23, 1944, hereafter cited as NORC. These polls have appeared both in *Opinion News* and in the *Public Opinion Quarterly*.

³ Gallup poll, April 5, 1947.

⁴ NORC poll, August 6, 1946. A similar poll three years earlier gave comparable answers.

⁵ Gallup poll, August 25, 1948.

Progressive

Henry A. Wallace, President	67
Glen H. Taylor, Vice-President	30

States' Rights (Dixiecrats)

J. Strom Thurmond, President	11
Fielding Wright, Vice-President	3

Socialist

Norman Thomas, President	21
Tucker P. Smith, Vice-President	less than 1%

DISTRUST OF PARTY MANAGEMENT

Perhaps another explanation for the high and increasing number of independents is that large numbers of voters do not believe that the parties are themselves democratically managed. When asked whether they would agree with the statement that "the Republican Party is run by a few big businessmen," the results were:

<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No Opinion</i>
47%	37%	16%

When asked whether they thought the Democratic Party is run by the labor leaders, the answers were:

<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No Opinion</i>
40%	43%	17%

Similarly, the voters were asked if they thought the Wallace Progressive Party of 1948 was run by the Communists. A majority agreed:¹

<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No Opinion</i>
51%	21%	28%

GENERAL ATTITUDES TOWARD GOVERNMENT

In their general attitudes toward government and what government should do, the American people are not radical. They are more inclined

¹ Gallup poll, July 21, 1948. Notwithstanding their distrust of the parties, a Gallup poll of June 27, 1948, indicated that about 25 per cent of the voters, or approximately 16,000,000, would be willing if asked to contribute five dollars to the parties of their choice. The successful collection in 1948 of hundreds of thousands of dollars at Wallace meetings would corroborate this finding.

toward those attitudes loosely called middle-class — a high degree of satisfaction with things as they are, and a reliance upon themselves rather than upon government. Many polls show these attitudes. For example, 68 per cent (81 per cent of professional people) would prefer to own their own businesses rather than to be employed by someone else; 55 per cent (51 per cent of women) would not vote for a woman candidate for President even if she were nominated by the parties they normally support, and not even if she were the best qualified for the job.¹ Moreover, the people show middle-class attitudes toward public debt and taxes. When a billion-dollar federal surplus was reported in 1947, 53 per cent said that the money should be used to reduce the national debt; 38 per cent wanted the income taxes reduced, and 9 per cent did not know.² But half of the voters believe that nobody's income tax should take more than half of his income.³ Attitudes toward public ownership are consistent with these others. When Gallup's interviewers asked if the government should own certain named enterprises, the results in October, 1945, were:

	<i>Banks</i>	<i>Rail- roads</i>	<i>Coal Mines</i>	<i>Electric Utilities</i>
Government should own...	34%	26%	38%	38%
Government should not own	51	56	49	39
No opinion.....	11	18	13	23

From the Greenback Party to the Socialist and Communist Parties, the public ownership of these facilities has been urged, but the parties of the left seem to have made little progress.

The opposition to government ownership does not extend, however, as far as opposition to government regulation. As late as August 18, 1948, a Gallup poll showed that a majority favored a return to rationing and price controls. The question was stated, "Do you think the government should put back rationing and price controls on some products?" The answers were:

Should.....	56%
Should not.....	35
Price controls but not rationing	2
No opinion	7

Willingness to see government regulation has been shown in other polls. The American people are not deeply devoted to *laissez-faire* economics.

¹ Gallup polls, June 27, 1947; December 14, 1945.

² Gallup poll, May 30, 1947.

³ Gallup poll, January 7, 1947.

On social security 95 per cent had opinions, and of these 73 per cent favored the legislation.¹ According to a Gallup poll in January, 1949, majorities of from 57 to 70 per cent would favor the extension of social security to include farmers, government employees, professional and self-employed persons, and domestic servants. Minimum-wage legislation has also been consistently favored by strong majorities. Asked in a Gallup poll in January, 1949, whether the minimum wage should be raised from 40 to 75 cents an hour, respondents' answers were:

Raise minimum wage.....	68%
Don't raise.....	25
No opinion.....	7

Although majority opinion is generally conservative toward the role of government, still a majority is convinced that in the event of a depression the Democrats are more likely to attempt to cope with it than the Republicans. A Gallup poll, April 9, 1947, asked the question, "If hard times come again, would you rather have the Republicans or the Democrats in office?" About 8 per cent had no opinion; but among those who had opinions the replies were:

Would like to see the Republicans in.....	30%
Would like to see the Democrats in.....	51
Makes no difference.....	19

OPINIONS ON MAJOR ISSUES

THE TARIFF

If there is any one question upon which the two major parties have tended to take opposite positions that issue is the tariff. This issue goes back to the First Congress. Millions upon millions of words have been uttered upon the tariff; presidential campaigns have been fought over it; acres of the pages of *The Congressional Record* have been devoted to it, and yet only 42 per cent of the adult population "indicated a reasonably clear understanding of what tariffs are or how they work" in an NORC poll published April 27, 1947, and Gallup's findings are comparable. In May, 1948, only 34 per cent said they knew what the reciprocal trade agreements are. But when the agreements were explained to them, they were favored by majorities of 75 to 80 per cent, with no significant

¹ George Gallup and S. H. Rae, *The Pulse of Democracy* (1940), p. 300.

difference between Democrats and Republicans.¹ Various other polls indicate that the electorate would favor a general reduction in tariffs, when a tariff has been explained.

CIVIL RIGHTS

Attitudes must be said to be mixed toward civil rights and the acceptance of minority groups, in spite of all the agitation there has been during the last decade. Even complete freedom of the press is not yet unanimously accepted. When the question was asked by the NORC, "In peacetime, do you think newspapers should be allowed to criticize our form of government?" the results were:

	<i>February</i> <i>1944</i>	<i>November</i> <i>1945</i>	<i>September</i> <i>1948</i>
Yes.....	66%	64%	70%
No.....	30	31	27
Undecided.....	4	5	3

In view of this opinion, it is scarcely surprising that the American people apparently do not fully approve of freedom of speech for Communists. Other NORC polls asked, "In peacetime, do you think members of the Communist Party in this country should be allowed to speak on the radio?" The results of these polls show, in fact, that opinion against free speech for Communists has been increasing:

	<i>November</i> <i>1945</i>	<i>April</i> <i>1948</i>
Yes.....	48%	36%
No.....	40	57
Undecided.....	12	7

The protection of the rights of minorities is another aspect of civil rights. A number of Gallup polls have sought to measure public attitudes toward Negroes and have found, as would be expected, a strong feeling in the South against permitting Negroes to enjoy full social and economic equality with whites; but there is considerable opposition in the rest of the country as well. A Gallup poll of July 25, 1948, asked the question, "Do you think Negroes should or should not be required to occupy a

¹ See Gallup polls December 26, 1947, and May 12, 1948.

separate part of a train or bus when traveling from one state to another?" The replies were:

	<i>Should</i>	<i>Should Not</i>	<i>No Opinion</i>
National.....	42%	49%	9%
South.....	84	12	4
Outside of South.....	36	54	10

Gallup polls published at the same time indicated that the American public is not ready for Fair Employment Practices legislation. The question was, "How far do you yourself think the federal government should go in requiring employers to hire people without regard to race, religion, color, or nationality?" The results were:

	<i>National</i>	<i>South</i>	<i>Outside South</i>
All the way.....	32%	9%	36%
None of the way.....	45	68	42
Depends on type of work.....	7	3	7
Should be left to state governments.....	2	2	2
Don't know.....	14	18	13

Federal anti-lynching legislation has plurality nation-wide approval, bare majority approval outside the South. After explaining that at present most crimes are dealt with by the states, the question was put, "In the case of a lynching, do you think the federal government should have the right to step in and deal with the crime — or do you think this should be left entirely to the states?" The replies were:

	<i>Federal</i>	<i>State</i>	<i>No Opinion</i>
National.....	48%	41%	11%
South.....	23	65	12
Outside South.....	51	38	11

Judgments will differ as to whether the right to drink alcoholic beverages is or ought to be a civil right. Gallup's surveys indicate that only about 33 per cent of adults are total abstainers; 15 per cent say that they will drink wine or beer; and 51 per cent are willing to drink hard liquor. Since the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment, public opinion has very steadily opposed the return of prohibition. The 33 per cent who are themselves total abstainers apparently constitute the core of the dry

vote, and more women than men, by about 13 per cent, favor prohibition. The national averages since 1936 have been:¹

	<i>Dry</i>	<i>Wet</i>
1936.....	33%	67%
1938.....	36	64
1940.....	32	68
1942.....	38	64
1943.....	34	66
1944.....	37	63
1945.....	33	67

RELIGIOUS ATTITUDES

As will be shown in more detail in Chapter 24, religious opinions and religious groups are of great importance in American politics, and religious issues crisscross politics at many points. It is therefore significant that 94 per cent of the American people say that they, personally, believe in God; 3 per cent say they do not; and 3 per cent do not know.² Their belief in a life after death is less certain: 68 per cent believed; 13 per cent disbelieved; 19 per cent did not know.³

While almost all Americans say that they believe in God, this belief does not take them out of their homes to religious services every Sunday. An NORC poll, December 24, 1944, inquired, "How often do you go to church or religious services?" The answers were:

Four or more times a month.....	45%
One to three times a month.....	20
One to eleven times a year.....	17
Less than once a year.....	2
Never.....	16

In this particular instance, one poll can be checked with another. When Gallup's staff asked in May, 1947, "Did you, yourself, happen to go to church this last Sunday?" the yes vote of 45 per cent was exactly the same as that of the NORC poll three years earlier of those who said they

¹ Gallup polls assembled in *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 8 (Winter, 1944), p. 580.

² Gallup poll, January 10, 1948.

³ *Ibid.* The people of the United States are considerably more religious than the people of European states. For instance, in Holland, Sweden, and Denmark, 80 per cent said they believed in God, and in France, only 66 per cent; in the same countries belief in immortality was 68, 49, 55, and 58 per cent respectively.

attended four or more times a month. That such a large proportion of adults attends church lends support to the view of the practical politicians that the church vote, if aroused, is of great importance. More farmers than city people go to church regularly; more people in small towns than in cities; more old people than young people; more women than men — but the differences are not very great. Instead of colleges producing agnostics or atheists, as is often alleged, the reverse is true: the more education a person has, the more likely he is to attend church.¹

Toward their religious organizations American Protestants are conservative. A plurality now opposes the merger of Protestant denominations into one church, but the degree of opposition has been decreasing, according to Gallup's polls:

	<i>March</i> 1937	<i>July</i> 1948
Favor combination	40%	42%
Do not favor	51	47
No opinion	9	11

No large number of the many issues which bring religious groups into politics appears to have been studied by the polls in order to ascertain how many individuals are interested in and follow the teachings of their churches. A few, however, may be mentioned. To the question, "Should divorce be made easier in your state?" 77 per cent of those with opinions answered No. Only 59 per cent thought that college teachers should be free to express their views on politics and religion; but 71 per cent of those with opinions favored the birth-control movement, and 72 per cent favored a government agency which would furnish birth-control information to married couples who asked for it.² The Roman Catholic and some other churches have been strongly opposed to laws that would permit euthanasia, or mercy killing of incurable invalids at their own request. A series of Gallup polls have indicated that a majority of the public is also opposed to such laws:³

Favor	37%
Opposed	54
No opinion	9

¹ For details see *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 11 (Summer, 1947), pp. 309-310.

² Gallup polls from Gallup and Rae, *op. cit.*, pp. 310-311.

³ Gallup poll, June 21, 1947. Other polls taken in 1937 and 1939 showed results that were not greatly different. The question used was, "When a person has a disease that cannot be cured, do you think doctors should be allowed by law to end the patient's life by some painless means if the patient and his family request it?"

SCIENCE, RESEARCH, AND EDUCATION

In spite of their religious attitudes the American electorate shows a strong faith in science, and, moreover, the people are both willing to have the government engage in scientific research and they are also willing to pay for it in taxes. Of various examples, one will suffice. A Gallup poll of June 26, 1948, asked, "Would you approve or disapprove of having the government spend 100 million dollars for research to find the causes and cure of diseases of the heart?" The responses were:

Approve.....	79%
Disapprove.....	11
Qualified answers.....	3
No opinion	7

The American people apparently have more faith in science than the scientists have. At different times from 54 to 56 per cent of the people have expressed the belief that the United States will be able to work out an effective defense against the atomic bomb before another nation can use it against us.¹

A strong belief in education forms a sort of corollary to the belief in science. About half of the women and a third of the men in the country would like adult education courses for themselves.² Both Gallup and NORC polls show a majority opinion that certain states do not provide enough money for public schools, and furthermore, both polls showed majorities of from 51 per cent to 69 per cent in favor of federal aid to the states for their schools.³ This attitude is consistent with the view in February, 1947, expressed to Gallup's interviewers by 64 per cent, that teachers are underpaid, and also with the view, held in August, 1947, by 74 per cent, that nowhere in the United States ought teachers to be paid less than \$2400 per year.

PREPAREDNESS

Every poll has indicated that the American people are strongly in favor

¹ Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr., and Sylvia Eberhart, *American Opinion on World Affairs in the Atomic Age* (1948), p. 104.

² Gallup poll, July 7, 1947. The greatest demand (22 per cent) is for courses in the social sciences; next for professional work (16 per cent) such as law, journalism, engineering.

³ Gallup poll, May 22, 1948; NORC poll in *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 8 (Spring, 1944), p. 138. No poll appears to have been conducted on public support for church-related schools.

of a powerful army, navy, and air force. Before World War II, when Congress was hesitating, strong majorities favored more expenditures for military purposes and expressed willingness to pay the necessary taxes. People are still of the same opinion; in March, 1948, a Gallup poll showed that 61 per cent wanted a bigger army, 63 per cent a bigger navy, and 74 per cent a bigger air force. These majorities were consistent with those shown in the polls of other sampling organizations.

Universal compulsory military training has been consistently favored over a number of years by majorities of from 63 to 75 per cent, according to both Gallup and NORC polls. In August, 1948, a Gallup poll revealed that 60 per cent favored a draft of civilians for war work or civilian defense in time of national emergency, and 70 per cent favored compulsory training in civilian defense for men not taken by the draft.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Many studies point to a very low level of public information about foreign countries, world politics, and international organizations. Domestic issues that directly touch the voter's pocketbook, his family, or his church will almost always show higher responsiveness to questions than will international matters. Gallup has called attention to the "little father" attitude that many Americans have toward the President — that they are willing to leave foreign policy to him and his advisers. Even on the atomic bomb, which is the number one factor in world policy today, 42 to 47 per cent either were not worried at all or were very little worried. Instead, typical respondents said, "I know the bomb can wipe out cities, but I let the government worry about it," and "I let the people who are qualified in those things do the worrying. . . . To me, it is just like if you were living in a country where there were earthquakes."¹ As a general rule, no problem of foreign affairs will arouse great interest, and where opinions do exist, there is little difference on foreign policies between Democrats and Republicans. For example, exactly the same number (56 per cent) of the Republicans and Democrats who had heard of it approved of the Truman Doctrine of aid to Greece.²

Notions of what the United Nations is or what it stands for are very fuzzy, but when the purpose of the UN is explained, the organization is

¹ Cottrell and Eberhart, *op. cit.*, pp. 28, 108.

² Gallup poll, April 4, 1947. About three fourths of the voters had heard of the Truman Doctrine. A poll by NORC in March, 1947, found 60 per cent approval.

approved, and 67 per cent think that it is important to world peace.¹ Dissatisfaction with the UN has been steadily increasing, however, from 37 per cent in 1946 to 54 per cent in 1948.² But even though the American people are dissatisfied with the United Nations, they blame the Soviet Union and its use of the veto for the failures they deplore, and 41 per cent would like to see the veto done away with.³ Meanwhile, they are overwhelmingly (73 per cent) in favor of having the United States remain a member, and by 56 per cent they would approve having the UN made into a world government, able to control the armed forces of the world, including those of the United States.⁴

Isolationism, if it ever was the opinion of the majority, is pretty well gone. This fact has been shown not only by public opinion polls, but also by official referenda. In Massachusetts, for example, 75 per cent of the voters in 1942 approved an instruction to the legislature of that state to request the President and Congress to call a world convention to frame a federal world constitution. Three public opinion polls found that 73 per cent favored such a step, and the following year the percentage rose to 81.⁵ For more than six months after the Marshall Plan was announced it made little impression upon public opinion — only 49 per cent had heard of it as late as October 8, 1947. But gradually the number rose to 64 per cent, and it was approved in principle by 56 per cent.⁶ By August, 1948, 73 per cent of the voters came to favor a permanent military alliance of the United States and the Marshall Plan countries, according to a Gallup poll.

DEMOCRACY AND PUBLIC OPINION

The fundamental problem of democracy is whether the mass of the people have enough information and sufficient intelligence to govern themselves. The dictators, emperors, kings, and tzars have agreed that the mass is incompetent to govern. There have been many doubts expressed in the United States. One recent instance was that of Monsignor Fulton J. Sheen, who said in a sermon: "In any great crisis of civilization the only ones who ever see clearly are at the extremes, the

¹ NORC poll, April, 1948.

² Gallup polls of various dates, 1946–1948.

³ Gallup poll, May 26, 1948.

⁴ Gallup polls of October 22 and December 24, 1947, respectively.

⁵ Jerome S. Bruner, *Mandate From the People* (1944), p. 38.

⁶ Gallup polls of various dates, summarized in Gallup news release December 8, 1947.

very simple and ignorant people, and a few intellectual giants. The great masses never see.”¹

The weight of the evidence, however, is on the side of democracy — that the great masses do see. This conclusion is justified not only from public opinion polls but from official referenda and elections. In a multitude of cases public opinion has been more farsighted than Congress, and the people have been about six months ahead of their representatives.² When Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain returned from Munich with what he said was peace for our time, the American people were not fooled. Two thirds of them thought that there would be a European war within a few years.³ As the war clouds blackened, the American voters took the side of the popular governments of Europe against the dictators. They were willing to help England even at the risk of war, and a sizable minority were ready to declare war on Germany even before Pearl Harbor. According to all the evidence, the great masses saw what the war was about, and they understood their interest in it.

The American public, as has been demonstrated in these pages, is not always well informed about either issues or personalities. But the people understand the major questions, and when unfamiliar matters, such as reciprocal trade agreements, are explained to them, their approval would, in general, agree with the opinions of economists. The people read the newspapers, but they do not always accept what they read. The presidential election of 1948 proved that fact once again. That same election showed that when a plurality had decided how to vote, no bandwagon sentiment that Dewey was sure to win dissuaded them from voting for Truman.

The students of public opinion who have examined the results of public opinion surveys, such as Cantril, Gallup, and Lydgate, have not always agreed with the majority, but they have felt that the people “generally come to a sensible conclusion,” as Lydgate put it. Cantril did not agree with Monsignor Sheen that the ignorant and simple see clearly. On the contrary, he says that “the well-informed people accept less readily than the uninformed certain stereotyped, fatalistic, or emotional solutions to problems.”⁴ Gallup’s and other polls show that usually the higher up the respondent is in the educational scale, the more likely he is to have

¹ *PM*, June 16, 1946.

² For a review of the evidence see Lydgate, *op. cit.*, pp. 2-14.

³ *Fortune*, vol. 19 (January, 1939), p. 67.

⁴ Hadley Cantril, *Gauging Public Opinion* (1944), p. 211.

an opinion, and the more likely that opinion is to be a logically defensible one.

The trends in public opinion have in many instances been correlated with events, foreign and domestic. The popularity of Presidents has been measured against their official acts.¹ It may be reasonably concluded that American opinion changes with events, not usually with violent swings, but gradually, as the implications of occurrences are grasped. When violent swings of opinions do come, "in the great majority of cases," wrote Lydgate, they are "directly traceable to dramatic or decisive events."² The extent to which opinion changes as a result of speeches is not yet sufficiently studied to make conclusions certain, but it would be unsafe to assert that campaigns do not make (and change) attitudes. Lydgate believed, for example, that it was not the speeches made in Congress in 1937 attacking President Franklin Roosevelt's Supreme Court plan that turned opinion against it so much as the court's approval of the Wagner Act. But it is impossible to say with certainty, because history cannot be turned backward to see if the plan would have been disapproved anyhow had the court held the Wagner Act unconstitutional.

There are blind spots in American public opinion. There are areas of ignorance. A few opinions are inconsistent with others, although often the apparent inconsistencies arise from the different wording of questions. But, in the words of Hadley Cantril, "if people in a democracy are provided educational opportunities and ready access to information, public opinion reveals a hard-headed common sense. The more enlightened people are to the implications of events and proposals for their own self-interest, the more likely they are to agree with the more objective opinions of realistic experts."³

¹ Cantril, *op. cit.*, pp. 221-225, presents a number of charts which show the responsiveness of public opinion to the events of World War II.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 153. ³ *Op. cit.*, p. 230.

III

Party Organization and Structure

9

Party Organization, State and National

"IN AMERICA," wrote Lord Bryce, "the great moving forces are the parties . . . and the fewer have become their principles and the fainter their interest in those principles, the more perfect has become their organization. The less of nature the more of art; the less spontaneity the more mechanism."¹ Elaborate as party organization was in 1888, it is more complete today; the widening of the suffrage and the increase in population have necessarily increased the size of the party machinery.

INFLUENCES ON ORGANIZATION

The development of party organization from the informality and simplicity of Samuel Adams's caucus and the committees of correspondence to the complex organizations of the present, which are in most states regulated in great detail by law, has been conditioned by a number of factors.² The large number of American state and local government units

¹ *The American Commonwealth*, vol. 1 (The Macmillan Company, 1888), p. 638.

² There is no complete history of the evolution of party machinery in the United States. There are period studies, such as George D. Luetscher, *Early Political Machinery in the United States* (1903), and there are some works which treat the subject along with a history of the changes in the nominating procedure, for example, Frederick W. Dallinger, *Nominations for Elective Office in the United States* (1897); histories of American parties, such as Wilfred E. Binkley, *American Political Parties* (1943), have scattered references. A good short account is Edward M. Sait, *American Parties and Elections* (1942 edition), pp. 307-338.

with their many elective offices have encouraged organization, and the patronage and spoils which have gone to the winner have helped to finance complete party machinery. The American federal system has in large degree determined the autonomous nature of state parties, and the establishment of elections at calendar intervals in the Constitution has required party organizations to offer candidates whether there are issues or not.

STATE ELECTION LAWS AND PARTY STRUCTURE

STATE VARIATIONS


By means of the state election law, each state legislature controls the form of party organization in that state. Scarcely a session of any legislature passes without some amendment to this statute being passed, as one party or the other seeks to change it to partisan advantage, or as both major parties jointly change it to make success more difficult for third parties. South Carolina, as noted in Chapter 3, has no primary election law but, aside from the states in the Solid South where the Negro problem has created special circumstances, the trend is to regulate party organizations in greater and greater detail. There are considerable variations in the party structure from one state to another as it has been established by law or developed by usage, but these differences from the typical organization are less important than the likeness to it.¹ Broadly, the laws differ from those which provide only a general outline of party structure to those which provide for every permissible party official and every legal action he may take. In general, the laws are most explicit in the doubtful states, such as New York, where the election law is a volume of 764 printed pages.² In the one-party states the laws tend to be looser and to allow the parties greater freedom of organization.

¹ So great is the interest of politicians in the election law that most states print their law as a separate book or pamphlet, revising it with each session of the legislature. Copies are usually available gratis to residents of the states concerned. For specific information about party organization in any state the current law of that state must be consulted. These statutes, of course, include other matters relating to elections, such as eligibility to the suffrage, registration, and ballot legislation.

² 17 *McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York* (1943), and 1947-1948 supplement.

BASIC STRUCTURE OF PARTIES

Party structure in the United States forms a rough pyramid with levels corresponding to the layers of government:



THE PRECINCT COMMITTEEMAN

From the point of view of party success the most important unit is not the top but the bottom, not the national committee but the precinct committeeman. As one commentator has put it:

While he is the smallest he is also, by long odds the most vital. There are about 250,000 of him in the country. He is the bone and sinew of the machine. He is its foundation and the real source of its strength. If he does not function, the machine decays. If he quits, the machine dies.¹

The precinct is the smallest unit of government, ordinarily composed of the number of voters who can conveniently vote at one place. The number of voters per precinct varies from half a dozen in some mountainous or desert areas to two thousand in some cities where voting machines are used.² The average number is perhaps five or six hundred. Local authorities are usually directed by the state election law to divide the ward, city,

¹ Frank R. Kent, *The Great Game of Politics* (Doubleday, Page and Company, 1923), p. 1.

² Joseph P. Harris, *Election Administration in the United States* (1934), p. 207.

township, or county into precincts and to redivide after each election so that the number of voters shall not exceed a maximum set by the statute. The number of precincts, therefore, changes from year to year; there are about 140,000 in the United States at the present time. Each party would like to have an organization functioning in every precinct in the United States, but in one-party states, counties, and cities the organization of the minority party is wanting or incomplete.

How Selected. The precinct committee, if there is one, or the committeeman and committeewoman, may be selected by a caucus — a kind of general meeting of all the voters in the precinct belonging to one party.¹ These meetings, however, are generally small. It would be a rare precinct caucus indeed at which more than fifty party members appeared. If no committee is provided for by law or custom, the precinct committeeman (and committeewoman) may be selected by the caucus; or they may be elected at the party primary; or appointed by a higher party official. In the last case they are usually called precinct captains.

Source of Power. The power and importance of the precinct committeeman arise from the number of votes he can control. He has his own vote and his relatives'; those of his friends in the same church, lodge, or political club; and those he may obtain from the hiring by the city or county at his recommendation of the election officials for the precinct. If privately owned quarters for the polling place must be rented, then he may obtain a few votes from the owner and his family, and, most important, from the election-day party workers he engages with money provided for the purpose by party headquarters. If he can hire ten election day workers at five to ten dollars each, they should be worth a total of at least fifty votes, mostly from their families. Frank Kent calculated that the average precinct executive thus has about "sixty-five deliverable votes which he can swing in any direction and at any time he wants."² In a primary, where commonly only 10 or 20 per cent of the vote comes out, these sixty-five votes are likely to constitute a majority; consequently the precinct committeeman can always get a hearing at party headquarters. And hence a party revolt, or a third party movement which is

¹ Paul D. Hasbrouck, *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 3, p. 277, defines a caucus thus: "In the United States a caucus is a meeting by members of a party or faction for the purpose of choosing party leaders, formulating policy, or naming candidates for public office. It is a meeting of a small group within a larger group: of voters in local districts, of representatives in municipal, county, and state legislatures or in Congress, or a corresponding group in a non-political organization."

² *Op. cit.*, p. 22.

not supported by the precinct committeemen, has little chance of success.

Dependence on Money. General elections may be won or lost by these precinct committeemen. The outcome has often depended upon the number of election-day workers the committeemen could hire. "It is easy to see," wrote Frank Kent, "what chance there is under these circumstances for the 'busted' candidate against the flush one . . . to understand, for example, how little chance Bryan had against McKinley in 1896, 1900, or against Taft in 1908." Kent quoted an Ohio Democratic precinct committeeman in the campaign of 1900 as saying, "It was a darn hard blow on the Saturday before election when instead of getting \$120 for my precinct from the district leader I got \$30. I knew then that things were not going to be so good, but I did not know the worst." He found that the Republicans had hired all the available election-day workers at from twenty-five to fifty dollars each, and "I lost the precinct by 167 votes that I had counted on carrying by 150."¹

Typical Background. In the study of American politics less attention has been paid to these precinct executives than they deserve. William E. Mosher studied four thousand committeemen in eighteen upstate New York cities. He found that "55 per cent had not gone beyond grammar school; . . . 33 per cent had enrolled in high schools; . . . 12 per cent had had at least some training at the academic level."² Harold F. Gosnell in his study of precinct captains in Chicago found roughly the same levels of educational attainment among them.³ Dr. Sonya Forthal, who interviewed six hundred precinct executives in Chicago, found that "more than half of them . . . had gone no further than grammar school," but at that they tended to have a higher educational training than their constituents.⁴

Most of the committeemen who have attended college are lawyers who believe that political activity assists them professionally. The lawyers and other professional men constitute, however, only about 4 per cent of the committeemen. The largest occupational group (60 per cent) Mosher found to be "clerks, laborers, salesmen," and minor white-collar workers. Next largest are public employees, who made up about 20 per cent of the

¹ *Political Behavior* (William Morrow and Company, 1928), pp. 211-213.

² "Party and Government Control at the Grass Roots," *National Municipal Review*, vol. 24 (January, 1935), p. 16.

³ *Machine Politics: Chicago Model* (1937), p. 57.

⁴ *Cogwheels of Democracy: A Study of the Precinct Captain* (William-Frederick Press, 1946), p. 34.

total in New York, 50 to 60 per cent in Chicago and Philadelphia. It is well known in most areas with fully organized parties that any precinct committeeman of the winning party can have a public job for himself if he wants it; many, however, prefer other favors or have wives or relatives on the public payroll. From one half to two thirds of the committeemen are totally uninterested in issues of public policy.¹ They are active in politics because of traditional or economic devotion to party or for the love of the game, or because they are interested in advancing the fortunes of some leader, candidate, or racial or religious group to which they belong.² A few are active because they advocate some particular issue or seek to improve their parties or to "clean up politics" generally.

Other Responsibilities. In addition to his function of getting out the party vote on primary and general election days, the committeeman does the little favors that bind a voter to his party, from killing traffic tickets to obtaining liquor licenses. Commonly the Thanksgiving turkeys and the Christmas baskets given away by the parties (the Hague organization gave out 15,000 in 1947) are distributed by the precinct committeemen. The efficiency of these precinct executives may be judged from the number of favors they do for the voters. Speaking to a group of them, a Philadelphia ward leader once said, "I can tell how many of you committeemen are drones and how many are active. I can judge the number of favors you do for your constituents by the amount of favors you ask of me."³

THE SECONDARY COMMITTEES

The legal relationship between the precinct committeemen and the level of party organization just above — ward, city, town, or whatever it may be — differs from one state to another. In some jurisdictions the ward committee is made up of all the precinct committeemen, and they select the ward chairman. In others, the ward committee is elected by

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 55.

² Dr. Forthal, *op. cit.*, p. 39, found that the great majority of precinct captains in Chicago were in politics for a wide variety of predominantly economic reasons, such as holding public jobs, keeping their assessments down, selling goods or services to government agencies, securing immunity from punishment for violations of the law, and so on. "The views on politics enunciated" by them, she says (p. 43) "were decidedly inchoate, very few were interested in theoretical speculations." And when they were brought to discuss issues their views were "usually a re-echo of the campaign slogans of their party bosses."

³ Quoted by David H. Kurtzman, *Methods of Controlling Votes in Philadelphia* (1935), p. 23.

all the party voters at a primary or ward convention, and the ward chairman may also be so selected. Whatever the legal relationship, what may be called the secondary level of the party structure is usually controlled by the precinct committeemen: "It is they who [in fact] select the party leaders; the party leaders with more or less backing from the party committeemen . . . then select the candidates for the local tickets and later influence elected officials in the conduct of their offices."¹

THE COUNTY COMMITTEE

Real authority in the party usually next appears at the county level. There are approximately three thousand counties in the United States, and while neither major party has full organizations in all of them, it is safe to say that both parties are organized in a majority of the counties. There is always a county committee, the size of which varies from one state to another. Generally, however, it is large. Manhattan County, for instance, has a committee of 1952 persons; Brooklyn, of 2592; the Bronx, of 1700; and Queens, of 1602.² These New York City committees are composed of at least two representatives from each election district, a fairly common practice. An active precinct committeeman is often also a member of the county committee. The usual rule is for the county committee to select the county chairman, although in a few states this officer is chosen by the party members at the primary.

The County Chairman. Many a bitter intraparty battle has been fought in each party over the selection of a county chairman, because he is an important party official. If his party is in control, state patronage, such as the appointments of county judges, prosecutors, and election supervisors, clears through him. Much local and federal patronage is also controlled by the county chairman. It comes to him because of the location of institutions or offices in his county — post offices, for instance. It is not dependent upon his party's carrying county elections. He may demand that his county obtain its fair share of the state-wide appointments, such as those of judges of the state supreme court, highway and utility commissioners, and wardens and supervisors of institutions. There is a common political tradition that these state-wide appointments shall be distributed as equitably as possible among the county chairmen in the

¹ Mosher, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

² Hugh A. Bone, "Political Parties in New York City," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 40 (April, 1946), p. 272.

same proportion that the party vote in each county bears to the party vote in the state. The same rule applies to federal state-wide appointments, such as United States district attorneys and collectors of internal revenue, although the congressman or senator must deal through the state chairman and sometimes the national committeeman as well as with the county chairmen.

The county chairman is also an important political figure in the making up of the organization's slate of candidates for county elective offices, such as those of sheriff, clerk, treasurer, county board, and so on. Whether state legislators are elected by districts or at large within counties, the chairman in most states has considerable influence over their nominations. In the make-up of the slate for county elective offices the chairman must, of course, satisfy as nearly as he can the various ward, city, township, and precinct chairmen — all of whom often go direct to him with their demands — as well as the business, labor, racial, religious, and other interest groups influential in his county. And just as he tries to get for his county a share of the state-wide appointments, he tries for a share of the state-wide elective offices.

The county chairman may thus be a local boss; if not, he must be acceptable to the boss, if there is one, or to the interests that control his party. His position is one of real political authority, whether he exercises it directly or on behalf of someone else. The four or five thousand county chairmen in the United States are the colonels of their respective political armies.

DISTRICT COMMITTEES

Between the county and the state there are in most states various district committees to elect such persons as members of Congress, district attorneys and judges, and state senators. Sometimes these districts are made up of several counties, though sometimes also they cut across county lines. In either event, the political organization for such districts is sketchy. The county chairmen sometimes compose the district committees, and where they do not, they are influential in the selection of candidates and the distribution of patronage. Most candidates for Congress, except some of those in highly organized urban constituencies, build up their own campaign organizations and take what financial and other help they can get from the county and state committees and from the congressional campaign committees. There is usually no district chairman.

THE STATE COMMITTEE

The state committee — also called the state central or the state executive committee — and the state chairman top the party structure in each commonwealth. The committees vary in number from eleven members to six hundred. In some states members are elected at primaries or conventions from counties, congressional districts, or other areas. In other states the county chairmen compose the state committee. The county chairmen are usually influential in the state committee, however it may be made up.

The State Chairman. The state chairman is almost always selected by the state committee, not necessarily from its own membership. In some states the party nominee for governor is allowed in fact to pick the state chairman, who is then formally elected by the state committee. Where there is a state boss, the chairman is either the boss or the boss's man. As many an intraparty battle has been fought over the selection of a county chairman, so many another has been waged between contending bosses or factions over the state chairmanship. The man who gets the job is usually a person of some years' political experience who has worked his way up in the party. Sometimes he has been, and remains, a county chairman.

The office of state chairman is not as well defined in election laws or in party practice as the office of county chairman. The chairman usually has considerable authority in making up state-wide slates, although here he must try to satisfy the county chairmen and the interest groups. Much of the management of state campaigns is in his hands, but he may delegate authority to or share it with a campaign manager, the state party treasurer, and others. If his candidate for governor wins, the state chairman may become the dispenser of patronage under the governor. If this is an onerous duty, he will be rewarded with some place in the governor's cabinet or entourage. A common appointment for him is secretary of state.

NATIONAL PARTY ORGANIZATION

THE CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE

Each major party has in each house of Congress a campaign committee selected by the party members in the house concerned. What the *Democratic Manual* says of the Democratic House committee is also true of the Senate committee:

The Democratic National Congressional Committee is composed of members of the House of Representatives and has no organic relationship with either the Democratic National Convention or the Democratic National Committee. It was organized in 1882 for the purpose of aiding in the election of Democratic members of the House of Representatives.¹

Women not members of Congress have at times been appointed to membership on the House committee by the chairman upon the recommendation of members of the committee, but the Senate committee is composed exclusively of senators. The committees vary in size from one campaign to another.

Each congressional campaign committee has an organization and staff. The committees are intended to assist in the congressional elections, with money and speakers, such candidates as they can. Senators not candidates for re-election, and members of the House from safe districts, are the principal speakers. Although the committees accept funds from other sources, their chief reliance is upon their national committees. For the campaign of 1948 the Republican national chairman, Carroll Reece, announced that the budget of the Republican National Committee would include \$400,000 for the senatorial campaign and \$600,000 for the House campaign.² Presumably most of this money would, as in previous years, be expended through the respective campaign committees.

THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE

The national committee is the apex of the party structure. It is composed of one man and one woman from each state and territory, nominated to the national convention from the states and territories. Those members whose nomination is unopposed are confirmed by the convention, usually on the second day, after the address of the permanent chairman. Their term is four years. They are in reality the officials of the next convention, and therefore do not act until the organization meeting that follows the convention, at which meeting any contests may be settled. Following their selection according to the laws or customs of their respective states or territories, members are nominated to the convention in any one of four ways. The commonest method (used in 22 states or territories) is selection by a state or territorial convention; other devices

¹ Clarence Cannon, *Democratic Manual* (1944), p. 10. The Senate Democratic committee dates from 1916.

² *New York Times*, January 21, 1948.

are choice by the delegates to the national convention (16); by the state or territorial committees (9); and by state or territorial primary (7).

National Chairman. At the organization meeting the new committee nominally elects its chairman. Actually, it selects as chairman a man designated by the party's candidate for President, because the chairman is to be the active manager of the campaign that is to follow. He is rarely a member of the committee until his election. In most cases the chairman was the campaign manager of the nominee in his pre-convention campaign. If the party is successful, the chairman then continues as long as he has the confidence of the President. Thus James A. Farley was Democratic national chairman for eight years until, according to his account, he disagreed with President Franklin Roosevelt over the third term.

His Patronage Functions. The national chairman of a successful party, by a tradition going back at least to the days of Andrew Jackson, usually becomes Postmaster General.¹ The actual work of the office is performed by subordinates, while he devotes his energies to politics, and especially to patronage.² He is regarded as the chief dispenser of political appointments, not only in the Post Office Department, but throughout the national administration. For thousands of jobs his is the final approval necessary, since the President accepts his recommendations without discussion. For cabinet and other appointments of importance the chairman and the President may or may not consult; the relationship between them has varied. The chairman is always the President's man. In the event of a vacancy in the office of chairman, the President names the new chairman, and the national committee assembles in a special meeting to ratify his choice. But next to the President, he is usually the most important party politician, both because he has so much control over patronage and because, as an old acquaintance, he has personal influence with the President.

His Term of Office. If the party does not elect its candidate for President, the national chairman, unless he is personally blamed for the defeat, generally remains in office for a year or more, but he has no real party leadership. Usually he resigns before the midterm elections. It is part of party tradition that he must resign if the candidate for President with whom he was associated plans to make an attempt for a new nomination, because the chairman cannot otherwise escape the charge that he is using

¹ Dorothy G. Fowler, *The Cabinet Politician* (1943).

² James A. Farley, *Behind the Ballots* (1938), pp. 227, 233-238.

the national party organization and funds in behalf of his one favored candidate for the nomination.

Other Functions of the National Committee. The national committee has various other functions in addition to the settling of contests in its own membership and the selection of the national chairman. Upon nomination from the states or territories it fills vacancies in its own membership. It has nominal control over the conduct of the campaign and over the appointment of publicity men and other employees at national headquarters, though actual authority resides in the chairman. It makes arrangements for the national convention, including the selection of the city (usually the city that makes the biggest financial offer to the party), the date, and the physical arrangements. It prepares a temporary roll of delegates, which is accepted pending a report by the Committee on Credentials. The national committee designates the temporary officers of the convention, including the temporary chairman, who makes the "keynote" speech. The powers of a national committee are derived from the convention that creates it, so that it cannot change the make-up of the next convention or issue binding declarations of policy unless it is specifically authorized to do so. The national committee is not a party council. Committees do, however, make recommendations to conventions, as the Democratic National Committee in January, 1936, recommended the abolition of the two-thirds rule. As it turned out, however, the Convention of 1936 ended the rule not so much because of the recommendation of the committee as because Chairman Farley and President Roosevelt, then at the peak of their party authority, wanted it ended. The committee is authorized to fill vacancies on the national ticket which might occur by reason of the death, declination, or resignation of a nominee. This potentially important authority, however, has been exercised only once. In 1860, when Benjamin Fitzpatrick of Alabama declined to run for Vice-President with Stephen A. Douglas, the Democratic National Committee named Herschel V. Johnson of Georgia in his place.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COMMITTEES

The committees in the pyramid have a variety of other officers besides the invariable chairman. Often there is a woman co-chairman, who is seldom of great political importance. There are generally two or more vice-chairmen who have no real duties, but are appointed to appease some group or faction. There is always at least one secretary and a

treasurer. Committeemen and officers serve for the term of the election cycle in their jurisdiction, two or four years. When a committee is large it may have an executive committee composed of the officers and a small number of committeemen. There are usually a variety of special committees and subcommittees on finance, publicity, headquarters, and such matters. No committeemen are paid salaries by their parties. Each party has a permanent national headquarters in Washington where the national and other committees can meet, and both have headquarters in many state capitol cities and in some counties. The headquarters staff is expanded for each campaign, contracted after the election.

NO FLOW OF AUTHORITY

Authority in the pyramid of committees does not flow from one level to another, either up or down. Each set of committees, rather, is autonomous; beyond some financial support, a national committee cannot control a state committee, nor a state committee the county committees, nor they the local ones. This loose relationship arises from the variety of election laws, which is perhaps inevitable in a federal government. Conceivably, political traditions might have grown up to strengthen and integrate the party structure, but sectionalism and localism have been too strong. If parties had been financed from the top down, the national leadership might have come to count for more, like that in British parties; but each level in the American parties has its own sources of funds. Moreover, each has its own peculiar constituency, its own combinations of groups and interests, so that even if a higher committee had authority to direct a lower, it would hesitate to do so, believing that those who are nearer the scene would know better what tactics were most promising. The single-member constituency system also contributes to the autonomous character of American parties. Superficially a hierarchy, in reality the structure of American parties is a loose league or confederation, rather than an integrated, or even a federal system.

Nominations: Primaries and Conventions

JUST AS NO OTHER COUNTRY puts such a burden upon its voters as the United States, so no other country requires so much of its parties. Woodrow Wilson noted that

The preparation of lists of candidates is too complicated and laborious a business to be undertaken by men busy about other things. Some one must make a profession of attending to it, must give it system and method. A few candidates for a few conspicuous offices which interested everybody, the voters themselves might select in the intervals of private business; but a multitude of candidates for offices great and small they cannot choose; and after they are chosen and elected to office they are still a multitude, and there must be somebody to look after them in the discharge of their functions . . . against the time when they are to be judged.¹

We still have the multitude of elective offices, great and small — some 800,000 of them — in spite of the short-ballot movement.² Offering candidates for this vast number of official positions is a major function of parties. Making up all the slates for all these offices consumes an appreciable amount of the time of political managers. Since many of the official terms are short, and since many officers cannot by law succeed themselves, slate-making is an almost endless process. The second function Wilson noted in this connection — standing responsible for the behavior of officials once they are elected — is, on the whole, of less interest to party organizations.

¹ Woodrow Wilson, *Constitutional Government in the United States* (Columbia University Press, 1908), p. 206.

² Estimate of Charles E. Merriam and Harold F. Gosnell, *The American Party System* (1940 edition), p. 273.

EARLY DEVICES FOR PARTY NOMINATIONS

Three principal devices for party nominations have been developed in the United States, the caucus, the convention, and the direct primary.¹ All these devices are still in use, but the shift of emphasis has been away from the caucus to the convention and the primary. With this change has come a recognition in the state statutes of parties as organs of government, not mere voluntary associations like the Knights of Pythias or the Baptist Church. Whatever the method used, in providing the personnel of elective office, parties do indeed perform a governmental function, and except in the case of the rare independent candidate, parties alone perform it.

THE CAUCUS

Early Local Caucuses. The caucus is the contemporary ancestor of American nominating systems. Little is known about the method of nominating candidates in early colonial times. Apparently many candidacies were self-announced, as they are occasionally today. Henry Wallace's announcement of his candidacy for 1948 was made before his party was organized or even named. The caucus, or conference of persons interested in elections, was, however, in use in Massachusetts as early as 1635.² The patriotic societies of the pre-revolutionary period were called caucuses; it was the North End Caucus of Boston which was responsible for the Boston Tea Party. The leaders of the Revolution worked through caucuses which were, as time went on, loosely connected with one another through the committees of correspondence.³ Our present party organizations are the lineal descendants of the system of caucuses and committees of correspondence.⁴ In 1763 John Adams wrote in his diary the

¹ Louise Overacker, *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 12, p. 396, defines primary thus: "A primary election is a polling of the members of a particular party in order to select or to initiate the process of selecting the party's nominees for elective offices. Primary elections are indirect if the party members select delegates to nominating conventions. . . . and direct if the party members make the nominations themselves." The terms *direct* and *indirect* applied to primaries are no longer in common usage, *convention* means a delegate convention, *primary* a direct primary.

² Frederick W. Dallinger, *Nominations for Elective Office in the United States* (1897), p. 5.

³ John C. Miller, *Sam Adams: Pioneer in Propaganda* (1936).

⁴ Wilfred E. Binkley, *American Political Parties* (1943), p. 67, and M. Ostrogorski, *Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties* (1902), vol. 2, pp. 3-7.

following oft-quoted description of the caucus that met in Tom Dawes' garret:

There they smoke tobacco till you cannot see from one end of the garret to the other. There they drink flip, I suppose, and there they choose a moderator, who puts questions to the vote regularly; and selectmen, assessors, collectors, wardens, fire-wards, and representatives are regularly chosen before they are chosen by the town. . . . They send committees to wait on the merchants' club, and to propose and join in the choice of men and measures.¹

The Sons of Liberty were political organizations often identified with local caucuses; after the Revolution they became the Jacobin, or Democratic-Republican, societies of the Federalist period.²

The caucus survives in New England and in some other areas as a means of nominating candidates for local office or as an informal pre-primary convention. Just as in Adams's time, before a New England town meeting, the politicians may meet in a smoke-filled room to decide on the men and measures later to be decided formally by the town.

Use for Legislatures. The transfer of the caucus as a nominating device to the legislatures and to Congress was natural. In the Federalist period, when the rich and well born, in Hamilton's phrase, controlled the legislatures and Congress, candidates for state-wide office were nominated by the Federalist caucus in the state legislatures, and candidates for President and Vice-President were nominated by the congressional caucus. Nomination by legislative caucus, which began about 1790, lasted until 1824; William H. Crawford was the last candidate for President to be nominated by this means.

The legislative caucus had the advantage that, in times when travel was difficult, party leaders already in the legislatures and in Congress, could offer nominations without the necessity for creating other machinery. It tended, moreover, to centralize party in the government, not outside it, as convention and primary were later to do.

The Caucus and Presidential Nominations. Thus the caucus had possibilities for bringing public policy and party responsibility together. But it was ill-adapted to a presidential form of government. Legislators tended to select candidates for governor and President from among themselves, and popular leaders like Jackson, whose strength lay outside the

¹ *Works of John Adams*, Charles Francis Adams, editor (1850), vol. 2, p. 144.

² Eugene P. Link, *Democratic-Republican Societies, 1790-1800* (1942), especially pp. 21-23.

legislative body, had little chance of nomination. The legislative caucus, furthermore, met in secret, and so was liable to the charge of a "corrupt bargain." Moreover, it did not represent areas from which the party had failed to elect representatives, even though there was party strength in such districts. In consequence, attempts were made to remedy this defect by the "mixed caucus," composed of legislators plus delegates elected to fill the gaps.¹ Mixed conventions also were tried. But these mixed bodies, as well as the legislative caucus, were subject to other objections: they were alleged to be too readily influenced by executive patronage; they were inadequate for local, county, and district nominations; and in an age of strong democratic sentiments, they were charged with having an aristocratic, oligarchical taint. By the third decade of the nineteenth century the delegate convention had everywhere displaced the legislative and mixed caucus as a method of nominating party candidates.

The legislative caucus survived, however, as a device for nominating party candidates for officers of the legislature, such as speaker, president *pro tem*, floor leaders, and others. In varying degrees in different legislatures and at different times, it has also been used as a means of deciding party legislative policy.² Attempts have been made, with limited success, to bind legislators who attended the caucus to vote in the house on measures as the caucus majority should decide. But no such discipline exists in Congress today; indeed, even the word *caucus* seems to have fallen into disrepute. The Republican leaders of the Eightieth Congress referred to their meetings as a conference, and the policy committee of the majority had only the power to recommend.

THE MASS MEETING

A short-lived rival or supplement of the caucus was the mass meeting, held in some counties or cities for the nomination of local candidates. "It was soon discovered that, although attendance at the county meeting was the right of every elector, it was decidedly not his privilege, and that the nominations were controlled by the large delegations from the towns within the immediate vicinity of the place of meeting."³ The Republican

¹ Ostrogorski, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 34-38; and Dallinger, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

² Paul D. Hasbrouck, *Party Government in the House of Representatives* (1927), pp. 26-34.

³ George D. Luetscher, *Early Political Machinery in the United States* (1903), p. 2.

(Jefferson's) Party complained about the manipulation of these mass meetings and by 1800 had generally abandoned them. The Federalists, however, refused to change from caucus or mass meeting to convention.

THE CONVENTION

Growth of the System. Even during the heyday of the legislative caucus the system of delegate conventions for the nomination and election of candidates at nearly every level was beginning to develop. Dallinger found a record of a convention for Philadelphia County in 1794. By 1800 a system of electing ward and town delegates to county and district conventions in Pennsylvania had grown up.¹ Since parties were at that time entirely unregulated by law, rival slates were occasionally offered by a legislative caucus and by a convention. As the convention system displaced the legislative caucus, a hierarchy of conventions grew up. Precinct caucuses (also called conventions and primaries) selected such candidates as there were for the precinct — perhaps a justice of the peace or a constable — and also elected delegates to the ward or town convention. Here the process was repeated, and delegates to the county convention were named. The county conventions named county candidates and selected delegates to the state convention. This arrangement, theoretically more democratic than the legislative caucus (it was called “representative government in the party”), actually removed control of nominations further from the rank and file of the party members, who might be three or four steps away from the state convention.

Advantages. The convention system, however, permitted the adjustment and compromise necessary to the politics of popular government. It allowed for the working-out of slates of candidates to recognize various sections, racial and religious groups, and other interests. As a means of formulating and announcing party policies in a platform, no adequate substitute for a convention has ever been invented. The platform, moreover, could be adopted before the candidates were selected, so that, theoretically at least, they could be bound by it. Unfortunately, perhaps, the conventions were from the first too large for deliberation, and at the very time when the system was growing up the idea of short terms and rotation in office overburdened the parties.

Convention Abuses. The claim of oligarchical control earlier made against the legislative caucus was soon made against the convention,

¹ Dallinger, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-23.

though this time the villain was not the executive, but the boss. There were complaints even before the Civil War, but they reached their peak in the eighties. Some local conventions ("snap primaries") were called on insufficient notice; others were held in disreputable places, such as saloons; some of the meetings were packed by thugs. Where voting was by ballot there were scores of charges of fraud, but perhaps the most universal complaint was that the determination of party membership was in the hands of the machine — Tammany in New York, McManes in Philadelphia, and others. At the state conventions the seats of delegates who were not friendly to the state boss were contested, and the decision rested in the hands of the hold-over state committee. Sometimes instructions from local conventions were disregarded, delegates were bought and sold, and meetings were riotous and drunken.¹

It is possible that the convention system might have been cured of many of its diseases, although it must be said that all temporary, *ad hoc* meetings are lacking in morale and especially liable to oligarchical control. They may be stampeded, deceived, bluffed. The lore of American politics is full of examples, but one recent one will suffice. At the New York state Democratic convention of 1932, Franklin Roosevelt, then candidate for President, and Edward J. Flynn were most anxious to obtain the nomination for governor for Herbert Lehman, but they did not have a majority of the delegates. Flynn related what happened:

We went over the list again, and our figures told the same story. We were short. Only by some bold strategy could we hope to nominate our candidate. . . . We decided without Lehman's knowledge to confront up-state leaders with a flat claim that we had the votes and to tell them that they had better get in line. . . . Our strategy succeeded. The opposition weakened, despite their small majority, and before the roll call was over, a motion to make Lehman's nomination unanimous was carried.²

State Regulation of Conventions. Beginning in California in 1866, some of the state legislatures slowly and hesitatingly passed statutes to regulate conventions, forbidding the frauds that disgraced the conventions, setting the time and place, the number of members, officers and procedure, and other matters. These statutes, most of them passed in the eighties, for the first time divested parties of their character as purely voluntary,

¹ Charles E. Merriam and Louise Overacker, *Primary Elections* (1928), pp. 257–258. For a vivid description of Professor Merriam's impressions of the last convention in Illinois before the direct primary, see pp. 259–260.

² Edward J. Flynn, *You're the Boss* (Viking Press, 1947), p. 109.

extra-legal associations, but the laws came too late to save the convention system, except in Connecticut, which still has no primary.¹ Elsewhere it gave way before the direct primary.

THE DIRECT PRIMARY

ORIGINS

The direct primary seems to have originated in Crawford County, Pennsylvania, in 1842, and for many years was called the Crawford County System. The Democratic voters of Crawford County, assembled in a mass meeting in Meadville, resolved that the party candidates for all offices should, at a later meeting, be selected by ballot by all Democratic electors, and "those having the highest number of votes shall be duly nominated." The system soon spread through the Democratic organizations of other counties of Pennsylvania, and in the succeeding seventy years throughout the United States.² The statutes were at first optional with the parties and applicable only to certain officials. The first mandatory, state-wide law was passed by Wisconsin in 1903 at the urging of Governor Robert M. La Follette.³ By 1917 all but four states had some sort of direct primary.

The demand for nominations by primary was part of the discontent of the Populist and Progressive periods. The advocates of the primary, such as La Follette, looked upon it as the cure for the ills of democracy, a remedy for the evils of the boss and the machine. He said in a speech in 1897:

Abolish the caucus and the convention. Go back to the first principles of democracy; go back to the people. Substitute for both the caucus and

¹ Rhode Island long retained its convention system, but in 1947 set up a state-wide closed primary. In Georgia, delegates to state party conventions are elected at primaries, candidates for public office are nominated at conventions. New York has a mixed system, with candidates to be elected at large (governor, lieutenant governor, etc.) nominated by conventions, others chosen by primary. South Carolina has repealed all statutes applying to nominations, which are by party rule only. *Book of the States* (1948), p. 92.

² James H. Booser, "Origin of the Direct Primary," *National Municipal Review*, vol. 24 (April, 1935), pp. 222-223. The text of the resolution which established the first direct primary is reprinted in this article.

³ Allen F. Lovejoy, *La Follette and the Establishment of the Direct Primary in Wisconsin* (1941), discusses fully the campaign in the state that led to the passage of the statute.

the convention a primary election — held under the sanctions of law that prevail at the general elections. . . . The nominations of the party will not be the result of compromise or impulse, or evil design — the “barrel” and the machine — but the candidates of the majority, honestly and fairly nominated.¹

As will be shown more fully below, the primary did not turn out to be the political penicillin that such advocates as La Follette expected it to be.

SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF PRIMARY LAWS

The primary is, as La Follette said, an election conducted under the sanctions against fraud that prevail at the general elections. The polling places are usually the same; the public officials in charge of elections are in charge of the primary, and in most states they are now paid from public and not party funds. The ballots are prepared according to a form prescribed in the state election law and are almost everywhere printed at public expense. Names are put on the primary ballot either after a caucus or after the filing of a petition carrying a designated minimum number of signatures of party members. In some states groups of candidates may jointly petition to have their names appear together, bracketed with some slogan or identifying phrase such as “Regular Republican” or “Organization Democrat.” Individual candidates are in some states also permitted to have slogans or short statements of policy after their names. The number of required signatures is usually small — a dozen to fifty — although the required number increases for the higher offices, so that a thousand or more may be required for governor or United States senator. The small number leads to the occasional filing of “joker” or “straw” candidates, or to filing in order to obtain free personal advertising.² “Cross-filing,” or filing in more than one primary, is permitted under various conditions in four states. In California in 1946 Governor Warren

¹ *La Follette's Autobiography* (The Robert M. La Follette Company, 1913), pp. 197-198.

² It is very difficult to prevent this trickery. A filing fee, if large, may prevent worthy but impecunious candidates from filing; if it is returned upon attaining a certain percentage of the vote, it only encourages the sponsors of the straw candidate to get out enough votes for him to have the fee repaid. A large number of signatures encourages machines, and is a burden upon non-machine candidates. The Republican State Committee in New Hampshire has sought to have the State Ballot Law Commission authorized, after complaint and hearing, to strike such names off the ballot because, they allege, it has become customary for crude humorists in some towns to file in the Republican primary the town drunk or the village halfwit.

won both Republican and Democratic primaries. In New York Congressman Vito Marcantonio won Democratic, Republican, and American Labor nominations until an act passed in 1947 especially to reach him forbade cross-filing unless the appropriate party committee by a majority vote at a meeting authorized such designation.¹

During election years the primaries are held at various dates from early in April to late in September, according to the state laws, or in a few states, according to party rule. In presidential years some states hold two sets of primaries, one for delegates to the national convention, the other later for nomination to offices.

Although there are four border and southern states where the holding of a primary is optional with the parties, the trend has been toward mandatory primaries for major parties, both to be held on the same day.

OPEN OR CLOSED PRIMARY

The first primary in Crawford County was evidently a closed primary; that is, one to which only party members (in that case, Democrats) were admitted. Just how the fact of party membership was determined in that early primary does not appear. The closed primary is the overwhelming preference of the political organizations, but ten states have an open primary; that is, one in which any duly qualified voter may participate in whatever party he pleases. He may, depending upon the election law of the state, be either handed a ballot for each party (of which he uses one and returns the others) or he may be given a consolidated ballot, on which all the tickets of all the parties have been printed.²

It is possible under all systems for the partisans of one party to enter the primary of another. This trick is variously called colonizing, invading, or raiding opponents' primaries. It may be done in order to nominate the weakest candidate among several opponents; to confuse the general election by nominating in an opponent's camp two or more persons with identical names; or because of some interparty deal whereby the two parties divide the offices to be filled at the general election.³ It was (and

¹ *Laws of 1947*, Chapter 432; 17 *McKinney's Consolidated Laws*, Article 6, Section 136-a.

² For facsimiles of various types of primary ballots and for voting machine faces set for primary elections, see Carl O. Smith, *A Book of Ballots*, Report No. 148 of the Detroit Bureau of Governmental Research (June, 1938), pp. 1-13.

³ A number of specific examples of colonizing are given by Clarence A. Berdahl, "Party Membership in the United States," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 36 (February, 1942), pp. 40-50.

is) one of the chief complaints against the caucus that it could easily be colonized. Because few voters participate in primaries, it is possible for a well-organized machine successfully to invade even closed primaries by having a group of trusted adherents appear as "one-day Republicans" or "one-day Democrats" as the case may be. If the laws require it, they may even be registered as members of the party to be raided.¹ But while colonizing may be done under various nominating systems, it is obviously easiest to accomplish and most difficult to detect under an open primary. Indeed, if parties are to be held responsible for their policies and for the behavior of their nominees and officials in a system of representative government, it is difficult to see how they can justly be judged when in an open primary they have no control over the process of nominations.

PARTY MEMBERSHIP AND THE CLOSED PRIMARY

The closing of the primary has, however, offered great difficulties. The problems have never been fully solved. Who is a Democrat? Who is a Republican? The national authorities of the parties have no power to determine. They cannot go behind the state election laws. "Any man who can carry a Republican primary is a Republican," said Senator Borah. He might "believe in the communistic state, in the dictatorship of the proletariat, in the abolition of private property, in the extermination of the bourgeoisie; yet if he carried his Republican primary he would still be a Republican."² Party membership is not, in the United States, distinguished for the major parties from mere voting affiliation; minor parties may for their own purposes require oaths, tests, the payment of dues, or the performance of designated party work, but the election laws do not and perhaps cannot take account of these conditions, either to determine who may vote in a primary or who may be a party nominee.

In a closed primary the voter is entitled to receive only the ballot of the party with which he is affiliated. "Three possible tests of a voter's party membership are applied by statute in various states, either alone or in combination, namely, past allegiance, present affiliation, or future intention."³ Under some state laws, the voter may be asked at the time he

¹ For examples of colonizing in closed primaries see William Howard Taft, *Popular Government* (1913), pp. 106-109; and Dayton D. McKean, *The Boss: The Hague Machine in Action* (1940), pp. 67-70.

² Quoted by Berdahl, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 27. Berdahl gives many examples of the tests and combinations of tests in current use in various states.

registers whether he wishes to declare his party membership. If he does, he may forthwith be enrolled in that party, or he may be asked first to swear or assert that he is in general sympathy with the principles of his party and expects to support its candidates or a majority of them, in future elections. If he refuses to declare or to take the oath he will be registered and will be permitted to vote in the general election but not in the primary. The other common method is to permit any legally qualified person to register but to challenge his party membership if at a primary he attempts to obtain a ballot for a party other than his own. The registration device seems steadily to be replacing the challenge as a means of enforcing the closed primary. But as long as party membership is identified with voting habits or intentions, and as long as the secrecy of the general election ballot is maintained, it is impossible to convict anyone of perjury who asserts he is a Democrat or a Republican and does not vote for the candidates of the party to which he nominally belongs.

NONPARTISAN PRIMARIES

Seventeen states have nonpartisan primaries for municipal, judicial, or school officials, and Minnesota and Nebraska also nominate the candidates for their legislatures in this way. The persons receiving the highest and next highest number of votes go on the general election ballot. In some states the nonpartisan primaries for judges come at a different date from the party primary. In others, the particular offices to be filled through nonpartisan nominations and elections carry no party designations on the ballot. The idea of party government does not appeal to the advocates of nonpartisan nominations, such as Senator George W. Norris, who have alleged that there are rarely any party issues in state and local government and that such issues, when occasionally they do arise, are not Democratic or Republican but of a local nature. Consequently, these people assert, nominations for state and local offices should be taken away from the parties. The proponents of nonpartisan nominations rest the best part of their case on nominations for judicial office, where, they argue, no issues of party policy should apply.

Although there have been few studies of nonpartisan nominations and elections, it may well be doubted if the influence of national parties can be kept out of local affairs merely by removing party labels. And when judges pass upon the constitutionality of legislation, they determine public policy; they legislate. Perhaps, therefore, they should be elected

on party tickets so that voters can have some intimation of their attitudes. At any rate, it seems apparent from the so-called nonpartisan elections in Detroit that interest groups are just as active in the selection of officials as they are in party situations, and perhaps even more influential. For the successful future of representative government, discussed elsewhere in this book, the way lies not in the direction of weakening party and strengthening the essentially irresponsible groups; rather, it lies in the opposite direction.

PRIMARIES IN ONE-PARTY AREAS

In the discussion of sectionalism it was noted that in the ten states of the Solid South the Democratic primary is the real election, and in Maine and Vermont the Republican primary is the actual contest. As will be seen by an examination of election returns, there are also many one-party counties and cities scattered over the United States.¹ Sometimes the vote in the Democratic primary in the South will exceed the total vote in the general election by three or four to one. The reverse is true in most northern states, and the total vote cast in the general election exceeds that in the primaries by three or four to one. When there are more than two candidates for a single office, one of them may of course receive a plurality and not a majority. If the number of candidates is large and the party organization is weak, the nomination may go to a candidate with 5 or 10 per cent of the votes cast. In order to avoid such minority nominations, the ten states in the South and one of the border states use a second, or run-off, primary if no candidate attains a majority in the first primary. The run-off primary, when one is needed, comes two weeks to a month after the first primary, and only the names of the two highest candidates from the first primary appear on the ballot.

POST-PRIMARY CONVENTIONS

After the primary, as has been noted, most state laws require some sort of convention to draft a state party platform, because the rank and file of

¹ See E. E. Robinson, *The Presidential Vote, 1896-1932* (1934), *The Presidential Vote, 1936* (1940), and *They Voted for Roosevelt* (1947). Many of the three thousand counties show a consistent party preference. Merriam and Overacker, *op. cit.*, p. 269, wrote that "The fact is that the primary is the election in about one half of the states, one half of the counties and one half of the legislative and congressional districts of the nation." This estimate may be rather high.

party members cannot write a platform in the voting booths. The candidates, of course, are already selected when the convention meets, and they are usually automatically members of it, along with other especially elected delegates and party officers. This curious political arrangement, by which candidates are selected to run on an unknown and unwritten platform, is at its most absurd in the South, where the platform is drafted after what is the real election:

The state convention . . . meeting in September is supposed to state the aims of the party. Yet the primaries have already been held in July and August, and in Texas are synonymous to election. The upshot of the whole thing is that the prospective lawmakers have been selected in each district on their own personal platforms and without reference to a party program of any kind. Under such conditions they feel no obligation to support a party program, since it does not represent the will of the people, as the outcome of the local campaigns was decided before it was written. In fact, they usually ignore it completely. Such procedure leaves us virtually in the same position as if we had no political parties at all, and, as a result, the legislature splits along factional lines. . . .¹

RESULTS OF THE PRIMARY SYSTEM

In spite of nearly a century of experience with direct primaries, there is no universal agreement on their value as a device for nominating candidates.² The best that may be said for the primary with any degree of assurance is that, other things being equal, it makes a revolt by the rank and file in a party easier than the convention system made it, because the identity of the voter is not revealed, and he need not, therefore, fear reprisals for voting against a machine. It would be difficult to prove, however, that this threat to the organization has in fact restrained unscrupulous politicians. Such bosses as Hague, Long, the O'Connells, Thompson, and the Vares have not been stopped by the direct primary. "The Bath House Johns and the Honest Johns," wrote Professor Merriam, "have pursued the even tenor of their way undisturbed by such details as the shift in the form of nomination."³ That the party members

¹ From C. P. Patterson, S. B. McAlister, and G. C. Hester, *State and Local Government in Texas*, p. 62. Copyright, 1945, by The Macmillan Company and used with their permission.

² The arguments and evidence for and against are examined by Professor Charles E. Merriam in Merriam and Overacker, *op. cit.*, pp. 209-358. See also *Annals*, vol. 106 (March, 1923).

³ Merriam and Overacker, *op. cit.*, p. 212.

do not often revolt does not gainsay the gun-behind-the-door argument; they have in the primary a weapon for revolt if they wish to use it. Since referenda on proposals to repeal direct primary statutes have almost always resulted in defeat for repeal, it may be concluded that the voters prefer the primary to the convention.

It was feared by such opponents of the primary as President William Howard Taft that parties would lose control of nominations, and consequently party responsibility would be impossible. But the development of the organization slate, unexpected by friends and foes alike, has enabled party leaders to balance tickets, to recognize racial, religious, sectional, and other interests and groups, and in other ways to integrate the party in much the same way that leaders do in such conventions as remain.¹ To the extent that the direct primary makes slate-making difficult or expensive for them, political leaders dislike it. A person may have such powerful group support (say, labor) that he can get himself nominated in a primary, and yet the leaders may know that this very group support may carry down the whole ticket in a general election. To mobilize the whole organization to defeat such a candidate for nomination is both expensive and productive of antagonisms that could be avoided in a convention system. Colorado, Nebraska, and Utah have systems of pre-primary conventions to make slate-making official. In these states persons who receive the designations of the conventions go on the primary ballot, but nomination by petition is still permitted.

Great expenditures of money were made under the convention system and are now made in the pre-convention campaigns of candidates for the presidential nomination. It is impossible to prove that expenditures were lower when every state had its convention than they are now when most states have primaries. But since a hard-fought primary campaign is likely to be just as expensive as an election campaign, in the two-party states a candidate has to find money for two elections. Whether or not the primary system is, on the whole, more expensive to candidates, there have been a number of extremely expensive fights in Republican primaries, such as those between Ford and Newberry, Vare and Pepper, McKinley and Smith.² It is also the experience of many political leaders that men of attainments and established reputation will often refuse to go into pri-

¹ For an interesting, specific example of pre-primary slate-making, see Edward J. Flynn, *You're the Boss* (1947), pp. 219-223.

² See C. H. Woody, *The Case of Frank L. Smith* (1931); Louise Overacker, *Money in Elections* (1932); Spencer Ervin, *Henry Ford vs. Truman H. Newberry* (1935).

mary fights. They will, however, accept an uncontested party nomination and go into a campaign against the other party, if that can be arranged. How important this is, in the whole of American politics, it is impossible to say with certainty. It is equally impossible to determine whether the primary produces more "good" men and fewer "bad" ones than the convention; too much depends upon the observer's standards of good and bad.¹

Some of the other common objections to the primary, such as the overburdened-voter argument, really are objections to something else, such as the long ballot. The general scattering of authority and want of leadership within the parties is probably due more to federalism than to the primary; at least, conditions were about the same before as since its adoption. Party managers are more sensitive to the desirability of leadership and party integration than the rank and file. The leaders dislike a primary fight which, even though it may be patched up before the general election, still leaves soreness and wounds at the time of the main battle.

INDEPENDENT AND NON-PARTY CANDIDACIES

It is possible in every state for independent candidates to get on the general election ballot without going through a primary. The lot of the independent is, however, never a happy one, and since the La Follette campaign of 1924 the major parties in control of the legislatures have in many states made it still more unhappy. The independent gets on the ballot by a petition, but the election laws are coming to require large numbers of signatures. In New York, for instance, a candidate to be voted on by all of the voters of the state must file in proper form a petition signed by 12,000 voters "of whom at least fifty shall reside in each county of the state." There are sixty-one counties in New York State. Candidates for other offices must file petitions signed by voters numbering at least 7 per cent of the total vote cast for governor in the last election in the constituency wherein the petition is to be filed. Thus an independent candidate for mayor of New York would need about 157,000 signatures. Collecting the large number now generally required is an expensive undertaking, and it is made more onerous by various devices. In New Jersey, for example, each person signing a petition for an independent candidate must do so in the presence of a notary public, who

¹ See Boyd A. Martin, *The Direct Primary in Idaho* (1947), p. 136, for a survey of opinion in Idaho.

must witness the signature. Other states have such requirements as that independent petitions must be filed before the date of the primary (so that a candidate defeated in a primary cannot run in the general election); or that if a candidate files in a primary he cannot in that year file as an independent; or that independent petitions must be filed sixty or ninety days before an election. Yet in spite of all these hurdles, independent candidates do get nominated by petition, and occasionally they get elected.

NATIONAL CONVENTIONS

A national convention of an American major party is a phenomenon unlike anything else in the world. As was said earlier, it is a device of propaganda rather than a real deliberative party assembly.

The convention is designed partly for deliberation and partly for demonstration, and alternates between these moods and tensions. At one moment it is seriously considering the merits of complicated questions of tariff, or finance, or corporate regulation; in the next moment it is a tumultuous sea of emotional demonstration in behalf of some symbolic hero or tradition. Now it is a personnel-selecting agency, passing upon the qualifications of a . . . President and in the next moment an Indian war dance; returning hoarsely, however, to its sober choice of an executive manager and leader. Now it is dominated by its lungs; now by its brains; now they are in conflict. No one knows when it will become a parliament and when it will become a mob.¹

Twenty thousand persons, of whom eleven or twelve hundred are delegates and as many more are alternates, crowded into a huge auditorium or sitting in an outdoor stadium, cannot compose a deliberating party parliament.

EARLY NATIONAL CONVENTIONS

The first national convention was called by a now-forgotten party, the Anti-Masons. It met in Baltimore in 1831 with 114 delegates present. The form of its proceedings has been followed with variations by all

¹ From Charles E. Merriam and Harold F. Gosnell, *The American Party System* (1940 edition), p. 290. Copyright by The Macmillan Company and used with their permission.

major parties since.¹ The National Republican Party, predecessors of the Whigs, met in December, 1831, also in Baltimore, and nominated Henry Clay for President. The Democrats met the following year to nominate Andrew Jackson for his second term and Martin Van Buren for Vice-President. Like the others, this first Democratic convention was held in Baltimore. The apportionment of delegates in the early conventions was irregular; because of the difficulties of travel, the states near the convention city were relatively over-represented, and in 1848 the Democrats adopted a rule (still in force) that states or territories might accredit non-residents as delegates. In 1852 they changed the basis of apportionment to two delegates for each electoral vote, and the Republican Party adopted the same scheme in 1860.

PRESENT APPORTIONMENT OF DELEGATES

The Democratic Formula. The Democratic Party, organized in every state, clung until 1944 to the rule of two delegates per electoral vote. This rule caused no grave concern, because the South felt that it had a veto in the two-thirds rule (adopted in 1832) over any nominee for President. But when in 1936 the two-thirds rule was abrogated, the South demanded some sort of compensation for its loss of this veto. The 1940 convention instructed the national committee to work out a formula to compensate states that went Democratic, and in 1944 a new arrangement was adopted which gives the South a slight advantage. Each state is entitled to twice the number of delegates that it has senators and representatives in Congress, and two additional delegates if it went Democratic in the previous presidential election.² The South is still not satisfied. The national committee is authorized to assign arbitrarily the number of delegates who are to come from the territories and the District of Columbia. The formula worked out to 1176 delegates in 1944 and 1234 in 1948. Each state or territory is permitted to send for each delegate one alternate, who is entitled to vote only in the absence of the delegate.

The Republican Formula. Sectionalism has always been a greater prob-

¹ Ostrogorski, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 59-61. There had been earlier national meetings of party leaders, "embryo conventions," Ostrogorski called them, to nominate candidates; the Federalists held them in 1808 and 1812. See Samuel E. Morison, "The First National Nominating Convention," *American Historical Review*, vol. 17 (July, 1932), pp. 744-763. In the period after the fall of the caucus in 1824 and before the rise of the national delegate convention, state legislatures and state caucuses nominated candidates for President.

² Clarence Cannon, *Democratic Manual* (1944), p. 13.

lem to the Republican than to the Democratic Party because of the solidly Democratic South. It was long obvious to the Republican leaders that apportionment in terms of electoral votes had two undesirable effects. First, it gave an undue influence in the convention to the skeleton Republican organizations in the South. Alabama, for instance, would have approximately the same strength as Iowa, Texas about the same as Illinois. The other effect was that the use of federal patronage in the South by a Republican President gave him enough southern delegates so that he could either control his renomination or pick his successor. Theodore Roosevelt used the southern delegates in 1908 when he picked Taft for the Republican nomination; when Taft used the same tactics against him in 1912, he took his followers out of the Republican Party and formed the Progressive Party. On that occasion the Taft forces arbitrarily used their control to exclude so many Roosevelt delegates that he knew he could not obtain a majority.

The upshot of this contest was that the Republican Party began at once to reconsider the apportionment of delegates, and there have been a number of changes since, all in the direction of cutting down the proportion of delegates from the South. Rule Number 1 adopted at the Convention of 1944 provides that there shall be

Delegates at Large

1. Four delegates at large from each state.
2. Two additional delegates at large for each representative at large in Congress from each state.
3. Three delegates at large each for Alaska, District of Columbia, and Hawaii, and two additional delegates if the delegate to Congress elected at the last preceding election was the Republican nominee. Two delegates at large each for Puerto Rico and the Philippine Islands.
4. Three additional delegates at large from each state casting its electoral vote, or a majority thereof, for the Republican nominee for President in the last preceding presidential election. If any state fails to cast its electoral vote or a majority thereof for the Republican nominee for President in the last preceding presidential election and thereafter in the next succeeding election elects a Republican United States Senator, then in that event such state shall be entitled to such additional delegates at large.

District Delegates

1. One district delegate from each congressional district casting one thousand votes or more for any Republican elector in the last preceding

presidential election or for the Republican nominee for Congress in the last preceding congressional election.

2. One additional district delegate from each congressional district casting 10,000 votes or more for any Republican nominee for Congress in the last preceding congressional election.¹

This complicated formula produced 1059 delegates for the Republican Convention of 1944 and 1094 for the convention of 1948. It still over-represents the Republican vote in the South, however; Alabama, for instance, had 14 delegates in 1948, Maine, 13, Texas, 33, and New Jersey, 35. In 1948 the ten states of the Solid South, which the Republican Party could not carry unless a political miracle occurred, had 167 delegates, about 15 per cent of the whole number of delegates. The present formula nevertheless works out more nearly to reflect party strength in the states than the electoral votes apportionment used in 1912 and earlier, and no doubt it will be further refined in the future.

THE SELECTION OF DELEGATES

Delegates to national conventions are selected by any one of four methods, according to the election law of the state. Twenty-eight states select the delegates by state conventions; sixteen use a primary; Arizona and Kansas a party council; and Arkansas and South Carolina the state Committee.² The delegates are chosen in the presidential years at various dates beginning with the New Hampshire primary on the second Tuesday in March and ending thirty days before the conventions assemble.

PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES

The Democratic platform of 1912 urged that each state should pass legislation providing for primaries to select delegates to national conventions; the Progressive platform the same year went further and urged a constitutional amendment to provide for nation-wide preferential primaries for candidates for the presidency. In his first regular message to Congress, President Wilson urged national legislation to "provide for primary elec-

¹ Republican National Convention (1944), *Proceedings*, p. 121. No fractional votes are permitted by the Republican rule No. 3, *ibid.*, p. 124.

² These figures are only approximate. A few states, like New York, select some delegates one way and others a different way; in New York, delegates at large are selected by the state convention; the remainder by primaries. In several southern states, here counted as primary states, the primary is not mandatory.

tions throughout the country at which the voters of the several parties may choose their nominees for the presidency without the intervention of conventions.”¹ Twenty-six states at one time or another have had some sort of law to control their delegates at the national conventions, but the drive for such statutes subsided with the passing of the Progressive era.²

In fourteen of the sixteen states that select all or some delegates by a primary, an opportunity may be given to the party member who votes in the primary to express his preference among candidates for the nomination for President. This type of primary is called the presidential preference primary. The voter may show his preference either by voting for delegates “pledged” to one candidate or another, or by indicating by a mark the name of the candidate for President he prefers, or by doing both.³ Where both are permitted, the curious result may occur that the preference vote may go for one candidate while the delegates elected may be pledged to another candidate or to various other candidates.

Objections to the Presidential Primary. For several reasons, the presidential primary does not fit well with the system of national conventions. State laws binding delegates are ineffective; a candidate may withdraw from the pre-convention race after the delegates pledged to him in some states are elected; and if a number of candidates go into the convention, all with pledged delegates, none may get a majority until some delegates abandon their instructions. Candidates commonly do not enter the primaries in the states where other candidates (“favorite sons”) reside, because they do not wish to offend these organizations. Nevertheless, there is always hope that as the booms of the favorite sons collapse before or in the convention, the votes of their delegates will accrue to a candidate who has been friendly. Governor Harold Stassen’s entry into the Ohio primary in 1948 when Senator Robert Taft was Ohio’s favorite son was regarded, therefore, as an ill-advised tactic. A candi-

¹ *The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, Ray Stannard Baker, editor (1926), vol. 3, p. 76. Wilson would have retained conventions “only for the purpose of declaring and accepting the verdict of the primaries and formulating the platforms of the parties; and I suggest that these conventions should consist not of delegates chosen for this single purpose, but of the nominees for Congress, the nominees for vacant seats in the Senate of the United States, the Senators whose terms have not yet closed, the national committees, and the candidates for the presidency themselves, in order that platforms may be framed by those responsible to the people for carrying them into effect.” Wilson repeated his recommendation in his letter of acceptance in 1916.

² Louise Overacker in Merriam and Overacker, *Primary Elections* (1928), p. 142.

³ For facsimile ballots see C. O. Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 7–11; and Louise Overacker, *The Presidential Primary* (1926), pp. 264–274.

date may also refuse to file for a primary, particularly an early one, in a state where he has reason to believe he will be defeated, for the loss of the delegates may be less important than the dampening effect of the defeat upon his chances in other states. State laws and decisions differ upon whether a candidate may be entered in a primary without his consent, and whether, if entered either with or without his consent, he may withdraw. But unless all the names of all the candidates for the nomination are on the presidential primary ballot, the party members cannot express their choice. A forced choice among the candidates who happened to enter may give a very false impression of party sentiment in a given state.

When a state is allowed a considerable number of delegates — California had 54, Illinois, 60, Pennsylvania, 74 in the Democratic Convention of 1948 — and when various rival slates of delegates are filed, pledged to different candidates, the possibilities are good for a primary ballot six feet long. All kinds of splits in the delegation finally elected are also possible. It is even possible for alternates to be elected who are pledged in ways different from the delegates.

The preference among the rank and file may be so impracticable politically that if the convention followed it, party defeat would be probable or certain. The voters cannot, or at any rate do not, take into account all the elements of availability, as the party leaders can and do. A highly popular candidate from Alabama or Vermont, to mention just one element of availability, would be much less valuable to his party than a man less well known or well liked who had proved that he could carry New York or Ohio. Nor do the rank and file pay any attention to the value of balancing the ticket, especially the necessity of selecting a candidate for Vice-President from a section of the country different from that of the candidate for President.

Tying down the delegates with pledges would, if effective, limit their bargaining power and enhance the power of the uninstructed delegates. For this reason practicing politicians prefer unpledged or favorite son delegations. Lincoln might not have been nominated if his managers had been unable to trade two cabinet posts and the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for the convention votes of Indiana and Pennsylvania.¹ For all these reasons, not to mention the low popular interest, "the presidential primary movement has not only been halted; it has actually been turned backward."² In many ways, as has been noted in Chapter 7, the

¹ William E. Baringer, *Lincoln's Rise to Power* (1937), pp. 214-215; 239-240.

² Merriam and Overacker, *op. cit.*, p. 183.

public opinion polls constitute an informal presidential preference primary which is a better expression of party sentiment than the formal primaries. Thus it was impossible to tell from the results of the Republican primaries of 1948 what candidate was preferred by the largest number of Republican voters. The magazine *Newsweek* canvassed "fifty of the nation's leading political writers" just before the convention opened to find the most likely nominee. Of the fifty, twenty-eight thought Vandenberg had the best chance, fifteen favored Dewey, six Taft, and one Martin.¹ But a Gallup poll among Republican voters, published June 18, rated the presidential possibilities thus:

Dewey	33%
Stassen	26
Vandenberg	13
MacArthur	11
Taft	10
Warren	2
Martin	1
Others, or no choice	3

No existing party machinery is so efficient at revealing the preferences of the members of a party.

ASSEMBLING OF THE NATIONAL CONVENTION

Late in June or early in July the convention assembles in the city selected by the national committee. In recent years the Democrats have set their convention to follow the Republicans'. The number of delegates and alternates is so great that only a few cities have stadia or auditoriums big enough to seat them, along with the fifteen or twenty thousand other politicians and sightseers who attend and who want places in the galleries. A national convention is a great spectacle that draws crowds. The convention city must also have extensive hotel accommodations to care for such a vast assemblage of people. Before the convention actually meets the various presidential "hopefuls" have set up headquarters in hotel suites as near the convention hall as possible, and they often have bands that parade the streets while supporters carry banners and hand out lithographed buttons.²

¹ *Newsweek*, vol. 21 (June 7, 1948), p. 14.

² For further details of the candidates' preparations see Roy V. Peel, "The 1948 Preconvention Campaign," *Annals*, vol. 259 (September, 1948), pp. 75-89.

THE ORDER OF BUSINESS

The order of business is virtually the same in each convention, and it has changed but little over the years, although the broadcasting of the proceedings by radio and television and the use of public address systems have brought some slight changes; for instance, a stentorian voice like Bryan's is no longer necessary. First of all, the national chairman calls the meeting to order. The national anthem is sung, and a prayer is offered. The national chairman introduces the mayor of the convention city or the governor of the state; one or both make addresses of welcome. The secretary of the national committee reads the convention call, or part of it. The chairman submits the recommendation of the national committee for the temporary chairman. This man is always elected by *viva voce* vote; he has his "keynote" address all ready, and he is escorted to the platform by a special committee.

The Keynote Speech. The keynote address, which lasts about an hour, is a highly emotional performance. Among the qualifications, in fact, for temporary chairman is the ability to deliver this set oration. In it the memory of party heroes is invoked, past victories are reviewed, and deep devotion is expressed to party ideals. The other party is castigated in such unrestrained language that an uninformed observer would think that the speaker regarded the opposition as a group of traitors. Part of one paragraph from Governor Warren's keynote address to the 1944 Republican Convention as reported in the *Proceedings* will both show this characteristic tendency and give the flavor of this campaign oratory:

We believe the New Deal is destroying the two-party system. (Applause.) The New Deal is no longer the Democratic Party. (Applause.) It is an incongruous clique within that party. (Applause.) It retains its power by patronizing and holding together incompatible groups. It talks of idealism and seeks its votes from the most corrupt political machines in the country. (Great applause.) The leaders of its inner circle are not representatives of the people. (Applause.) They are the personal agents of one man. (Applause.) Their appointments to public office are not made on the basis of efficiency or public approval, but on the basis of loyalty to the clique only. (Applause.) Under their rule the Constitution has been short-circuited. The Cabinet has ceased to be a voice and has become an echo. (Applause.) Congress, wherever possible, has been circumvented by executive decree. Both Congress and the judiciary have been intimidated and bludgeoned to make them servile. (Applause.) Over all of this — and over all of us — is the ominous, gargantuan figure of an arrogant, power-intoxicated bureaucracy. (Applause.)

"At the conclusion of his address," according to the *Proceedings*, "the temporary chairman received a great ovation, delegates, alternates, and guests rising, standing on chairs, cheering, waving hats and flags."

Permanent Organization. This usually concludes the first day. The next morning the temporary chairman, after the opening formalities, calls for the appointment of committees on credentials, permanent organization, and the rest. The members of the committee on resolutions (platform) have actually been selected by the national committee and have been holding hearings for a week; nevertheless, the convention goes through the motions of electing them. While the committees go forth for their meetings the convention is entertained by "optional speeches," memorials, and music. This usually concludes the second day and the first session.

At the beginning of the second session the committee on permanent organization reports, nominating a slate of officers. The permanent chairman, heading the list, is a man not a candidate, but since his rulings may affect candidacies, his election is occasionally made a test of factional strength. Ordinarily he and the whole slate are accepted, and he makes an hour's address which is much like the keynote speech of the previous day. All the other committees then report. Any changes in the permanent rules are made. If there are contesting delegations, as in the Republican Convention of 1912, the acceptance or rejection of the report of the committee on credentials may determine what nominations will later be made.

The Platform. The third session is devoted to the platform. The adoption of party resolutions antedates national conventions, although the first true platform, according to Porter, was the Democratic platform of 1840, a set of nine resolutions which occupy a little more than one page of print.¹ In contrast to this relatively restrained statement, platforms are now lengthy, prolix documents. For instance, the Republican platform of 1944 was twelve pages long and had twenty-seven main headings. Something was said about each of a variety of topics or issues, from agriculture to the Western Hemisphere. Even the rinderpest (a disease of cattle) got mentioned. The Democratic platform of 1948 contained about 4000 words. The objectives of platform writers are to unite the party, as much as possible, and to bring into the fold as many interest groups as possible.

Except for those matters upon which most Americans are agreed, such

¹ Kirk H. Porter, *National Party Platforms* (1924), p. 1.

as the Constitution, tolerance, and the desirability of peace, the platforms are likely to be vague, couched in what Theodore Roosevelt called weasel words: "Alaska is entitled to the fullest measure of home rule looking toward statehood" means almost nothing at all. Especially when two powerful groups face one another and a party dares not offend either of them do the writers show what Frank Kent called the art of seeming to say something without doing so; the leaders of organized labor, for instance, could in 1944 have looked over the Republican labor plank without finding any hint of a Taft-Hartley Act, but they would instead have found much praise for labor, and this sentence: "The Republican Party accepts the purposes of the National Labor Relations Act, the Wage and Hour Act, the Social Security Act, and all other federal statutes designed to promote and protect the welfare of American working men and women, and we promise a fair and just administration of these laws." The party in power points to its accomplishments. Thus the Democratic platform of 1948 said:

Ours is the party which was entrusted with responsibility when twelve years of Republican neglect had blighted the hopes of mankind, had squandered the fruits of prosperity, and had plunged us into the depths of depression and despair. Ours is the party which rebuilt a shattered economy, rescued our banking system, revived our agriculture, re-invigorated our industry, gave labor strength and security, and led the American people to the broadest prosperity in our history. . . .

The party out of power usually asserts that the country is being ruined by its opponents. In 1944, for instance, the Republicans saw disaster just ahead:

The national administration has become a sprawling, overlapping bureaucracy. It is undermined by executive abuse of power, confused lines of authority, duplication of effort, inadequate fiscal controls, loose personnel practices, and an attitude of arrogance previously unknown in our history.

Importance of the Platform. When a President is ending his first term, the platform of his party is usually written in the White House and sent to the convention. Thus President Hoover is supposed to have passed upon the Republican platform of 1932, and President Franklin Roosevelt upon the Democratic platforms of 1936, 1940, and 1944. The President in office and seeking re-election will permit the resolutions committee to make changes only with his approval. But when a party is out of power there is

a vast amount of pulling and hauling, of trying planks and rejecting them. Each faction wants planks that may favor it. The struggle is generally out of all proportion to the general importance of the platform, because platforms are not widely read, and people tend to vote for a candidate, not because of his party's platform but because of his personality.¹ There are, however, occasional and important exceptions to the general rule that the platform is unimportant. Such an exception was the silver platform that emerged from the Democratic Convention of 1896. It was in the debate concerning the platform on the convention floor that Bryan made the Cross of Gold Speech, which caused such a tremendous impression that he was nominated for President the next day on the first ballot. And it was the civil rights plank of the 1948 Democratic platform which caused some of the southern delegates to walk out and later to set up the States' Rights or "Dixiecrat" Party.

Allegiance to the Platform. Parties often insert planks in their platforms that assert that candidates are bound by them. In 1944, for instance, the Republican platform contained a plank entitled "Good Faith" which read, "The acceptance of the nominations made by this convention carries with it, as a matter of private honor and public faith, an undertaking by each candidate to be true to the principles and program herein set forth." But since many of the principles are vague and equivocal,

¹ A recent specific instance was General Eisenhower's leading all the public opinion polls in 1948 at the time he withdrew as a possible candidate for President. The people could not have known anything about his political views, because, aside from advocating compulsory peacetime military training, he had never expressed himself on any important issues. The general low level of public interest in platforms has been shown by various Gallup polls. Just before the 1948 conventions the voters were asked, "Is there any particular idea or plank which you would like your party to include in its platform for the coming presidential election?" The results were:

	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>
Republicans	34%	66%
Democrats	31	69
Independents	40	60
All United States	34	66

After the conventions (poll of July 31, 1948) Republicans and Democrats were asked by Gallup if they had read their party platforms. Very few had:

	<i>Democratic Platform</i>	<i>Republican Platform</i>
Yes, all of it	7%	7%
Yes, only part of it	32	21
No, not any of it	61	72

reasonable men may interpret them in different ways. Sometimes a candidate for President reads a plank to mean one thing; the candidate for Vice-President sees it to mean something different. The interpretations by Dewey and Bricker of the Republican platform of 1944 were noticeably different. It may be said that the candidates inevitably amend the platform in their speeches as the campaign progresses. In 1928 Alfred E. Smith was not content with the Democratic prohibition plank, which he thought straddled the issue, and he sent a telegram to the convention after he was nominated which repudiated the plank and reminded the delegates of his views.¹ Other candidates have similarly modified platforms.

But even though the candidates may accept the platform in June, political and economic conditions may change so markedly before November that planks inserted and approved in good faith five months earlier may be impracticable or impossible. New issues, moreover, which did not exist at the time the platform was drafted may emerge to crowd it out of public interest. No American party has any means of forcing its candidates, if elected, to obey the platform during their terms of office. Conceivably a party might refuse a renomination if the official seeks and is eligible for one, but while in office he owes his authority not to party but to constitution or laws.

Nominating Candidates for President. As soon as the platform is adopted, the convention turns to the main business that brought all the fifteen or twenty thousand people together: nominating a candidate for President. In this process the roll is called by states in alphabetical order, and a spokesman for each delegation may nominate a candidate, pass, or yield to a state not yet called, which state is known to have a nomination.

Nominating speeches are by rule limited to twenty minutes in Democratic conventions, to thirty in Republican. The Democrats permit any number of seconding speeches but limit them to five minutes each; the Republicans allow only four five-minute seconding speeches. The nominating speech, like the keynote address, is encrusted with tradition. It too is bombastic and unrestrained. It depicts the man about to be named as only a little lower than an angel, a sterling character, a one-hundred-per-cent American, and — most important of all — a sure winner. His life and accomplishments are reviewed in discreet detail, and if he had the good fortune to be born in a log cabin, as Governor

¹ Roy V. Peel and Thomas C. Donnelly, *The 1928 Campaign* (1931), p. 34.

Bricker was — and many a candidate before him — that fact will surely be mentioned. Although it may have been known for weeks that the speaker had been picked to nominate a certain candidate, it is part of the tradition that he mention the man's name only once, at the very end of the last sentence.

The "Demonstration." The utterance of this name is a signal, a cue, for a "demonstration." The supporters of the candidate leave their seats on the floor and march around the hall and up and down the aisles carrying banners, placards, and pictures of their man. They have their own bands, which play as loudly as possible, but the music is often drowned out by the yelling, cheering, and the noise made by various mechanical devices — though power-driven noise machines have now been banned. The uproar is deafening. "It is a sort of pandemonium or Bedlam. If one could imagine a crowd of fifteen thousand persons all attacked at once with Saint Vitus' dance, one would have a faint idea of the scene presented by the convention."¹ Amid the wave upon wave of noise, fist fights break out as the demonstrating delegates try to seize the banners held by delegates favoring other candidates for the nomination. Chairs collapse. People are swept away from their places. Hats thrown in the air are trampled and smashed. The gallery crowd joins, of course, in the screaming. Sometimes these gallery clacques have been important in producing a nomination by giving the impression that one man is much more popular than another. Seward's forces brought a thousand "pressure men" to Chicago in 1860. Lincoln's managers, "Ward Lamon and Jesse Fell, therefore had a large supply of extra tickets printed Thursday evening, and several Lincoln men spent the night forging official signatures on the pasteboards." The next morning, Seward's men, to their horror, "could not get in. The places from which, yesterday and the day before, they had shouted for Seward, were occupied by a thousand limber-lunged Chicagoans, ready to roar for 'Old Abe.' These were packed in with the help of those counterfeit tickets — a trick (in Whitney's phrase) 'known only to wicked Chicago.'"²

The "voice from the sewer" of the 1940 Democratic Convention was another trick, but perhaps not wicked, known to Chicago. Mayor Kelly's commissioner of sanitation, operating a loudspeaker in the basement of

¹ Ostrogorski, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 268. Ostrogorski's whole description of the convention process is well worth reading. See also pp. 133-160 in his *Democracy and the Party System in the United States* (1912).

² Baringer, *op. cit.*, pp. 267, 278.

the convention hall, demanded over and over, in the name of different states, the renomination of Franklin Roosevelt. The length of each demonstration is carefully noted, not only by newspaper reporters, but for the official report of the convention; thus, in 1944, Governor Dewey's demonstration officially began at 11:30 A.M. and ended at 12:07. The intensity of the sound is scientifically measured in decibels. The roll of the states is continued, and as successive men are named, demonstrations for them are conducted.

The Balloting. After all are nominated and the seconding speeches delivered, a vote is taken. In the parlance of conventions, this vote is called a ballot, and such statements will be made as "Wallace received on the first ballot 429½ votes to Truman's 319½."¹ Voting, however, is not by a ballot but by a roll call of the states, the chairman of each state's delegation announcing the vote.² If no one attains a majority at the first voting, the process is continued until someone does, and sometimes the contest is long and bitter. In the Democratic Convention of 1924 John W. Davis was nominated on the one-hundred-and-third ballot after two weeks of deadlock between McAdoo and Smith.³ When no one has a majority, and while successive ballots are being taken, the party leaders, who are not necessarily delegates, meet in hotel rooms and try to work out compromises or deals to produce a majority. The biographies and memoirs of American politicians are replete with stories of these meetings in smoke-filled rooms. When none among the major factions will give way, a "dark horse" is likely to emerge from these conferences, perhaps some favorite son or other candidate acceptable to a majority as a second choice. He may be a person not widely known to the public, like Harding; or a non-professional, like Willkie; or he may be a person accepted by the delegates out of sheer weariness, like Davis.

¹ The Republicans do not permit fractional votes, but the Democrats allow states to elect more persons than they are entitled to delegates so as to give more people seats on the floor. The Democratic formula, discussed earlier, is also expressed in terms of fractional votes.

² The Democratic convention has since 1860 recognized the unit rule, under which a majority of the delegates from a state may cast the entire vote of that state regardless of the preference of a minority. The rule is not imposed by the national convention, though if a state convention instructs its delegates to observe the rule the national convention will enforce it. But since 1924 the national convention has refused to recognize the unit rule as applying to delegations from primary states.

³ This record, made when the two-thirds rule was in force in Democratic conventions, is not likely soon to be broken. McAdoo had 530, a majority, on the first day. But there is always the possibility that three or more strong factions will deadlock a convention.

In a deadlocked convention there is always the possibility of a "stampede," or a sudden rush of delegates to some nominee. This movement may be spontaneous, as was Polk's nomination in 1844, with the delegates ignoring their leaders and anxious to get on the bandwagon. Or it may be the result of outside pressure and careful maneuvering, as was the stampede to Willkie.

THE CONVENTION AS A RATIFYING DEVICE

In two sets of circumstances the convention as a nominating device is superfluous. The first of these arises when a deal has been worked out before the convention assembles to assure one man the nomination for President and another the nomination for Vice-President. This occurred with the nomination of Dewey and Bricker in 1944. The second type of *pro forma* convention is that at which a President and Vice-President in office are to be renominated. A party cannot deny a President a renomination without repudiating him, and even if it might like to do so, his four years of patronage make him very powerful. Probably the most unnecessary convention in a generation was the Democratic Convention of 1936 which renominated Franklin D. Roosevelt and John N. Garner. The platform was already written; the two candidates were nominated by acclamation; and only much speechmaking and entertainment kept the delegates in Philadelphia long enough for the hotels to get back the money that had been paid to bring the convention to the city. Seventeen times in thirty conventions between 1832 and 1948 the Democrats have either nominated their candidate for President by acclamation or on the first ballot, showing that often the nomination is a foregone conclusion.

NOMINATING A CANDIDATE FOR VICE-PRESIDENT

Once a nomination for President is made (and another demonstration is run off), the convention, in a mood of anticlimax, nominates a candidate for Vice-President, usually on the first or second ballot. Little attention is paid to this nomination in spite of the fact that on several occasions the nominee has succeeded to the presidency. The nominee for Vice-President must be a man acceptable to the man at the head of the ticket, and a sitting President can change Vice-Presidents almost at his pleasure, as Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt did. Wilson was prepared to drop Thomas R. Marshall in 1916 had Marshall refused to agree to resign if

Hughes won. When he agreed, Wilson gave the word for Marshall's renomination. Another element in the choice of Vice-President is balancing the ticket, both on issues and on sections. Thus, if a New Yorker is nominated for President, a man from the Middle or Far West is indicated for Vice-President, and *vice versa*. Or, if a liberal is nominated for President, a conservative may be nominated for Vice-President. When in 1928 Smith, a "dripping wet," was nominated for President, Joseph T. Robinson, a "dry," was nominated for Vice-President.

Sometimes, however, the nomination for Vice-President may be largely a matter of luck. In 1944, for example, the Democratic bosses, Crump, Flynn, Hague, and Kelly did not like Wallace, and President Roosevelt took little interest. The bosses, with National Chairman Robert Hannegan and George Allen, canvassed the possibilities. Sam Rayburn of Texas would arouse the Negroes. "Byrnes, who was the strongest candidate, wouldn't do because he had been raised a Catholic and had left the church when he married, and the Catholics wouldn't stand for that." Truman, however, had few enemies; "he came from a border state, and he had never made any 'racial' remarks. He just dropped into the slot."¹

NOTIFICATION AND ACCEPTANCE

The National Republican Convention of 1832 appointed a committee to notify Henry Clay of his nomination and to obtain his acceptance. In stagecoach days, this procedure was necessary, or at least reasonable. But with the invention of the telegraph it became a mere formality. The ceremony, with its notification and acceptance speeches, continued, however, even into the days when a candidate could follow the proceedings on his radio and keep in constant touch with his managers by direct telephone wire. Franklin Roosevelt broke precedent in 1932 by flying to Chicago to accept the nomination before the convention adjourned. Willkie, Dewey, and Truman followed his example, and it may be that the notification ceremonies are gone forever.

THE NATIONAL CONVENTION: AN APPRAISAL

It is difficult, perhaps impossible, to appraise with complete justice the national convention as a device for selecting candidates. Criticisms of it are often in reality criticisms of the electoral college and federalism, or of

¹ Flynn, *op. cit.*, pp. 180-181.

the presidential form of government. For example, the complaint is made that the convention does not take into account the will of the majority — if there is any majority opinion on the candidates who have been mentioned. The electoral college, however, is constructed to reflect not popular majorities but sectional combinations. While the popular majority may be disregarded by a convention, the sectional interests reflected in the operations of the electoral college obviously are not so disregarded. Another complaint is that the convention tends to nominate men of no national political experience, notably generals and governors of states. Actually, however, this objection is directed against the presidential form of government, for under a parliamentary form the chief party leader would have to work his way up through the legislative body. Parties or their conventions cannot be justly blamed for avoiding candidates, when constitutional forms permit them to do so, who because of service in Congress have made enemies which outsiders have not made.

Whether or not the convention tends to turn up great men as candidates is a fruitless argument, likely to turn upon what is meant by "great." By any definition, conventions have nominated some great as well as some weak men. Given the available supply of able men at any one time, would any other system have produced better results? There is no means of knowing. For that matter, what alternative is now offered that has any promise of producing more general satisfaction? The difficulties with the primary system of selecting delegates have already been discussed, and a nation-wide presidential preference primary such as Wilson proposed might produce new difficulties of its own, such as a splitting of the party vote among forty-eight favorite sons with a necessary run-off between, perhaps, two men who each got 3 or 4 per cent of the party vote respectively and both of whom were cordially disliked by the party members the country over. A national presidential preference primary is virtually irreconcilable with federalism and the electoral college.¹

¹ For a recent discussion of the problems and an account of the conventions of 1948, see Elmer D. Graper, "How Presidents are Nominated," *Annals*, vol. 259 (September, 1948), pp. 53-63. Professor Graper concludes that "the convention, with its noise and confusion, its windy speeches and boisterous demonstrations, may not seem conducive to the high purpose of selecting the nation's leader. But as long as it furnishes the opportunity for party leaders to arouse in their followers a feeling of active participation in the determination of party policies, and at the same time gives the leaders a chance to make their agreements and necessary compromises, their trades and their deals, the nominating convention, with all its faults and obvious absurdities, may be considered an effective means for bringing about a large measure of popular consent."

Assuming that no new nominating device is likely to displace national conventions in the immediate future much could be done to improve and reform them by actions of the parties themselves or by Congress. At present, conventions are entirely extra-legal bodies, unregulated either by Congress or by the states; but in its present mood on election cases the Supreme Court would probably permit Congress to control them if it wished to do so. The conventions have become far too large. They are so big that they invite either mob behavior or boss control if the eleven or twelve hundred delegates are to act in concert. A smaller group, say of about two hundred, with none but delegates permitted on the floor, would be at once more of a party council and a meeting less subject to the hysterical behavior characteristic of recent conventions. Being unregulated, national conventions are subject to all the trickery which brought state conventions into disrepute. In short, none of our devices for nomination — caucus, convention, or primary — can be considered perfect or even fool-proof. It is a question, however, what other device might work better.

IV

Party Behavior

Leadership in Group and Party

The Practice of Politics

"In all assemblies and groups and organized bodies of men," wrote Viscount Bryce, "from a nation down to the committee of a club, direction and decisions rest in the hands of a small percentage, less and less in proportion to the larger and larger size of the body, till in a great population it becomes an infinitesimally small proportion of the whole number. This is and always has been true of all forms of government, though in different degrees."¹ The necessity for leadership has been recognized by writers on politics from Plato and Aristotle to Harold Laski. There is general agreement with Bryce's view that leadership inevitably concentrates in a few hands; Bryce thought that even the nominal autocrat, such as Caesar or Napoleon, found his governing actually reduced to "selecting those who are to govern in his name." In an aristocracy the leaders are selected from and govern for the privileged class; in a democracy they may rise from any part of the population, but ideally these few govern for the benefit of the many, in whom sovereignty resides. Democracy, even in its simplest forms, such as the New England town meeting, contemplates leadership, though the degree and kind of responsibility of the leader to the led will differ with differing forms of government, custom, party, and group power. The never-ending problem of popular government is the solution of the question of authority versus responsibility: the selection and the control of leaders.

¹ James Bryce, *Modern Democracies* (1921), vol. 2, p. 542; cf. William B. Munro, *Personality in Politics* (1934 edition), pp. 89-92. Harold Lasswell makes the point in his *Power and Personality* (1948), p. 110, that this famous passage of Bryce's is not to be construed to mean that democratic government is rule by an élite, but that democratic leadership is possible as long as the selection of leaders is upon a community-wide basis.

GROUP LEADERSHIP

"The thread of governance runs through all the web of social life," wrote Professor Charles E. Merriam, and private groups within the political state "have their own bureaucracies, their own factions or parties, their own leaders and demagogues, their own politics — petty or noble."¹ With appropriate but minor differences a leader of a group behaves like a political leader, and the larger the group the closer the resemblance. The tactics, for instance, of a man seeking to become national commander of the American Legion are markedly like those of a man seeking his party's nomination for President. "A close scrutiny of such [non-party] groups leads to the conclusion that the social and psychological factors involved in the genesis of leadership are essentially the same in the case of a group built about a non-political interest as in the political party."² As our society becomes more and more complex, groups increasingly find that their objectives can be attained only through some political action. Their leadership, therefore, is more and more like the leadership of politicians. Indeed, a high position in a veterans' organization has for generations been a way to political leadership. Congressman James E. van Zandt of Pennsylvania is a contemporary example: he moved into party politics from being commander-in-chief of the Veterans of Foreign Wars.

LEADER AND LEADERSHIP DEFINED

The terms *leader* and *leadership* are variously defined. "A leader is a person who exerts special influence over a number of people."³ "Whoever . . . can sway the minds and wills of the sovereign people becomes a leader."⁴ Paul Pigors distinguishes leadership from domination: "Leadership is a process of mutual stimulation which, by the successful interplay of relevant individual differences, controls human energy in the pursuit of a common cause," whereas "Domination is a process of social control in which accepted superiors assume a position of command and demand obedience from those who acknowledge themselves as inferiors in the social scale."⁵ Many writers follow this distinction and insist

¹ *Public and Private Government* (1944), pp. 2, 7.

² Richard Schmidt, "Leadership," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 9, p. 285.

³ Emory S. Bogardus, *Leaders and Leadership* (1934), p. 3.

⁴ Bryce, *op. cit.*, p. 552.

⁵ *Leadership or Domination* (1935), pp. 16, 48.

that when an individual holds a position of such influence that others must obey him, not because of choice, but because of coercion, convention, custom, economic pressure, or law, such an individual is not a true leader but a representative of authority, a symbol of status.¹ Military commanders, heads of business concerns, college presidents, and political bosses would not under such a definition be *bona-fide* leaders, and the members of their groups would not be followers but subordinates.

A further distinction is frequently made between a leader and a demagogue. The leader is said to be a person who influences the behavior of others by means of types of persuasion that involve an element of rational and free choice, whereas a person who rules primarily by means of irrational, emotional, or symbolic appeals is a demagogue or agitator.² The distinction, however, is likely to depend upon the attitudes or interests of the observer. Bryan, for example, was regarded by the agrarian Democrats as "the peerless leader," but by the Gold Democrats as a complete demagogue. There is an element of demagogy in all leadership, because emotions affect all attitudes.³

The commander, the leader, and the demagogue are frequently mingled in the same person, who will use the tactics or the authority that seem to him appropriate to attain his objective. "In the specific instance the conceptual distinctions between leadership, the exercise of authority, and demagogy of course tend to become attenuated; one phenomenon may easily pass into another in the course of a single sequence of events."⁴ The career of Franklin D. Roosevelt might provide many examples of each conception; for instance, in his removal of Jesse Jones from his Cabinet to make room for Henry Wallace, he acted the commander; in his famous appeal in his first inaugural, the leader; and in his attack upon the mythical firm of "Martin, Barton, and Fish," the demagogue. Leadership, whatever its specific aspects, "is personal social control."⁵

¹ Schmidt, *op. cit.*, p. 282.

² See, for example, Sigmund Neuman, *Permanent Revolution* (1942), pp. 44-47, and A. Barratt Brown, *Democratic Leadership* (1938), pp. 16-17.

³ A special or separate type of leadership arising out of pre-eminent achievement, such as leadership in some school of art or in scientific discovery, is sometimes distinguished. If this influence be leadership, it may extend long beyond the life of the leader. See, for example, Mapheus Smith, "Leadership, the Management of Social Differentials," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, vol. 30 (October, 1935), p. 348.

⁴ Schmidt, *op. cit.*, p. 282.

⁵ Floyd H. Allport, *Social Psychology* (1924), p. 419. There is an extensive literature on leaders and leadership. For bibliographies see Bogardus, Pigors, Schmidt, *op. cit.*, and Bruce L. Smith, Harold D. Lasswell, and R. D. Casey, *Propaganda, Communica-*

LEADERS AND FOLLOWERS

The relationship of the leader to his group or party is complex. In most group and party situations there is a hierarchy of leadership, so that usually the leader is himself at once follower (or subordinate) and leader. A city chairman, for example, may be the leader of his party in his municipality while he is the follower of the county or state leader, and he, in turn, is a follower of a President of their party. The same relationship may be noted within pressure groups that have local chapters, county and state departments, and a national organization. In many non-party groups the exact relationship of one leader to another cannot be ascertained by an outsider, but the hierarchy is obvious.

The degrees of responsibility of the leader to his group or party will vary from none to complete responsibility. The owner of a business, for example, is not responsible to his clerks. At the other extreme, a county chairman selected by the direct primary is entirely responsible to the party members who vote, and they may depose him if they disapprove of his leadership. Responsibility is further affected by law or custom in that the leader may be bound by a charter, a constitution, a platform, resolutions or referenda, by a committee, council, or board of trustees, or in other ways. Few if any leaders are free to do entirely as they please, although there is an observable tendency for them to obtain wider freedom of action the bigger the group.

Leadership is a process of integration, for the leader seeks to focus the interests or desires of his followers into some goal that is socially attainable. In doing this he may only carry on long-established policies, as any leader of the Anti-Saloon League would be bound to do. In this sense he is a representative or symbolic leader. Or he may urge his group or party into new paths or toward different goals, as Franklin Roosevelt — elected to reduce public expenditures — soon took his party in the direction of social and welfare legislation that cost billions of dollars. The party, moreover, followed his change of direction with great enthusiasm. This type of leadership has been variously called creative or dynamic.

The leader is at once the creature of an opinion in the minds of his public and the creator of that opinion. "Issues do not propound them-

tion, and Public Opinion: A Comprehensive Reference Guide (1946). All texts on social psychology have some discussion of leadership; the treatment differs with the schools of psychology to which the authors belong.

selves. Programs of public policy are not self-created. Campaign funds do not drop from the clouds. A consensus of opinion among multitudes on any matter is not spontaneous but has to be wrought by the sweat of somebody's brow. Leaders, of one sort or another, must direct the process."¹ In general it will be found that leaders combine deference to the will of their publics with efforts to change that will.

Whatever the situation, leadership is seldom if ever complete. Even though the majority may follow, there is almost always a dissident minority.

Nothing the leader can do will attract them; they are unco-operative, some because of desires to lead, others because of inertia or stubbornness, and others because their tendencies are antisocial. An almost infinite variety of personalities faces the leader of large groups. Some people are very suggestible, others very tough-minded. Some take an interest in a plan; others are apathetic.²

Differences of economic interest may also prevent a complete integration of the group. A leader of a chamber of commerce, for example, will find it impossible to satisfy both the importers and the men engaged in tariff-protected industries. Farmers and laborers have interests sufficiently diverse so that attempts to form them into one party have been unsuccessful. There may be problems within a group that no leadership can completely resolve.

QUALITIES NECESSARY FOR LEADERSHIP

It is the individual differences among people that make some and not others leaders. Certain qualities may be observed which appear to be so necessary that without them an individual cannot be expected to attain or consolidate a position of leadership; other qualities appear to be useful but not indispensable. Once the student of politics knows what these qualities are generally considered to be, the observation of persons in group or party activities in order to detect these attributes may enable him to predict the success or failure of a would-be leader and perhaps of the objectives of his group. It is not necessary for a leader to possess all the qualities, but he must possess some of them.³

¹ Munro, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

² Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 351.

³ Ordway Tead, *The Art of Leadership* (1935), pp. 82-114, distinguishes ten qualities that he believes to be necessary. Other writers list varying numbers of traits and give them different names.

GLANDULAR BASIS OF LEADERSHIP

Perhaps most fundamental to the personality factors that make for leadership are the various endocrine glands. "To the extent that they overstimulate or fail to stimulate the organism, the activity or energy of a person is involved, and his leadership achievement is directly affected."¹ Glandular endowment, while affected by disease and environment, is hereditary, so that the rise of such leaders as Jackson and Lincoln from what might be considered unpromising ancestry may come primarily from the fortuitous combination of an extraordinary glandular balance. When the glandular balance is upset, "an otherwise capable leader may go to pieces," says Bogardus, unless and until it is restored. Leaders like Bryan and Theodore Roosevelt may have owed their unusual drive and energy more to their glands than to their ideas. The whole subject of the effect of glands upon personality is being examined by biologists and psychologists; as evidence is accumulated, students of political behavior may be able to understand better the phenomena of leadership as they are affected by purely fortuitous biological inheritance.

HEALTH AND STRENGTH

The varying physical endowments among men undoubtedly affect their capacity for leadership.² Some men may rise above crippling physical handicaps, as Franklin Roosevelt did, and indeed physical weakness or small size may lead a person to seek power as a means of compensation. But the competition among leaders is usually so keen, and the necessary amount of physical and nervous energy so great, that the usual rule must be that only men with extraordinary physical equipment rise to positions of highest leadership. Certain diseases or accidents may make leadership impossible. In comparing four outstanding American party leaders — Lincoln, Bryan, Wilson, and Theodore Roosevelt — Charles E. Merriam noted, among other factors, the physical equipment that made their leadership possible. In this respect Merriam found that Bryan excelled the others:

Throughout life Bryan was gifted with tremendous physical vitality. . . . He maintained a high degree of physical fitness. He displayed unrivaled

¹ Bogardus, *op. cit.*, p. 43. See also E. A. S. Shaffer, *The Endocrine Organs* (1924), and H. S. Jennings, *The Biological Basis of Human Nature* (1930).

² See Harold Lasswell, *Power and Personality* (1948), pp. 27-30 and 112-118.

capacity for the stress and strain of political campaigns, and for political contacts of all sorts. His remarkable campaign of 1896 eclipsed all previous records in number of speeches and in persons reached. This untiring energy was evident throughout a generation of strenuous endeavor which would have torn most men to tatters, but which left the Nebraskan undisturbed and unruffled. In a country as large as the United States his sheer strength and endurance were unquestionably significant factors in his political fortunes.¹

INTELLIGENCE

In addition to health and strength, the leader must have greater intellectual ability than his followers if he is to rise above them. This difference, however, must not be too great. The expert, the man of extraordinary intellect, or the genius, is likely to be distrusted by the rank and file. Webster and Wilson were thus distrusted, and Bryce asserted that British parties likewise "seldom cared to bring into Parliament men who could serve the party by intellect, preferring the local wealthy man who, not liable to the aberrations of youth and originality, could be trusted to give a steady and, if possible, a silent vote."² The sneers at the "brain trust" of the administration of Franklin Roosevelt had their origins in the dislike of the mentally inferior for the superior. Even among children, where the habits of leaders are formed, the child of extraordinary intelligence must not be too far above his fellows, or they will refuse to follow him and instead will follow someone only slightly above them.³

The man of marked intellectual ability must, if he is to attain or main-

¹ *Four American Party Leaders* (The Macmillan Company, 1926), p. 65. The leadership of Woodrow Wilson, on the other hand, suffered, says Merriam, from the fact that "physical weakness shadowed him through much of his later life, especially during the last ten years of it. Although vigorous and energetic, he did not possess the rugged endurance and vitality of any of the other leaders here discussed" (p. 46).

² *Op. cit.*, p. 556.

³ L. S. Hollingworth in *Gifted Children* (1926), p. 131, observes that among children the intelligence of the leader is related to that of the followers "in a fairly predictable manner. . . . Among children with a mean IQ of 100 the IQ of the leader is likely to fall between 115 and 130. That is, the leader is likely to be more intelligent, *but not too much more intelligent*, than the average of the group led. . . . Above 130 IQ, however, the chances of leadership . . . appear to decrease till, beyond IQ of 160, a child has little chance of being a popular leader." The author cites a case of a boy with an IQ of 190 who, in the fifth grade of a public school, never exercised any leadership. When, however, he was placed in a special school among children whose average IQ was 164, he immediately became their leader. See also John E. Bentley, *Superior Children* (1937), pp. 259-265.

tain leadership, be very careful of the ways in which he reveals his superiority. Woodrow Wilson, who was impatient with callers whose ideas did not quickly focus or whose facts were not in order, did not always do this. On one occasion he remarked that he thought the sincerest flattery that a visitor could pay him would be to assume that the President understood a simple statement the first time it was expressed. Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt were also men of unusual intellect, but they were better schooled in politics than Wilson and were willing to listen to anyone, no matter how dull. If the leader cannot suffer fools gladly, he must at least suffer them patiently. Otherwise he will get a reputation for aloofness and superciliousness which will injure his leadership.

EDUCATION

"If you have been to college," said Plunkitt, "so much the worse for you."¹ There is an uncertain amount of this anti-intellectualism in American politics. Just as the man of extraordinary intellect is distrusted, so is the person of more than average education. A precinct politician can put the same scorn into the words *professor* or *doctor* that Roscoe Conkling could put into the word *reform*. The uneducated or the poorly educated feel a sense of inferiority or insecurity in the presence of the educated, and this feeling is often rationalized by asserting that a college graduate is a bookworm, a dreamer, or an impractical idealist. "He never met a payroll or carried a precinct," was Senator Guy Gillette's most damning condemnation.

The opposition to leaders with formal education is strongest at the lower levels of politics and diminishes the higher a leader gets. A college education is probably a handicap in establishing ward, town, or county leadership, but — as shown by the election of lawyer-legislators — it begins to decrease at the state levels. College graduates form a majority of state legislators, state chairmen, governors, members of Congress and Presidents. Probably opposition to educated leadership is now sufficiently diminished with the widespread attendance at colleges so that a would-be political leader is well advised to get all the education he can. But while an uneducated man may still use his lack of education as an argument in urging his partisans to support him — "I am a plain dirt farmer," or "I am a graduate only of the school of hard knocks" — the educated man dare not make any similar appeal, mentioning his degrees or years of

¹ William L. Riordan, *Plunkitt of Tammany Hall* (1905), p. 46.

study. Some educated politicians have carefully cultivated ungrammatical usages to establish an appearance of commonness. At the least, the college graduate should, as Heywood Broun said, carry his crudition like a gentleman if he wants to succeed in American politics.

AMBITION

Whether it arises from glandular equipment, from other physical or intellectual factors, or from environment, a person must have ambition if he is to be a leader in a group or in party politics. Usually this ambition develops at a very early age — in a young Beveridge declaiming political speeches along a railroad track, in a Bryan going at sixteen alone to St. Louis to attend his first national convention, in the schoolboy Wilson writing on his cards, “Thomas Woodrow Wilson, Senator from Virginia.” “The desire for applause is natural, the desire for influence not abnormal, the seeking of public preferment and public office desperately human.”¹ The ambition is necessary to the long hard work of building up a following, of mastering the details of government and politics, of sustaining political defeat and yet trying again and again. When he is partway up the ladder, ambition is necessary to sustain a leader-to-be through the countless hours of political talk and negotiation. Most highly successful leaders have had ambition to the degree of drive, so that they would force themselves to the very limit of their physical powers. Theodore Roosevelt is an outstanding example. Qualities of dominance are probably inseparable in most such men from their desire to establish leadership. Now and then, perhaps, office seeks the man, and group and party entreat some reluctant leader; but if he is really reluctant he is likely not to be an effective leader against opponents. A better possibility would be the ambitious man who seeks to displace the less vigorous, less effective existing leader.

COURAGE

A quality associated with ambition is courage. The timid, fearful, hesitating person is not likely to rise in political leadership. Physical courage, such as that shown by Jackson, Lincoln, and Theodore Roosevelt, is often necessary, especially in rough constituencies. The courage necessary to add another mortgage to one's home in order to raise money for a political

¹ Job Hedges, *Common Sense in Politics* (1910), p. 66.

fight, to risk reputation or security by getting into a campaign, is an everyday necessity for political leaders, great and small. It is almost as common in group politics.

SENSITIVITY TO GROUP OR PARTY OPINION

"The leader," wrote Professor Merriam, "leads not because he is entirely different from the others but because he is much like the others and may symbolize and fuse their aspirations and desires."¹ He has to have a feeling for the opinion of his followers, whether they make up the American Medical Association, the voters of the First Ward, or the people of the United States. A man who lacks this sensitivity is not likely to be a very successful leader. Herbert Hoover seemed to lack it, but Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt had it to an amazing degree. The leader may, within limits, influence the opinions of his followers, but he cannot ignore them except at grave risk to his leadership. While he is making his own way up, he is likely not to make very great attempts to influence his group's opinions.

WILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE

Most successful political leaders are not of the stuff of which martyrs are made; they show no willingness to die rather than to retreat a single inch. "If you can't lick 'em, jine 'em," has been attributed to various American politicians. Willingness to compromise need not go that far, but there must be some compromises, or group and party politics would be impossible. Everybody cannot go through the same door at once; the taxpayers' league and the teachers' association cannot both be completely satisfied. The essence of successful leadership is the adjustment of conflicts, not the winning of battles. An astute party leader hates a primary fight, even though he knows he can win it, because it is sure to make enemies, to weaken the unity of the party. A dearly bought harmony is usually better than a hard-fought victory. There is a point, perhaps of principle, perhaps where his leadership is threatened, beyond which a leader cannot compromise. Then he must fight, and fight with all the courage and resources he has. But until that point is reached, the successful leader does everything he can to achieve a workable "deal."

Reformers are frequently contrasted with politicians on this willingness

¹ Charles E. Merriam, *Systematic Politics* (1945), p. 107.

to compromise, and perhaps it is this quality that distinguishes the one from the other. William Lloyd Garrison was clearly the reformer; he was determined to end slavery everywhere in the United States by any means he could use. Lincoln before Fort Sumter was willing to compromise by leaving slavery in the South, while preventing its further spread. Both were leaders, but Lincoln has come to be generally regarded as the greater. Philosophers and theologians may dispute whether the better does not defeat the best, but the successful leader must usually advance himself and his cause by one compromise after another. "It is better to accept an inadequate housing law than to hold out for something that is unattainable and get nothing at all. It is wiser to go out for a single new playground, and get it, than to insist upon a 'comprehensive plan of public recreation facilities' and get nowhere."¹

QUALITIES USEFUL TO THE LEADER

If the qualities that have been mentioned are so necessary to leadership as to be almost indispensable, others may be observed which are perhaps not essential but highly useful. Leaders have arisen, however, who did not possess all or even most of these helpful attributes. A whole group of these traits, associated with the devices of propaganda, have already been discussed in this book. Among these are facility at organization, a flair for the dramatic, the ability to speak and write effectively, and the use of symbolism. Some other useful traits are worth mentioning.

POLITICAL IMAGINATION AND INVENTIVENESS

The leader needs a certain inventiveness and resourcefulness which may be described as political imagination. He needs these qualities especially if his group or party is not in a strong majority position, or if its objectives are not fully formulated or institutionalized. In a much-cited and often-quoted section of his *Public Opinion*, Walter Lippmann stressed this need for the invention of policy:

Leaders often pretend that they have merely uncovered a program which existed in the minds of their public. When they believe it, they are usually deceiving themselves. Programs do not invent themselves synchronously in a multitude of minds. That is not because a multitude of

¹ Munro, *op. cit.*, p. 36. See also J. T. Salter, *Public Men* (1946), pp. 460-463.

minds is necessarily inferior to that of the leaders, but because thought is the function of an organism, and a mass is not an organism. . . .

[The leader] identifies himself with the familiar attitudes of his audience. . . . Finding that he is trustworthy, the multitude milling hither and thither may turn in towards him. He will then be expected to set forth a plan of campaign.¹

And yet it can certainly be said that few political ideas are identifiable as being clearly the result of one man's thought. Rather, political inventiveness may be sufficient if it produces a new synthesis or brings old ideas to bear upon new situations. Bryan was extraordinarily successful among American politicians at redefining and reworking the ideas of Grangers, Greenbackers, Populists, and Socialists into a combination which he could use in the formation of his leadership. The ideas of the New Deal were not uniquely the invention of Franklin Roosevelt or Henry Wallace or the brain trust; rather, they were ideas current in the public domain of politics. What is often said to be political shrewdness may be no more than the acceptance of an old idea at an appropriate time, or the astute synthesis of various old ideas into a group or party program.

HUMANENESS, SYMPATHY

Another valuable quality in a leader is personal warmth. Few successful leaders are cold, frigid, distant men who hold themselves remote from their followers. Cleveland and Wilson had this reputation, but Wilson, at least, had to husband his physical strength very carefully, and probably his reputation for coldness was not entirely deserved. Humaneness and sympathy, such as were shown by Blaine, Bryan, Farley, Lincoln, and both Roosevelts, are necessary if the leader is to develop personal devotion to himself among his followers. An attention to the welfare of individual followers, the satisfaction of the many little wants of many people, builds up the prestige of the leader. It is flattering to followers for a leader to remember their names. James A. Farley, among recent political leaders, was notable for the thousands of names he knew. The use of first names and nicknames gives the followers a further sense of unity with the leader. Memory, of course, can be cultivated, and many politicians consciously fix details in their minds, writing down each day the names, addresses, and family circumstances of people they have met. The endless hand-

¹ Pages 243-244.

shaking that goes on in politics, the baby-kissing, cornerstone-laying, funeral-going, the sending of wedding presents and letters of congratulation are all part of building up in the group a feeling that the leader is a sympathetic and humane person. The behavior known as "coddling the voters" or "nursing constituents" is part of the same process.¹ Many politicians have found that a knowledge of a foreign language is useful. The late Senator George Moses of New Hampshire, for instance, was able to woo many voters of French-Canadian origin away from their normal Democratic allegiance because he could speak their native tongue, and Vito Marcantonio endears himself to the voters of East Harlem by being able to discuss their wants with them in Italian, Spanish, or Yiddish.

An older leader will often tell an ambitious younger one, "Get out and meet people; develop a wide acquaintance." Political leaders do, and they attend as many church suppers, clambakes, corn roasts, outings, and picnics as they can. Harold Burton developed his leadership in Cleveland in part by faithfully working the banquet and luncheon circuit: "He often attended two or three banquets a night. It came to be said of him, paraphrasing the Bible, 'wherever two or three were gathered, there was Burton.'"² Most political and many group leaders are great joiners of fraternal and social organizations, lodges, and clubs. They thus both develop their reputation for commonness and extend the scope of their acquaintanceship. In many a close campaign a man has won for no more profound reason than that he has shaken more thousands of hands and smiled at more thousands of people than his opponent. There is no doubt that such activities are more successful if the leader has a genuine liking for people, a real gregariousness; but if he hasn't, it can be simulated. The "new Dewey" publicity after 1940 was an obvious attempt to create a new stereotype that Thomas E. Dewey was more than a cold, driving prosecutor.

ABILITY TO READ AND ASSIMILATE RAPIDLY

The ability to read rapidly and to assimilate quantities of political and economic information is a useful trait, particularly for persons who aspire

¹ For interesting examples see Arthur F. Mullen's account of "Many Platforms Kincaid," *Western Democrat* (1940), p. 126; Riordan, *op. cit.*, pp. 170-174, for Plunkitt's day's work; Richard H. Rovere, "Vito Marcantonio: Machine Politician New Style," *Harper's Magazine*, vol. 188 (April, 1944), p. 395.

² Richard L. Maher in *Our Fair City*, Robert S. Allen, editor, Vanguard Press (1947), p. 140.

to the broadest leadership. Both Theodore and Franklin Roosevelt had this capacity, but all leaders have it in varying degrees. La Guardia was said to be a walking encyclopedia of New York City affairs, and Al Smith knew the state just as thoroughly. Most politicians are careful students of election statistics. These abilities, like a memory, may be cultivated by the ambitious leader.

THE GAMBLER'S ATTITUDE

A successful leader will usually possess some of the traits of a gambler. If he wins, fine; if not, he will try again. Meanwhile, American mores seem to require that he must not sulk at defeat. He must be "a good sport." Under these conditions American voters do not usually lose faith in a leader. Bryan, for instance, was always defeated in his attempts to win the presidency, but he had millions of followers to the day of his death. An American political leader should have a certain fatalism in his make-up, because he must realize that landslides and other political circumstances over which he has no control may produce a crushing defeat, no matter what his record has been.

SOME TACTICS OF LEADERSHIP

In making the most of his traits of leadership, the ambitious man will utilize the tactics appropriate to his social situation. Some of these have been discussed; others perhaps deserve separate mention. Many tactics are negative; that is, the leader must know what not to do as well as what to do. There is a strong feeling among politicians that people vote as much against as for a leader, so that he should never offend his followers unnecessarily.

THE BUILD-UP OF PRESTIGE

The would-be leader must build up his own prestige with his group, but he should not appear to be dictatorial or domineering. He may in fact possess — and perhaps should possess — strong traits of dominance, but he ought to cover them with the appearance of fairness and reasonableness. Subordinates like to be consulted, and even if the leader disregards their advice, his listening to them preserves their self-esteem although he may have no intention of doing what they want.

FREEDOM FROM ENMITY

A hard lesson for a leader to learn is that he should not hold enmities. Persons with the drive and qualities of dominance necessary for leadership are too likely to be vindictive. Conkling's hatred of Blaine, for instance, was so great that he was willing to see the Republican Party defeated rather than come to Blaine's assistance. Theodore Roosevelt's hatred of Wilson was so intense that he disregarded his own promise to preserve the Progressive Party and campaigned for Hughes in 1916, leaving his supporters of 1912 in a hopeless position. As a result of this action, his leadership of this group was lost.

IDENTIFICATION WITH THE GROUP

The leader ought not to do anything that will have the appearance of setting him off from his group. He should not offend the religious customs or the sexual conventions of his followers. In many American states a divorce will injure leadership beyond repair, and a divorce is an almost insuperable difficulty for a candidate for President. Astute leaders must be careful not to wear articles of dress that appear to set them above their followers; one of the reasons for the defeat of John Purroy Mitchel, by all accounts one of the best mayors New York City ever had, was the gibe that he was "the head of a 'swallow tail' administration."¹ Wendell Willkie never sufficiently identified himself with the Republican Party to obtain the full confidence of the organization; he even betrayed his Democratic background by a slip of the tongue in a speech to the convention that nominated him when he said, "So *you* Republicans, I call upon you to join me."² One of the dangers to leadership of independence in politics is that if the leader leaves his party to join the opposition, he is not really accepted for years, and he cannot return to his old party without more years of probation.

BIPARTISAN UNDERSTANDINGS

This is not to say that opponents in the other party should be regarded as complete enemies. Bipartisan understandings and agreements are

¹ Munro, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

² For further discussion of Willkie's difficulties in identifying himself with the Republican Party see *Public Men*, J. T. Salter, editor (1946), pp. 64-65. Willkie at the time of his nomination was listed in *Who's Who* as a Democrat, and he was a member of a Tammany Democratic Club. These facts were hard for Republicans to forget and forgive.

common in American politics, and in group politics alliances are an every day occurrence. As Plunkitt said, "Me and the Republicans are enemies just one day in the year — election day."¹ At other times they got jobs for each other's adherents and traded various favors. This kind of dealing may impress a leader's adherents with his shrewdness and influence; what he must not do is to lose his own identity with his party.

OPPORTUNISM

A successful leader needs to be opportunistic — to be ready to take advantage of any breaks that come his way. If a leader higher up dies or gets in trouble, the aspirant should be ready to move at once to take advantage of the situation. He may even be able to capitalize upon his own injuries; one minor politician of the author's acquaintance was unbeatable after he lost his arms in an accident. Mayor James M. Curley of Boston effectively used the fact of his conviction for impersonating another man in a civil service examination as a campaign argument. Indeed, he was successful in utilizing his various convictions to build up in his followers a sympathy for him as the persecuted leader.

NEED FOR AN OCCUPATION BESIDES POLITICS

Non-party group leadership may offer a person a livelihood with sufficient security so that the leader needs no other occupation. Edward A. O'Neal, for example, made a career of his leadership in the American Farm Bureau Federation, just as William Green and John L. Lewis did of labor leadership, and Walter White of Negro leadership. Men spend their entire lives as secretaries of chambers of commerce or managers of trade associations. Political leadership, however, has so many uncertainties that most men find they need another occupation to fall back upon. The practice of the law seems among all the professions to mix most readily with politics; next, perhaps, is that of real estate and insurance brokerage. Teaching and the practice of dentistry and medicine, on the other hand, do not lead easily to a political career. The teacher cannot readily leave his students, nor the dentist or doctor his patients, to attend committee meetings, to go on campaign trips, or to travel to the state capitol or to Washington on errands for members of their parties. Men who give up these professions for politics hazard re-establishing them-

¹ Riordan, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

selves in case of defeat. Professions or occupations that require frequent change of residence or long absences from home are impossible to combine with a career as a political leader. An occupation that identifies a man with high finance is undesirable for political leadership. Preachers, priests, rabbis, and other religious leaders often have wide influence, even outside their groups, but in the United States they have not been successful at first-hand party leadership.

CUSTOMS AND USAGES OF POLITICS

American politics has in it a whole array of customs and usages which an ambitious leader must learn and which he may violate only at his peril. Some are national, and others differ from state to state; some are affirmative and some negative. To newspaper writers and other commentators the politician's adherence to many of these customs appears to be ridiculous, not to say hypocritical, but to the practitioner of politics they are a sort of common law of political behavior, not always approved or even understood, but to be obeyed nonetheless. Only a few of the more common of these usages can be cited here by way of illustration.

For instance, there is the pretense that an aspiring leader is seeking a position, not because of his own ambition, but because of the pressure from his friends. Such statements may be issued in such a form as, "In response to thousands of letters, telegrams, and visits from members of the party in every county in the state, I have decided to allow my name to be considered for state chairman." When former Governor Harold Stassen announced in 1946 that he was seeking the Republican nomination for President in 1948, he violated this custom. Governor Dewey carefully did not. Instead, an obvious pre-convention tour in the summer of 1947 to line up delegates was carefully disguised as a vacation in the West for his sons.

Another custom is that of refusing to commit oneself on an issue until the issue has been fully clarified, or until silence becomes more embarrassing than comment. Calvin Coolidge, one of the most talkative of American Presidents, established a reputation as "Silent Cal" because he did not say anything if he could avoid it on controversial matters. In the campaign of 1924 Bryan attacked him in whole speeches over the issues on which Coolidge had been silent. But while he spoke frequently on other matters, Coolidge remained silent on these issues. In 1947 Senator Robert A. Taft publicly complained about Governor Thomas E.

Dewey's silence on national questions, but the governor by his refusals to commit himself was showing his political astuteness. Every public man must make many public addresses, especially on ceremonial occasions. But, lest he get himself involved in endless and unnecessary controversies, he must, as Frank R. Kent said, cultivate "the art of seeming to say something without doing so."¹

The pressure of business upon most men in positions of party leadership is so great that few of them can prepare their own speeches. The best that most can do is to go over drafts of speeches written for them by others — "ghost writers" — before the texts are released to the press. Woodrow Wilson was an exception; he drafted his speeches in shorthand and typed them himself on his own typewriter. Yet even though the leader has had little or nothing to do with the preparation of his speeches, the pretense is maintained that he wrote them himself.

When a man is seeking the first place in some race for leadership, he customarily will not admit that he might accept second place. He must maintain until his cause is clearly hopeless the pretense that he will be first or nothing. To admit that he would serve as vice-chairman, lieutenant-governor, or Vice-President reveals a want of confidence in his own resources and points the way for his followers to desert him. Even when men are really out for second place they announce that they want only the first, and with a show of reluctance give in for what they sought all the time. John Nance Garner's campaign for the presidency in 1932 was an example. He and his supporters must have known that no party would nominate a candidate for President from the Solid South, but a campaign for President might line up enough delegates to bargain for second place. And so it turned out.

The "spontaneous" gathering of crowds to wish a man well when he leaves for the national convention where he hopes to attain the leadership of some organization, the testimonial dinners, rallies, parades, and demonstrations are other customs of politics. They are all ostensibly informal and voluntary, though actually they are almost always carefully planned, and the leader and his lieutenants use every appropriate device of persuasion to stage them.

It is part of the common law of politics that political leaders do not refer to themselves as politicians. Rather, they like to call themselves plain businessmen, lawyers, farmers, or whatever is appropriate, men who

¹ *Political Behavior* (1928), p. 73. This book discusses many other tactics of politics, particularly those used in Maryland.

are interested in politics because somebody had to be in order to improve conditions. Indeed, some politicians have made capital out of carefully planned attacks on "the politicians."¹

IMPORTANCE OF LUCK AND CIRCUMSTANCE

The most superlative qualities of leadership and the most astute of tactics will not always suffice. "It is often said that every country has the leaders, like the newspapers, which it deserves. This is not altogether true. Fortune takes a hand in the game, and takes it for evil as well as for good. . . . That which we call chance . . . has had more to do with the course of events than the builders of scientific history have generally liked to recognize."²

An endless variety of chance factors affects the establishment of leadership. Membership in most groups is necessary to leadership in them; a non-veteran could not be a leader in the American Legion. Birth in racial groups is necessary for a leader in them, and a certain color will bar leadership in others. A Catholic could not expect to become mayor of Dallas, nor a Protestant of Boston. The death of McKinley gave Theodore Roosevelt his great chance; in fact, a series of accidents had put him where he was. Wilson and Lincoln, until tragedy overtook them, seemed to be Fortune's favorites, to possess that quality of good luck that Napoleon demanded of his generals. Blaine, Bryan, Clay, Webster, and others, on the other hand, seemed to be favored only to the point where the last great goal was often in sight but never attainable.

Considerations of party strategy may put one man and not another into a position of leadership. The "dark horse" may get the nomination away from abler men, for reasons of sectional or personal politics. Even the nature of a man's opposition in his party may advance him. Thus it was said of Cleveland that "We love him for the enemies he has made." A mistake or failure by one party leader may cause his lieutenants to desert him and to unite behind another man who might otherwise never have had the opportunity. The desire of a party to bring in some group — veterans, for instance — may give an opportunity only for a leader who is a member of that group.

¹ In their eschewing the odious word *politician*, political leaders have, apparently, a sound feeling for what the American people think of politics as a career. A Gallup poll, published January 24, 1945, on the question, "If you had a son, would you like to see him go into politics as a life's work when he gets out of school?" found 21 per cent who said yes, 68 per cent who said no, 11 per cent undecided.

² Bryce, *op. cit.*, p. 559.

Accidental personal factors, such as an illness or absence from the country at a critical moment in a leader's progress, may injure his chances. Sufficient family income to permit him to obtain an education, especially a legal education, may be largely due to chance. Birth outside the country makes a man ineligible for the presidency.

Politicians realize that these and other elements of chance are of great importance in the development of leadership. They know that most of the factors are partially or wholly beyond their control. The best they can do is to exploit to the fullest extent the favorable factors and to hope that they can get into positions where Fortune will favor them and that they will be able to stay in those positions. In more formal language, leadership occurs when there is a conjuncture of social situation, personal, intellectual, and even physical traits, tactical skill, and sheer luck.

Bosses and Machines

SOMEONE is always predicting the end of the boss system. Walter Davenport called Boies Penrose "the last of the great bosses."¹ Writing at the end of World War I Professor Samuel P. Orth thought it improbable that "from the height of public devotion" reached during the war, "the nation would permit the return of the boss system."² Since the time when Orth and Davenport wrote, many bosses have flourished, among them Huey Long of Louisiana; Enoch ("Nocky") Johnson of Atlantic City; Edward H. Crump of Memphis and Tennessee; James, Michael, and Thomas J. Pendergast of Kansas City; William Hale Thompson, Anthony Cermak, Patrick A. Nash, and Edward J. Kelly of Chicago; Frank Hague of Jersey City; Edward J. Flynn of the Bronx; Harry F. Byrd of Virginia, and many others. Professor Pendleton Herring thought that he saw in the rise of the service state, which would provide the charity and welfare long extended by boss and machine, the doom of the boss. Pendergast, he wrote, "has rightly been called an anachronism in the political scene of today."³ But the bosses soon demonstrated how they could control the welfare and relief projects such as the WPA, with the result that they were not injured by the service state but thrived on it.⁴

Upon the occasions of the death of Michael ("Hinky Dink") Kenna of Chicago and the resignation of Frank Hague as mayor of Jersey City, the newspapers noted once more the passing of the boss system. The *New*

¹ *Power and Glory: the Life of Boies Penrose* (1931), p. v.

² *The Boss and the Machine* (1919), p. 188.

³ *The Politics of Democracy* (1940), p. 139.

⁴ For a more realistic view of Pendergast and the service state see William M. Reddig, *Tom's Town* (1947), especially pp. 182, 271, 330, 358.

York Times, for instance, solemnly published an article by Warren Moscow in its Sunday Magazine Section entitled, "Exit the Boss, Enter the Leader."¹

THE BOSS AND THE SYSTEM

PERSISTENCE OF THE SYSTEM

The system of boss and machine, so often pronounced to be moribund, nevertheless persistently refuses to die. Since the time of Aaron Burr, who is usually regarded as the first American boss, the bosses have come and gone, but the system has survived. Presidents have dealt with them, and the President of today deals with them, as Lincoln did with Simon Cameron and Thurlow Weed, as McKinley did with Mark Hanna, as Coolidge and Hoover did with the Vares, and as Franklin Roosevelt did with Ed Flynn, the O'Connells, Frank Hague, and Ed Kelly. President Truman owed his election to the United States Senate to Tom Pendergast and his nomination as Vice-President to the efforts of bosses. He used the remnants of the Pendergast machine to defeat Congressman Roger C. Slaughter of Missouri, and he maintained his personal membership and paid his dues to the Jackson County Democratic Club, the central unit of the Pendergast machine, of which he was for a time vice-president. He refused reappointment to United States District Attorney Maurice M. Milligan, who had been instrumental in sending Pendergast to the penitentiary. In his presidential campaigns of 1944 and 1948 Governor Dewey took into what he called his "team" (a group of intimate advisers) Edwin F. Jaeckle, boss of Buffalo and western New York. Robert S. Allen, writing the introduction to *Our Fair City*, published in 1947, paraphrased Lincoln Steffens's characterization of Philadelphia and applied it to the seventeen cities discussed in the book, all of which he called still "corrupt and content." In them he found "the same old story of boodling bosses and businessmen, of horrendous slums, of dirt and filth, disease and vice, of gross and shameless waste, of mismanagement and misrule, of crass disregard of human dignity."²

¹ June 22, 1947.

² Page 4. Other books on recent or contemporary bosses are H. T. Kane, *Louisiana Hayride* (1941), on Huey Long; Dayton D. McKean, *The Boss: the Hague Machine in Action* (1940); Charles Van Devander, *The Big Bosses* (1944); and Maurice M. Milligan, *The Inside Story of the Pendergast Machine* (1948).

BOSS AND MACHINE DEFINED

The Boss. The word *boss* used to designate a type of politician is of American origin. It is not an exact term, and when individual politicians are discussed, there will be general agreement that certain ones, such as Crump, Hague, or Penrose, are or were bosses; but there will be disagreement upon whether Byrd, Curley, and Dewey are bosses or leaders; and at the other extreme there will be agreement that such leaders as La Guardia, Alfred E. Smith, and James A. Farley were not bosses. As used here the term *boss* will be applied to political leaders who are chiefly interested in politics and political power as a business and whose interest, if any, in issues of public policy is incidental.¹ While there are bosses who have discussed issues, the issues are likely to have been absurd or fictitious ones, such as Thompson's running verbal fight with King George V of England or Hague's with a mythical railroad lobby.

The American boss partakes of the nature of a dictator: "We don't have politics in Memphis," Edward Crump is reported as saying, "We don't need politics in Memphis."² Frank Hague tapped on his own chest and asserted, "I decide — I do — me!"³ The boss is also essentially irresponsible. He governs without himself holding the public offices whose policies he controls. Indeed, many bosses, like the long succession of Tammany bosses, have held no offices at all. Where bosses have taken office, as Penrose, Platt, Hague, and Thompson did, their real power has come from their control of their party, not from their control of the machinery of government.

It was this irresponsibility of ruler to ruled that Elihu Root denounced as the "invisible government" in a famous passage in an address to the New York Constitutional Convention of 1915:

Then Mr. Platt ruled the state; for nigh upon twenty years he ruled it. It was not the governor; it was not the legislature; it was not any elected officers; it was Mr. Platt. And the capitol was not here; it was at 49 Broadway [New York City, office of the United States Express Company] with Mr. Platt and his lieutenants. It makes no difference what name you

¹ Cf. Charles E. Merriam and Harold F. Gosnell, *The American Party System* (3d edition, 1940), p. 172, "The boss is a political leader, local or state in range, who uses chiefly the weapons of patronage and spoils."

² Allen, *op. cit.*, p. 211. The *New York Times* on February 13, 1949, quoted with approval a description of Harry F. Byrd's Virginia state machine as "the most urbane and genteel dictatorship in America."

³ McKean, *op. cit.*, p. 270.

give, whether you call it Fenton or Conkling or Cornell or Arthur or Platt, or by the names of men now living. The ruler of the state during the greater part of the forty years of my acquaintance with the state government has not been any man authorized by the constitution or the law. . . . The party leader is elected by no one, accountable to no one, bound by no oath of office, removable by no one.¹

Penrose, supposed to have been one of the most astute of bosses, saw that control of the party came first. Walter Davenport reports him as saying to William Barnes of New York, "Bill, a wiser man than you — Governor Ben Odell of your own state — told me something years ago. He told me that when it came to deciding between losing an election and losing control of the party, lose the election. And, Bill, he was right, by God."² It was for this reason that Penrose led the Old Guard to refuse to compromise with Theodore Roosevelt in 1912, saying, "After the crash we can pick ourselves out of the wreck [and] in the reconstructed machine we'll ride back home." He preferred defeat for the party to loss of leadership in it to Theodore Roosevelt.

The Machine. The machine is a political organization controlled by a boss or composed of politicians who are primarily if not entirely interested in office and its perquisites as a means of livelihood. The machine is the business of politics. It is a kind of interest group.³

TYPES OF BOSSES

Rural Bosses. Bosses come in all sizes, from all areas, sections, and types of environment. There are rural bosses, such as Sheriff Birch Biggs of Polk County, Tennessee.⁴ Another long-established rural boss is "Cap'n Tom" Mathis of Ocean County, New Jersey. Many New England towns have their local bosses. The New England town meeting, commonly regarded as the very citadel of democracy, is in fact relatively easy for a boss to control. There are a number of reasons, but among them may be noted that there are rarely enough seats in the meeting-

¹ *Addresses on Government and Citizenship* (1916), p. 202.

² Davenport, *op. cit.*, p. 191.

³ Cf. Harvey Fergusson, *People and Power* (1947), p. 112, "All machines are organizations formed by politicians for the purpose of capturing and holding power in general and office in particular. A political machine, as such, has no more political principle than a crocodile."

⁴ See Van Devander, *op. cit.*, Chapter 7, pp. 167-191, entitled "Mailed Fist in Tennessee."

house for all of the voters of the town, and consequently the village boss needs only see to it that his adherents arrive early, get a majority of the seats, and remain. In addition, the systems of oral voting and voting by show of hands facilitate the use of economic pressures upon voters who oppose the wishes of the boss.¹ Although the literature on rural bosses is sparse, anyone who will make a first-hand study of country politics will discover the local bosses and machines for himself. For example, James West, in his sociological study of a middlewestern town, thus described the rural machines he found:

The county Democratic machine, called by a local agricultural expert, also a Democrat, "the worst racket in this county," is an extended family. All are farmers, and the wealthiest and most progressive farmers in the county. They live in separate neighborhoods, and no one thinks of them as a "clan," but they work together solidly for profit and political control. The banking family is somewhat similarly organized, and its members have large power in the county Republican machine.²

The rural bosses are probably fully as numerous as the city bosses, but they do not receive as much newspaper publicity, and not many books get written about them.

City Bosses. The bosses of the great cities are the ones most familiar to students of American history and politics — such men as William M. Tweed of New York, George Cox of Cincinnati, and Abraham ("Abe") Ruef of San Francisco. The ones mentioned were bosses of their cities, but there have been and are important bosses of wards or sections of cities, such as "Hinky Dink" Kenna and "Bath House" John Coughlin of the First Ward of Chicago, Martin Lomasney of the old Eighth Ward in Boston, or "Big Tim" Sullivan of the Bowery section of New York.³ Frequently the power of a city boss rests upon an alliance among ward bosses, plus an occasional boss of a racial or nationality group which cuts across ward lines; such a boss was Michael Scaturchio, boss of the Italians in the Hague machine.

¹ This use of economic pressures was fully described by Winston Churchill in his novel *Coniston* (1906) which is a fictionalized account of a real New Hampshire boss.

² James West (pseudonym of Carl Withers), *Plainville, U.S.A.* (Columbia University Press, 1945), p. 68.

³ For an account of Kenna and Coughlin see Lloyd Wendt and Herman Kogan, *Lords of the Levee* (1943); for Lomasney and Sullivan, see Harold Zink, *City Bosses in the United States* (1930), pp. 69-95; for Tammany, Gustavus Myers, *History of Tammany Hall* (2d edition, 1917).

State Bosses. The state-wide bosses have been less numerous but no less important than those who have controlled cities. Harry Byrd, Edward H. Crump, Huey Long, "Jim" Watson, Boies Penrose, and J. H. Roraback are recent examples. State bosses, in their turn, often depend upon city and local bosses who are loyal to them. As has been observed elsewhere in this book, state bosses tend to be United States senators because of the powers over patronage which senators possess. If a state boss decides not to go to the Senate himself — Crump, for instance — he needs to have a United States senator who will protect him against unfriendly appointments, particularly in the offices of United States district judge and district attorney. Crump long had such an ally in Senator Kenneth McKellar.

No National Bosses. The state bosses have never combined to establish a national boss. Marcus A. ("Mark") Hanna may have had such ambitions. He gave orders, according to Thomas Beer, to Secretary of State John Hay without consulting President McKinley, much as a city boss would call the chief of police without consulting the mayor. "This power, he told a friend, he would not exchange for the presidency. He was proud of it."¹ The death of McKinley ended any chance he might have had to establish himself as a national boss. Theodore Roosevelt was not unfriendly to Hanna, but he would not follow his orders. The immense powers residing in the presidency make a national boss unlikely, but it is not beyond the range of practical political possibilities that sometime either a state boss might arise who would be able to extend his power into other states — as Huey Long was doing when he was assassinated — until such a man became a national boss; or a group of state bosses might be able to elect or control a weak President or even a series of Presidents.

Bosses may also be distinguished — whatever the distinction is worth — between those who work their way up through an existing machine, such as Tammany Hall or the Philadelphia Republican organization, and those who, like Huey Long, establish or build up their own machines. There is no apparent difference either in the tactics used or in the results attained.

INFLUENCES BEHIND SOME BOSSES

A distinction that may be of more importance, however, is that which may be made between those bosses who rule in their own right, so to

¹ Thomas Beer, *Hanna* (1929), p. 234.

speak, through their personal control of or selection by a political machine, such as Tammany or the old Hendricks Club of Boston, and those who are selected by or responsible to some interest outside the political machine. The nature of the interest, or combination of interests, differs from city to city and from state to state. Over the years it may not be the same in any given locality, but it changes with shifts in population and industry.

Very often the power behind the boss may be a business, an industry, or a newspaper. In a small town it may be the First National Bank, a local factory, a mine, or — in the West — an irrigation company. Many examples of control by such an institution could be cited, such as the control of the Anaconda Copper Company over Butte, Montana, or of the steel companies over Birmingham. "The Big Boss," in Philadelphia, "may be a rich dilettante, such as Pew, or a professional such as the late Boies Penrose, Edwin H. 'Little Ed' Vare or William S. 'Brother Bill' Vare. In Philadelphia the Big Boss himself has bosses: the bankers, industrialists, and big businessmen whose money makes them a power. With few exceptions, these overlords live in political showplaces in lovely suburbs outside of, and not a part of, the city. . . . Frequently, the banker-businessmen bosses demonstrate their political power, as in the enactment of the Philadelphia wage tax." This "neat device was a one-and-one-half per cent tax to be collected at the source by checkoff and applicable to all Philadelphia workers no matter where they lived. However, the tax was not to apply to dividends. In other words, not to the unearned income of coupon clippers."¹

Vice and Crime. Organized vice, gambling, and crime constitute a business, albeit a special business, that frequently is overlord to a boss. The power of "Nocky" Johnson of Atlantic City rested upon his connection with vice and gambling. When he was tried for evading the full payment of his income tax, his defense was that the money did not come to him as personal income but as payments from the vice and gambling interests to the local Republican organization. He asserted that he was only a sort of broker, a middleman. The Pendergast machine in Kansas City also was associated with vice and gambling interests.² The Hague machine did not permit vice in Jersey City, but allegedly a large part of the income of the organization came from protected gambling, especially horseracing and the numbers game.

Like many other businesses, vice and gambling tend to be nonpartisan

¹ Thomas P. O'Neil in Allen, *op. cit.*, pp. 64-65.

² See Reddig, *op. cit.*, especially pp. 160-168.

and to support a boss of one party or the other without partiality, provided he gives the necessary protection. Walter C. Reckless traced the connections between the Thompson machine, which was Republican, and vice. The Morals Squad of the Chicago Police Department was abolished by Thompson at the behest of vice lords. In return for support in the Republican primary elections the "machine promised vice and gambling an open town." In 1928 "the police were implicated in an alleged \$5,000,000 fund which organized vice and crime on the South Side paid to the Thompson machine via the America First campaign organization to win the [Republican] primary election."¹ Protection during the Thompson administration was sold through the Eighteenth Ward William Hale Thompson Club, which took in more than a million dollars a year.² But with the defeat of Thompson, organized vice and crime turned to work with the Cermak Democratic organization, and later with Nash and Kelly.³ It has been said that nobody could be mayor of Chicago against the opposition of organized vice and gambling. Perhaps not, but at least no one in recent years seems to have tried.

Business and Bosses. Lincoln Steffens was inclined to think that there was always a business interest or a combination of businessmen behind each boss.⁴ This explanation is too simple. There have been many bosses who have been closely allied with business, Aldrich, Platt, Roraback, and others, but American society has too many complexities to permit us to assume that one interest always accounts for all bosses; and in point of fact some bosses, such as Hague and Long, have been feared and cordially hated by business and industry. Long owed most of his support not to businessmen, but to the back-country farmers of Louisiana. He said himself that he was supported by the "hillbillies, Cajuns, and sapsuckers." Hague and Curley (if Curley be called a boss) could not have remained in power except for the friendly relations between them and the Catholic Church; either of them could have been driven from power in a moment by its opposition. Both did many favors for the church. Hague was received by the Pope, and Curley the next night but one after he returned to Boston convicted of mail fraud was the principal speaker at a dinner sponsored by the Archbishop.⁵ David C. Stephenson was Republican

¹ Walter C. Reckless, *Vice in Chicago* (1933), pp. 77, 78.

² *Ibid.*, p. 91.

³ See Fletcher Dobyns, *The Underworld of American Politics* (1932), pp. 37, 141-186; and Van Devander, *op. cit.*, pp. 278-279.

⁴ See his *The Shame of the Cities* (1904); *The Struggle for Self-Government* (1906); and *Autobiography* (1931).

⁵ For Curley see Allen, *op. cit.*, p. 17; for Hague, see McKean, *op. cit.*, pp. 160-165.

boss of Indiana until in 1925 he began his life term in the penitentiary for homicide. His power rested upon his control of the Ku Klux Klan which in turn rested upon the Protestant Churches: "Approximately seven hundred clergymen were recruited as honorary members of the Klan in Indiana. One hundred of these churchmen were members of the inner circle which Stephenson used to handle all sorts of difficult problems."¹ David Beck, boss of Seattle, is satisfactory to business interests, but he holds power primarily because of the support of organized labor. Whatever the interest or combination of interests that may back a boss, if he is dependent upon them for support he does not have the same security of tenure that he has when he can rely upon a well-established machine that is independently powerful.

CHARACTERISTICS OF BOSSES

INTELLIGENCE

Only one systematic attempt has been made to study American bosses comparatively, that by Harold Zink, and his work was confined to twenty municipal bosses.² As a result, almost no general statement can be made about them without noting qualifications and exceptions. Perhaps the nearest thing to such a generalization is to say that they are intelligent, often highly intelligent, men. A man does not rise in the rough and tumble of practical politics unless he has more intelligence than his fellows. This intelligence is most commonly shown in an unusual political shrewdness. Platt, Penrose, Weed, and Crump have been given credit for extraordinary shrewdness, which no doubt they deserved. Others like Hague, have received credit for shrewdness that should have gone in large part to their subordinates. None has failed to make some political mistakes. The intelligence of the bosses is almost always innate, not schooled.

¹ Harold Zink, "A Case Study of a Political Boss," *Psychiatry*, vol. 1 (November, 1938), p. 530.

² As Merriam and Gosnell, *op. cit.*, p. 172, point out, to advance our knowledge of American politics more studies of a careful and critical sort need to be made of American bosses, not only to show their traits but also to examine their techniques. "Studies of such bosses might cover their origins and development, their early history and training, their personality attributes, their methods of obtaining and holding power as well as their political decline, their relation to the social movements of their time and place, and their significance from the point of view of their role in the political and social process." Until such studies are made we are driven to discuss bosses in terms of generalities.

Boies Penrose, Dr. Albert A. Ames of Minneapolis, and Edward J. Flynn of the Bronx stand out as rare exceptions to the general rule that bosses have a small amount of formal schooling.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL BACKGROUND

Very few bosses have gone into politics from an upper-class background. Many have had fathers who were unskilled or semi-skilled laborers. Penrose again was an exception, and Harry F. Byrd is another. In a few instances men who were bosses have succeeded in passing their power on to their sons — the Camerons in Pennsylvania and the Bairds in Camden, New Jersey, are examples. William Barnes of Albany was a grandson of Thurlow Weed. The general rule, however, is that each boss must work his own way up; he cannot take over his father's or grandfather's authority. The attempt of Mayor Frank Hague to pass the dynasty on to his son failed; Frank, Junior, simply did not have the energy or ability. In 1947 Hague tried to pass it to his nephew, Frank Hague Eggers, whom he had the city commission select as mayor. This one transaction illustrates the nature of boss and machine: at no time was either the abdication or the succession submitted to a plebiscite; the people of Jersey City were given no choice as to whom they wanted to rule them.

THE IRISH AS BOSSES

"There seems to be some relationship," says Zink, "between the racial stock of municipal bosses and the dominant racial group of foreign origin in their cities."¹ Of the twenty he studied, however, fifteen were either born in Ireland or had one or both parents born in Ireland, and it is well known that many Irish bosses, such as Hague, have ruled over cities or states that did not have a majority of Irish in their population. Any roll of American bosses will contain, if not a majority of Irish names, a proportion that exceeds that of the Irish in the whole population. During almost all of its history Tammany Hall ruled through Irish bosses. In other cities and states such Irish names appear as Brennan, Coughlin, Hague, Kelly, Kenna, Lomasney, McFeely, McCooley, O'Connell, O'Malley, Quinn, Sullivan. No other racial group appears to approach the Irish in turning up American bosses, but among the noted bosses there was one Czech, Cermak; one Swede, Lundin of Chicago; one of

¹ Zink, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

French descent, Ruef; one German, Behrman of New Orleans; and a scattering of other nationalities. Several have been of English parentage, such as "Iz" Durham of Philadelphia, and George B. Cox of Cincinnati. Next to the Irish, native Americans of native stock for several generations appear to have provided the largest number; of the many of this sort, Boies Penrose, who came from an old Philadelphia family, stands out. Byrd, Crump, Johnson, Long, and the Vare brothers were other bosses whose ancestors for several generations had lived in the United States.

RELIGIOUS AFFILIATIONS

"The Roman Catholic Church held the allegiance of exactly one half of the twenty" bosses that Zink studied.¹ It may be assumed that the other American bosses of Irish descent have also been Catholics. Nine of the remaining ten of Zink's cases were of various Protestant faiths, and one, Ruef, was Jewish. By and large, Protestant bosses have dominated cities and states where the population was largely Protestant; Catholic bosses have arisen where there was a Catholic majority, as in Boston, Chicago, and Jersey City, or a large Catholic minority. With a few exceptions, the Catholic bosses have been Democrats and the Protestants, Republicans.

PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS

In personal characteristics bosses have differed so widely that no generalizations are possible. They have varied from huge men such as Tweed and Penrose to small ones such as "Ed" Vare and "Abe" Ruef. The differences have been so great that the cartoonists' picture of the boss as a large, fat man chewing a cigar is certainly an inaccurate stereotype. Bosses have also an unjustified reputation for taciturnity. A few, like Murphy, were indeed usually silent, but most have been as talkative as the usual citizen, and some, like Kelly of Chicago, Hague, and Long, have been garrulous.

Like most successful political leaders, the majority of bosses have not been heavy drinkers. "Look at the great leaders of Tammany Hall!" exclaimed Plunkitt, "No regular drinkers among them."² Some bosses have been total abstainers, like Murphy and Hague. Only a few were

¹ Zink, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

² William L. Riordan, *Plunkitt of Tammany Hall* (1905), p. 145.

like Boies Penrose, who engaged in "star-spangled brawls," and Stephenson of Indiana, who needed liquor in order to make an effective speech.

Dominance; Feeling for Politics. They show, on the whole, traits of dominance. Some, like Tom Platt, who was called the easy boss, have shown these traits through a courteous and polite exterior; others, like Long and Thompson, through Hitler-like demagoguery; and still others, like Hague, the McFeelys, and the O'Connells, have been rough, crude, coarse, and domineering. But none has been weak, unless Ames and Ruef be called weak. Rather, they showed both physical and political courage to the point of recklessness. In make-up they seem to be extroverts, projecting their qualities of personality to their followers. They have a feeling for command, a liking for intrigue. Most showed these qualities early in life, as they rose to be leaders of groups of boys and then to take part in the wirepulling of precinct and ward politics. Their native aptitudes for politics have not generally been accompanied by a flair for the dramatic, though Curley, Thompson, and Long stand out as conspicuous exceptions.

Loyalty to Associates. Bosses and their friends usually stress their loyalty to their associates "even up to the gate of State prison, if necessary," as Plunkitt said. But it may very well be doubted if they are any more loyal to their friends than the run of men are or the necessities of their positions require. A boss cannot, of course, ignore the wishes and the needs of his associates with impunity; his position depends too much upon their continued loyalty. But the lore of American politics is too full of stories of double crosses and sellouts to lead one to believe that bosses are extraordinarily loyal to their adherents. To cite just one example, Richard Croker turned on the man who had given him his chance in politics, Jimmy O'Brien. And loyalty to associates does not include refraining from nepotism. Most bosses, indeed, have taken care of all their needy relatives on the public payrolls — the O'Connells and McFeelys are recent examples.

Loyalty to Party. The loyalty of the boss to the national party of which he is a member is usually suspect. There are too many instances of bosses knifing their own national organizations to permit one to conclude that as Republicans or as Democrats their party loyalty is more than skin deep. Thus Tammany knifed Tilden, Cleveland, and Bryan, always professing at the time loyalty to the Democratic Party and its principles. While insisting that party loyalty comes next only to loyalty to one's country, bosses of both parties will on occasion unite in a deal behind the scenes to knife a reformer who shows promise of threatening one machine or the

other. A classic example was the deal made between Tom Platt, the Republican boss, and Richard Croker, the Tammany boss, in 1897, when Seth Low, President of Columbia University and reform Republican candidate for mayor of New York, threatened to win; then Platt ran his own candidate, Benjamin Tracy, who split the Republican vote and caused the Tammany candidate to win. "The combined vote of Low and Tracy considerably exceeded that of the Tammany candidate, Van Wyck. . . . Edward Lauterbach made a frank confession that he and his Platt associates would rather see a Tammany man elected mayor than have a non-partisan succeed in getting office."¹

Personal Morality. Bosses are also often given credit for personal morality, for careers free from divorce and scandal. But here again there are enough exceptions, such as Ames, "Nocky" Johnson, Penrose, and Platt, to lead one to doubt that they are more moral than most men.

Morality in Money Matters. Clearly, their morality does not run to scrupulousness in money matters. Of the twenty bosses whose careers were examined by Zink only "eight remained free from prison, trial, or indictment."² Tweed died in jail. Ruef served a four-year term in San Quentin Penitentiary. And in more recent years, Curley, Johnson, and Pendergast were convicted of various frauds and sent to jail. Some, like Hague, have escaped only because of their control of the courts. The way in which most of them have handled their money in cash would indicate that they were attempting to prevent the establishment of evidence that could be used against them in court. The safety deposit boxes stuffed with currency left by Kenna and Thompson are examples. It may reasonably be inferred that the hundreds of thousands of dollars were kept in cash because of the sources from which they had been obtained. The records of those bosses who have been subjected to court trials or investigations are full of evidences of graft, often of the most sordid sort, that they have taken.³ On nominal salaries, or with no visible means of support or occupation other than politics, many of them have lived in royal style, traveling widely, owning handsome homes, estates, race horses, even yachts. Even if no other evidence were available, the inference would be justified that such incomes were in large part obtained in illegal ways.

¹ H. F. Gosnell, *Boss Platt and His New York Machine* (1924), pp. 232-233; see also Lothrop Stoddard, *Master of Manhattan: the Life of Richard Croker* (1931), p. 180.

² Zink, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

³ See especially W. B. and J. B. Northrup, *The Insolence of Office* (1932).

Wealth Acquired in Politics. Unless they have been reduced to penury, as Tweed was, by protracted legal battles to escape justice, most of the successful state and city bosses have left substantial estates. William Flinn of Pittsburgh left more than eleven millions; Chris Magee, also of Pittsburgh, nearly five millions. Of those who each left more than a million at death may be mentioned George B. Cox, Richard Croker, Israel Durham, Michael Kenna, Hugh McLaughlin, James McManes, Charles F. Murphy, Roger Sullivan, and William H. Thompson. Others might have left big estates except that they spent their millions in lavish living. The rural bosses do not have opportunities of the same size as their city and state counterparts, and consequently they do not leave the big estates. A few big bosses like Lomasney, Penrose, and Platt have seemed not to care for the accumulation of money but to be more interested in personal power or prestige, or in the game of politics. But the majority, as Croker said of himself, have worked for their own pockets all the time.

Tolerance of Group and Religious Interests. An intolerant, prejudiced, or bigoted person does not usually become a successful political boss. A vote is a vote, whether it is cast by rich or poor, white or black, Jew or Gentile, Protestant or Catholic. A boss may have his preference for men of his own racial or nationality background or his own religion, as Hague had for Irishmen, but he must, if he expects to remain in power, "recognize" each group or faction in his constituency. Edward J. Flynn of Bronx County, New York, who frankly calls himself a boss, explained this necessity thus:

The Bronx is a cosmopolitan place. The Jewish and Italian populations are large. There are also many Irish Catholics. These three groups make up the largest portions of the [population of the] county. Therefore, when the organization is forming a ticket to present to the people, it is important that the candidates represent and come from these three large groups.¹

BOSS TACTICS

The tactics used by successful bosses are necessarily those adapted to their times, their constituencies, their own personalities, and to the group or interest support upon which they may rely. What works in one city

¹ *You're the Boss* (1947), p. 222. This extraordinary book deserves careful examination by students of American politics. A few bosses, Weed and Platt for example, left autobiographies, but they are historically unreliable and apologetic in tone; Flynn's book, on the contrary, is frank and specific, free from any cant. No other boss has discussed so frankly in print the boss system and his part and tactics in it.

may not succeed in another — the milieu of New Orleans differs from that of New York. A state boss may need different tactics from those successfully used by a city boss in the same state. A Huey Long may rise by using demagogic appeals; a Hague by rough and ruthless suppression of opponents; a Crump by party intrigue and maneuvering — each relying primarily upon the device best adapted to his own nature and to his constituency. No single set of tactics suffices for all men on all occasions, but the essence of success appears to be the adaptation of tactics to circumstances, and a boss who cannot see this necessity will fail. Any boss will need a considerable element of luck in addition to hard work and skill, because it is only in the right circumstances and at the right time that his own combination of qualities and forms of support will suffice. The matter is not thereby hopelessly complicated. Rather, certain types or sets of tactics may be observed that appear to be commonly successful under ordinary conditions.

A first difference that may be noted is that between the devices used or needed to attain power and those needed to retain or to consolidate it. Demagogic appeals, such as "Every Man a King" used by Huey Long, may win elections. After the victory, however, such appeals must give way to more practical devices, such as corrupting a legislature or controlling patronage, both used by Long.

INCREASING INFLUENCE IN THE MACHINE

Most bosses do not step into power from the top, though such businessmen-bosses as Pew and Grundy may be regarded as exceptions. The normal way is to work up through an increasing control of or influence in the party machinery. This influence may be attained by one man rather than by a rival because of his unusual access to sources of party contributions; Penrose and Platt are outstanding examples. Or it may be attained through control of some interest group upon which the machine must depend for a large part of its support; so Curley rose on the Boston Irish and Dave Beck on the Teamsters' Union. Again, a man's native shrewdness may so commend itself to party leaders that a rising boss is entrusted with more and more responsibility year by year until he makes himself master of the machine; thus Croker established the confidence of Tammany leaders, particularly the aging boss, "Honest John" Kelly, and even before Kelly died Croker was actually in control. Flynn tells how his work with Charles F. Murphy commended him to Murphy who, when

the opportunity arose, backed Flynn as boss of the Bronx.¹ This type of success usually requires years of patient effort, endless hours of club-house conferences, and long attention to political and party detail.

Building of a Staff. During this period of rise in the party the aspiring boss will, if he is shrewd, build up a sort of informal general staff. He will expand and improve this staff over the years. There will probably be a second in command, a deputy boss, such as Jacob Arvey in the Kelly machine in Chicago or John Malone in the Hague machine. There may be a financial man, the collector and distributor of funds, although the boss is certain to watch him closely if not to do a large amount of this work himself. Most bosses will build up a law department to advise which of the plum trees, to use Plunkitt's figure, are penal code trees; or, if the boss eats from the wrong tree, to do what they can to rectify the mistake. A few judges and district attorneys are immensely useful members of this part of the staff. Someone also is needed to handle patronage matters, though again the boss is likely to supervise this carefully if not to do all of it himself, especially in his early years. A publicity specialist is useful, not merely to correct the grammar in the boss's speeches and statements, but also to advise him on how to handle newspapers and reporters. Some bosses have had, in addition, a man who specialized in the violent methods of dealing with opponents and dissident members of the machine; but once in power, the boss will likely assign this function to the chief of police. Tom Pendergast's relationship with the gangster John Lazia is a recent example.

AVOIDANCE OF ISSUES

No boss has risen to power because of his attachment to some issue or set of political principles. The successful boss, on the contrary, is likely to avoid issues and commitments to principle; his adherence is instead to the machine of which he is a part. An attachment to principle is too likely to cut across the interests of the machine or to divide the loyalties of his followers.

Once in power, bosses may be said to consolidate their rule and to continue in authority by using appropriate combinations of fear, fraud, force, and favor.

CRUSHING THE OPPOSITION

A favorite tactic is to crush out the opposition wherever possible.

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 27-33.

Hague did it by such crude methods, among others, as having his police beat his opponents within an inch of their lives. Chicago machine politics has also resorted to violent means, so violent that it has often been impossible to distinguish with certainty the line between organized crime and organized politics. Tammany bosses in the nineteenth century often rose to power from leadership in street gangs, and they carried over into city politics the violent methods they had learned as boys. Only by a hung jury did Croker avoid the gallows for a death that resulted from such an election-day battle in which he took part.¹ The McFeely organization of Hoboken, New Jersey — recently overthrown — succeeded in surviving for a score of years primarily upon violence or the threat of violence.

ECONOMIC PRESSURES ON OPPONENTS

Such violent methods are no longer common; economic pressures of various sorts arouse less opposition and are equally effective. Control of the tax machinery, for example, may make opponents who own certain kinds of property, particularly real estate, cease active opposition. The raising of the assessments on Republicans' property has been a device widely used by the O'Connells: "Wise and frugal home owners in New York's capital city long ago learned not to enroll as Republicans. In 1938 only 6930 of the city's registrants admitted their Republicanism, as compared with 51,035 enrolled Democrats. Presumably, few of the 6930 Republicans were property owners. It was too costly."² Hague used the same techniques, not only upon Republicans, but upon dissident Democrats as well.

CONTROL OF COURTS

The control of the machinery of justice to prosecute opponents is another means of crushing the opposition. The Seabury Investigation showed how this was done in New York City. Hague's forces prosecuted John R. Longo, an opponent, and obtained his conviction in court for a crime that, subsequent evidence showed, had never been committed by anyone.³ Control of courts and prosecutors is also indispensable to a boss if he is to protect his own adherents.

¹ Zink, *op. cit.*, p. 132; and Stoddard, *op. cit.*, pp. 53-60.

² Van Devander, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

³ *Public Men*, E. T. Salter, editor (1946), p. 449.

USE OF LICENSING POWER

The refusal to issue licenses, such as those required for taverns, dance halls, bowling alleys, pool halls, and similar establishments, has a twofold effect upon opponents. It may restrict their ways of livelihood and it may close up the places where they congregate or hold their meetings. In states where political clubs can obtain liquor licenses, refusal to issue licenses limits the activity of opponents' clubs drastically. Where the local government has no discretion to issue licenses, opponents' establishments may be held to the strict letter of the law — notably statutes concerning gambling in saloons — and licenses may be revoked at the first violation.

USE OF POLICE TO HARASS OPPONENTS

The police may be used to harass any business. Edward Crump of Memphis may serve as an example of the use of this tactic:

He has made spectacular examples of private citizens because of [their] expressions of dissent. For months, Frank Thompson, a local undertaker who openly expressed his criticism, had his hearses and ambulances trailed by squads of motorcycle policemen who gave his drivers summonses for various technical traffic violations. A wealthy wholesale druggist who was "unfriendly" failed to get police protection of his plant during a strike of his A.F.L. employees. A Negro druggist who would not "take orders" was boycotted by the device of having police search all his customers on the "suspicion" that he was selling narcotics.¹

Control of the police is also necessary in order to protect adherents of the machine, from the individual voter up to the boss himself. One Philadelphia committeeman, attached to the Vare machine, resented complaints that he was not working at his public job in City Hall. "I have to go to the police station every morning, and sometimes to even more than one station. I must take care of the followers [of Vare] in the division. I would not have the job if I could not carry my division. My place is among the voters, and they are not at City Hall."² Control of the police is necessary in many other ways: to protect other controls, such as those over the machinery of elections, which cannot usually be accomplished

¹ Gerald M. Capers in Allen, *op. cit.*, p. 230.

² Quoted by David H. Kurtzman, *Methods of Controlling Votes in Philadelphia* (1935), p. 42.

without police support; to provide income for the machine in protection money; and to enforce discipline within the machine. Huey Long as state boss never hesitated to use the police or the state militia in his political wars.

Commonly, the relationship between the machine and the police is not only from the boss down through the ranks of the force but also direct: from the precinct, ward, or section bosses to the police in their areas. To get a favor done it is not necessary to go to the city boss himself, unless it involves the whole force or some very important matter. Rather, subordinates are allowed to do the favors, not only because of their sheer volume but also because doing them builds machine support from the bottom up. In order for the subordinates to interfere with the police they must be given a share with the boss in control of the force. A Philadelphia judge, in sentencing a ward boss for taking graft, explained the whole arrangement. The "defendant," he said, "while not a member of the police force, was yet a source of influence on official police action, greater in its scope and compulsion than that deriving from any but the highest ranking police officer." Within his ward he had "the power to make and unmake members of the police force, even of the highest rank. This invisible but potent part in the actual composition and administration of the police department (unknown to the law but real and vital) constituted in all essentials a public trust of a peculiarly intimate and effective character. . . ." ¹

CONTROL OF ELECTION MACHINERY

Control of the election machinery may enable a boss and his forces to maintain their hold upon a government, even when they do not have a popular majority. The registration and election frauds by which this may sometimes be accomplished are discussed more fully elsewhere, but it may be said here that there is scarcely a boss who has not at some time in his career used this device. For years the O'Connells had a number of votes cast for their candidates that, according to Van Devander, was, in proportion to population, the highest in the country.² Legislative investigations of the Hague machine showed examples of almost every known type of ballot and registration fraud.³ The Pendergast organization obtained "between fifty and sixty thousand" ghost votes, as they are called in

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 98.

² Van Devander, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

³ McKean, *op. cit.*, pp. 138-144.

Kansas City.¹ When the election returns from a machine-controlled city or county are not announced until those from the rest of the state are published, and when, time after time, the machine vote then proves sufficient to overcome the opponents' lead elsewhere, there is *prima-facie* evidence of manipulation. This used to happen when "Nocky" Johnson controlled Atlantic City. It has often happened in Memphis.² Any astute boss would, of course, prefer to win on an honest count, because he knows then that his machine is working efficiently enough to carry a majority. But if he cannot obtain enough *bona fide* registrations and honest votes to win, he will if he can, win anyhow. Repeated defeats, whether honest or dishonest, will sooner or later be likely to demoralize the opposition.

THE CAPTIVE OPPOSITION

No astute boss, however, wants to have his opposition disappear. A total want of opposition is an invitation to an annoying investigation from Congress, a legislature, or a hostile court, grand jury, or prosecutor. Even though the opposition may be merely nominal, it also keeps up the spirit of competition within the organization, which is necessary for national campaigns if not for local ones. Better than a total lack of opposition is a captive organization of the other party. The Republican Party in New York City has often been owned by Tammany, and the Democratic Party in Philadelphia by the Republicans. This situation seems to arise whenever one machine, over a number of years, attains overwhelming superiority over the other. Former Mayor La Guardia explained in his pungent style how Edward J. Flynn, Democratic boss of the Bronx, supported the Republican machine:

Mr. Flynn is the boss, not only of the Democratic machine of his county but also of the Republican. I ought to know. They both opposed my election. The Republican bosslet of that county is Mr. Flynn's stooge. He holds a \$9000 job through the influence of Boss Flynn, his Democratic opponent. This man has a \$9000 job, and no one has ever been able to ascertain if he has ever in any day done a lick of work. His official job is "Commissioner of Records of the Surrogate's Court," a job originally created to patch and mend old records. These old records were all mended twenty-five years ago, yet this \$9000 commissioner and a \$6000 deputy to help him do nothing continue on the payroll.³

¹ Reddig, *op. cit.*, p. 287.

² Allen, *op. cit.*, p. 227.

³ *Atlantic Monthly*, vol. 180 (July, 1947), p. 21.

USE OF NON-PARTY GROUPS

As the years pass, a sagacious boss will do everything he can to perfect his machine. He will attempt, among other things, to bring into machine control important groups or interests within the constituency which might on some occasion make trouble for him. Probably no American boss ever saw the necessity of this so clearly as Hague, or did so efficient a job as he at taking over or infiltrating every association, club, church, league, society, or union that existed in his domain. The chamber of commerce, the bar and medical associations, the taxpayers' association, the veterans' organizations sooner or later found Hague men running them. He put all willing and loyal priests, preachers, and rabbis on the public payroll as chaplains, and gave sinecures — such as secretary to the janitor of the courthouse at \$4500 a year — to labor leaders.¹ Long before Hitler and the Communists had made famous the techniques of infiltration and "front" organizations, Hague had used them with great success in Hudson County, New Jersey. Once Hague had gained control of every private association, his opponents could find no group from which to start a revolt or a reform movement. He could, moreover, use these controlled groups to extend his power into the state groups of which the captives constituted locals or chapters. Thus he came to dominate the state bar association, the state association of civil service employees, and both the AFL and the CIO. When he could not or did not wish to make a bipartisan deal with the state legislature, which was almost always overwhelmingly Republican, he could still exert great pressure upon it through the groups he controlled. No adequate reason appears why other bosses have not used these techniques of group management as extensively as Hague. Many years of patient work are necessary to get machine men elected or appointed to control of the groups, but when the process is complete the machine has a dominance of the society of which it is a part that cannot be matched by straight political methods.

BOSSSES AND NEWSPAPERS

The opposition of newspapers, as has been observed elsewhere, has not prevented the rise of bosses. Indeed, many bosses have won repeatedly and long remained in power against the concerted opposition of the press of their cities or states. But bosses are probably no more thick-skinned

¹ McKean, *op. cit.*, pp. 150-165.

than other individuals, and none can be indifferent to steady, long-continued newspaper attacks. Such sustained attacks, moreover, are likely to bring on state or federal investigation or prosecution, and they cannot safely be ignored. Bosses have tended, therefore, to attempt to reach understandings with newspapers whenever possible. Crump had no serious trouble with any newspaper in Memphis. When for many years the Pendergast machine ruled Kansas City and sometimes all of Missouri, it was only half-heartedly opposed by the *Kansas City Star*. "The fact remains," wrote W. G. Clugston, "that although the machine controlled all the taxing agencies of the city, the records show that neither the newspaper nor its millionaire executives ever were soaked very hard by the tax collectors. And some of Tom's henchmen were intimate cronies of the *Star's* top editors."¹ When Pendergast was deposed, according to the same writer, the *Star* itself became a kind of boss.

With the most powerful radio station in the area and a complete monopoly of the press in their possession, the masters of the *Star* have been able to suppress virtually every independent movement and cause . . . to control and direct every form of civic activity from the Chamber of Commerce to the City Hall. . . . And newspapers, public officials, and local businessmen throughout Kansas and Western Missouri have, with rare exceptions, been browbeaten, hoodwinked, and worse into echoing the *Star's* jeremiad in defense of the power trusts.²

If a boss is strong and well established and cannot make a deal with the press, he may be able to use force and pressure to compel the papers to turn from attacking to supporting him. Sometimes he can buy enough stock in a newspaper to induce it to change its policies. By this and other economic pressures Tweed bought the silence of every paper but the *Times*. If these attempts fail, the boss may, as Hague did, use the police to harass advertisers and even to solicit subscriptions for a rival paper. Newsboys may find child-labor laws enforced. Newsstand dealers who handle the offending paper will lose their licenses on one pretext or another. Or trucks carrying papers will be stopped repeatedly for long and careful motor vehicle inspections. The paper will, of course, lose all public printing and advertising, and it is likely to have its assessments doubled. The *Jersey Journal* found the persecutions of the Hague organization so serious that it had to choose between bankruptcy and turning from opposition to support. It turned a complete about-face; the per-

¹ Allen, *op. cit.*, p. 273.

² *Ibid.*, p. 274.

secutions ceased, and one member of the Dear family, which owned the paper, was rewarded by a Hague governor with a seat on the state's highest court.¹ Fortunately for the freedom of the press in the United States, the case of the *Jersey Journal* is not typical, but the devices Hague used could be employed by most bosses.

PATRONAGE AND SPOILS

The distribution of patronage and spoils, elsewhere discussed in detail, is one of a boss's chief duties, and the skill with which he performs it or supervises its performance by subordinates will in large degree determine his continued success. He must "recognize" by suitable appointments all the economic, racial, religious, sectional, and other organized interests in his constituency. To prevent revolts, he must reward his generals, captains, lieutenants, and sergeants with places on the public payroll commensurate with their political importance. The satisfactory distribution of these appointments is extremely difficult and calls for the highest degree of political skill, not only because there are never enough jobs to please all the claimants, but also because rival leaders and interests are constantly complaining that the pay received or the amount of work required in their public jobs does not match the amount of political work they do or the number of votes they produce. Boss Flynn of the Bronx has explained the principles he follows:

To begin with, I always see to it that the key party workers have exempt positions [i.e., exempt from civil service] if they want them. Some of the salaries are small (particularly those given to women). They run from \$2500 to \$5000, with only one at \$10,000. Still, to use the political parlance, all the District Leaders have been "taken care of" during my entire term as County Leader. In New York County, by contrast, there have been many changes among the District Leaders during the same period — because they were not put into exempt positions. . . . The families also — sons, daughters, husbands, wives — of the District Leaders are taken care of in some way or other. Sometimes they are given exempt positions, and sometimes they get help from us in the line of civil service promotion. . . .

There is one other important factor in retaining the support of the Executive Committee . . . I have final word about who should be appointed to positions which control exempt jobs. . . . Thus not only my long association with the party, but my absolute control of exempt positions, is a powerful influence in my control.²

¹ McKean, *op. cit.*, pp. 242-248.

² Flynn, *op. cit.*, p. 224.

As a Means of Discipline. The distribution of patronage and spoils serves also as a means of discipline. Not only will the district or group leader who has some sinecure hesitate to disobey the boss's order or to take part in a revolt, but the prospect of more lucrative positions may always be held out to him as the reward of continued loyalty and industry in the boss's service. A shrewd boss in handing out jobs will always express the hope that he can do more for the recipient at some future time, when longer service in the party will justify advancement to sheriff, clerk of court, collector of internal revenue, judge, or even United States senator — whatever is appropriate to the background or profession of the individual. And when, as Flynn says, the sons, daughters, husbands, and wives — and he might have included inlaws to the most remote degree — are given places on the public payroll, these people serve as hostages for the obedience and political diligence of the man for whom they were put on. They can as quickly be cut off if he shows signs of independence. On one occasion when Hague was not getting the kind of decisions he wanted from a Chief Justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court, relatives of the jurist were dismissed or demoted; as soon as the decisions became satisfactory, they were restored to their former positions.

Variations in Discipline. Bosses, like other men in authority, differ in the degree of obedience they insist upon. Some, such as the successful Tammany bosses, and Crump, Hague, Long, and Pendergast, demand absolute, instant, and unquestioning obedience. They rule with a tight rein. Crump appeared to delight in forcing his men at his command to humiliate themselves in public. Hague often compelled his legislators to vote "no" one week and "yes" the next week on the same measure, either upon his mere whim or when he had made some deal that required them to switch their votes. Flynn wrote that one act of opposition in his machine meant that the person was "forever barred from any political preferment" and was sent "to organization Coventry." Probably he could not have enforced such rigorous discipline until he had solidly established his authority. State bosses as a general rule cannot exact such obedience; they must preface their commands with explanation, or they may have to put their wishes in terms no stronger than suggestions or requests. They do not ordinarily have the authority over county machines that a city boss has over ward or precinct machines. Thomas Collier Platt, long Republican boss of New York, ruled wherever he could by persuasion and not by decree. He wanted party harmony. His associate, United States Senator Chauncey M. Depew, was also president of

the New York Central Railroad, and in that capacity provided railroad passes for the upstate county leaders, so that each Sunday they could meet with Boss Platt at the Fifth Avenue Hotel, where party plans could be discussed and, if possible, a consensus of opinion reached. This weekly meeting came to be called "Platt's Sunday School Class." In spite of the fact that two sofas where the politicians sat acquired the name of "the Amen Corner," the local leaders or state officials did not always do what Platt wanted, and he did not (perhaps could not) banish them to any organization Coventry. At any rate, as "the easy boss," he ruled for many years, and if he did not always get his way, he did not arouse the hatred and enmity in his own organization that a Crump or a Hague would do.¹

THE STABLE OF CANDIDATES

Many if not most bosses do not themselves run for public office, or they no longer run when they have attained command of the machine. They can thus escape responsibility for unpopular or illegal acts or for failure to act by blaming the officials whom they have elected or appointed. They prefer the substance to the form of power. But whether or not they run themselves, they must develop a "stable" of candidates, men who can get elected, for the numerous offices that have to be filled. A well-organized machine that has reduced the opposition to impotence can run almost any person successfully, no matter how incompetent or dishonest he may be known to be. Indeed, such candidates in those circumstances prove to have advantages to the boss, for the incompetent man is easily managed, and the threat of prosecution can be used to force the dishonest to obey orders. But if there is a considerable body of independent votes that must be obtained in order to insure success, the astute boss will if he can develop candidates who, while generally manageable, will still present a front of respectability and independence. Thus Weed had his Seward, Platt his Chauncey Depew, Hague his Harry Moore, Pendergast his Harry Truman. More frequently than not, such candidates are good speakers, able campaigners, handsome men who enjoy public life and who do not mind the baby-kissing, funeral-going, and cornerstone-laying that is demanded of them. The more of such men a boss can get, the better off he is likely to be. If he has so many of them that he cannot continuously provide offices for them all, still the younger ones at least can

¹ Gosnell, *op. cit.*, especially pp. 55-72.

be kept loyal by a division of spoils such as appointments as counsel, receivers, guardians, referees, or appraisers. A wise boss will not compel such men to do dishonest or illegal acts, because they will thereby injure their future candidacies and usefulness to him. Such men are known in political machines as "pets" or "pet candidates."

When very hard-pressed, a boss will even pick a candidate whose addiction to reform is notorious, as Platt did when scandals concerning the state's management of the Erie Canal threatened Republican defeat in 1898. After much worrying about the business, he selected young Theodore Roosevelt, who campaigned on a platform of patriotism and manifest destiny while the canal scandals were forgotten. A more recent example was the selection in 1947 of Martin H. Kennelly by the Kelly machine as candidate for mayor of Chicago. Faced with almost certain defeat, even the head of the machine shrewdly stepped down. Such candidates are for emergency use only; they are undisciplined and dangerous. The most that can be expected of them is that they will not appoint opponents to office; at the worst they may turn upon the machine that elected them. Platt soon had enough of Theodore Roosevelt, who faithfully consulted but would not always obey him, and in 1900 he kicked him upstairs into the vice-presidency.

THE INEVITABLE EXPANSION OF POWER

Napoleon found that he could never rest on his laurels; no sooner had a victory been won than a new alliance was formed against him, and to prevent defeat he had always to push his conquests farther and farther from home. Something of the same tendency may be observed among American political bosses. Crump found that he could not control Memphis unless he controlled Shelby County, and he could not control Shelby County unless he could control Tennessee; so step by step he had to become a state boss. A ward boss may be perfectly willing to let well enough alone, but he may not be able to survive against a hostile city government or city boss of his own or of the other party; he is forced, therefore, to expand his operations to include the whole city. The bosses of cities find themselves particularly vulnerable to attacks from the state government through court processes or legislative action. The plums in the city Garden of Eden, to paraphrase Plunkitt, may be ample and satisfactory, but a state boss or governor may keep interfering with their picking. Even one hostile state judge or attorney general may cause endless

trouble. Tammany's difficulties with the state government and with state Republican bosses have a long history; the Hall has had to be subjected to a series of investigations. Platt alone, when he was not dealing with Croker, had his legislatures conduct three damaging inquiries of Tammany administrations, but the sachems, much to their chagrin, had no power to investigate Platt. Indeed, Platt had the New York constitution so rigged that regardless of Democratic popular majorities in the state a Republican majority in the legislature was almost always certain. Tammany's troubles with Albany are parallels of Hague's troubles with Trenton, Pendergast's with Jefferson City, the Vares' with Harrisburg, and others.

The same inevitable, even if reluctant, expansion plagues a state boss. He must become a power in his national party lest it turn upon him, as the Franklin Roosevelt administration turned upon Long and Pendergast. A state boss must at all costs keep in the good graces of a President of the boss's party as Flynn, Hague, and Kelly did, not merely to obtain the federal patronage — which Tammany lost by its obstinate opposition in 1932 — but more important, to protect himself from the Department of Justice, the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the Post Office Department, and other federal agencies which can make life difficult for him and his associates. A state boss, moreover, will find that he must ask a national administration for countless favors for the interests that support him at home. Penrose's watchfulness over the tariff in behalf of the manufacturers of Pennsylvania was an outstanding but not unique example — he had to keep the tariff up to keep the campaign funds flowing, for without them he could not remain boss of Pennsylvania. Consequently he had to influence the selection of Republican Presidents and the direction of Republican national policy.

When a state boss finds on the first Tuesday after the first Monday of some fateful November that a President of the opposite party has won, he may well wish that he had never expanded beyond the ward where he was born. There is probably nothing he can do. On a somewhat similar occasion Penrose is said to have observed that it looked to him like a good time for all men who loved fishing to go fishing, and he recommended the salmon streams of Canada. "Nocky" Johnson, the Republican boss of Atlantic City, who knew Penrose well, could have taken that advice on November 9, 1932. He might, if he had, have escaped a term in Lewisburg.

CAUSES OF FAILURES OF BOSSES AND MACHINES

No tactic, no set of tactics, will always avail to preserve even the most astute boss and the most efficient machine from destruction. Some of the circumstances that have led to their failures have already been mentioned, such as external attack from the state or national governments. Sometimes a national landslide, such as those of 1920, 1924, 1932, and 1936, will overturn the best established machines. In 1920 even Hudson County, New Jersey, went Republican, and Hague lost control of the legislative delegation. He was soon able to repair the damage, but it took the Pennsylvania Republican organization years to recover from the Roosevelt landslides of 1932 and 1936. If a machine is working smoothly, and if an election is not complicated by other factors, a straight-out attack from the other party is not likely to succeed; but if the machine has been weakened in some way, as by the revelation of a particularly nauseous scandal, the opposite party may overthrow it. Perhaps such an instance was the defeat of Thompson in 1927, although it is always difficult to be sure of the factors in such a turbulent city as Chicago. A fusion movement is ordinarily more promising; then the enemies that any boss always makes combine with the members of the other party to attain a plurality. Thompson was finally driven from power in 1933 when Anton Cermak, who came on the scene with a reputation not entirely unblemished, received the support of dissident Republicans who looked upon him as the lesser evil. Mayor La Guardia won each of his three city-wide elections as a result of a fusion movement. But these loose alliances are likely to be torn by patronage and other difficulties. La Guardia was the only fusion mayor of New York ever to be re-elected. His personal popularity, his obvious honesty, and his dramatic behavior combined to win for him when, partly because of his patronage policies, he lost the support of the Republican organization. It was freely said that he could not win a fourth term when the Republican organization was openly hostile, and he retired undefeated.

DEFEAT BY A REFORM MOVEMENT

It is not impossible for a boss to be upset by a straight reform movement — by some civic association, such as the Charter Committee in Cincinnati. The bosses almost uniformly oppose the council-manager form of city government, and the now wide adoption of the scheme is

itself evidence that in many instances they have been defeated by reform groups. It is common for both Republican and Democratic machines in a city to unite to oppose the plan, and yet it continues to spread. With a few exceptions, however, it tends to be adopted in the small or medium-sized cities. In the great cities party organizations have usually succeeded in defeating it.

Boss Flynn admits that a machine can be defeated by reformers, but he adds: "I do not want to minimize how difficult a job this is. It is difficult, because in a successful machine the leaders have so well fortified themselves that it takes time to upset them. It cannot be done in a year. In some cases, it cannot be done for many years."¹ In his Bronx County there are 850 election districts. Each of those would have to be manned by reform workers, at least as many as there were machine workers. Perhaps some would do the canvassing without pay, but such volunteers are likely to work less steadily and industriously than the paid workers. Members of the machine have families on the public payroll who would work to defeat the reform movement. Two or three thousand election-day workers would be needed. In a hard-fought election it is not uncommon for a machine to spend (mostly in honest ways) at least a dollar per vote. In the Bronx that would mean between \$450,000 and \$500,000. It would be a remarkable reform organization that could raise one tenth of that amount. The reform group would need leaders whose businesses, professions, or reputations were invulnerable to any attack and whose adherence to the cause was so intense that they could not be bought off. The cards are stacked against the reformers, but in spite of all handicaps they do occasionally win.

REVOLT OR TREACHERY WITHIN THE RANKS

Internal causes of collapse are at least as common as external. The boss himself and the men who rose in the machine with him inevitably grow old, and they may lose the contact with their constituents that gave them their original power. Most successful bosses soon cease to reside in the poor section of the city which commonly gave them their start in political life; they build handsome mansions or rent fine apartments. They travel extensively. Such behavior gives internal opposition an argument: the boss no longer cares for his people; new leadership is needed. Internal revolt or treachery "within their own ranks partially or entirely" caused the downfall of four of the bosses Zink studied.²

¹ Flynn, *op. cit.*, p. 232.

² Zink, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

FAILURE TO PRODUCE ADEQUATE NEW LEADERSHIP

Few boss systems provide adequate machinery for the selection and training of new leaders. Platt's machine, the Philadelphia organization, and Tammany are exceptions. Each important change, generally speaking, must be brought about by revolt, and any revolt, successful or not, is likely to injure the efficiency of the machine.

In those machines that are highly personal — built up under the leadership of one man, such as Ames, Crump, or Roraback — the illness, old age, retirement, or death of the boss may lead to the dissolution of his machine. But when a machine has been long established, like Tammany, while it may suffer temporarily from the loss of a successful leader, sooner or later a new man will emerge to repair or reconstruct the organization. In cities where there has been a long tradition of bosses — Chicago, Jersey City, Philadelphia, for example — when one boss dies or retires the system that produced him will produce another, usually one much like him.

LENGTH OF BOSS'S TENURE

It must not be concluded that disaster is the inevitable fate of a boss and his machine. On the contrary, many bosses rule for long periods and die or retire undefeated; Croker, Murphy, Nash, Penrose, and Roraback, for instance. Among contemporaries Crump, Flynn, and Hague have been ruling for a quarter of a century or more.¹ Of the twenty bosses Zink studied, natural causes ended the political careers of thirteen, and three resigned or retired — how voluntarily it is sometimes difficult to say. "In no case," says Zink, were the reformers "entirely responsible for a knockout. . . . Back of reform in each case some other factor really stood pre-eminent."² Of the nine who died in power, the average age at death was 64.4 years. Being a boss does not appear to be a particularly hazardous occupation. Pendergast was 72 at the time of his death, Platt was 76, Thompson 75, Kenna 89.

¹ It is often difficult to measure exactly a boss's tenure, because the actual day or year when his power is consolidated is not easily determinable in all cases. Less often a boss may lose power gradually, as "Honest John" Kelly lost to Croker and as "Hinky Dink" Kenna and "Bathhouse John" Coughlin lost to the gangster control of the First Ward in Chicago.

² Zink, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

ALLEGED BENEFITS OF THE BOSS SYSTEM

CHARITY

Most bosses do not defend their rule by arguments about its benefits. But they and their adherents will, when pressed, defend the system. A favorite position is what may be called the Robin Hood argument, that the bosses steal from or tax the rich and give to the poor. "When a poor man comes to Old Tom's boys for help," Pendergast was reported as saying, "we don't make one of those investigations like these city charities. No, we feed 'em and we vote 'em."¹ Tammany and most other machines have done varying amounts of this haphazard and superficial welfare work. The Christmas baskets for the poor, the ton of coal for the widow, the month's rent for the unemployed, the picnic for the slum children — these and similar charities are all part of the tradition of machine politics. "Whenever a member of the organization is in financial difficulties," says Flynn, "and comes to me for assistance, I usually lend him money. Some of these loans have even been paid back."²

PUBLIC WORKS

The public works built by a boss's administration, such as the Jersey City Medical Center or the roads and bridges of Louisiana, are offered as evidence of the good the boss has done. The graft that accompanied their building is considered to be irrelevant and incidental. The ordinary adherent of Hague's does not feel that, as an individual, he paid any part of the graft. The money for the building came from the rich, he thinks, and if the machine got a brokerage fee in the process, that is fair enough. It is usually idle to point out that public works have been built without graft in boss-free cities and states. Consciously or unconsciously the boss and his supporters follow the *post hoc* fallacy: we did not have a Medical Center before Hague; we got one with Hague; therefore, we would never have had one without Hague.

ALLEGED RESPONSIVENESS TO PUBLIC OPINION

Another argument very like the Robin Hood argument runs to the effect that the boss and his machine really are more representative or more

¹ *New York Times*, January 28, 1945.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 225.

responsive to public demand than a more popular government would be. Cities are commonly under-represented in state legislatures, but the boss system does not correct this. The argument of popular support rests upon the false premise that the boss did nothing to manufacture consent or to suppress opposition; it is like Hitler's allegation that he really represented the German people better than the Reichstag which they had elected.

MITIGATION OF THE EFFECTS OF LAW

Another alleged benefit is that the boss cushions the effect of the law upon the poor, the unfortunate, the "little man." Hague was fond of citing examples of boys he had saved from being sent to reform school; it was in that connection that he made the famous statement, "I am the law." A boss may save an unlicensed street vendor from a jail term or the owner of an uncovered ashcan from a fine, but these and similar favors really have a high price. The recipients are expected to vote for the machine, which more than likely is doing big favors for big law violators for cash. The law is undoubtedly often harsh and frequently inflexible, but the cure for such conditions does not lie in the establishment of extra-legal powers to suspend the law as a political favor.

Some businessmen will defend the boss and the machine on what are essentially anti-democratic grounds. "You can do business with him," they will say. That is, he may be persuaded, for example, upon sufficient consideration, to suspend or scale down the collection of a tax that is disadvantageous to them, as Hague suspended in Hudson County the collection of the New Jersey tax on intangible property. When he later was forced to impose it, he collected it at an illegally low rate. It is often easier, quicker, cheaper, and more certain for a business interest to go to a boss for favors of this kind than to attempt to persuade a majority of the people or their representatives, if unbossed, that such special consideration should be given to them.

"He gets things done," some Boston businessmen said of Mayor Curley. That is, he got done quickly and with a minimum of publicity the things they wanted done. The business interests of Memphis were reported to be solidly behind Crump. Businessmen are not used to the slow and complicated processes of government. When a rule or practice in a business needs to be modified or rescinded, an order from the appropriate officer is sufficient. But if a legal rule or administrative order stands in the way, a long time may elapse and much business may be lost before all the public

officials who have a voice in the matter can be induced to act. It is much cheaper and quicker, then, to go right to the boss, who can get things done at once. The way the boss can hand out orders seems normal to most businessmen; that is the way they behave, and if he charges a fee, it seems worth paying to get the service.

EFFECTS OF THE BOSS SYSTEM

LOSS OF INDEPENDENCE OF JUDGMENT

The most serious effect of the boss system is the habit of obedience it inculcates in the people, the loss of independence of judgment on public matters. The boss, as Crump said, adjourns politics. He does the people's thinking for them. In his inaugural address as president of the National Municipal League, Charles Edison, former governor of New Jersey, put the problem thus:

Any people, to govern themselves successfully, must get experience in the art of government. The place where the people can get their experience at self-government — and each generation must learn anew — is in the local governments — cities, boroughs, towns, townships, counties, school districts, and states. If local governments are true democracies, we need never worry about the Great Society not being one. But, we cannot expect a great democracy to exist upon a foundation of local dictatorships.¹

The loss of independence of thought and judgment is frequently the effect of the fear of the machine and of the reprisals it can produce. "It is to some an ugly, but to all an incontrovertible fact that Crump rules Memphis partly because of a universal sentiment of fear and futility which, to varying degrees, permeates the consciousness of the entire community."² The same feeling of fear could be detected in Hoboken under the McFeelys, in Albany under the O'Connells, in Chicago, and in other boss-ruled cities. There is a general tension, an insecurity. Rumors abound.

DECLINE OF PUBLIC MORALE

Public morale suffers under the boss system. The individual is not free

¹ "Let's Quarantine the Bosses," *National Municipal Review*, vol. 36 (January, 1947), p. 1.

² Allen, *op. cit.*, p. 229.

to develop the full resources of his personality; he cannot trust his neighbors; he cannot trust the officers of groups to which he may belong. In the domain of a boss the schools may faithfully extol the virtues of merit in public office, but the children grow up to see offices given to incompetents, and consequently they scorn their naïve teachers. Churches may advocate honesty, but the young people see dishonesty successful and honesty unsuccessful. When they see a boss live like a millionaire on a salary of \$8000, it is difficult to persuade them that the boss is not really the person who knows the ethical answers. The corrupt atmosphere of a boss-controlled city is easier felt than described, but the whole tone of the community is in various degrees lowered.

There is a lack of civic pride. There is a sense of frustration, even of decay. There is a general feeling of hopelessness. In Philadelphia, for instance, "Philadelphia's faults are no secret to its people. To them, *The Philadelphia Story* of graft and waste is an oft-told tale. They see evidence of it every day. They hear it told and retold in every election campaign. But they go on sending back to City Hall the same old political hacks of the Republican organization responsible for Philadelphia's plight."¹

Not only does the danger of unquestioning obedience apply to the people in general; it applies even more to the type of experience obtained by men in public life who are or have been parts of a machine. They too are likely to fail to learn independence of judgment. They cannot be expected to rely upon political methods and tactics other than those they learned. And the ethics they show will be those of the political environment that produced them. "They are likely to think that they can run the nation or the world as they ran the Third Ward," said Governor Edison, "when upon some momentous occasion, they are given new and great authority."

MONEY COSTS OF BOSS RULE

That government by a boss is expensive will almost go without saying. Jersey City under Hague has long been the highest taxed city of its size in the country. Statistics for the per capita cost of city governments for any year may be readily assembled from the *Municipal Yearbook*, and they show that the costs of boss-ruled cities tend to run high. So many other factors, however, such as the amount of taxable property per capita,

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

and the types of services provided, enter into the problem that it is difficult if not impossible to determine exactly how much more boss rule costs. Sometimes a machine may manage to have some of the costs of a city government paid by a county or the state and so conceal in part the real costs of local government. The padded payrolls, the inflated contracts, the purchases above the market, all must be passed along to some taxpayers. Sometimes the day of reckoning may be postponed by the accumulation of debt, and so it may be said that the present high cost of debt service in New York and Chicago is the payment in part of the cost of political machines in previous years.

For these high costs the public services obtained are generally poor in quality. Here, however, elements of individual judgment will enter. Just how much dirtier and how much more trash-littered are the streets of Jersey City than the streets of Cincinnati? Just how bad is the "chlorine cocktail" Philadelphians have to drink? A corrupt police force, venal judges, rigged juries, favoritism in tax assessments, all these and many more facets of boss rule may be determinable but not precisely measurable.

CAUSES AND CURES

ALLEGED CAUSES OF BOSSISM

The easy assumption that bossism, if not quite dead, is at least dying, not only ignores the experience of American history but assumes that the causes that produced bosses have of themselves ceased to operate. Since these causes lie deep in human nature and in the nature of American political institutions, even though there were no current bosses (and there are), a conclusion that they were gone forever would be unwarranted. We are likely to have them for a long time to come. Individual bosses may come and go, their machines may break up and be rebuilt, but the system survives. The system, said Flynn, makes bosses

natural and inevitable. . . . At the present time, because the Democratic Party has been in federal power so long, the machines of the Democratic Party have attained greater prominence than the machines of the Republican Party. However, during the time the Republican Party controlled the national government, the Republican machines were stronger than those of the Democrats. This was true of every large city in the North at least, with the exception of New York, during the Harding-Coolidge-Hoover era.¹

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 47.

Observers will differ on the causes of bossism, and some will ascribe more weight to one operating factor than others will, but there is a rough measure of agreement.

"*Law*" of *Oligarchy*. First, there is an observable tendency in all human associations for a few interested individuals to rise to the top and to manage the affairs of the group. Robert Michels called this the iron law of oligarchy. Wherever power rests upon extra-legal or illegal arrangements, whether in a political machine, a lobby, or a gang of criminals, it is necessary for the decisions to be made by one man or a few men. They cannot be reached by the processes of open debate and discussion, or the group will be opened to outside attack. In the American boss system real power has usually been concentrated in one man, who can make binding decisions without public discussion or without witnesses to the considerations leading to the decisions. Although there have been partnerships among bosses, such as Kelly and Nash, Kenna and Coughlin, "Chris" Magee and William Flinn, Byrd and Glass, and although attempts have even been made, by Tammany to have leadership vested in a committee, the oligarchical tendency is so powerful that usually one man comes to be recognized as the boss, and the others become subordinates. The social and individual factors that cause certain individuals and not others to rise in the group are elsewhere discussed. While they may explain why men rise in party groups, they do not explain the American boss system. If they did, all countries with open elections would have bosses.

The Boss's Answer. Practicing bosses will not agree with this view. They will insist that the system is inevitable, a necessary accompaniment of the two-party system. "In practically every city and every state," says Boss Flynn, "there are [*sic*] a Republican machine and a Democratic machine, and there is always one man who is the boss of the machine. The final responsibility for nominations is wholly in his hands. Thus, when you condemn the 'boss system' you condemn both major parties and indeed all political parties, because all operate in exactly the same way."¹ Despite the views of so eminent and successful an authority, there are so many states where the final responsibility for nominations is not in any one man's hands that no discerning student of American politics would agree that a boss is the inevitable result of the two-party system.

¹ Flynn, *op. cit.*, p. 232. As has been indicated in an earlier chapter, there is no Republican organization in some southern states, much less in the cities. And in some northern cities there is no Democratic organization; in others there is a skeleton only.

Expeditionousness in Business. It is nevertheless true that many American political forms and institutions contribute to the rise of bosses and help to maintain them in power. All the constitutional and legal provisions that make real party responsibility difficult or impossible make boss government easy or natural. If real leadership cannot be exercised by and in the legal government, it will tend to grow up outside it in an extra-legal government. When the formal government cannot act, some boss will rise who can make it act. The principle of the separation of powers and the system of checks and balances that goes with it tend to bring government to a standstill — they are essentially negative. But the demands of groups and interests are not always negative, and a boss who can bring the separated powers together and hold back the checks and balances — who can control governor, legislature, and courts — may get their support. "He gets things done."

Complexity of Government. The vast multiplication of the units of government, with the resulting conflict and overlapping of authority, is so bewildering to the half-interested citizen that he makes no attempt to understand it. The boss, however, understands the ins and outs of the whole array. He must understand them, both to learn the sources of patronage and spoils in the labyrinth and to obtain from it the other results his clients want. When local governments proliferate, as they have done in the Chicago area and in other metropolitan districts, the situation is ideal for the rise of a boss. When at any one level of government there is a scattering of authority among a number of officials — notably when many are elected — there is an opportunity for a boss to rise because, extra-legally, he can produce a kind of administrative unity. The long ballot has, therefore, commonly been regarded as one of the reasons for the boss system.

Legal Restrictions. Many officials are so hedged about with legal restrictions, often absurd and out of date, that they have a very limited degree of discretion. The statutes, moreover, are often unclear or even contradictory; one law may direct a sheriff to do what another seems to prohibit him from doing. Such confusions are sometimes due to the failure of legislative bodies to revise their statutes or ordinances. The official, to be sure, has some protections at law, but these are not always certain. Moreover, he is always in danger of having to defend himself at his own expense in a legal action which may injure his availability as a candidate, regardless of his honest intentions. An official may, therefore, tend to rely upon the boss for protection against prosecution or civil

liability for necessary and honorable administrative decisions. In exchange for this security the boss is, of course, likely to ask on an appropriate occasion for administrative actions that are not equally necessary or honorable.

Short Terms of Office. Most elected officials in American local governments serve for short terms of one or two years; often they are legally ineligible to succeed themselves. In such circumstances it is much more difficult to establish a record that will appeal to the people, who are half-indifferent anyway, than it is to satisfy the boss, who is not indifferent. When a governor, sheriff, county clerk, or mayor is ineligible to succeed himself, he may please the people and retire at the end of his term to honored obscurity; but if he pleases the boss he can count on machine support for another, perhaps a higher, office.

Frequent Elections. The frequent elections characteristic of American political institutions have other results favorable to bosses. The elections come, not when issues arise but by the calendar, so that an official may have to run at a time when the public cannot be aroused, and if he is to win it must be on the machine vote. The result, of course, is that he tends to conduct himself in office so as not to lose that support. Campaigns are also costly to the candidates, and the more frequently they occur, the more most candidates must depend upon the machine for the necessary money for expenses. An upstanding man seeking re-election in a populous state, let us say as governor, may well need fifty to a hundred thousand dollars for legitimate campaign expenses if he is to win. But he will have the greatest difficulty in raising that amount from among the church people, the good-government groups, and the individual citizens who respect and admire him. The boss, however, can raise that amount perhaps once a month if necessary from the horseracing and gambling interests which will gladly pay it if the candidate will assure them through the boss that when the franchises for the race tracks are up for renewal he will not, if elected, veto the bills. Parallels to this situation may be found at all levels of local government down to the village constable who allows pinball machines to operate illegally. Frequent, issueless elections seem to be a contributing cause to the boss system.

Blind Partisanship. The blind partisanship characteristic of many areas is another. It is not invariable, because Maine and Vermont have not been boss-ruled, and in the states of the Solid South personal politics is usual and the boss is the exception. But where there is this solid party attachment plus the anonymity of urban life, perhaps a boss is more likely

than elsewhere to arise. It is necessary for him only to acquire control of the party primary, where the vote is usually light, and his candidates, however obnoxious, are then sure of winning at the general election. At any rate, many one-party cities, such as New Orleans, New York, and Philadelphia, have a long history of boss rule.

The spoils system has long been blamed for boss rule. It is common, however, in states such as Maine and Iowa which have not produced bosses. Spoils undoubtedly provide fuel for the machine, but they do not build it. Nor is the merit system a universal cure for bosses; Hague always operated in a civil service city. Bosses do not like it, but they get along with it because there are enough ways to bring machine pressure upon civil service employees to satisfy most bosses.¹

It would seem that no one cause produces the boss and the machine. Rather, the natural tendency of some persons to rise to the top of any organization may produce a boss in the right set of political and social circumstances. Bosses are more likely to appear under some conditions than under others — for example, when government is complex or when public officials are denied real authority by laws or constitutions. Nowhere, however, are bosses inevitable.

SUGGESTED CURES FOR THE BOSS SYSTEM

Opponents of bosses and boss rule have long sought a sure and simple cure or preventive. The Americanization of immigrants, the direct primary, the merit system, commission government, the city manager plan, the initiative and referendum, woman suffrage, prohibition — all these and other proposals, singly and in combinations, have been tried. None has sufficed, because none goes deep enough. If there is any cure, it appears to lie in part in the simplification of governments, in reducing their number and removing their complexity, so that the people, who have other things to do besides governing, may readily understand and watch their government. The devotion of the American people to the separation of powers and to the system of checks and balances has been overdone. But a merely simplified government may make boss rule easy, as in Kansas City. In addition to simplicity there must be real authority vested in the official government, particularly in the executive. Failure to provide real executive powers will tend to cause these powers, which

¹ See V. O. Key, Jr., "Methods of Evasion of Civil Service Laws," *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*, vol. 15 (March, 1935), pp. 337-347.

must exist somewhere, to vest outside the government, in a boss. When the framers of the Constitution put great powers in the hands of the President, they made it possible for him to be bigger than any boss could be, and as a result we have never had a real national boss.

Simplicity and authority must be accompanied by responsibility. When an executive provides real and satisfactory leadership, he must be eligible for re-election, so that he will look to the voters and not to the boss for the reward of re-election or the punishment of defeat.

It has been said that in none of the reorganized state governments where the governor is a little President and eligible for re-election has a boss arisen. Whether or not this statement is correct, the best form of government is not likely to be a sure and permanent cure for all areas, particularly not the one-party cities and states. What amount to city parties, such as the Charter Committee of Cincinnati, have possibilities, although they are always likely to face the combined opposition of both major parties, and their sources of funds are more limited. If state politics were not essentially issueless, so that a higher degree of citizen interest might be aroused, strictly state parties might help to prevent state bosses and machines; but the election of senators, congressmen, and presidential electors from states and districts in states produces an inevitable interest on the part of national parties in the states. National patronage is likely to go to state organizations of the national party, not to any strictly state party.

Patronage, Spoils, and Graft

JUST AS SOMEONE is always predicting the end of the boss system, so someone is always expecting the end of patronage, spoils, and graft. In 1910 Robert C. Brooks wrote that "there would seem to be ground for the conclusion that political and social corruption is decreasing in extent and virulence," and he thought that corruption in business was also diminishing, because the great and growing size of business establishments required "a greater degree of fair dealing."¹ This optimistic forecast was written before the Teapot Dome and Veterans' Administration scandals of the Harding Administration, before the Seabury investigations, and before the exposures of the electric utilities. Graft, patronage, and spoils have such an ancient (if dishonorable) history that no one should hurry to predict their end. There must be great vitality in the drives of human conduct or in the institutions that produce them. Patronage is age-old and as new as the Aurelio case, discussed below. The sale of office has been traced to ancient China.²

DEFINITIONS

The terms *bribery*, *graft*, *patronage*, and *spoils* are loose and overlapping; they cover both legal and illegal acts. The broadest term is *graft*, which in common usage extends from a sinecure and the obtaining of favors to bribery and extortion. The terms *spoils* and the *spoils system* are of American origin, traced to Senator William L. Marcy of New York who said in 1832, "To the victors belong the spoils." In this sense these

¹ *Corruption in American Politics and Life* (1910), pp. 300, 303.

² Leonard D. White, *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 14, p. 302.

terms have usually but not always been confined to appointments of partisans to office, which is patronage.¹ Plunkitt of Tammany Hall made a much-quoted distinction between honest and dishonest graft, which only amounts to the difference between legality and illegality. Taking advantage of inside information about a contemplated park to buy the land for resale to the city at a profit was, he said, honest graft, but he thought that the Philadelphia politicians who stole the zinc off the poor-house roof were engaged in dishonest graft.²

CORRUPTION IN ABSOLUTE GOVERNMENTS AND NON-POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

Political corruption is not unique to popular government. All governments have had it, though in varying amounts at different times. Absolute governments, whether of emperor, dictator, king, or tsar, have all shown evidences of it — indeed, have often been permeated with it. Many a title of nobility has rested upon some ancient graft, the bribery of a king's minister or the favor of his mistress. Clearly the Nazi dictatorship in Germany and the Fascist in Italy were riddled with corruption,

¹ The looseness of usage may be illustrated by a few definitions. "Bribery is the practice of tendering and accepting private advantage as a reward for violation of duty. To bribe is to control by means of tangible inducements rather than by persuasion and coercion. . . . Acts of bribery merge into bargaining, price setting, and term making in general." — Harold D. Lasswell, *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 2, p. 690.

Graft is a term "commonly used to designate an advantage which one person by reason of his peculiar position or superior influence or trust acquires from another; a dishonest gain acquired by private or secret practice or corrupt agreement or connivance, especially in positions of trust, as by offering or accepting bribes. . . ." — 38 *Corpus Juris Secundum*, 975.

But: "The public official who acts to the detriment of his constituents in the hope of receiving 'campaign support' is indistinguishable from the official who accepts the direct bribe. In practice, the promise or delivery of a block of votes is of infinitely more importance in corrupting government (i.e., in making it serve a special, rather than the general interest) than the use of direct bribery." — Charles H. Garrigues, *You're Paying for It! A Guide to Graft* (1936), p. 6.

"Most frequently it [the spoils system] designates the practice of making appointments to office not on the basis of merit or fitness but on that of party or factional affiliation or personal gain. In this sense the meaning is essentially the same as patronage system. The expression is also used authoritatively to describe the profits of many types which abuse of official power may extort, not only through appointments, but the grant or refusal of licenses, the enforcement or non-enforcement of the law and other means. In this sense the meaning is substantially equivalent to graft." — Leonard D. White, *op. cit.*, p. 301.

² William L. Riordan, *Plunkitt of Tammany Hall* (1905), pp. 4, 56-57.

and such accounts as come out of Russia and Spain indicate that those dictatorships also are saturated with it.

Nor are governments uniquely susceptible to patronage, spoils, and graft. Almost every illegal or unethical practice in politics can be illustrated with examples from business. "We think of graft as a form of dishonesty peculiar to political life. It is far more common, far more extensive, in business. . . . I have mixed more or less intimately with businessmen and politicians for many years, and I think it must be said in all fairness that the latter do not suffer by comparison with their brothers in trade."¹ Grafting by purchasing agents ("cumshaw") and nepotism are probably more common in business than in politics. The estimated four billions of dollars of losses sustained by investors in the Insull utility empire far exceed any amount that Tammany ever got from the taxpayers.² Nor are other human activities free from taint; there have been charges of patronage and favoritism in some educational and charitable organizations. Some labor leaders have grafted on the funds of their unions. Organized sports, both professional and amateur, have had their scandals. Political misdeeds, however, commonly receive more publicity than all these together, and a false and distorted public opinion is consequently created to the effect that all politics is rotten, whereas only some athletic contests are fixed and only some "amateur" athletes are subsidized. If the truth could ever be determined, it would probably reveal that at any given time the ethical standards of any society condition its politics and its other social processes and institutions to much the same degree.

THE PATRONAGE SYSTEM

In a campaign speech in 1916, Vice-President Thomas R. Marshall said:

Did I say civil or snivel service? They both mean the same. We found the offices guarded by snivel service and our only regret was that we couldn't pry more of the places loose and fill them with Democrats. If there is any office under the government which a Democrat can't fill I believe that office should be abolished.³

¹ John T. Flynn, *Graft in Business* (Vanguard Press, 1931), pp. 18, 34. See also A. A. Berle and G. C. Means, *The Modern Corporation and Private Property* (1933), and David Lynch, *The Concentration of Economic Power* (1946), especially pp. 261-300.

² David Loth, *Public Plunder* (1938), p. 377.

³ Quoted by William Dudley Foulke, *Fighting the Spoilsman* (G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1919), p. 255.

There are too many technical and professional positions in contemporary governments for most politicians to go as far as Marshall went in urging partisan preferment. Nor would many agree with Andrew Jackson that "The duties of all public offices are, or at least admit of being made, so plain and simple that men of intelligence may readily qualify themselves for their performance."¹ If this was ever true, it is true no longer.

DEFENSES OF PATRONAGE

The institution of the patronage system, commonly ascribed to Jackson, goes back to the earliest days of the Republic.² It may, in fact, be seen in colonial politics, although parties were not at that time fully developed and the patronage was personal or factional. The patronage system has been practiced and defended by many American politicians, of whom Abraham Lincoln was perhaps the most skillful and successful.³ Although the system of party patronage has lost ground before the advance of the merit system and veterans' preference — which is no more than veterans' patronage — practical politicians from the earliest days to the present have defended it. "As long as there are political parties," wrote Edward J. Flynn, "as long as men are elected to public office who are politically ambitious (and who ever enters a political race who is not?), the practice of the 'spoils system' will continue." Unlike Marshall, Flynn would not abolish a job if no qualified partisan could be found, but if the appointing officer appoints to offices "a number of men who are qualified in every way by education and training to occupy the positions, as well as [by] their being members of his own party, he has not only strengthened his own leadership, but has also done a real service to the community."⁴

Payment of Party Expenses. A respectable case can be made for some patronage appointments, beginning with the argument that in a huge country huge parties are necessary to fill the multitude of offices and to mobilize some sort of consent. "The root of the problem of party patronage is party finance. To perform the normal and legitimate functions of the party requires a huge effort, which is forthcoming in large part only

¹ First Annual Message (1829), J. D. Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents* (1897), vol. 3, p. 1012.

² Carl Russell Fish, *The Civil Service and the Patronage* (1904). See also Howard L. McBain, *De Witt Clinton and the Origin of the Spoils System in New York* (1907).

³ H. J. Carman and R. H. Luthin, *Lincoln and the Patronage* (1943).

⁴ *You're the Boss* (1947), p. 141. For other comments on patronage see pp. 77, 79, 153, 162.

for reward, immediate or eventual," wrote T. V. Smith.¹ The taxpayers, in other words, must subsidize the parties, because the parties perform a necessary public service. Otherwise to finance parties, either by gifts from the wealthy or from organized labor, would lead to their class control. The public is not yet sufficiently interested in paying its political expenses to tolerate outright appropriations of public funds to parties, not to mention the other difficulties that would arise in the just apportionment and administration of such money.

Strengthening of Executive Leadership. The use of patronage strengthens the executive in the eternal contest produced by the separation of powers established by American constitutions. The executive usually rests upon a broader base of popular support than the legislature, elected by single-member districts, and if unity of action is to be obtained at all, it is obtained through executive leadership. Lincoln was notably successful in his use of patronage at keeping his party unified and at maintaining his support in Congress. "He utilized the patronage in holding together diverse conflicting factions in common purposes — the preservation of the Union, the success of his administration, and the rewarding of the party faithful. . . . Lincoln recognized the necessity of patronage as a weapon in party leadership under the American system."² Franklin D. Roosevelt used the same weapon to obtain action from his partisans in Congress. James A. Farley quoted him as saying: "First off, we must hold up judicial appointments in states where the delegation is not going along. We must make appointments promptly where the delegation is with us. Where there is a division we must give posts to those supporting us. Second, this must apply to other appointments. I'll keep in close contact with the leaders."³ Both Lincoln and Roosevelt were savagely attacked for this use of patronage as a means of controlling members of Congress, but it is hard to see — the American constitutional system being what it is — how otherwise they could have maintained any party unity. When the national party leadership has no control over the nominations to Congress, patronage may be its most effective weapon.

¹ Leonard D. White and T. V. Smith, *Politics and Public Service* (1939), p. 82. This volume marshals the arguments for and against patronage and bureaucracy. Volume 189 (1937) of the *Annals* is devoted to the question of public personnel; for a defense of patronage by a political boss, William Turn, see pp. 22–28.

² Carman and Luthin, *op. cit.*, p. 336. See also pp. 228, 240–242. Lincoln went even further and used patronage for personal reasons; for cases of nepotism see pp. 115–116.

³ *Jim Farley's Story: The Roosevelt Years* (1948), p. 74.

Very similar conditions exist in the state governments. A governor who seeks to unify his party and to carry out some set of party policies may be unable to accomplish his purposes unless he uses patronage. Warren Moscow, for many years Albany correspondent of the *New York Times*, summarized Governor Dewey's use of patronage thus:

Probably state patronage has never been used more intelligently and to greater effect than by Dewey to keep his party in line and to put his policies into effect. Those few who opposed him were put into the political ash-can with neatness and dispatch. Rolland B. Marvin of Syracuse had supported Willkie in 1940 . . . and he remained tied to Willkie by bonds of personal affection. Dewey cut off his state patronage, set up a rival dispenser in Marvin's home town, and sat back and waited for the local organization to unseat Marvin, as it did in short order. A political leader who can't deliver jobs or favors when they are to be had is always doomed to early death. A number of others, none so prominent as Marvin, likewise disappeared from the public ken, for the same reason.

But Sprague of Nassau, who became national committeeman and chief lieutenant for Dewey, fared very well, as did Broderick of Monroe a convert to the Dewey standard. Westchester and Suffolk leaders, the Dutchess and Erie organizations, may have grumbled quietly over the bows they had to make to the supreme authority in the party, but they could never complain about the political pay-offs.¹

Patronage and Public Policy. Advocates of the merit system always concede that policy-determining posts should be political, in order that a party, elected to office, should have an opportunity to carry out any public policies upon which it campaigned and for which it received the approval of the voters. The carrying out of such policy, it is said, should then be left to a career service. But the formulation and determination of policy is not so simple and clear-cut as that. Policy is not the strong point of American parties, made up as they are of sectional and interest groupings. In the formulation and invention of policy the administration is at least as important as party. When Raymond Moley landed in the State Department he found that "In the course of the years this [career] service had, as any bureaucracy does, embodied its fears and prejudices in thousands of minute decisions that, taken together, had slowly formed a gigantic coral reef of major policy."² A bureaucracy, as will be shown more fully in a later chapter, is itself an interest group, one which stands

¹ *Politics in the Empire State* (Alfred A. Knopf, 1948), p. 80.

² *After Seven Years* (1939), p. 131.

as a rival to the political party as an organ for the formulation of public policy. How far down, therefore, is the party justified in making removals and in appointing partisans, so that if the party has a policy it can be carried out? Gideon Welles thought that Lincoln's wholesale removals were not only justified but imperative if the administrative loyalty to the Union necessary for victory was to be attained. The same argument can be used in any time of crisis. Franklin Roosevelt's removal of William E. Humphrey in 1933 from the Federal Trade Commission because their views differed on the policy embodied in the Clayton Act was a recent, peacetime example. Some successful city managers who have proved that they can conduct the affairs of a city efficiently and without scandal will not accept appointment in civil service cities because, they allege, they cannot carry out their policies. It is not easy, and perhaps it is impossible, to draw a line between those offices where policy is determined and those where it is merely executed. However, the matter is not likely to be settled by logic but rather by unstable resolution of pressures between the political managers, who prefer complete patronage, and the advocates of the merit system who would extend it right up to the Cabinet.

Nationalizing Effects of Patronage. Another defense of patronage is that it is used by parties to diminish group antagonisms. The "recognition" by politicians of nationality, racial, and religious groups, and the appointment of their members to office, tends to reduce social frictions. It gives these groups a sense of belonging that they would not have if individual members were appointed on a basis of strict merit. The Americanizing effect of this use of patronage may be expected to pass away over the years, because of the restriction of immigration. But religious and racial differences promise to remain indefinitely. Meanwhile, patronage appointments, even though few, seem to make for better feeling.

Alleged Deficiencies of Career Service. T. V. Smith and many others have offered as a defense of patronage the commonly alleged deficiencies of a career service, such as arrogance, irresponsibility, lack of responsiveness to public demands, tendency to become case-hardened, and the rest. If employees selected by party favor are sometimes inefficient, the condition, they say, is not corrected by a merit system which in practice protects the lazy and inefficient as well as the vigorous and efficient. Measurement of these matters is extremely difficult; no rating scheme for employees has ever been devised which is fully satisfactory, and the administration of any scheme is open to great abuse. At any rate, the

wholesale turnouts that used to take place in the federal service with a change in parties lowered efficiency and morale to zero in many agencies for a year or more after the overturn. The same condition can still be observed when a change of party control occurs in the non-civil service states and cities. When an administrator finds that he cannot discipline employees for lateness or other inefficiency because of their political backing, or when he finds that around election time only a skeleton force is at hand, he cannot possibly make the agency operate as it should.

EVILS OF PATRONAGE

Payroll Padding. Opponents of the patronage system have persuaded even the machine politicians of the benefits to the public of merit and tenure for professional and technical personnel. They go on to assert that the system has such intrinsic evils that it should be abolished for all positions which do not determine policy. Certainly one of its evils is payroll padding, the appointment of unnecessary employees. How much of this there is the country over, it is impossible to say with certainty. There have been estimates that the costs to the taxpayers of the useless jobs run to half a billion dollars a year. In individual instances, however, clear examples may be shown. For example, the water department of Kansas City had, under Pendergast, 905 employees and operated at a deficit of \$700,000 a year. When the merely political employees were dismissed, the department operated more efficiently with 365 employees and produced a surplus of \$1,500,000 a year.¹

The loading of the payrolls with unnecessary personnel is at its worst in boss-controlled cities, such as Kansas City was under Pendergast, but there is some of it in almost every state capital, courthouse, and city hall. There is some of it in Washington; Theodore Bilbo's appointment in 1933 to clip newspapers for the Agricultural Adjustment Administration at \$6000 a year — "Pastemaster General," he called himself — was a curious but not a unique example. There is no ethical difference between appointing an unnecessary clerk at \$2500 a year in a county treasurer's office and stealing \$2500 a year from the county funds, and certainly the result to the taxpayers is the same. When public payrolls are used for political purposes there is always the temptation to go beyond padding and to put on them fictitious names, to force kickbacks, to put in false claims for overtime, and to engage in similar frauds.

¹ Statement of National Civil Service League, December 2, 1946.

Use to Control Official Action and to Capture the Opposition. When patronage is used to control official action it is hardly distinguishable from bribery. Appointments to bipartisan election boards may be used to protect the perpetrators of election frauds from prosecution. By means of a judicious distribution of the jobs on other bipartisan boards and commissions, the majority party may often make the minority a captive, and this condition extends beyond boss-ridden cities and states. Another familiar tactic is for the majority to appoint leaders of the minority to judicial and quasi-judicial positions where they cannot take an active part in politics. In these and other ways patronage may be used to break down a two-party system.

CIVIL SERVICE REFORM

The campaign to reform the civil service in the United States was part of an international agitation by good-government liberals. In the 1860's England, France, and Prussia had reform movements which limited patronage more rapidly than this occurred in the United States.¹ The first bill to provide in the federal government appointments only after examination, tenure, and dismissal only for cause was introduced during Lincoln's administration by Charles Sumner. In 1871 Congress passed an ineffective act which allowed the President to prescribe rules. President Grant appointed George William Curtis, a famous civil service reformer of the period, to the new board, but Grant made so many offensive appointments that Curtis resigned. The Pendleton Act of 1883 was the first effective national act. It divided employees into two groups, the "classified service," or those subject to examination for appointment, and the unclassified service, or those subject to patronage appointment. With advances and retreats, the merit system expanded in the federal service until the Ramspeck Act of 1940 authorized the President to bring into the classified service most of the positions still exempted. Acting under this authority, President Roosevelt in 1941 took 182,000 positions into the classified service. The great majority of federal employees are now under civil service.

¹ Fish, *op. cit.*, pp. 209-211; for a history of the reform movement in the United States see pp. 209-228. Most texts on public administration, e.g., Leonard D. White, *An Introduction to Public Administration*, contain chapters devoted to the history of civil service reform. See also Frank M. Stewart, *The National Civil Service Reform League* (1929).

The first state to adopt a civil service law was New York, in 1883, but state and local governments have been slow to abandon patronage. Twenty-two states have service-wide systems of some sort in their state governments, fewer than two hundred among the three thousand counties have them, and only about a thousand towns and cities.¹ The systems vary widely in coverage and in administration. Veterans' preference is almost universal.

The whole movement, national and state, has occurred over the objections of such practical politicians as Conkling, Flynn, and McKellar. It has been encouraged more by executives wearied of patronage squabbles than by legislative bodies, and it has been furthered by the ceaseless agitation of the National Civil Service League and the Civil Service Assembly. Politicians have learned to work within civil service laws and regulations, but they have never really accepted them.

DEVICES FOR EVADING CIVIL SERVICE LAWS

Starving the Administration. An investigation of the New Jersey Civil Service Commission in 1943 revealed sixteen devices there in use to evade the state civil service statute. Others have appeared in different states.² The simplest means of evasion is to vitiate an act or a constitutional requirement by the provision of inadequate funds for administration and enforcement. If a commission does not have money to hire examiners, conduct examinations, and set up lists of eligibles, the appointments of temporary employees by partisan action is necessary. One example must suffice:

As respects the merit system which is written into the constitution of the state of Ohio, former Governor Bricker showed complete lack of interest. On the contrary, he countenanced flagrant violations and permitted the passage of laws which have dealt it mortal blows. The appropriations for the State Civil Service Commission have been so inadequate as to disclose intention to wreck proper enforcement of the law.³

Another device is to pass statutes which, without repealing a civil service law, reduce it to absurdity, such as the Ohio act of 1943, signed by

¹ *Book of the States* (1948), pp. 195-201.

² See V. O. Key, Jr., "Methods of Evasion of Civil Service Laws," *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*, vol. 15 (March, 1935), pp. 337-347.

³ Murray Seasongood in *Public Men*, J. T. Salter, editor (University of North Carolina Press, 1946), p. 410.

Governor Bricker, which prohibits the use of educational qualifications. Another is the passage of a statute that classifies a host of employees as "confidential" personnel and hence exempt from examinations. But if a civil service law is adequate in scope, and the commission sufficiently financed, there are still ways to evade the law and the regulations. For purposes of convenience in discussion these may be classified as (1) devices to get a person into office; (2) devices to keep him in and improve his status; and (3) devices for getting a person out. Since laws and rules differ from one jurisdiction to another, only the principal methods can be enumerated.

DEVICES TO GET PEOPLE INTO OFFICE

The Appointment of Temporary Employees. All civil service laws must allow for temporary or provisional appointments to meet seasonal needs or emergencies. The emergencies occur, not only when people must be appointed quickly to cope with some disaster, but also when employees die or retire. Theoretically a civil service commission can have lists of eligibles all ready, composed of people who have passed examinations, and for the commoner jobs (stenographer, file clerk, bookkeeper) the lists can be ready. But for the better paying classifications in which perhaps only two or three jobs of each type exist in any department (inheritance tax examiner, actuary, office manager) a commission cannot well maintain lists. Vacancies may occur only once in twenty years, and competent people will not take examinations on such remote possibilities of appointment. When a vacancy does occur there is either no list, or the list is so old that the appointing officer may legally demand that a new examination be held. Meanwhile he can appoint a temporary employee at the recommendation of an appropriate politician. In January, 1949, the Philadelphia Bureau of Municipal Research published a study it had made of provisional appointments in Philadelphia. For selected years from 1920 to 1947 the ratio of provisionals to all appointments varied from 18 to 71 per cent; and once appointed, "The provisional appointee's chances of landing high enough on the eligible list for permanent appointment ranged from a little better than 6 out of 10 in 1941 and 1942 to better than 8 out of 10 in 1946."¹ In some jurisdictions such temporaries will receive an experience credit, a set number of points on the examination for each month of service. If the

¹ *Citizens' Business* (no. 1868, leaflet), January 18, 1949.

rules permit, the appointing officer will delay proceedings until experience credits have so piled up that the temporary cannot fail to come out on top of an examination.

Almost all American civil service examinations are practical; that is, they aim to test not so much general culture and education as ability to perform a particular job. Here, then, the temporary has another advantage. He may in a few weeks so master the statute and regulations under which he works, and the details of the job — such as office forms and procedure — that no outsider can equal him on an examination. No civil service examiner, moreover, can know as much about many jobs as the office that performs them. He must, therefore, seek the help of the appointing officer at setting up the examination. The possibilities are obvious. If the examiner, on the other hand, fails or refuses to seek this help, the administrator may object to the nature of the examination on the ground that it is impractical and may take an appeal to the civil service commission and sometimes to the courts. Temporary appointments, therefore, may be made to last for years; in some instances, for a lifetime.

Unfair Marking or Conduct of Examinations. Examinations may be unfairly marked, although this fact is extremely difficult to prove, because different examiners, actuated by the purest motives, may give widely differing scores to the same paper. V. O. Key cites a number of examples, however, where the unfairness was patent.¹ There are constant rumors of impersonation in examinations, and occasionally some one like Mayor Curley of Boston gets caught at it and sent to jail. This use of a substitute is relatively easy, however, when large numbers of people gather to take an examination.

Examinations may be held on short or inadequate notice, insiders being notified. Or they may be held at inconvenient times or places, so that persons engaged in private employment cannot, without risk of losing their jobs, take the examinations. Or the examinations may be given in parts, one part each day over several days, so that outsiders, presently employed, cannot afford the loss of wages involved.

Use of Oral Examinations. The composition and preparation of written examinations have already been mentioned. Many positions, however, require factors of personal appearance, voice, manner, patience, tact, and other factors of personality which cannot be measured by written exam-

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 344-345. The multiple-answer type of examination tends to overcome this unfairness.

inations. If these matters are to be given the weight they deserve, only oral examinations will suffice. But the long experience of educational institutions with oral examinations has demonstrated that they are peculiarly liable to subjective distortions. They cannot be adequately pre-tested or standardized, and the results cannot be objectively reviewed. That the oral examination may be politically rigged was shown by the following letter, addressed to Governor Harold Hoffman, which in 1943 turned up in the investigation of the New Jersey Civil Service Commission:

November 12, 1936

Dear Harold:

I arranged with John [E. Joyce, Civil Service Commissioner] and Maury Cronin [President of the Commission] that we are to furnish a list of the people we are interested in for the motor vehicle examination. The idea being, that the commissioners are going to sit in on the oral examination and will give a high rating to our friends. This should be very helpful to us.

If you will have the list ready on our return I shall take care of the necessary trench work.

Sincerely,
Barney

The signer was Bernard Lamb, Governor Hoffman's patronage dispenser. The governor wrote a notation to his secretary in the margin, "Tell Barney I am getting the list ready."¹

Establishment of Job Requirements. Another device for getting people in is the establishment of job requirements. For the more usual types of work, a civil service commission can establish standards of education, experience, or performance that may be applied on a service-wide basis. But for the higher (and better paid) positions, no commission can pretend to have the knowledge or experience to establish requirements. Even if it had, it could hardly enforce its wishes by fiat upon another bureau or department. If, therefore, an appointing officer sets requirements so that a very limited number of persons are eligible (those who have been ap-

¹ *Newark* [New Jersey] *Evening News*, December 22, 1943; also December 28, 1943. When the former governor was asked about this matter, he readily admitted the scheme but said he was "depressed by reformers who think they can cure all the ills of government by making investigations." The *Newark Evening News*, an independent paper, observed editorially that the administration of civil service in the state was so full of "hypocrisies and deceptions" that the state might as well return to an out-and-out spoils system.

proved by the political leader), there is little that can be done about it, especially if the chief executive, who appoints the civil service commissioners, stands by the appointing officer. This device of setting requirements has been used by appointing officers to keep out veterans, in spite of veterans' preference, to the great indignation of the American Legion. Age and educational requirements, however, have been most used for this purpose.

"Going Down the List." When people pass a civil service examination, their names are placed on the list of eligibles in the order of their rank on the examination, with such exceptions as the veterans' preference laws or rules may demand. The appointing officer is rarely required to accept the first name on the list, unless in some cases it is that of a veteran. Rather, he may go down the list a varying number of names, at least three, to make a selection. If one of the top three is politically acceptable, and the others are not, that one is likely to be appointed. In some jurisdictions an appointing officer can reject an entire list after an interview with each candidate and can then call for a new examination. This process can be repeated until the people not politically sponsored drop out.

KEEPING PEOPLE IN AND IMPROVING POSITIONS

Once a person is safely in office other devices may be used to keep him in and to improve his position. If a rating scheme is in use, the administrator who got the man in will see that the reports on him to the civil service commission will show his performance to be uniformly excellent. Before long, promotion examinations may be set which only he may take, "open only to persons presently employed in the following category . . ."

But arranging promotional examinations to exclude all but the politically select is difficult in large organizations, such as city police and fire departments. Under such circumstances, a device known as the waiver is often used. A large number of those eligible to take the promotional examination may be asked, in return for various favors, such as increases in pay, pleasant assignments, even cash gifts, to file waivers of their rights to take the examination. Those who prove recalcitrant may be set to patrolling the city dump, put on night-and-day duty, or otherwise persecuted until they sign. When the list is reduced to manageable numbers the promotional examination is held. If a few besides the favored ones get through, they can be passed over or induced not to accept promotion by the threat of being brought up on charges or in other ways.

GETTING PERSONS OUT

There are various ways to get political opponents out of civil service positions. The easiest and simplest is to abolish the jobs. When done by statute, this device is often called "ripper" legislation. A reduction of force for reasons of economy always looks well in the papers. Soon the jobs may be re-established under new titles, with such different requirements as are appropriate. Meanwhile, temporary political appointments may be made until the new examinations are held. Upon a change of administration, the civil service employees known to belong to the defeated party may be discreetly notified that they have sixty or ninety days to resign. If they fail to do so they may be harassed until they do. The devices available for this purpose naturally vary from one agency to another and often depend upon the nature of the job to be opened up. State policemen may be ordered to move their headquarters and their families from one end of the state to the other, and soon may be ordered back again. Office employees may be ordered to the most unpleasant field offices, say in the insane asylum. Others may lose certain privileges, such as travel expenses or maintenance allowances. If all else fails, they may be brought up on charges and dismissed for alleged insubordination or inefficiency.

In such circumstances the employees may usually take appeals to the civil service commission and sometimes to the courts, but if the administrator has been careful to build up some evidence — and rarely can employees avoid violating a few regulations — he can get his decision sustained. Dismissal on charges, however, is strictly a device to be used as a last resort, because of the bad publicity and ill feeling that is aroused. By all odds the commonest device used is abolishing the job. On the whole, the attitude of politicians is that they would rather create new jobs for their own people or get them in some other way than to force their opponents out.

EFFECTS OF PATRONAGE ON PARTIES

Although the great majority of practical politicians believe that patronage is necessary to their success, a few regard it as a liability. James A. Farley thought that he could have built up the Democratic Party without a single job, but he did not put such a theory to the test.¹ Since there are

¹ *Behind the Ballots* (1938), p. 237.

almost always more job-seekers than there are jobs, the distribution of patronage inevitably produces hard feelings, no matter how skillfully it is handled. When Senator George W. Norris, for example, had to pick one from among seventeen applicants for the post office at Trenton, Nebraska, "The unsuccessful sixteen," he said, "invariably revealed the bitterest animosity."¹ His is a common experience. The observation that each appointment makes nine enemies and one ingrate has been attributed to various politicians, including Grover Cleveland.

If patronage were indispensable to party success, a party in power could never be put out. But all the Republicans appointed over the years by Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover could not prevent Democratic success in 1932, nor could all the Democrats appointed under Roosevelt and Truman prevent Republican success in 1946. It may be concluded that patronage will not stop a landslide, but when an election is close, the office-holders, with their friends and relatives and the money they contribute, may make the difference between victory and defeat. They are like a professional army, well trained in the political wars, which can put down revolts but can be defeated by a revolution. The more attention a party pays to patronage, of course, the less it pays to policy. The more interested it is in getting and holding jobs for its adherents, the less risk it will run in taking positions that will endanger those jobs.

THE HATCH ACTS

The Hatch Acts of 1939 and 1940 undertook, among other things, to take federal civil service employees out of politics. They made it unlawful for employees in the executive branch and for state employees paid in whole or in part from federal funds — other than the President, the members of the Cabinet, and a few others — to use their official authority to influence elections in which federal officers are chosen. While reserving to federal employees the right to vote and to express their opinions, the acts denied them the right to "take any active part in political management or in political campaigns."² Although the acts were upheld by the Supreme Court (though not unanimously), it does not take much acquaintance among politicians to discover that they are widely evaded or violated. Just how widely it is impossible to say on what evidence has

¹ George W. Norris, *Fighting Liberal* (1945), p. 140.

² 18 USCA, 61a, 61h, 61i.

appeared.¹ In a vast variety of subtle ways it is possible for an employee to use his official discretion to influence elections, and he can covertly take a fairly active part in politics. The acts would clearly prevent, however, such behavior as acting as a campaign manager, accepting election to a party position, or being a member of a party committee. Some states have "Little Hatch Acts," and others have provisions in their civil service laws to the same effect. Like the federal statutes, these too are often evaded and violated.

ADMINISTRATIVE SPOILS AND GRAFT

LICENSES AND TAXES

The great body of patronage appointments lies in the administrative branch of the government, although, as will be seen later, there is a considerable amount of very lucrative patronage around courts and legislatures. In the administration there are various other sources of spoils besides appointments. The use of the licensing power is discussed in a subsequent chapter in connection with licensed businesses, which frequently must contribute to politicians to obtain licenses. Legal advertising, explained in Chapter 6, is a kind of honest graft. The use of the tax machinery, mentioned in the previous chapter on bosses and machines, is not confined to boss-dominated cities or states. Anyone who can obtain the complete confidence of the insiders in the courthouse gang in many, if not most, American counties will find that favors are done for political friends through assessments. The favors are often not gross. A house worth \$25,000 and owned by the village banker may be assessed at \$15,000, or a merchant's own estimate of the value of his stock in trade may be accepted without question. Because an element of judgment or opinion enters into what the law calls a "fair, full, and true" value, favoritism is extremely difficult to prove beyond that well-known reasonable doubt. The tax machinery is not so often used for punitive purposes in rural areas as it is by the city machines. The political use of inspections was also mentioned in the previous chapter.

¹ The constitutional questions involved and the cases are fully discussed by Ferrel Heady in "The Hatch Act Decisions," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 41 (August, 1947), pp. 687-699.

GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS

Almost every government has to enter into contracts — to build and repair aqueducts, courthouses, jails, roads, schools, sewers, streets, water systems, and many other public works. The laws relating to these contracts are usually very complex and specific. It may be said that almost every clause in them is the relic of some old abuse, but the laws have yet to be written that will end all abuses. A few examples must suffice. It is common to require that no contract for an amount exceeding \$1000 can be let unless there is public bidding upon published specifications. Some public projects, especially those such as street and highway repairs, sewer extensions, and the painting of buildings, can readily be divided into many units that individually come under the thousand-dollar limit, and these are then awarded to political friends of the officials who have the authority to enter into the contract. Where a contract cannot be split, insiders may be enabled to bid low, knowing that extra charges will be allowed, that the inspection will be lax, or that changes in specifications to the advantage of the contractor will be made. Many public contract laws require that the contract be awarded to the lowest responsible bidder. In determining what constitutes responsibility, performance bonds may or may not be required, depending upon the law or the contractor's political standing. Sometimes various securities and notes may be accepted in lieu of a bond. Probably there have been many town halls, county courthouses, and state capitols and office buildings erected without any graft or favoritism, but the wide differences common between the architects' estimates and the final costs must lead one to suspect that even where no investigation results — and there have been hundreds — there are many leaks in the law of public contracts.

GOVERNMENT PURCHASES

Almost every government has to make purchases of coal, gasoline, oil, machinery, printing, land, foodstuffs, and thousands of other items, from a stamp pad for the village tax collector to a ten-million-dollar office building for the state government. Hundreds of examples of the sale of land and buildings to governments at excessive prices could be assembled. One must suffice. Pendergast

was able to dispose of the Jefferson Hotel with the assistance of the [Kansas City] government, which suddenly got around to ordering an important

civic improvement, widening Sixth Street to a point where it took in a corner of the Goat boss's hotel, for which he was awarded \$79,550. The foreman of the condemnation jury, a Pendergast lieutenant, pointed out that the amount allowed was larger than the amount that Tom had asked. He mentioned this as an illustration of Pendergast's moderation. . . .¹

Laws relating to purchases are also complex and often specific. They too often have the thousand-dollar clause, though they may set an even lower figure for the size of a purchase that can be made without public bidding. But purchases may be split even more easily than contracts. "Trick specifications" — those that operate to exclude all but a single supplier — are easily made and readily defended. A borough council, for example, may present a most plausible case that one kind of stop light, parking meter, or fire truck is so superior to all others on the market that in the very nature of the matter only one company could meet their high-quality specifications. When suppliers are selling patented or copyrighted devices or supplies, all at virtually the same prices, there is an especially strong temptation for the salesmen to split their commissions with the right people. It has even been done with purchases of schoolbooks; a salesman for a schoolbook company once told the author hours of stories about how he dealt with school boards, superintendents, and commissioners of education. On one occasion he bought a horse and wagon from a county superintendent of schools, and of course never went to claim this property after the county schools were supplied with his company's books.

The purchase of furnishings for public buildings is a continuous source of temptation to graft. Some of the revelations have been spectacular. For instance, "The Capitol itself had cost the state four million dollars — just the building, the shell. But Pennsylvania had paid nine millions to furnish it." The state was shown to have paid \$80 for an \$8 hatrack, \$150 each for chairs worth \$34.65, \$2500 each for chandeliers worth \$194, and so on.² Similar amazing prices, such as forty dollars each for wastebaskets, were paid for the furnishings of a New Jersey state office building. But such extreme mark-ups are fairly rare; smart politicians avoid them because they are *prima-facie* fraudulent.

When there is graft in purchasing (commonly called the "rake-off"),

¹ William M. Reddig, *Tom's Town* (Lippincott, 1947), p. 93.

² Walter Davenport, *Power and Glory, the Life of Boies Penrose* (1931), pp. 128-132. Penrose disdained such graft as this. He was reported to have said that if the perpetrators of these frauds should be found they should be sent "to the insane asylum. They're damned fools, not criminals."

it seldom goes to a political organization. Rather, the deals are made on an individual basis, between the vendors and the politicians who have the authority to make the purchases, who profit personally. But there are exceptions. It is common knowledge, for instance, that in Jersey City the Hague machine gets 3 per cent of most purchases, flat per-item fees on others, such as fifty cents a barrel on cement. Some of the graft may find its way ultimately to an organization in the form of campaign contributions from the persons who made the profits on the purchases.

RENTS AND LEASES

Many administrative agencies have to rent or lease buildings or parts of buildings — office space, warehouses, garages. This may occur because a legislative body will not appropriate money to buy, because the government concerned is at or too close to its legal debt limit, or because the use is so limited or uncertain that it would not pay it to buy. Yet even when space is rented at rates suspiciously above the market, so that the difference could be divided between owner and politicians, the fact of the graft is very difficult to prove. Perhaps only one garage in a town is available for the storage of snow-removal equipment, so that no basis for comparative rentals can be established. But even if there are two or more, a case can always be made out for the superior facilities or location of the one selected.

INSURANCE AND BONDS

Many governments carry fire insurance on their buildings and automotive equipment. Many carry fidelity bonds on public employees who handle money. Many cities, being suable, carry casualty and liability insurance. The premiums are almost the same no matter what companies write the insurance or the bonds, and where they differ, slight changes in coverage may be used to account for the differences. Many legislators and local politicians are in the real estate, insurance, and bonding business, and a considerable amount of honest graft may be distributed among them by allowing them to write insurance. Performance bonds may also be channeled through favored individuals. To cite one recent specific instance, the former campaign manager for a governor of New Hampshire was shown to have obtained the bulk of the performance bonds for state highway and building construction; his commission was said to be between

\$12,000 and \$40,000.¹ There is nothing illegal about this. It is just one of those plums growing on the trees in Plunkitt's political Garden of Eden.

PUBLIC FUNDS AND DEBT

The handling of public funds and public debt offers other possibilities of perhaps unethical but not generally illegal profit. Banks favored with deposits of public funds are known as "pet banks," and while this device was once an important source of favoritism, in days of low interest rates the deposits are not so much sought by banks. When bonds, notes, or other evidences of indebtedness are sold through brokers, and when the brokers all charge virtually the same commission, it is easy to handle the matter through those brokers who will split their commissions. The operations of some sinking funds give an opportunity to increase this profit. The money for a public improvement is raised through the sale of bonds, which are supported by tax money paid annually into a sinking fund. As the money is paid in, it is invested by the authorities in other securities, usually bonds, which are later sold to pay off the sinking fund bonds as they mature. Obviously considerable buying and selling of bonds has to go on all the time in a large sinking fund. There have also been charges that financially unfortunate but politically influential investors have on occasion succeeded in selling low-grade bonds ("cats and dogs") into sinking funds to prevent or reduce their losses.

LOCATION OF PUBLIC WORKS

The location of public works offers many possibilities for profit, mostly honest. If, for instance, a city builds a park, the value of apartment houses abutting that park may double. The building of a city hall or county courthouse will enhance the value of adjacent property. Farm land may be increased in value by the construction of a good road past or near it. Attempts to recapture by means of excess condemnation proceedings such increases in value due to public improvements have been generally unsuccessful. To be able, therefore, to control the location of public works may be immensely valuable. It is not even necessary to own the land upon which the improvement is to be made.

¹ *New Hampshire Sunday News*, October 16, 1947.

CONTROL OF PUBLIC SERVICES

The control of public services, such as the extension of charity, welfare, relief, hospitalization, and the rest, may for a politician produce not cash graft but votes; yet the difference may be immaterial. One political organization of the author's acquaintance always had to spend a hundred dollars for election-day workers in order to carry a particular election district, but when an aged and senile grandmother of the largest family in the precinct was, through the work of the organization, admitted to the state old people's home, the expenditure was no longer necessary. The men of the family worked harder than ever before and refused thereafter to accept any money.

Sometimes favors no more important than obtaining low automobile license numbers or the prompt removal of snow from a street or highway may be politically very valuable. Or being introduced to the mayor or the governor or having tea at the White House — all these favors make friends and get votes.

LEGISLATIVE SPOILS

PATRONAGE

Varying from the appointment of the clerk of the village board to the appointment of hundreds of clerks, assistants, and other employees of Congress, legislative bodies have patronage of their own to dispense. There are clerks, doorkeepers, messengers, sergeants-at-arms, and all their deputies and assistants. Some of these employees do a modicum of work for their pay, but it is not uncommon to find five times as many doorkeepers as there are doors, more clerks attached to a committee than it has members, and so on. For example, a grand jury investigating the New York legislature in 1944 counted 990 legislative employees.¹ "Many employees," the grand jury said in one presentment, "are carried on the legislative payrolls, not because their work is essential, but because the legislature has become a ready medium through which political debts are paid." The following year, in an eighteen-page presentment, the grand jury cited such examples as "An elderly, retired merchant, appointed doorkeeper, served only a day or two because of his infirmity but remained on the Senate payroll for two sessions of the legislature"; "the appoint-

¹ *New York Times*, December 8, 1944.

ment of a man as a stenographer whose eyesight was so bad he had to be assisted to the witness stand in the grand jury room"; "a county leader who was paid \$1000 for 'working at home,' purportedly writing letters"; and similar payroll padding.¹ Committees which almost never met were found to have employed expensive legal counsel, as well as the whole array of clerks, stenographers, and other personnel. Indeed, some committees appeared to have been set up for no other purpose than to provide employment for these people.

NEPOTISM

Roughly the same conditions appear in Congress. In a survey made in 1947, Howard M. Norton of the *Baltimore Sun* found sixty-two members of the House with close relatives of the same name on the payroll; thirty-five members with their wives on salaries from \$1700 to \$7000, to a total of approximately a quarter of a million dollars a year. A number of the wives do some work, but the reporter found "the usual reply was that 'If you wish to talk to Mrs. X you should call her at home.' Of one congressman's wife getting \$40 a week it was said: 'She hasn't been at the office in months — she is having a baby.' " Representative J. Parnell Thomas, chairman of the House committee on un-American activities, had his daughter-in-law, who lived in Allendale, New Jersey, with her husband, on the payroll for \$3598 a year. The representative, however, insisted that she worked for him at home.² Legislative bodies have commonly successfully resisted the introduction of civil service for employees of the legislature.

OTHER SPOILS

In addition to patronage, there are other minor grafts, such as padded expense accounts and postage and printing allowances. Junkets (travel at public expense) to study the defenses of the Panama Canal or the Hawaiian Islands, or to represent the city or state at the inauguration of a President or a governor, are naturally popular with legislators, high and low.

¹ *New York Times*, May 5, 1945.

² *Newark* (New Jersey) *Evening News*, April 18, 1947. For an earlier account see Raymond Clapper, *Racketeering in Washington* (1933), especially pp. 71-124.

BRIBERY

The exact extent to which pressure has taken the place of the bribery of legislators is not known, but most contemporary writers appear to be agreed that there is less bribery than there was in the post-Civil War period, for instance.¹ Wholesale bribery of a legislature is now apparently rare, but it does occasionally occur.² Most of the franchises, water rights, power sites, timber grants, and similar privileges which produced the spectacular investigations of the past have been awarded. "Strike bills" — bills introduced or even passed to blackmail business interests — are no longer common.

PORK-BARREL LEGISLATION AND LOGROLLING

"Pork-barrel" legislation, however, is as common as the latest rivers and harbors bill. In this form of spoils, legislators, in order to form a majority to pass an appropriation bill, divide up the pork, each getting something for his constituency. There may be no personal graft for a councilman, legislator, or congressman in such an appropriation, although there are often rumors of collusion with contractors. Legislators who engage in pork barrel deals are really buying votes, even if indirectly, with public funds. Logrolling — the trading of legislative votes — is a similar and everyday occurrence and takes place on the passage of an unknown proportion of contemporary legislation.

¹ See Loth, *op. cit.*, pp. 192–241. Many of the state political histories also contain accounts of legislative bribery in the heyday of land grants and railroad franchises. For example, Fred L. Holmes in his *Badger Saints and Sinners* (1939), p. 158, says that in 1856 the governor and all but seven Wisconsin legislators were bribed by the La Crosse and Milwaukee Railroad: "Stocks and bonds of the company aggregating \$175,000 had been distributed among thirteen senators, and \$355,000 in like securities had been shared among thirty-nine members of the assembly. The sum of \$30,000 was divided equally among three state officials, and \$50,000 in bonds were delivered to Governor Bashford, after the signing of the legislative grant. . . ." No one was ever indicted, but the governor left Wisconsin for the territory of Arizona.

For the period from 1900 to 1914 much of the material is summarized by C. C. Regier in *The Era of the Muckrakers* (1932). See especially pp. 59–107; the book also presents an extensive bibliography, pp. 217–241.

² See "Missouri Mud. Legislature Charged With Wholesale Corruption," *News-week*, vol. 18 (October 20, 1941), p. 19: "The death of a life-insurance bill was offered for \$13,000; an offer was made by a legislator to deliver the St. Louis bloc of votes for cash on the line; a cost of \$1500 was estimated to get a milk bill out of committee."

GERRYMANDERING

The unfair distribution of seats in a legislative body, known as "gerrymandering," is a species of fraud as old as legislative bodies and as new as the latest apportionment bill.¹ The establishment of congressional districts, state senatorial and representative districts, county commissioners' districts, and wards all offer opportunity for gerrymandering. When a party, having a majority of the seats in the body that has authority to establish districts, seeks to reapportion so as to maintain or improve its position, it has two possibilities. It may split up areas in which its opponents' strength lies among various districts, each of which it can carry by a narrow majority. Or it may construct one or more districts in which its opponents are concentrated. In this way one party having a majority of the votes in a state or other area may get only one out of three or more seats, all of which it would obtain if the election were at large. For nearly a century after 1842 Congress by law required that districts be composed of "contiguous and compact" territory, but in the Apportionment Act of 1929 the phrase was omitted. It had never been effective. Ingenious legislators had constructed districts designed to yield the controlling party the largest possible number of seats, and the courts had refused to intervene. In the process districts with the most curious shapes appeared, such as the belt line, dumb-bell, horseshoe, saddle-bag, and corkscrew districts. The failure or refusal to redistrict following the growth or shift of population — the "silent gerrymander" — may have the same intention and effect. The long refusal of the legislature of Illinois, dominated by downstate Republicans, to redistrict the state resulted in the under-representation in Congress of the Democratic voters in Chicago.

PATRONAGE IN COURTS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT

APPOINTMENT OF JUDGES

Probably few citizens realize the great amount of spoils and patronage

¹ Elmer C. Griffith, *The Rise and Development of the Gerrymander* (1907), p. 7. "The word gerrymander was coined in Massachusetts in the spring of 1812," says Griffith (p. 16), from the name of Governor Elbridge Gerry, who had allowed a bill establishing a distorted district to become law. Griffith reproduces an illustration of that district on p. 18. For current illustrations see the maps of congressional districts in the latest *Congressional Directory*.

in the court systems of the United States and in the administration of justice. In the first place, the appointment or election of judges itself constitutes valuable and important patronage. Whether they are elected or appointed seems immaterial, since in either event political leaders generally control the process of selection. As Boss Edward J. Flynn wrote, "Most lawyers aspire to be judges. If a man does not take an energetic rôle in party activities he cannot expect to gratify this ambition. Therefore the great majority of lawyers join the organization."¹ The situation in Cincinnati is comparable. "A man does not become a judge in Hamilton County, save in the rarest of cases, unless he has the approval of the Republican organization, which organization is controlled by a boss who awards favors for value received. . . . Only one candidate has been entered for each office in the judicial primaries in the last twenty years. . . . It is plainly a necessity that any aspirant to the bench must have the approval of the boss."²

Lawyers aspire to be judges both because of the salaries and because of the prestige attached to the office. The salaries and fees paid to local and state judges vary greatly, all the way from a few hundreds of dollars a year to \$25,500 for the Chief Justice in New York. But on the whole, the salaries are sufficiently attractive and the work sufficiently honorific to appeal to most lawyers.³ Salaries of ten thousand dollars a year are now fairly common, even in intermediate and lower courts. Many lawyers regard a judiciary term as desirable regardless of the salary, because after serving on the bench they can often command higher fees and have broader choice among the cases they will take.

The Aurelio Case. It almost will go without saying that where a political organization is strong, the judges, whether elected or appointed, are as much a part of the organization as the city councilmen, the legislators, or the county commissioners. The qualifications, beyond that of being a member of the bar, are usually much the same as the qualifications for any other office. The election of Thomas A. Aurelio in 1943 to a fourteen-year term at \$25,000 a year on the New York Supreme Court was a startling but revealing example. His wife was a Tammany district co-leader. "To become a judge in New York City it is practically essential

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 24.

² Charles O. Porter, "Defects in the Administration of Justice in Hamilton County (Cincinnati), Ohio," *Journal of the American Judicature Society*, vol. 32 (June, 1948), p. 21.

³ For current salary ranges see the *Book of the States*.

that a man be of Irish, Italian, or Jewish extraction.”¹ The two party organizations made a bipartisan deal, ratified at their respective judicial conventions, by which the two parties together nominated only as many candidates as there were places to be filled. Aurelio was on this slate. But at the same time District Attorney Frank S. Hogan was tapping the wires of Frank Costello, a “convicted gun-toter, slot-machine operator, ex-bootlegger, race-track gambler, and bookmaker . . . and comrade of an astonishingly inclusive number of nationally notorious top-drawer criminals.” Hogan intercepted and recorded Aurelio’s telephone message to thank Costello for the nomination. In the proceedings that followed nothing was proved against Aurelio except that one year he had paid \$600,000 in income tax. “Costello testified that he had heard that Boss Kennedy was considering an Irish Catholic for the vacancy rather than an Italian, but Costello was able to prevail upon him.”² Costello continues his wide acquaintance with New York judges. On January 24, 1949, he gave a charity benefit dinner at the Copacabana night club in New York City. At \$100 per plate he raised \$18,000 for charity. Not only did the leader of Tammany Hall, Hugo E. Rogers, and various leaders of the New York underworld show up for his dinner, but also appeared five state supreme court justices, three judges of lower courts, and one former judge.³

Justice G. V. Schenck was another New York state judge embarrassed in 1944 by having his telephone conversations with a politician intercepted; in his case he was talking with Boss O’Connell of Albany about a pending case.⁴

¹ Ferdinand Lundberg, “Aurelio: The People’s Choice,” *Harper’s*, vol. 188 (January, 1944), p. 132.

² For further comment on the case see *The New Republic*, vol. 109 (November 15, 1943), p. 683. For an account of an earlier and more extensive bipartisan judiciary deal in New York City see W. B. and J. B. Northrop, *The Insolence of Office* (1932), pp. 147–155.

³ *Newsweek*, vol. 33, no. 6 (February 7, 1949), pp. 22–23. This friend of New York judges, according to *Newsweek*, had intimate connections with the old Long machine in Louisiana and helped to finance the comeback of Earl Long. Costello had once attained national prominence by calling a nation-wide convention of gangsters which met in Atlantic City: “With him as peacemaker, the mobsters agreed to divide the United States into spheres of influence and thus avoid such unsavory incidents as the St. Valentine’s Day Massacre in Chicago.”

⁴ *New York Times*, November 11, 1944, and days following; and Luther Gulick, “The Shame of the Cities — 1946,” *National Municipal Review*, vol. 36 (January, 1947), pp. 20–21. Gulick reproduced part of the damaging conversation. “Many a boss,” said Gulick, “is the county judge, north, south, and west; many a judge gains his post through the boss and confers with the boss on cases in which he is interested.”

Bar Associations Dissatisfied. The American Bar Association and many local bar associations are deeply dissatisfied with the selection of American judges through political organizations. On one occasion when the Chicago Bar Association complained that a number of Illinois judges had violated Canon 28 of the Code of Judicial Ethics by reason of their political activities, forty-one of the forty-seven judges of the superior and circuit courts resigned from the association rather than be brought up on charges and possibly expelled.¹ Kurtzman in his study of politics in Philadelphia found both the magistrates and judges of the courts of record deeply in politics; indeed, the country over, the magistrates (justices of the peace), who need not usually be lawyers, owe their appointment or election to politics and continue to be active in politics while on the bench. Of the judges of courts of record Kurtzman wrote:

One of the judges is a member of a ward executive committee, while at least two others are titular ward leaders, but not members of the city committee. Many of these judges have also been active politically on several occasions. Among them are former members of the City Council, of the State Senate and House of Representatives, and one of them was even successful at being elected Speaker.²

PATRONAGE IN COURTS

In addition to the patronage in the judgeships themselves, each court has some patronage of its own to distribute — jobs as bailiffs, clerks, stenographers, and so on. The larger the jurisdiction, the greater this patronage. "In the office of the clerk of the municipal court [of Chicago] there are 350 available jobs involving an annual expenditure of more than \$1,500,000 in salaries. With the county judicial offices included, there are about 1000 jobs involving an expenditure of over \$2,000,000. These positions, filled as a rule not on a basis of fitness, but as political spoils, represent real power."³ Judges usually distribute this patronage, not to build up personal organizations, but upon the recommendations of the politicians to whom the judges owe their own positions. At least half the jobs are perfectly useless and utterly unnecessary.⁴

¹ *American Bar Association Journal*, vol. 22 (June, 1936), p. 366; cf. Edward M. Martin, *The Role of the Bar in Electing the Bench in Chicago* (1936).

² David H. Kurtzman, *Methods of Controlling Votes in Philadelphia* (1935), p. 90.

³ Sonya Forthal, *Cogwheels of Democracy* (1946), p. 74.

⁴ Raymond Moley in his *Tribunes of the People* (1932), p. 263, estimated that "roughly half of what goes to support the magistrates' courts in New York City yields no return in the actual administration of justice. It goes either to political work or to utter waste and inefficiency."

OTHER APPOINTMENTS

In addition to the patronage involved in the appointment of the personnel of courts, some judges have the right to appoint appraisers, guardians, liquidators, masters, receivers, referees, trustees, and other persons to act for the court in connection with pending cases. The fees of these individuals are either fixed or approved by the court concerned and are usually paid from litigants' funds. The judge appoints these people at his discretion from among his personal friends, people recommended by a political organization, or by the litigants. An appointment as receiver for a railroad, liquidator for a trust company, or guardian for a wealthy incompetent may be as big a plum as any that grows in the garden of politics.¹ Often a receiver has authority (subject to approval by the court) to appoint adjusters, an attorney, appraisers, real estate agents or brokers, and others. The spoils connected with a single large receivership may easily run to a million dollars.

State Senator Thomas C. Desmond, one of the leaders of the New York legislature, introduced early in 1949 a bill to compel judges to make public the names of and the fees paid to guardians, referees, trustees, and similar appointees of New York courts. When he filed this bill the senator issued a statement in which he pointed out that a judge of the surrogate's court in New York County alone would during his term of office handle estates the value of which would exceed \$7,000,000,000. "Appointments to handle these estates," he said, "rank among the juiciest political plums in the state. . . . The courts are the principal source of large-scale spoils. Judges have built up little empires of patronage. . . . Bar associations ought to but do not take leadership in . . . cleaning up the scandalous pork-barreling in appointments by judges."² He went on to quote with approval an estimate of the New York Chamber of Commerce that the fees allowed by the New York Supreme Court total about \$1,700,000 a year, of which 85 per cent is "sheer waste" of litigants' funds.

UNEVEN ENFORCEMENT OF CRIMINAL LAW

A great variety of spoils, from the fixing of a traffic ticket to the systematic protection of an organized underworld, exists in the machinery for the enforcement of the criminal law. Many books have been written

¹ See "Politics and Receiverships," *American Bar Association Journal*, vol. 19 (April, 1933), p. 198.

² *New York Times*, February 6, 1949.

about this machinery, its operations, and its defects.¹ The details lie beyond the scope of this book. Suffice it to say that from the constable, sheriff, or policeman, through the office of the state's attorney, district attorney, or prosecutor, up through the grand and petit juries and the judges, the machinery of justice may be used in two ways: to protect adherents of a political organization and to punish its opponents. In some instances openly, in more instances covertly, political organizations have replaced judges and prosecutors who did not conduct their offices to suit the political leaders. Vane did it in Philadelphia, Tammany in New York, Thompson in Chicago. The threat "forces the judicial candidates into a relationship of acquiescence and obeisance which profoundly affects the judicial independence and impartiality of the successful candidates."² Some policemen and sheriffs have told investigators fantastic stories of the sources of their fortunes.³

Great powers reside in the public prosecutor, who may prosecute vigorously or may accept pleas of guilty to lesser offenses ("copping a plea"), enter a *nolle prosequi*, delay prosecution until witnesses die or disappear, or "throw" a case by a weak presentation to a jury or by remarks in court which will lay grounds for mistrials or appeals. The prosecutor, whether elected or appointed, owes his position and his future to politics. He may seek by a record of spectacular convictions to advance himself toward the governorship or the presidency, or he may go along with a party organization and enrich himself in the process.⁴

PARDON, PROBATION, AND PAROLE

The power to temper justice with mercy, whether by pardon, probation, or parole, offers many an opportunity for political favoritism or graft. The presidential pardon extended in 1947 to Mayor Curley of Boston before he had served out his minimum sentence for using the mails to defraud had a strong color of politics. Various governors, such as "Pa"

¹ Some have been cited above. See also Sheldon Glueck, *Crime and Justice* (1936), and Raymond Moley, *Politics and Criminal Prosecution* (1929).

² Edward M. Martin, "The Selection of Judges in Chicago," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 30 (April, 1936), p. 322.

³ Sheriff Thomas F. Farley of New York County deposited in his bank accounts \$396,503 in a little over five years, which sum he claimed he got from a "little tin box." — Northrop and Northrop, *op. cit.*, pp. 225–235; Sheriff James A. McQuade of Kings County deposited \$510,597, which he claimed was borrowed. — *Ibid.*, p. 165.

⁴ For cases of both kinds see Northrop and Northrop, *op. cit.*

Ferguson of Texas and "Len" Small of Illinois, have been charged with using the power to pardon for personal or political reasons.¹ When a governor receives two to three thousand applications for pardons annually, he has an immense opportunity to do favors, and more. Even the treatment of prisoners in penal institutions has been affected by politics in a wide variety of ways, from the contracting of prison labor in the South to the extension of favors, such as vacations or special food, to prisoners in jails and penitentiaries.

During the years when Mayor Hague manipulated much of the judiciary of New Jersey almost at his pleasure, lawyers said that the enforcement of the law was corrupt only in "political" cases; that is, that judges and prosecutors resisted pressure except where the political organization was involved. Criminals not connected with the organization could not buy their way out. Juries trying election, bribery, or fraudulent purchasing cases might be fixed, if the cases were allowed to come to trial at all; but juries were not fixed in most cases between private individuals. While judges would hand down fantastic decisions in election cases — such as that a superintendent of elections had the power to open ballot boxes but not to look into them — these same judges would render just decisions in cases in which politics did not enter. Similarly in New York, Illinois, Massachusetts, and other states, judges and prosecutors with an unsavory record in cases in which their parties had an interest, have in other cases administered the law justly and fairly.

GENERAL EFFECTS OF SPOILS AND GRAFT

Out-and-out corruption, such as the sale of justice, or the bribery of legislators, is the exception rather than the rule in American politics, but a certain amount of favoritism is everywhere to be expected. The absence of charges or of proved instances of graft at any given time or in any jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as evidence that none, or very little, exists; rather, it may only be that "By and large it appears that the techniques of graft have reached a highly refined state, making detec-

¹ During the term of his predecessor 403 pardons were issued, but "Pa" Ferguson issued 1774 before he was impeached; "Ma" Ferguson issued 384 in her term. See Stuart A. MacCorkle, "Pardoning Power in Texas," *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*, vol. 15 (December, 1934), pp. 218-228. "In Texas," wrote MacCorkle, "every conceivable form of pressure seems to be brought to bear on the governor to influence his actions [in issuing pardons]. Political pressure, personality, and family influences are played up."

tion much more difficult than it was thirty or forty years ago . . . there is a trend towards more complicated and more effective means of concealment.”¹

There is steady opposition to the cruder forms of graft in politics, not only from reformers but from professional associations and from citizens. Some forms of spoils, such as patronage and sheriffs' fees are, year by year, reduced. Other activities, once regarded as merely unethical, such as the use of pet banks, are made illegal. That no statute can entirely suppress graft and favoritism will almost go without saying: as long as governments tax and spend, some persons will gain and some will suffer, and there will be opportunity for favoritism. And as other laws are violated, so will laws against bribery, extortion, misfeasance, and other forms of graft be violated. While complete purity is not to be expected, the social costs of spoils and graft are sufficiently serious so that a continual pressure should be exerted against them. There are not only the money costs, which are serious enough, and which divert the taxes that citizens pay from the services they should get for their money to the private enrichment of individuals; perhaps more serious is the resulting use of public power for private ends, which is a frustration of popular government. A graft-ridden government, moreover, is inefficient and unreliable, unlikely to suffice for the complex needs of contemporary society. When graft is prevalent there is, furthermore, a breakdown of confidence in government, whether it is regarded as umpire or servant or both. At its worst this want of confidence may result in a sort of anarchy, as in Chicago. Then, when public government cannot be trusted, private governments, relying upon their own force, grow up and engage in private wars.

¹ V. O. Key, Jr., *The Techniques of Political Graft in the United States* (1936), p. 414. Garrigues, *op. cit.*, pp. 109-162, agrees with this analysis and enumerates the devices used to make detection and conviction difficult.

Party Finance and Corrupt Practices Legislation

"I'LL TAKE MONEY from any man," said Penrose. "You can't run a party on nothing, and when you need money the place to get it is from them that have it."¹ It is probably safe to say that no party organization ever had as much money as its leaders thought it needed, if not for an immediate victory, then to consolidate its position and to build up a reserve against future necessities. The leaders of pressure groups feel the same way; not one, to the author's knowledge, has ever announced that his association had all the money it could reasonably use. Rather, even the leaders of the groups which appear to be most amply financed can generally point to a hundred activities which could be advantageously undertaken or extended, if the society only had the necessary money.

WHERE PARTY FUNDS GO

PAY OF EMPLOYEES

Every party organization uses as much volunteer help as it can get, and most of them get a great deal. Very few committeemen or other party leaders or officials are paid any salary or fee by their party. The great majority of them do their work for the party because of interest in the game of politics, through devotion to a cause for which the party stands or for which they hope to lead it to stand, in the anticipation of

¹ Walter Davenport, *Power and Glory: The Life of Boies Penrose* (1931), p. 177.

future preferment of some sort, or to help some leader, friend, or relative who is active in politics. In addition, much party work which costs the party nothing is carried by the taxpayers, in that some people who are in official positions devote part or all of their time to party politics. In many a state house, to cite just one type of situation, the commissioner at the head of a bureau is frequently not in his office, and during campaigns, very rarely in. The work of the agency is actually supervised and directed by the deputy commissioner, whatever his title may be. The commissioner, as a ranking political leader in the state, may be working very hard indeed, but at party business, not public business. At best, this is a kind of spoils or graft in which public funds used to pay salaries of official personnel are in reality used for party purposes. At worst, the maladministration of an agency which may result may go so far that while employees are busy at party work some disaster may occur. To cite one recent instance, the investigations that followed the coal-mine explosion at Centralia, Illinois, March 25, 1947, in which 111 miners were killed, revealed that various employees of the state department of mining had been busy collecting campaign funds for the Chicago mayoralty election and had not enforced the state mine safety laws.

Volunteer help does not go very far to meet the needs of a party. In the first place, many of the necessary people at headquarters, such as stenographers, cannot afford to give their time without pay, and part-time, volunteer work is undependable in amount and unsatisfactory in quality. Second, such skilled persons as publicity men, researchers, and radio script writers cannot normally be found who are willing or able to work for nothing, or for an honorarium. A political party, like any other buyer of services, tends to get pretty much what it pays for. If it has funds to hire competent personnel, the quality of the work turned out will be high, but if it must rely upon amateur or part-time help, the work will be done, if done at all, only accompanied by much confusion and with many damaging mistakes. A first-class publicity man may command a salary of a thousand dollars a month, but his employment, especially during a campaign, may be the most economical expenditure a party can make.

HEADQUARTERS EXPENSE

It is curious that a number of states provide, rent free, headquarters in the capitol building or elsewhere for certain pressure groups, particu-

larly for the veterans' organizations, but unless a governor's or a mayor's office may be a kind of party headquarters, none is commonly provided for parties. The amount of space necessary for a national headquarters or for that of the party organization offices in most populous cities and states is so great that a separate suite, or a whole building, is needed. The rent and maintenance of this space is not the most important item of party expense, but it is considerable. In campaign years the rent item has to be increased, just as all items must be increased. The payment for office supplies, equipment, telephone, and postage are annual expenses which also increase in campaign years.

When a party can raise the funds for additional rent, it finds it desirable to have regional headquarters, say in New York and Chicago, in addition to the Washington office. In the larger states two or more offices may be necessary or desirable, both to cut down travel expenses and to increase efficiency. In cities, the ward, nationality, and other clubhouses may be used, especially during campaigns, to supplement the central headquarters. Sometimes the administration of party affairs is then divided on an area basis; for example, all matters affecting one section of a city, from advertising in suburban papers to patronage, may go through the office in one clubhouse. Or the administration may be divided functionally, so that all matters affecting Italians or Negroes, for instance, may be handled through clubhouses in the sections where most of them live. Such ancillary or temporary organizations as the PAC or the Willkie Clubs may provide local headquarters.

COST OF PARTY PROPAGANDA

Most of the devices of party propaganda discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 cost money: advertising, banners, buttons, letters, lithographed pictures and posters, pamphlets, radio time, sample ballots, and all the rest. The publication of a party periodical, such as the *Democratic Digest* or the *Republican News*, is expensive. Occasionally some billboards, printing, or other materials or services may be donated, but in general all of the devices of propaganda cost money. And because most vendors have had sad experiences at trying to collect unpaid bills from parties, they demand cash in advance. The amount of money that can be spent upon party propaganda is infinite; and almost any available amount can be put into advertising alone. Millions of dollars are, and more millions could be used to buy radio time. Most parties spend as much on propaganda as they can raise or can spare from other purposes.

HIRING ELECTION-DAY WORKERS

If the whole truth could ever be known, probably the greatest single item in party costs is that of hiring election-day workers, watchers, challengers, drivers, and others. It is not the national but the state and local committees that carry this great expense. Writing in 1928, Frank Kent thought that "in a city of 700,000 or 800,000, \$60 to a precinct on election day is an ordinary amount for a party to have. In such a city, there would be about 600 precincts, which means that approximately \$36,000 is put out" by each party in each election.¹ But costs have risen since 1928, so that \$125 per party per precinct would be reasonable today. And it must be remembered that while the big, nation-wide expenditure of party money and effort falls in the quadrennial presidential election years, primary, special, congressional, state, city, and other local elections occur somewhere in almost every month the year around. Some of the primary elections that have involved contests for party control have produced the most spectacular spending and the largest expenditures per vote cast. An election for mayor of Chicago or New York City is commonly thought to cost each party about a million dollars.

In about half of the 140,000 precincts in the United States one major party or the other is so dominant that it needs to spend only as much in each election as is necessary to make a respectable showing and to maintain its position, say fifty dollars per precinct, or a total of \$3,500,000. But this estimate may be low, because many of these one-party precincts are in states where, to carry the whole state, it is desirable to get out every possible party voter. Even though the Democrats, for example, can ordinarily carry New York City with ease, it is necessary for them to marshal the greatest possible vote in every city precinct to overcome the upstate Republican vote. Comparable situations occur in many other states. If it may be assumed, however, that in most of the remaining 70,000 precincts both major parties contend to the limit of their resources, at least two hundred dollars per precinct will be expended, or a total of \$14,000,000. The total, then, for election-day workers is about \$17,500,000 for a national election, plus an amount for which a fair estimate cannot be made for primaries, local, and special elections.

This expenditure for election-day workers is, on the whole, perfectly legitimate. The workers stir the voters into voting; they remind them that it is an election day, transport them to the polls, even serve as baby-

¹ *Political Behavior* (1928), p. 219.

sitters while mothers go to the polls. Many voters expect these services. Others could not vote without one or more of them. When workers are paid ten or fifteen dollars each, it may be assumed that they are, in general, being paid for real work, even though in the occasional instance the only work expected is that the individual paid shall get out his own family. But when they are being paid two to five dollars each, the suspicion may reasonably exist that votes are being purchased under the guise of hiring workers, watchers, challengers, and so on. How much of this there is in the United States it is impossible to say. No doubt the amount varies from one election to another, and more is customary in some places than in others.¹

LEAKS IN PARTY TREASURIES

An unknown proportion of the money used for campaign funds and for other party purposes is handled in cash to conceal both its origin and its destination. As this currency passes from hand to hand, some of it inevitably sticks to the fingers that it touches. If a precinct captain finds that he can hire sufficient workers at five instead of ten dollars each, he will not likely return to headquarters any balance of the funds he receives. Rather, as Frank Kent said, he will buy himself a new suit of clothes. Edward J. Flynn states that a rural candidate whom he had helped out with money with which to buy votes was defeated in the election notwithstanding, but shortly thereafter, "he blossomed out in a new Buick automobile."² The Seabury Investigation turned up an example:

Between 1918 and 1928 Theofel was Treasurer of the Queens County Campaign Committee. In 1928 the Committee received \$123,699.75 in

¹ David H. Kurtzman cited testimony in his *Methods of Controlling Votes in Philadelphia* (1935), pp. 119-120, that four or five canvassers, four or five watchers, and varying numbers of other workers were hired for each precinct at about ten dollars a day each. He quoted the testimony of one leader to the effect that "The case of watching the ballots meant nothing. That was not in the deal at all. . . . If a division [precinct] leader was wise he wouldn't get a watcher that was not good for at least ten votes. Didn't he get ten dollars?" Sonya Forthal wrote in her *Cogwheels of Democracy* (1947), p. 83, that in some precincts in Chicago, "the party agent assembled the venal voters, those whom he had given \$3 to \$5 to help him. In the transient areas, those to whom the captain had given 'two bits' or some other 'handout' were marshaled to 'do their duty.' Precinct captains in these areas stated that the most certain way of getting votes was to buy them. The amount of money allotted to them on election day by their ward committeemen was spent for exactly this purpose."

² *You're the Boss* (1947), p. 113.

campaign contributions. Out of these funds, Smedley, the chairman, gave his secretary Kissling \$6000 and then said to Theofel, "John, take a thousand for yourself."¹

Higher party leaders may be fully aware or may suspect that party money is being diverted to private use — "knocked down" — but for a variety of reasons they may be unable to prevent the speculation. City and county chairmen and even precinct committeemen are leaders in their own right, usually not subject to removal by higher authority, even if the fraud could be proved. The leaders, moreover, may hesitate to take any action, because they may not like to reveal either the fact that they were distributing cash or that a certain amount was sent into a particular area, for then other areas less favored may complain. No allegation is here intended that all politicians help themselves to party funds. Probably they are as honest as any other class of men would be under the circumstances. But when secret amounts of currency filter through any organization, the temptations to misuse it are great.

WHERE THE MONEY COMES FROM

CONTRIBUTIONS FROM CANDIDATES

No one knows precisely how common the practice is of demanding that candidates make a contribution to the party organization or to the campaign fund in return for their nominations. No doubt it is more common in urban than in rural areas, and no doubt too much depends upon the standing of the candidate and his relationship to the party. That is, an unknown man may be asked to contribute, as the price of being supported by the organization in the primary or convention, an amount equal to one year's salary in the office he seeks. But if a party needs a candidate who is already famous, say to run for governor, he may not be asked to contribute anything. Such candidates, in the argot of politics, are "handed the nomination on a silver platter." Politicians defend the practice of requiring contributions from candidates on two principal grounds: that the party makes many expenditures on behalf of the whole ticket which benefit each candidate, even if indirectly, and consequently each should help to carry the general expense; and, second, that the nomination is valuable advertising to the candidate, especially to a

¹ W. B. and J. B. Northrop, *The Insolence of Office* (1932), p. 154.

lawyer, and that he will get the money back in increased business. In areas in which one party is dominant it will have little difficulty in collecting from candidates, but the minority party will find collection difficult or impossible, because the nomination is of little value when chances of election are poor.

Most candidates are expected by their parties to carry their personal campaign expenses, such as advertisements, the salary of a personal campaign manager, and traveling. The higher the office sought, however, the less this rule applies. A candidate for President, unless he is an extremely wealthy man, cannot be expected to pay for the special train used on transcontinental campaign tours and for other great expenses; and in some populous states and big cities, the cost of running for governor or mayor is too great for most individuals to sustain by themselves. A wealthy candidate for high office will help out toward his own expenses, but he cannot carry them all. But for the great majority of the 800,000 elective offices, the rule holds good that each candidate must carry his personal campaign expenses.

Amount of Expenses. How much these campaign expenses will amount to will vary widely with the office sought, the closeness of the contest expected, and the nature of the constituency to be reached. Fifty or sixty thousand dollars is not unusual for most state-wide offices. Richard L. Neuberger, a former member of the Oregon legislature, recently declined an offer from his state committee to run for the United States Senate. "The most recent campaign fund of a successful senatorial aspirant in our state exceeded \$64,000," he wrote. "I was informed that an adequate campaign . . . would require a minimum of \$40,000. I had no more idea where to raise such an amount of money than I have where Captain Kidd's treasure is buried." The costs of running for office have, like all other costs, everywhere increased. Neuberger quoted Oswald West, who was elected governor in Oregon in 1910, to show the differences in costs: "I was elected governor with \$3000. All the money came from my own bank account and that of one friend. Today \$3000 would just about buy you half an hour on a state-wide radio hookup."¹

The "Ideal" Candidate. The ideal candidate from the point of view of party finance is the wealthy man who can not only carry his own campaign but who can also make substantial contributions to the party campaign fund. Frank Kent called such candidates "fat cats" and listed among

¹ "It Costs Too Much to Run for Office," *New York Times Sunday Magazine*, April 11, 1948.

the well-known ones, Senators Coleman Dupont, Stephen B. Elkins, John B. Weeks, and Lawrence C. Phipps.¹ Senators Warren Barbour and Hamilton F. Kean of New Jersey were other recent examples. Because of the corrupt practices acts, discussed below, the amount that fat cats contribute and the ways in which the money is transferred are among the deepest secrets of politics. If one of these wealthy men contributes a quarter of a million or half a million dollars, he may do so in the names of a multitude of friends, relatives, and business associates who are quietly reimbursed, perhaps after the campaign is over. It may be that only three or four men at the top of the state party will know the amount and how the contribution was made, but the county chairmen and even the precinct executives will feel the difference when a fat cat is on the ticket. For then the request of a county chairman for five thousand dollars to advertise in local racial and nationality papers is honored without quibbling, and the precinct captains can get two hundred dollars per precinct instead of the usual hundred dollars.

ASSESSMENTS OF OFFICEHOLDERS

Another important source of party funds is the assessment of officeholders, the "shake down." It is a part of the spoils system, and as such it has been traced back to the 1830's. "From that time until the present," wrote Louise Overacker, "the civil servants have been the prey of local, state, and national committees, and their contributions — sometimes 'voluntary' and sometimes otherwise — have been an important source of party funds."² The contributions expected vary from one locality to another, and even in the same city or state they vary with election years and with the intensity of political campaigns. The amounts are usually graduated with salary ranges, from 1 to 12 per cent per annum. Kurtzman found that in Philadelphia 3 to 5 per cent was collected by the Republican city committee, plus 1 to 2 per cent by the ward committee of the employee's residence.³ The state committee will likewise undertake to assess state employees. The scale of assessments must be applied to too many people for it to be kept very secret, with the result that any investigator, or city hall or state house reporter can ascertain it readily.

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 62.

² *Money in Elections* (The Macmillan Company, 1932), p. 102. The author presents selected examples turned up by investigating committees over the years. See also James K. Pollock, *Party Campaign Funds* (1926), pp. 113-125.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 75.

A rough estimate of the total collected can then be made by applying the percentages in use against the salary items in appropriations. Thus, if a city or county has a payroll of \$15,000,000 a year, a 3 per cent average assessment will bring in \$450,000. The money is, however, commonly contributed in cash, often month by month, so that it is virtually impossible to build up a body of evidence sufficient for a court case to prove the total amount collected. Some employees, schoolteachers for example, usually escape the payment.

In some circumstances the contributions are not graduated at all. Thus a person holding an obvious sinecure may be required to pay a flat half or more of the salary (after income tax) to the organization that got him the office. Where handsome fees are paid, the recipient may be compelled (after income tax) to turn all or a large share of them over to his party. For generations it has been common for a party in power nationally to ask for very large contributions from the wealthy men who have sought the higher diplomatic posts. Since the Hatch Act these contributions have had to be broken up into units of less than \$5000 each or made to state committees.

Federal Employees. Soliciting, assessing, or receiving political contributions from federal employees by other officers or employees has long been illegal. Statutes of 1867, 1883, and 1925 all forbade it.¹ These laws do not forbid voluntary contributions by federal employees, but the Hatch Act of 1940 makes it illegal for any person, federal employee or not, to receive as well as to solicit any contribution from any person receiving a benefit under a federal relief appropriation. The acts are apparently generally observed in Washington, but Boss Flynn hints that they are ignored in the Bronx, and federal employees resident there are required to contribute through relatives.² In 1945 the United States Civil Service Commission ordered a Dr. A. H. Stewart, Pennsylvania Secretary of Health, dismissed along with two other officials all paid in part by federal funds, because they had "participated in coercion of employees to make political contributions to the state Republican Party."³ Some state laws also prohibit the assessment of public employees.⁴ It is safe to say that these state statutes are commonly ignored; classified as well as unclassified employees are induced to make "voluntary" contributions.

¹ Earl R. Sikes, *State and Federal Corrupt Practices Legislation* (1928), pp. 183-188.

² Edward J. Flynn, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

³ *New York Times*, February 16, 1945.

⁴ Harry Best, *Corrupt Practices at Elections* (1937), Senate Document 11, 75th Congress, 1st Session.

Attitude of Employees. The rank and file of public employees do not object, at least not vocally, to the assessment system. Those who got their jobs through politics feel an obligation to their party. Being asked to make a contribution enhances their self-esteem, their sense of belonging, of being a part of the organization; or they may be anticipating party help in keeping themselves in office or improving their status, so that they want to do what they can to assure party success. Flynn cites an example of an employee who paid her assessment years after she retired, not because she had to, but because she wanted to. Murmurs or revolts will occur, however, if the suspicion arises that much of the money goes to the private enrichment of leaders, or if the feeling becomes prevalent that employees in the higher ranges are not actually being made to contribute in proportion to their salaries. The ability-to-pay principle must be equitably applied in this political income tax. Reformers, however, have consistently opposed the political assessment of officeholders, and the statutes on the books, state and national, are the result of their efforts. The National Civil Service Reform League has used legal proceedings to enforce the laws, although their resources are too limited to produce general enforcement.¹

CONTRIBUTIONS FROM PERSONS WITH A GENERAL INTEREST

Parties receive a relatively small proportion of their total income from persons with only a general interest in the election or in certain candidates. The two-dollar and five-dollar contributions, which parties try hard to get, belong in this classification. The Socialist and some other minor parties have received most of their funds in small contributions from the membership fees of party members. Many candidates of major parties have wealthy friends or relatives who will contribute. Thus Theodore Roosevelt had his George Perkins, Al Smith his John Raskob, Franklin Roosevelt his Frank Walker. As in the theater, these contributors are known in politics as "angels." Some of them seek no office or reward; others will accept an honorary post.

CONTRIBUTIONS FROM SPECIAL INTERESTS

The largest proportion of the contributions comes from people and groups with a direct financial interest in the outcome of the campaign;

¹ Frank M. Stewart, *The National Civil Service Reform League* (1929), pp. 37-41.

from persons selling goods or services to government; from individuals seeking political appointments, protection, or favor; and, especially in state and local politics, from businesses existing under the licensing power, such as liquor and horseracing. In an unknown number of instances contributions from these interested individuals and groups are made to both parties, so that no matter which side wins the contributor will have friends in power. Probably this practice is more common in state and local than in national politics. Sometimes these double contributions are made openly, as when E. F. Hutton in 1944 contributed \$3000 to the Democratic National Committee and the same amount to the Republican National Committee.¹ But more commonly the contributions to one side only are revealed, and usually those revealed are to the side that the contributor expects to win. A group that contributes handsomely, such as a horseracing or dogracing association, may conceal its contributions to the minority party because it fears reprisals, but it will make the contributions nonetheless in order to preserve the minority party, because it fears that if one party becomes too dominant its exactions will grow to be intolerable.

No one can examine the eleven-page list of contributions by prominent family groups made in the presidential election of 1944 without being struck by the leaning of the wealthy to the Republican Party. The DuPont family led all the rest with total contributions of \$109,832; the Pews contributed \$96,995; the Rockefellers \$52,400.² Professor Overacker attempted to analyze the economic interest of some large contributors to national campaign funds, but found that in 1944 in the case of the Democratic Party 62 per cent were unclassifiable and 25 per cent unidentified, and that in the Republican Party, 38 per cent were unclassifiable and 21 per cent unidentified.³ Where the interests of the big contributors could be identified, however, three times as many bankers, brokers, and manufacturers contributed to the Republican as to the Democratic Party. The bulk of contributions to national parties come from relatively few individuals: "Half the Democratic campaign fund [in 1928] came from 135 members of the party who could afford to give \$5000 or more. Three contributions exceeded \$100,000. Ninety-nine per cent of the contrib-

¹ United States Senate, 79th Congress, 1st Session, Special Committee to Investigate . . . Campaign Expenditures in 1944, *Report* (1945), p. 144. Hereafter cited as *Green Committee Report*.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 140-151.

³ Louise Overacker, *Presidential Campaign Funds* (Boston University Press, 1946), p. 15.

utors gave the other half of the fund." In the Republican Party, "Three hundred persons, each of whom gave \$5000 or more apiece, gave more than 45 per cent of the entire fund. Another 44 per cent represented gifts of \$100 to \$5000."¹ It is still true, in Overacker's phrase, that the rank and file members of each party are not paying their political bills, but instead they allow a relatively few wealthy persons, most of whom have business interests, to pay their bills for them. It would be too much to assume that these big contributors give their money out of pure altruism, especially when the contributions cannot be deducted from income tax. But the tracing of contributions into specific determinations of public policy is very difficult. It is possible only in isolated instances to establish a direct, cause-and-effect connection between a large gift to a campaign fund and, say, a tariff schedule or a ship subsidy.²

MISCELLANEOUS SOURCES OF FUNDS

The national committees raise what money they can from the Jefferson, Jackson, and Lincoln Day dinners, where each person attending pays a hundred dollars or more per plate. About \$300,000 is obtained each presidential year from the convention city or from the hotels and other businesses that profit from having a convention in the city. Many state and local party organizations raise money by means of various kinds of entertainments, such as outings, clambakes, boat rides, picnics, and so on. The sale of tickets for these affairs is often indistinguishable from political assessments. Public employees and candidates are given books or blocks of tickets which they are expected to pay for, and they may either sell or give away the tickets as they please. Thus two thousand tickets may be bought for a ride on a boat that can carry only two hundred, or a thousand tickets may be sold for a corn roast at which only two hundred appear. Where the state law or the enforcement of the law permits, bingo games, raffles, lotteries, and similar games of chance are in some localities used to raise money.

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

² For Senator Grundy's very frank testimony concerning his collections of campaign funds from tariff-protected and tax-exempt corporations in Pennsylvania which desired to preserve their privileges, see Louise Overacker, *Money in Elections* (1932), pp. 182-187. The author assembles many other examples of contributions by persons with special interests to protect.

SERVICE AND ASSISTANCE IN LIEU OF CONTRIBUTIONS

Various types of assistance to parties have the same result as contributions of money. On the national level the millions of dollars spent annually by the National Association of Manufacturers on newspaper advertising and other publicity has virtually the same objective and effect as if they were spent by the Republican Party. The support of Democratic candidates in the labor press is worth thousands, if not millions, of dollars in advertising. Whether a party spends its money to get out the vote on election day, or whether the vote is mobilized by PAC workers who are not paid by the party, the result is the same. In state and local politics automobiles may be provided without charge for use on election day; headquarters space or the use of halls for meetings may be supplied at no cost or at a nominal rent; parties may be allowed to put posters on billboards not already in use; printers seeking contracts for public printing may do the printing for parties without charge, and so on. Corporations which cannot legally make contributions may lend the services of their advertising, layout, and publicity men to party organizations. Sometimes groups or businesses which cannot contribute will permit the use of their mailing or membership lists and thereby save a party committee the hundreds or thousands of dollars necessary to build up such lists; and indeed in many cases no one outside an association or society can build up a list regardless of cost. The money value of all these and other types of services and assistance is unknown and incalculable. Perhaps, the country over, they equal or exceed in value the direct money contributions to parties.

ATTEMPTS TO REGULATE PARTY FINANCE

THE SOURCES OF FUNDS

From the days of the Greek democracies and the Roman Republic, the financing of candidates and parties has involved problems of public policy which, in spite of much legislation, are still in large part unsolved.¹ The

¹ For a short summary of the history of such legislation see Louise Overacker, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-17. Such laws are commonly called corrupt practices acts, but aside from their common prohibition of a few offenses, long recognized as corrupt, such as the bribing or intimidation of voters, the acts aim to regulate behavior not usually regarded as corrupt *in se*; thus the making of contributions is not corrupt in itself, but only if the gift exceeds an amount set by law or comes from a prohibited source is it illegal and hence corrupt.

first problem is that of the sources of party funds, already mentioned. Is it dangerous to popular government for certain persons (public employees, the rich) or for certain institutions (banks, corporations) to contribute at all, or under certain circumstances? The attempts, not entirely successful, of the federal acts and a score of state acts to prevent political assessments of officeholders have been discussed. If Congress hoped that the \$5000 limitation imposed by the Hatch Act upon contributions by individuals to national committees or candidates would reduce the influence of the wealthy upon party behavior, the limitation proved a failure from the very first. As several congressional investigations have shown, the wealthy stayed within the letter of the law, but by dividing their contributions into amounts of less than \$5000, and by having them made in the names of a variety of relatives, the same large amounts came from the same rich individuals as before the Hatch Act. "Gifts were hung on more branches of the family tree," wrote Professor Overacker, "and routed through a variety of committees, but they came from the same old Santa Claus."¹

Congress and the legislatures in three fourths of the states have prohibited contributions from corporations to national and state campaigns. Among the reasons offered are that banks and corporations are custodians of funds belonging to persons in various parties or in no party and therefore that these funds should not be used to influence politics without the owners' consent; that the great resources of corporations would enable them, legally creatures of the state, to dominate its political processes unless they are restrained by law; and (pragmatically) that when corporations have been allowed to contribute, their objectives and political methods have not been in the public interest. The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 extended the prohibition to labor organizations, which were forbidden to make either contributions or expenditures in connection with elections.

Prohibitions running to the source of party funds have not been completely successful. "Contributions from corporations have not been eliminated, although they are usually carefully concealed," wrote Professor Overacker, citing various instances in which investigations had turned up direct violations of the laws.² The Ellender Committee, which investigated campaign expenditures of the 1946 election, reported that "some corporations and labor unions have spent money directly on behalf

¹ *Presidential Campaign Funds* (1946), p. 36.

² *Money in Elections* (1932), pp. 335-337.

of a political party or candidate.”¹ There is probably no effective way by which laws could prevent a corporation from voting a bonus to one of its officers with the understanding that the money, after income tax, should be used for a campaign contribution. Where corporations and unions have been barred from making contributions or making expenditures, they have sometimes succeeded in evading the laws by setting up organizations, nominally or actually independent, to which contributions may be made and which then use the money in behalf of one party or the other.²

THE AMOUNTS OF MONEY ALLOWED BY LAW

The second problem is that of the total amounts of money permitted to parties and to candidates. Legislators and congressmen have apparently felt that the spending of large sums by one party or one candidate produced an undesirable inequality. That certain parties and candidates did have more money than their opponents has long been known. From the campaign of 1896, when Bryan frightened eastern capitalists severely, to the present time, the Republican National Committee has almost always obtained and spent more money than the Democratic. Exactly how much more is entirely a matter of estimates for the years before 1910, when for the first time national committees were required to file reports. These estimates are often wide apart. Bryan, for instance, claimed that Mark Hanna raised \$16,000,000 for the 1896 campaign, but biographers of Hanna put the amount at about \$3,500,000. At any rate, the Democratic Party in the campaign of 1896 raised only about \$600,000. But even after the passage of federal legislation there was doubt that the laws were fully obeyed. The Tea Pot Dome investigation, for example, indicated that probably more money by several millions of dollars was raised and spent by the Republican National Committee in 1920 than its treasurer admitted; he died, however, before the investigation reached him.

The Hatch Act. The amounts that the parties announced for each campaign had risen by 1936 to \$8,892,000 for the Republicans and \$5,194,000 for the Democrats, when in 1940 the Hatch Act put a \$3,000,000 ceiling upon the total that a committee could lawfully spend. There-

¹ Senate Special Committee to Investigate Senatorial Campaign Expenditures, 1946, 80th Congress, 1st Session, *Report* (1947), p. 38.

² Such organizations were the Committee for Constitutional Government, which raised and spent more than \$255,000 in 1944, and American Action, Inc., which raised \$95,805 and spent \$114,828 in 1946.

after, neither national party committee admitted spending more than the law allowed. But the very first election after the Hatch Act showed the futility of the ceiling kind of legislation. The Republican National Committee itself spent some \$2,242,000, but the Willkie Clubs spent \$1,355,000, other committees spent \$1,476,000, and the Republican state committees, \$10,865,000. Charles Michelson wrote of the Democrats that "The Hatch Act had come along to plague us with its various restrictions, prohibitions, and limitations. It took all the ingenuity of the strategy board to evade these. Big contributions and loans now had to be made to state organizations or else be attributed to individual names in amounts not in excess of \$5000."¹ The Green Committee of 1944 reported that

The \$3,000,000 limitation placed upon receipts and expenditures of political committees by the Hatch Act of 1940 is utterly unrealistic. If it was intended to limit over-all expenditure of funds in a federal campaign, it has completely failed. It does not apply to state or local committees. Furthermore, it has led to the growth of numerous collateral organizations, thereby making publicity of campaign funds difficult.²

The Committee recommended repeal of the ceiling provision and reliance upon publicity. Professor Overacker thought that because the Hatch Act encouraged "decentralization, evasion, and concealment," it might well be entitled "An Act to *Promote* Pernicious Political Activities."³ Certainly if the future of popular government lies in the direction of the development of strong national parties, responsible to the voters for their conduct in office, a statute is distinctly undesirable which encourages the growth of temporary organizations that raise and spend money and dissolve the day after an election. It would be preferable to admit and accept financial inequality among candidates and parties and only to insist upon full publicity at all times, not merely for parties, but also, in the words of the Green Committee, for "all organizations which seek to influence directly or indirectly the nomination or election of candidates."

¹ *The Ghost Talks* (1944), p. 60.

² *Report*, p. 82. Not counting the regular state party committees, the Green Committee counted sixteen independent national committees or groups which supported the Democratic national ticket, twenty-seven which supported the Republican; sixty-nine intrastate independent committees or groups which supported the Democratic ticket, thirty-nine which supported the Republican (p. 79).

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 45. Italics in the original.

No organization should be permitted to escape publicity by calling itself an "educational committee," as scores have done.

State Regulation. A few states have limited total expenditures by state committees, but these acts are so commonly ignored that they may be regarded as obsolete legislation. State party organizations never admit to spending more than the law allows; they may channel contributions to local or special committees or to candidates, or they may report only those contributions which can readily be traced. But investigations are so rare and the machinery for enforcement of state corrupt practices acts so rudimentary that most politicians hold the laws in contempt.

Many state laws limit in one way or another the amount that candidates may spend. Money may be spent in some states for certain designated purposes only (travel, postage, advertising) or it may not be spent for certain forbidden purposes ("treating" voters to drinks, transporting them to the polls). The commonest type of limitation, however, is upon the total amount of money that a candidate may spend. This amount may be a flat sum (e.g., for governor of Alabama, \$10,000); or it may be expressed as a percentage of the annual salary of the office sought (e.g., not to exceed 10 per cent of the annual salary of any office in California); or the amount may be related to the number of voters a candidate may have in the constituency he seeks to represent (e.g., \$15 for each 1000 voters in Connecticut).

Federal Corrupt Practices Act. The Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925 forbids a candidate for senator to spend more than \$10,000, a candidate for the House of Representatives more than \$2500; or alternatively, "an amount equal to the amount obtained by multiplying three cents by the total number of votes cast at the last general election for all candidates for the office which the candidate seeks but in no event exceeding \$25,000."¹ The Priest Committee which investigated the campaign of 1946 recommended that these amounts should be increased.²

These state and federal acts applying to candidates are widely violated or evaded. As Frank Kent said, "There is no corrupt practices act in any state and no federal enactment on the subject through which it is not easy to 'drive a four-horse team' — none through which four-horse teams are not regularly driven."³ The biggest hole in the laws is that which

¹ 43 Stat. L. 1073. But necessary travel, stationery, postage, printing, and other items of expense are by Section 309 (c) exempt from the ceiling limitations.

² Special Committee on Campaign Expenditures, House of Representatives, 79th Congress, 2d Session, *House Report* No. 273 (December 31, 1946), p. 48.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 217.

places the limitation upon expenditures by a candidate but does not (perhaps cannot) limit what is spent in his behalf by others. A candidate for Congress may, for example, stop with spending the \$2500 allowed, but the Jones-for-Congress Clubs may spend \$10,000, his friend John Smith may at his own expense go on the air to speak in Jones's behalf; and the state organization may allot Jones a part of the radio time it bought and show his picture in advertisements and on billboards along with those of other party candidates. It is perhaps possible for Jones to know how much he spent of his own funds. He cannot know, and perhaps nobody can do more than estimate, what was spent in his behalf. The Priest Committee recognized the futility of the present limitations upon expenditures in behalf of candidates; it said in its *Report*, "The committee feels that the effectiveness of the personal limitation is lost if other persons or organizations may secure contributions and expend money to amounts without limitation, whether said persons or organizations are receiving contributions and making expenditures with or without the knowledge or consent of the candidate."¹

LOANS

The problem of loans to parties and candidates is a particularly difficult one for the laws to reach. If a sum is advanced as a loan rather than as a gift, the lender may hold a sort of mortgage on the party or candidate, and if they do not follow policies or make promises which the lender approves he may at a time inconvenient to them seek to collect his loan from any funds in their possession. If a candidate is successful in the election, his independence as a public official may be seriously compromised by such an obligation hanging over his head. Loans also may be used as a device for evading corrupt practices acts:

There is reason to believe that money is frequently lent without any expectation of repayment. It appears in the reports as a loan to allay popular suspicion, but with a tacit understanding between the borrower and the lender that the matter will be forgotten after the campaign. Were Joseph R. Grundy and W. L. Mellon repaid the hundreds of thousands which they lent various committees in the interests of Pepper's [1926] campaign in Pennsylvania? Did William Cooper Proctor and A. D. Sprague ever collect anything on the \$821,000 loans to the Wood pre-convention campaign in 1920?²

¹ *Report*, p. 49.

² Louise Overacker, *Money in Elections* (1932), p. 146.

A loan, furthermore, may only be a device to account for a large contribution until, as one newspaper put it, "a flock of dummy contributors" can be induced to allow their names to be used.

CAMPAIGN DEFICITS

Campaign deficits are composed of items left over after election day, either unpaid bills (such as those for advertising, printing, or telephone), or loans, or both. Although the raising of funds to make up a party's or a candidate's campaign deficit is a matter particularly important to the public interest, it usually receives little attention. It is important, because a contributor during a campaign may not know that the party to which his gifts go will win; but when he makes a gift afterward he knows exactly what, if anything, he is getting for his money in the way of determining party or official policy.

Although Harry F. Sinclair never admitted that his contribution and loan of \$260,000 toward cleaning up the Republican Party deficit of 1920 had any connection with the naval oil leases or the oil prosecutions, the [Liberty] bonds were given to [Republican national chairman Will] Hays just at the time that the Senate Committee on Public Lands and Surveys was bringing to light facts which indicated that Secretary of the Interior Fall had been bribed to make the Elk Hills and Teapot Dome leases, and Senator Walsh has suggested that "... the extraordinary sum yielded up at that critical time by Sinclair was not altogether voluntarily donated, and that either hope or fear, if not gratitude, stimulated his generosity and accentuated his devotion to the principles of the Republican Party. In the predicament in which he found himself at that juncture he stood in dire need of friends at court."¹

If there is any time when a contributor can be sure of getting something for his money, it is in making up a campaign deficit. He may indeed then be in a position to obtain from an elected public officer or from a party in power some official action which he desires before he pays over the money.

PUBLICITY OF CONTRIBUTIONS AND EXPENDITURES

The federal and the state corrupt practices acts require that party committees and candidates shall, under various regulations, file reports

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 187.

of their receipts and expenditures. Some state laws require these statements before and after the primary and before and after the general election; and the federal law, which requires statements in March, June, September, and before the tenth and again before the fifth day preceding a general election, has somewhat the same effect of producing intermittent publicity. These laws are desirable, as far as they go, in revealing to the voters who is paying which of their political bills while the campaign is going on. But because the last pre-election report commonly is filed some days before election day, the highly important election-day money is not reported (if it is reported at all) until after the election.

The federal law requires that the names and addresses of all contributors of one hundred dollars or more must be included in reports, and in recent years the reports of the campaign investigating committees have printed lists of these contributors. Many of the state laws have similar provisions, but when the reports are filed with a multitude of state, city, township, and county clerks, it is virtually impossible to make a complete compilation.

The publicity requirements of the corrupt practices acts are very commonly ignored by candidates and committees. The Priest Committee found that 122 of the candidates for the House of Representatives had simply failed in 1946 to file the reports required by the federal law. Noting this and other violations, the committee recommended that "the Federal Corrupt Practices Act be required to be enforced, or that the said act be repealed."¹ The same conclusion could be applied to most if not all of the state acts. Professor Overacker, who has made the most exhaustive studies of party finance, concluded that the present regulations concerning publicity are "flouted with impunity." She recommended that

provision should be made for pre-election as well as post-election publicity; for careful inspection of reports by a public officer; for pursuing delinquents by making public their names, by reporting them to the Attorney-General, and by court procedure if necessary; by creating a quasi-judicial board or commission empowering it to go behind the face of the returns while a campaign is in progress; by digesting the reports for popular consumption; and by making a summary of each campaign a matter of permanent public record.²

Both the Green and Priest committees agreed in their reports with most of these recommendations and proposed that the clerks of the houses of

¹ *Report*, p. 46.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 380.

Congress be made the officials responsible, with the Attorney-General, for the enforcement of the federal act. If adequate staffing and financing of the offices of the clerks and the Attorney-General should be provided, probably more complete publicity in federal elections would result. But it would still be bound to be incomplete, because the amounts spent by state and local committees in behalf of the entire tickets from President to precinct commissioner could not be allocated to the various offices sought by the great variety of candidates.

GENERAL IMPORTANCE OF MONEY IN POLITICS

It is easy to exaggerate the importance of money in politics. "You can't win on a shoestring," wrote Frank Kent; but candidates have won on not much more. A man without financial backing is probably at a disadvantage, but it is not a hopeless disadvantage. As between parties, the Republican Party has almost always been financed better than the Democratic, but it has not always been victorious. Political victory is a result of many forces, among which money is only one. The support of organized groups, for example, cannot generally be purchased, and yet it may be more important than any amount of money. The experiment seems never to have been tried, but probably no Democrat has been, or for the immediate future could be, elected governor of Vermont no matter how much money he had to spend; nor could a Republican be elected governor of Alabama. A rich candidate, or one upon whose campaign large amounts of money are conspicuously spent, may be at a disadvantage; the very fact of his wealth or of his adherents' wealth may readily be used against him, as Charles Michelson in 1936 rang the changes on the "gold-coast complexion," the "billion-dollar set," and the "dupontifical propaganda" of the Landon campaign and the Liberty League.¹ It has commonly been said that the lavish spending on behalf of Wood and Lowden ruined their chances at the Republican nomination in 1920. It may be, however, that large amounts of money can be spent to a candidate's or a party's advantage, but the spending must be discreet.

When two parties or two candidates contend with a near equality of forces, money may tip the scales in behalf of one or the other, particularly for the side with the money to get out its vote on election day. Probably the less conspicuous the office, the greater the effect of money in attaining it.

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 140-145.

When in 1941 the Gillette Committee reported that the announced expenditures of the state and national committees of the two major parties in 1940 totaled \$22,740,000, a Washington correspondent for the *New York Times* put in his dispatch the estimate that probably the real amount spent by all party committees and candidates was between \$35,000,000 and \$40,000,000.¹ This estimate that actual expenditures are close to twice those reported, and that they run a little under a dollar per vote cast, is perhaps as close as any that can be made. This does not take into account the amounts spent by non-party organizations, which may well equal or exceed what is spent by the parties themselves.

The announced amounts expended in congressional election years are about half those of presidential years. In 1946, the state and national committees of both major parties reported that they spent \$11,254,000.² But the costs of running a party continue even in years when there is no national election. In 1947 the Democratic National Committee reported spending \$727,000, the Republican National Committee, \$705,000.³

The minor and third parties have generally very little money to spend. Thus the America First (Gerald L. K. Smith's) Party spent \$39,370 in 1944; the American Labor Party, \$49,577; the Socialist Labor Party, \$60,237, and the Socialist Party, \$43,222.⁴ Various non-party organizations will spend as much, or more. The Committee for Constitutional Government, for instance, spent \$250,700 in 1944, \$326,619 in 1946.⁵

Some critics have seen in these large amounts of money spent a danger to democratic government. But it must be remembered that the campaigns for some 800,000 offices are paid for by this \$35,000,000 or \$40,000,000, and that in transporting voters to the polls, in hiring judges of elections, and in many other ways the parties are performing essentially governmental functions, doing what needs to be done to make popular government work. The total amount spent is impressive only when it is considered absolutely; when it is compared with other expenditures it is less impressive. Many a tobacco company will annually spend more on advertising than a major party will spend in a campaign, and what both parties spend would not buy a heavy cruiser or run the Veterans' Administration for a week.

¹ January 24, 1941.

² Priest Committee, *Report*, p. 53.

³ *New York Times*, January 8, 1948.

⁴ Green Committee *Report*, p. 76. During the 1944 campaign the Communist Party was allegedly dissolved, but the Communist Political Association, Earl Browder president, reported total income of \$106,439 and expenditures of \$50,256. *Ibid.*, p. 11.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 10, and Ellender Committee *Report*, p. 33.

A better argument can probably be made that the parties do not have enough money to spend properly to educate voters, to stimulate general interest in public affairs, and to induce capable but impecunious persons to engage in political activity. To this end it has frequently been argued that a public subsidy based on the number of votes regularly cast in a constituency should be provided, or that certain public services, such as the franking privilege, should be extended to candidates and to parties, or that some advertising should be carried for each party and candidate at public expense. A number of states now require the publication at public expense in newspapers or in pamphlet form of initiated and referred measures, proposed constitutional amendments, and similar matters, sometimes with an official summary and more rarely with a statement of arguments for and against. Oregon and North Dakota now publish candidates' pamphlets, although not entirely at public expense. One student of these pamphlets, who believes that they "have performed a valuable public service in providing information to the voters helpful to them in the performance of their duties," recommends that the device be carried even further:

It would seem that if a state makes its election machinery available to a candidate for public office, it is justified in requiring every candidate to co-operate by furnishing a portrait cut, simple biography, platform, and other information needed to give the voters an understanding of his qualifications. To require every candidate, except those whose nomination or election is not opposed, to take at least one page in the candidates' pamphlet, would be reasonable.¹

In any event, the cost of politics and parties in the United States is large and growing, and the legal measures so far taken to control corrupt practices in party finance have been signally unsuccessful.

¹ William L. Josselin, "Oregon Educates Its Voters," *National Municipal Review*, vol. 32 (July, 1943), p. 379. This article contains a summary of candidates' pamphlet legislation.

V

Elections

Registration, Ballots The Conduct of Elections

"INDIFFERENCE, fraud, corruption, and violence have marked the operation of our electoral system. Nor has this condition existed only sporadically or in a few particular localities. It has been a more or less permanent condition in all parts of the country. Every large city has contributed its chapter to the history of election crimes, and the rural sections have added to the story. . . . [Election frauds] are still more widespread than is generally supposed, and in many communities constitute the backbone of the strength of the corrupt political machine."¹ There were charges of fraud at the first election under the Constitution.² The charges have been repeated for most elections since, and the use of every conceivable device has been revealed by investigations and prosecutions. To cite only one specific recent instance, the Green Committee which investigated the elections of 1944 reported that in Arkansas "The committee found evidence of fraud and glaring irregularities in many specific instances. The committee found an appalling indifference to and a flagrant disregard for the laws governing the conduct of elections."³ Among "the wholesale

¹ Joseph P. Harris, *Registration of Voters in the United States* (The Brookings Institution, 1924), p. 2. For accounts of certain types of frauds, especially those having to do with registration, see pp. 5-16. Many of the books on bosses and machines cited in Chapter 12 contain some discussion of election frauds; one of the most recent is Maurice M. Milligan's *The Inside Story of the Pendergast Machine* (1948), pp. 134-166, 250-272.

² For details see Charles O. Paullin, "The First Elections under the Constitution," *Iowa Journal of History and Politics*, vol. 2 (January, 1904), p. 7.

³ United States Senate, 79th Congress, 1st Session, Special Committee to Investigate . . . Campaign Expenditures in 1944, *Report* (1945), p. 42.

irregularities" which they discovered were examples of voting by proxy (husbands voting for their wives and *vice versa*), fraudulent counting of ballots, and illegal ballot boxes, such as "cardboard cartons, mailboxes, envelopes, improvised grocery and commodity boxes" as well as

a regulation 5-cent match box

a Prince Albert tobacco box

an eight-inch long pasteboard box originally containing a dozen spools of thread

a cardboard candy box

a cardboard box with petroleum jelly label.¹

ELECTION FRAUD AND POPULAR GOVERNMENT

Any type of election fraud is, of course, a frustration or pollution of the process of popular self-government. If a citizen's vote is miscounted, or if it is offset by a vote cast in the name of a deceased or fictitious person, the citizen to that extent does not govern himself; he is governed by the person who manipulated the process of elections. When a group, such as the Negroes, is prevented by the maladministration of election laws or by force or fraud from voting, it loses its political power and consequently finds itself unable to better its conditions. The large number of elective offices and the spoils system have contributed to the number of election frauds in the United States and to their widespread use, because, when a large number of persons depend for their livelihood upon carrying their precincts, they operate under a degree of temptation often too great for their characters to resist — and if they cannot win by one means they will win by another. The registration, the ballot, and the election laws of the states have been built up over the years to repress or forbid one fraud after another; they are monuments to a multitude of old abuses. No system of election administration so far devised has prevented all irregularities, but the more advanced statutes steadily make frauds more difficult and detection easier. Just as the enforcement of no criminal law is ever absolutely successful and yet must be continued if society is to function, so must complete enforcement of election laws be steadily attempted even if it is nowhere perfectly attained. And just as the criminal law must grow to cover each newly invented antisocial

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 36, 40. Such boxes, the committee observed somewhat redundantly, were "an open invitation to fraud." But Arkansas was not unique in 1944; other frauds were discovered in other states.

act, so the election laws must grow to meet each newly invented ballot or registration fraud.

Election frauds are not exclusively associated with American governments. Almost every country that has used any form of election has had them. Nor are they characteristic only of public government. There have been charges of the manipulation of proxies in the elections of the directors of some corporations and of ballots for officers of private associations. Some labor unions have had ballots stolen, members kept by force from voting, and so on. Because of frauds, it has even been necessary for the faculties of some universities to supervise the election of the officers for student associations.

THE REGISTRATION OF VOTERS

RISE OF VOTERS' REGISTRATION

When property qualifications for voting were universal, the list of those who owned property sufficed as a kind of voters' registration. Professor Harris has pointed to an act of the Massachusetts legislature, adopted in 1742, as a forerunner of later registration laws. It required the assessors to file with the town clerks lists of landowners for use in elections. But the first real voters' registration law was the Massachusetts Act of 1800.¹ Other states followed slowly, because the property qualifications sufficed as a disqualification of aliens, illiterates, the insane, minors, nonresidents, and others. South Carolina still accepts property ownership as an alternative to a literacy test. But as the property qualifications fell away, some machinery was needed to ascertain in advance of the election the persons entitled to vote, because election officers could not administer the tests on election day nor of their own knowledge pass upon all requests to vote. Registration then gradually became a means of administering certain tests, such as literacy, and of preventing frauds, such as voting by persons not qualified. The states were slow to adopt registration laws until after the Civil War, and such laws as were passed did not always survive the state supreme courts. But gradually constitutional amendments and changes in court membership have enabled every state except Arkansas to pass a statute to require the registration of voters.²

¹ Harris, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

² For the history of the legislation, see Harris, *op. cit.*, pp. 66-92. Texas does not have a registration law, but the list of voters who have paid their poll taxes is a rough equivalent; and the same may be said of Arkansas.

RESIDENCE AS A PRELIMINARY TO REGISTRATION

A now universal prerequisite to registration is a period of residence in the state, county, and election district. Five states, all of them in the South except Rhode Island, require two years' residence in the state. The commonest residence requirement (thirty-two states) is one year, but eleven states accept six months. Varying periods, from ten days to a year, are necessary in the county and election district, and again the longest periods are in the southern states. Residence requirements are defensible on the ground that they give the citizen an opportunity to become acquainted with local problems and public personnel before he votes upon them, but the long residence required in the southern states is obviously calculated to disfranchise Negroes and migratory workers. The one-year residence requirement common in northern states prevented unknown thousands of workers in war industries from registering to vote in 1942 and 1944.¹

TYPES OF REGISTRATION LAWS

Compulsory or Non-Compulsory. The tendency among the states is to make their registration laws compulsory; that is, every citizen who wishes to vote must register before designated election officials at some date or during some period set by the law prior to an election. But the laws of a few states still permit voters to be "sworn in" on election day, especially in rural areas. When this proceeding is allowed, the would-be voter who failed to register appears at his polling place (he may be required to bring one or more duly registered voters as witnesses) and either takes an oath or files an affidavit that he fulfills the legal requirements. The swearing-in of voters on election day makes possible the use of repeaters; that is, men may be transported from one polling place to another to take the oath and to vote again and again.

Permanent Registration. Thirty-one states now require permanent registration for all areas and ten states require it for some areas. Permanent registration is the system advocated by the National Municipal League, the League of Women Voters, and by most authorities on the subject of registration, such as Professor Harris.² In this system, once a

¹ For a table of current residence requirements see *The Book of the States* (1948 edition), p. 96.

² The figure of thirty-one states, and other figures on state registration laws cited herein, are taken from *The Book of the States* (1948 edition), p. 97.

voter has established his right to vote, he remains on the list as long as his status remains unchanged. He may get on the list either by appearing in person before the election board, whatever it may be called, and presenting such evidence or testimony and taking such tests as are required to establish his right to vote; or the board may of its own motion make up lists of voters, using a house-to-house canvass, a poll-tax list, or other evidence. In some cases both these methods are used. It is also the official duty of the election officers to "purge" the lists of the names of persons whose status has changed: those who have moved from the district, been declared insane, been convicted of a crime, or died. In a few states failure to vote in two successive general elections is cause for removal from the list, and a person so removed must re-register if he wishes to vote on a later occasion. The purging of the lists is necessary to prevent votes being cast in the names of persons who are ineligible. Indeed, the great defect of systems of permanent registration is that names tend to remain on the lists not only for life but for eternity. Political machines, such as the Hague and Pendergast organizations, have proved to be expert at finding on the lists the names of the dead, of persons in jail, of those who have moved away, and of other ineligible, and then having votes cast in the names of them all — "ghost" votes or "graveyard" votes. The purging of voting lists can be accomplished effectively and economically if the election officials wish to do it. Notices of deaths may be obtained from the office of vital statistics, notices of conviction of crime from courts, of removals from gas, electricity, and drayage concerns, and so on.

Periodic Registration. Another type of registration is periodic. Six states use this system in all areas and nine in some areas or for some elections. Under periodic registration old voting lists are discarded at intervals, and all would-be voters must re-register. Four states re-register every year, three every two years, four every four years, Nebraska every six years, and South Carolina every ten years. Periodic registration produces an automatic purging of the lists, but it is necessarily a burden upon the voters. It costs the public close to a dollar per name registered, and the new lists are likely to be less reliable than those made up under systems of permanent registration. Fewer persons, by 5 to 15 per cent among those eligible, register under the periodic than under the permanent type of registration. Political machines commonly prefer periodic registration, because they know that they will get the "organization vote" registered — and may also succeed during the rush in registering a

number of fictitious persons — whereas the reform groups may not succeed in getting all of their supporters registered.

If the objective of a sound registration law is to permit at all times a maximum number of eligible voters to be registered with a minimum of inconvenience and cost, permanent registration must be preferred. Grand juries, election officers, or reform groups may check the lists at any time, not merely during a short period (thirty days is common under periodic registration) before an election. If court appeals are to be taken from actions of election officers there is adequate time. A body of permanent election personnel may be built up under a merit system with a degree of expertness which the temporary employees hired for periodic registration cannot possess. Reformers, in fact, have urged that the state governments take over from local governments the work of registration, and that a state office of registration and elections be established under civil service rules. This agency would have field offices in cities or counties. Kansas appears to be the only state so far to have moved in this direction, with the creation in 1947 of the state commissioner of elections. Permanent registration, no matter how administered, is frequently alleged to be unnecessary or unsuitable under rural conditions, but most of the New England states have long used it with satisfaction in rural areas.

Absentee Registration. Normally, a person seeking to register for voting must appear in person before the election officials. This requirement is necessary if tests, such as literacy, are to be administered. But twenty-four states, under widely varying conditions, will permit some sorts of absentee registration. The commonest is for persons necessarily absent from the state by reason of public employment or membership in the military services, and in this case a copy of a birth certificate may suffice for age, and a military or civil service record will be accepted in lieu of literacy or other tests. It may be necessary for the applicant to have his statement of eligibility sworn to before a notary public or a military officer. The requirements are commonly sufficiently onerous so that absentee registration is unusual.

OTHER PROBLEMS IN REGISTRATION

In addition to the administrative problems already mentioned, there are a number of others which the states have sought to solve in different ways. First, what unit of local government shall conduct the registration?

When this question is decided, it may then be asked whether there shall be one or two sets of election officers — one for registration and the other for the elections. The present tendency is to combine them, but political organizations do not like to lose the patronage. Whatever the type of election agency, it is commonly bipartisan, so that a third question is how it shall be selected. A common arrangement is to require that the appointments shall be made from nominations by party officials. Thus state boards of elections may be appointed by the governor from nominations made by the state chairmen, and so on down the levels of governments. This process usually results in the selection of partisans for these quasi-judicial bodies. Minor parties, of course, are rarely represented. Bipartisanship, moreover, often does not work out so that the two sets of partisans vigilantly watch each other. Rather, captive Democrats or captive Republicans are appointed, depending upon which party is dominant in the area. Bipartisan boards as a device for the prevention of registration and election frauds have not been a uniform success.

State laws differ widely on the degree and means of identification of registrants and voters. Some permit identification of the officials' own knowledge. Others require the production of legal documents, such as birth certificates or naturalization papers, or of witnesses. In some cases a registrant is only described by height, weight, color, and so forth on the poll books. In others he must sign the book or card upon registering and duplicate the signature each time he appears to vote.

Most election laws make some provision for transfers; that is, for permitting a registered voter to transfer his registration (subject to the residence requirements) from one election district to another without repeating the literacy or other tests. If the process is too difficult, voters will fail to vote; if it is too easy, political machines will use transfers to colonize election districts.

It may be concluded that, in general, the tendency among the states is not to relax their registration laws, but rather to tighten them. As frauds appear, new machinery is developed to cope with them. Old requirements for registration do not fall away; rather, they are retained and new ones are added.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE BALLOT

EARLY BALLOTS AND VOTING

The development of election ballots from the use of oyster shells in ancient Greece and voting in the American colonies by means of grains of corn and beans (corn for affirmative and beans for negative) to the Australian ballot and the voting machine has been a long process.¹ Only gradually did the laws seek to regulate the means of voting, and in the colonies various methods were used, of which some common ones were voting *viva voce*, by show of hands, by tellers, and by ballots prepared by individual voters. These variations carried over to the post-Revolutionary period:

In the first elections [under the Constitution] the voting was either *viva voce* or by ballot, both methods being common at this time. Maryland and Virginia voted *viva voce*; and New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and North Carolina used the ballot. The courthouse was a favorite voting place in the South, and the town house in New England. In South Carolina the parish house was much used. Polling places were comparatively few, in some states only one to a county.²

Voting by voice or by show of hands have all but disappeared except in the New England town meetings, and even there the town officers are commonly elected by ballot. Oral and teller voting obviously place a great reliance upon the qualities of hearing and impartiality possessed by the presiding officer. They are not secret, and the purchaser of votes can check up on those who sell them. For the honest voters, moreover, these devices are inconvenient, because such voters must go to the meeting and remain until the candidates or measures in which they are interested are put to a vote.

PAPER BALLOTS

The new state constitutions adopted after the Revolution commonly

¹ For the history of voting devices see Spencer D. Albright, *The American Ballot* (1942), pp. 9-30; Harold F. Gosnell, "Ballot," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 2, pp. 410-412; Joseph P. Harris, *Election Administration in the United States* (1934), pp. 11-23; Charles Seymour and Donald P. Frary, *How the World Votes* (1918), 2 vols.

² Paullin, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

required voting by ballot in all, or most, elections. "By the turn of the century," according to Albright, "most of the American states were using the paper ballot. States admitted thereafter regularly provided for its use."¹ These early ballots were not prepared by public authority, but were hand-written by the voters on paper they provided for themselves or were written or printed by candidates or parties. Various frauds, of course, resulted, such as the use of tissue-paper ballots for stuffing the ballot box. Each party printed its ballot in a bright color so that a party worker could see, as each voter put his ballot in the box, how he had voted. On election day in New York, the party workers, wrote Theodore Roosevelt

are at their places long before the hour set for voting; each party has a wooden booth, looking a great deal like a sentry-box, covered over with flaming posters containing the names of their nominees. . . . Every voter as he approaches is certain to be offered a set of tickets; usually these sets are "straight," that is, contain all the nominees of one party, but frequently crooked work will be done, and some one candidate will get his own ballots bunched with the rest of those of the opposite party.²

Sometimes the parties counterfeited each others' ballots.³ The states were moving toward the requirement of uniform paper and ink when, in 1888, the Australian ballot was adopted in Louisville, Kentucky, and later the same year in Massachusetts.

THE AUSTRALIAN BALLOT SYSTEM

The Australian ballot got its name from its adoptions in Queensland in 1857.⁴ The Australian system — for it is more than a ballot form — has four features. (1) Ballots are uniform, printed by public authority at public expense on a specified quality or type of good paper. (2) Ballots contain names of all candidates who have filed or have been nominated; twenty-five states use only a single ("consolidated") ballot at a given election, but the remainder may have different ballots for different sets of officials or for initiated and referred measures. (3) Ballots are distributed to voters only on the election day, in the official polling place,

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 19.

² *Essays on Practical Politics* (1888), p. 56.

³ Eldon C. Evans, *History of the Australian Ballot System in the United States* (1917), p. 7.

⁴ John H. Wigmore, *The Australian Ballot System* (1884), discussed the history of the legislation in Australia and reprinted the act and the Massachusetts statute.

and only by public officials; but unofficial, sample, facsimile, or educational ballots — clearly distinguished from the official ballots — may be distributed in advance by the parties or by officials. (4) Ballots are marked by the voters secretly in booths, are then folded and deposited unopened in a ballot box. Any identifying crease, fold, or mark invalidates a ballot.¹ After its introduction in 1888 the Australian ballot spread rapidly, until at present all states except Delaware, Georgia, and South Carolina have ballot laws which meet all four of the requirements mentioned above.²

Even though the official, secret ballot is now almost universal, in no two states are the ballots exactly alike. They vary in size, shape, color, arrangement of names, type of marking, amount of instruction to voters, and in other ways. Some of the more important differences deserve brief discussion.

THE OFFICE-GROUP BALLOT

The first Australian ballot used by Massachusetts arranged the candidates' names in groups or blocks under the offices they sought. The name of each candidate was followed by his party affiliation.³ This form has been called the headless or the Massachusetts ballot. Seventeen states now use it. Since the voter must go down the ballot, office by office, picking out one candidate after another, this type of ballot encourages independent voting, "split tickets." Illiterate and semi-literate voters have trouble in using it. Because the candidates' names appear in alphabetical, chance, or rotated order, it is not usually possible to drill the uneducated adherents of a political machine to vote the first name in each group, vote the second name, or whatever. For these reasons political bosses do not like the office-group ballot, and, conversely, ballot reformers prefer it.

¹ Carl O. Smith, *A Book of Ballots*, Report No. 148 of the Detroit Bureau of Municipal Research (1938), p. iii. Besides a discussion of ballot forms, this pamphlet contains forty-three pages of facsimile ballots. For a table of ballot forms in current use see *The Book of the States* (1948 edition), p. 98. The only state that prints its ballots in two languages is New Mexico, which uses both English and Spanish. In order to avoid the confusion caused by identical or similar names among nominees, many states permit the printing under each name of the residence, occupation, and some identifying phrase, such as "candidate for re-election" or "regular Republican."

² For an account of the spread of the Australian ballot system see Albright, *op. cit.*, pp. 23-30.

³ This first ballot of 1888 is reproduced in Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

The candidates for the highest office sought at the election — President, United States senator, governor — usually form the group at the upper left-hand corner of the office-group ballot, and the blocks follow in descending order of importance down to assemblyman or precinct constable. An examination of election returns under the office-group ballot will show what may loosely be called voter's fatigue: virtually all the voters will vote for the top office and fewer for each lower office, until at the bottom perhaps fewer than half will vote.¹ This phenomenon may be due either to indifference or to ignorance. The voters have decided whom to vote for as President or governor, but they either do not know or do not care about the candidates for alderman, coroner, and justice of the peace. When state constitutions have required that proposed amendments must be approved by a majority of those voting at the election, and when these items have been put at the bottom of the ballot, the constitutions have turned out to be almost unamendable. Roughly, the longer the ballot the greater the tendency of voters not to vote on candidates or propositions toward the end of it.

THE PARTY-COLUMN BALLOT

The other type of pattern is the party-column ballot, also called the Indiana ballot, because of its adoption by that state in 1889. In this form each party has a vertical column with the name of the party conspicuously printed at the top, and all party candidates are arranged in descending order of importance. In all of these states it is possible to vote for all of the party candidates by making one mark, usually in a box or circle at the top. Or the voter may "scratch his ticket" by crossing from one column into another.² In fifteen states some party emblem

¹ Election returns in almost any election where an office-group ballot carries more than a dozen names will show this phenomenon. Cortez E. M. Ewing, *Congressional Elections* (1947), p. 38, has calculated for national elections, "In 1928, of every hundred voters, ninety-two had voted also for congressional candidates; in 1932 that figure had dropped to slightly less than eighty-five, by 1936 it was back up again to more than ninety-four." His figures necessarily include returns from states using party-column ballots. If only returns from office-group states were used, the percentages voting for President but not voting for congressmen would be smaller. The election of 1948 was in this, as in some other respects, extraordinary, because state and local candidates the country over received 683,382 more votes than were cast for all presidential candidates.

² Texas is an exception; there the voter votes a "straight ticket" by scratching out or making vertical marks through the columns of the parties for which he does not

or symbol appears above the column. Among those in use are an eagle, a rooster, a dromedary (Prohibition Party), an elephant, a bison, a hammer and sickle, a star, and pictures of Lincoln, Washington, Jefferson, and other party heroes. These symbols are for the benefit of illiterate or poorly educated voters.

Because of people's reading habits, politicians set great store by the left-hand column, and the majority in a legislature will either designate the left-hand column for their party or will set up in the law some formula (e.g., largest vote for President or governor in the previous election) that will give them the favored position. How much difference this makes is impossible to say, but it is clear that the party-column ballot encourages straight party voting and makes independent voting correspondingly difficult. A party dominant in one state usually seeks, therefore, to preserve its position by the use of this form of ballot. If it then elects the "head of the ticket," it will almost certainly carry every other candidate in with him on the straight ballots cast.

There is a saying among politicians in the party-column states that "if you can elect the head of the ticket you can elect a yellow dog at the end." Indeed, dead men and candidates who have withdrawn and moved away after the ballots were printed have received majorities where the voting was done in this manner. The minority party will commonly oppose the party-column ballot, because they cannot usually elect anybody with it, whereas with the office-group ballot, even if the minority cannot elect the head of the ticket, they may elect other candidates, especially outstanding individuals.

Another political advantage of the party-column ballot is that it is possible for watchers to observe how long voters stay in their voting booths and thus to tell whether or not they voted straight tickets or scratched, because only an instant is required to mark a straight ticket. Then, if votes are being purchased, the corruptionist may refuse to pay those who remained in the booth too long. He cannot, of course, by judging this time interval, tell who voted a straight ticket for another party.

MARKING THE BALLOT

Ballots in all but three states are marked with a cross (X) or a plus (+) wish to vote. In the states that combine the party-column ballot with some non-partisan nominations, such as judges, the nonpartisan nominees may be put in a separate column.

made in a little box or circle at the top of the column or before or after the name of the candidate. In three southern states, however, ballots are marked by scratching or lining out the parties, names, or propositions not voted for.¹ Legislatures seeking to preserve the secrecy of the ballot have passed a number of statutes relating to ballot marking, because persons buying votes would instruct the sellers to mark their ballots in a certain way — say with a colored pencil, by a check mark (✓), by making one leg of the cross go out of the little box or circle, or in some other unusual way. The corruptionist could watch as the ballots were counted after the polls closed — the law almost everywhere requires counting to be open to the public — and determine, before he paid off, whether his venal voters had obeyed his instructions. Some states, therefore, require that ballots shall be marked only with a particular kind of pencil or ink, which is provided in the voting booth. Five states even provide a stamp and stamp pad, or a stencil, and refuse to count ballots marked with pencil or pen.²

THE NUMBERED STUB

In order to prevent a fraud known as the “endless chain” or the “Tasmanian Dodge,” twenty-four states have adopted the numbered-stub system for their ballots. The endless-chain fraud is worked by having a person leave a polling place with an unmarked ballot, sometimes with the connivance of an official. The trick may also be worked by walking out with a ballot during some confusion, which may be created for the purpose; or, in states where a folded ballot has no official seal or printing on the outside, by casting a blank sheet of paper folded to look like a ballot. Frequently, in states not having a consolidated ballot, absent-minded voters are sure some time during the day to leave in the voting booths one or more ballots, which can be picked up by voters who follow them and taken out unmarked.³ A person buying votes then takes the unmarked ballot, pays the thief, marks the ballot, and hands it to the next man whose vote is being purchased. This man is instructed to cast the ballot and to bring out another unmarked one. This process may be

¹ Arkansas, South Carolina, Texas.

² See Albright, *op. cit.*, pp. 63-68, and his “Legislation on Marking Ballots,” *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*, vol. 21 (December, 1940), pp. 221-226.

³ On one occasion the author, serving as an election official, was assigned to look in each booth before each voter entered, and to pick up and turn in the many ballots carelessly left in them by previous voters.

repeated all day long. Since the buyer of votes marks the ballot himself, he is sure of getting what he pays for. When the ballot box is opened, the blank paper may be discovered, or the number of ballots issued may not check against the numbers cast. But it is impossible to tell the corrupt from the honest votes, and most judges would rule that all had to be counted.

To prevent this fraud the law may provide, in order to stop confusion or scuffling, that only two or three persons aside from officials may be in a polling place while voting is going on. Lines must form outside the door, or in the street, and rails may be erected within the polling place in such a way that no one, once handed a ballot, can get out of the room without casting or surrendering it.

One of two ballot-numbering schemes is also used. In the single-stub arrangement all ballots are numbered consecutively with the numbers on perforated stubs at the top or at one corner of the ballots. When the voter receives his ballot the number on it is recorded against his name on the poll book or voters' list, and after he has marked it in his booth and folded it so that the stub protrudes, he shows or hands the ballot to a clerk who checks the number against the number originally assigned to him. If they are the same, he or the clerk tears off the stub, and he puts the ballot in the ballot box. Only then is he free to leave. The double-stub system differs somewhat among the states that use it. In some, all the ballots for a precinct, numbered consecutively, are bound together in a book, and the voter's name and address is recorded before his ballot is torn off along a perforation. The number that remains on the stub in the book corresponds to the number on another stub on the ballot, and before the ballot can be cast these two numbers must be checked and the ballot stub torn off. In other double-stub states both numbered stubs are on the ballot. One official tears off one stub and records the number at the time the voter is given his ballot. A second official tears off the other stub after the ballot is marked, but he does so only if it checks with the number that was entered in the poll book. Any of these numbered-stub plans, honestly administered, will break up the endless-chain fraud. Some form of numbered stub seems to be gaining ground among the states that continue to use paper ballots.

STICKERS AND WRITE-INS

Most states provide on their ballots some arrangement by which last-

minute changes may be made if, for instance, a candidate dies or withdraws after the ballots have been printed, and they also allow some means by which a voter can express a choice for a person who has not filed or been nominated. The office-group ballots usually allow one or more blank spaces at the end of each group; the party-column ballots provide a blank column. In the appropriate places a voter may write the names of candidates or parties or may paste gummed labels carrying the names of candidates. When both parties nominate candidates who are unacceptable to some group or faction, a write-in or sticker campaign may be conducted. These efforts are rarely successful, however, because voters are too hard to arouse. In the party-column states the flood of straight tickets usually carries all before it. Even when, as in local elections, voters can be aroused and educated to use a sticker or write-in, they are likely to fail to make the X or + beside the name they have written or pasted in. Some laws will permit the vote to be counted notwithstanding, but others will not. Election officers will vary in their insistence upon the correct spelling of candidates' names and will differ in whether they will accept nicknames.¹

THE PRESIDENTIAL SHORT BALLOT

Legally, a voter never votes for President and Vice-President, but for presidential electors. These persons are, however, usually pledged to vote for their party nominees. The populous states with many presidential electors have found that to print their names on the ballot lengthens it unduly. Millions of voters, moreover, do not know of the existence of the electoral college and are easily confused by a ballot that contains the names of the electors. Sometimes, for instance, voters will select a few Democratic and a few Republican electors, or will vote for only one or two at the top of the list. The long list of names also slows up counting. Beginning with Kansas in 1897, twenty-three states have removed the names of electors from their ballots and provided that voters shall mark their ballots for President and Vice-President directly or with some such phrase as "The Presidential electors pledged to —," who must be

¹ In New Hampshire in 1874 a canvassing board "threw out all the votes for . . . Nat Head, on the ground that no such person existed, although they admitted that there was a Nathaniel Head (a name by which he was never known) who was both existent and eligible." — L. B. Richardson, *William E. Chandler* (1940), p. 167. The state supreme court unanimously refused to take jurisdiction over the case; courts, in general, are most reluctant to take ballot and election cases.

voted for as a block.¹ The electoral college has fallen so far from the function expected of it by the framers of the Constitution that approximately 70 per cent of the voters, choosing 359 presidential electors, see only the names of the candidates for President and Vice-President and vote for men and women whose names are not even on their ballots.²

ABSENTEE VOTING

Voting by proxy is permitted only in Oklahoma.³ Under widely varying conditions, forty-five states allow certain voters (e.g., those in military service) or any voters under certain circumstances (e.g., necessarily absent from the state on business) to vote notwithstanding absence; but not always in all elections (e.g., only in presidential elections). Some states use a special absentee ballot different in style and color from the ordinary ballots and including on the outside, spaces for the required signatures, stamps, and seals of notaries and witnesses. Other states permit the use of a regular ballot attached to or accompanied by an affidavit. The requirements for absentee voting are usually sufficiently onerous so that only voters with extraordinary interest in an election will go to the trouble of applying (sometimes thirty days in advance of an election), taking the ballot before a notary public, sealing it in an official envelope, and perhaps sending it by registered mail. And even after all the requirements are met, the absentee ballots which arrive after the regular ballots are counted may be disregarded. It is curious that American legislatures, usually slow to attempt to cope with many types of ballot frauds, have so surrounded the process of absentee voting with precautions that both frauds and voting are nearly impossible.

¹ For facsimiles of various types of the presidential short ballot see Spencer D. Albright, *The American Ballot* (1942), p. 109; and Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 14-21.

² Spencer D. Albright, *The Book of the States* (1948 edition), p. 43.

³ James K. Pollock, *Absentee Voting and Registration* (pamphlet, 1940), p. 9. This pamphlet contains a convenient table summarizing absentee voting laws, pp. 12-19. Proxy voting is still permitted in Great Britain; there it appears to be widely and freely used: 682,324 proxy votes were counted in the election of 1945. For an interesting discussion of this and other present-day ballot and election laws in England, see R. B. McCallum and Alison Readman, *The British General Election of 1945* (1947), especially pp. 24-43.

FRAUD AND VIOLENCE

COUNTING THE BALLOTS

In order to allow the maximum opportunity for citizens to vote, and especially for those who work during the day, many states now require that the polls shall stay open until late in the evening, sometimes until eight or nine o'clock. Whenever the legal hour arrives, the polls are closed to further voting, and the clerks, already weary, begin the counting of the ballots — a task that, with a long ballot, may take them all night. With the best of intentions they will make mistakes, and more mistakes as their fatigue mounts. Piles of ballots may be counted twice and other piles not counted at all; in utter weariness tally sheets may be added up wrongly; or bitter disputes may occur as to whether a ballot marked in some peculiar way is an identifiable ballot and should be rejected. When elections turn out to be close — and once in a while there is a tie — recounts are conducted. Then, even though there was no suspicion of fraud on the first count, the final return when the new counts are conducted under more favorable conditions will almost always be different from the first count.

Frauds in Counting. The counting of the ballots, however, offers many opportunities for fraud, perhaps as many as all other registration and ballot situations together. One is the deliberate falsification of returns. Thus it may almost be assumed that in “zero precincts” — those in which one side is reported to have received no votes at all — the count is fraudulent. And it may usually be further assumed that when the count appears in round numbers in district after district — “Smith 600, Brown 100” — the ballots have not been counted or that they have been miscounted. Sometimes, apparently, tally sheets are even made up before the polls open. On one occasion the Vare machine in Philadelphia found just before election day that one of its candidates for a judgeship was dying — and he did die on election day. To prevent the loss of this important position the organization conducted a desperate last-minute sticker campaign for another candidate, but lost. One of the Vare inspectors gave this explanation of what had happened:

“It wasn't lack of time that beat us,” he said. “After the polls closed we could simply have opened the boxes and pasted on as many stickers as we pleased. The trouble was that we had made out the tally sheets early in the day, and given Patterson [the judge who died] enough

votes to make his election sure. Those tally sheets go to the judges of the Court of Common Pleas, and as they are marked in ink on special paper, it is almost impossible to erase them."

"Isn't it rather dangerous to prepare the final record of the election before even half the votes have been cast?" he was asked.

"No indeed," he assured his auditors. "We always do that. If we actually counted the ballots our job wouldn't be finished until the next morning."¹

Marking. When one or more of the clerks or officials is corrupt, various things may happen to the ballots. The marks made by the voters may be erased and new marks put in; or if the ballots are marked with ink or by a stamp or stencil they may be torn, stepped on, or have special creases folded into them so that they can be declared to be identifiable and hence void. Another famous dodge is the "short pencil trick." A clerk who unfolds or otherwise handles ballots before they are counted holds in his hand a two-inch pencil, with which on office-group ballots he may fill in where the voters failed to make their marks, may void party-column ballots by putting in a cross above an extra party column, or may void any ballot by making a mark on it, such as a checkmark in a corner. Spectators at the count are usually required by law to stand back a designated number of feet from the clerks so that unauthorized persons will not have access to the ballots. Consequently it is difficult for even the most vigilant watcher to detect the short pencil trick in action.

Stuffing. Another type of corrupt practice is stuffing the ballot boxes. When ballots are found in the boxes rolled instead of folded, or folded together in bunches, or folded only once, or when more ballots are found in the boxes than the poll books show were cast, or more than there are registered voters for the district, there is *prima-facie* evidence of ballot-box stuffing.² Where the central count system is used — that is, where the filled ballot boxes are collected from the precincts and taken to some one place where they are all opened — there is special danger that the boxes will be stuffed on their way from the precincts to the central point. In a recent election in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, it was charged that locked wooden boxes had had the screws removed and their bottoms

¹ Austin F. MacDonald, "Philadelphia's Political Machine in Action," *National Municipal Review*, vol. 15 (January, 1926), p. 33.

² The most complete collection of instances of these and other frauds is in Harris, *op. cit.*, pp. 315-382.

taken off, ballots put in and the bottoms screwed on again, while the boxes were on their way from some polling places to the city clerk's office where they were to be opened.

VIOLENCE IN ELECTIONS

Boxes filled with ballots have been stolen or destroyed in Chicago, Newark, and in other places. A series of registration and ballot irregularities in Kansas City, Missouri, in connection with the defeat in 1946 by the Pendergast machine of Congressman Roger C. Slaughter led to a federal investigation which had not been completed when, during the night of May 27, 1947, the steel doors of the county courthouse were blown off with nitroglycerin and the impounded ballot boxes containing evidence of fraudulent voting were stolen.¹ Violence in elections is an old story. Harris cites cases brought before the Second and Third Congresses. Scarcely an election takes place in Chicago or New York without violent crimes being committed. The murder of Joseph Scottoriggio, a Republican election district captain of the Eighteenth New York Congressional District, as he was on his way to the polls on election day, 1946, is only one recent example. If Negroes vote at all in the elections in most of the states of the Solid South, they do so under the threat of mob violence. It would be easy and pleasant to assume that violence is disappearing in American elections; and perhaps it has diminished somewhat recently. But there have been too many instances over too long a time and of too recent date to make any observer very optimistic that future elections will all be peaceful.

ATTEMPTED REMEDIES

VOTING MACHINES

The widespread prevalence and great variety of election frauds led inventors in Europe early in the nineteenth century to experiment with voting machines. The first one appeared in 1836 in England, and the first American patent was issued in 1869 to Thomas A. Edison.² The first state to adopt a voting machine law was New York in 1892. Since that time thirty-four other states have adopted some sort of legislation

¹ Milligan, *op. cit.*, pp. 265-272.

² Albright, *The American Ballot* (1942), p. 74.


to authorize or require their use, but some statutes have been repealed, and others have been declared unconstitutional by state courts. Machines are now mandatory for all precincts in New York and Rhode Island. They are extensively used, says Albright, in seven other states and are authorized or applied, chiefly for urban areas, in fourteen more.

Typically, a state legislature first makes machines optional. It then makes them mandatory for cities of a certain size, reducing the size session by session. And finally it forces the cities to buy them by deducting their cost from the cities' share of state subventions, perhaps providing for their actual purchase by a state agency. The movement for them has, in general, come from the state governments and not from the cities.

Use of Machines. The machines on the market differ somewhat, but they must, of course, vary to permit party-column, office-group, or cumulative voting. Machines are now made which "will record the votes of nine parties of seventy candidates each and provide space for voting on thirty-five questions."¹ As a general rule the machines are not put in booths, but a curtain which the voter pulls back both unlocks the machine and shields him from the view of spectators as he votes. The names of candidates are printed on cards or strips of paper, and are arranged on the face of the machine in horizontal rows. A little lever over the name of each candidate, party, or proposition is pulled down by the voter. If he changes his mind he can raise the lever. Locking devices make it impossible for him to vote for more candidates than there are to be elected. Thus he cannot, as with a paper ballot, void his vote. The levers remain as he left them until he pulls the curtain aside to leave; then his vote is cast. As successive voters use the machine, it continuously tabulates the total vote, so that when the polling is over officials may unlock plates over the counters and read off the totals. Write-ins are permitted by allowing for a metal slide which the voter may raise to write on a roll of paper, thus exposed, the name of a candidate not on the face of the machine.

While the machines cannot end registration frauds or prevent the use of repeaters, they do end all ballot frauds, such as the endless chain and the short pencil. They count votes as accurately as an adding machine and far more accurately than sleepy clerks can do. They also speed up the count. Although they may be tampered with or put out of commission — one trick is to put chewing gum under the levers — they are far less subject to tampering than paper ballots. Because voters can use

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 91.



Courtesy of Automatic Voting Machine Corp.

One of several types of machines. The voter shown here is splitting a ticket after pulling the Democratic straight party lever.

them in less time than they can paper ballots, larger precincts — up to two thousand voters — are practicable.

Cost of Machines. Their original costs are substantial, from a thousand to two thousand dollars each; and besides, they must be stored between elections, transported, insured, and repaired. Paper ballots must still be printed for absentee voters, as samples, and for use in case a machine fails. Probably if all elements of cost are included, machines are more expensive than ballots, but the difference, if any, is not great; and what greater expenditure there may be is justified in the reduction the machines make in the opportunities for fraud.

Complexity of Voting. Voters are often puzzled by paper ballots, and mark them in curious ways. They often fail to follow the simplest instructions. If, for instance, two persons are to be elected, and the ballot

clearly carries the words, "Vote for not more than two," some voters will invariably vote for three, or for two in each party. But apparently more voters are confused by voting machines than by ballots. People are accustomed to reading in vertical columns, and the horizontal columns of voting machines puzzle them. The commonest mistake, however, is for voters to pull down the levers below rather than above the names of the candidates they want. Even when voting machines had been in use in Essex County, New Jersey, for ten years, 3100 votes were cast in the election of 1946 for the assembly candidates of the Prohibition Party, while the Prohibition candidate for governor received 619 and the candidate for senator 538. Probably about 2500 of the votes that went to the Prohibition candidates for the assembly were intended for the Democratic list, which appeared just above.¹ An educational campaign appears to be necessary before each election to instruct and to re-instruct voters in the use of the machines. It seems to be desirable to have sample machines at elections offices and in public buildings so that voters may learn how to work them.

PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION

Some of the defects of the single-member district system of representation common in the United States have already been noticed in these pages. If one hundred legislators are to be elected from one hundred districts, and there is no gerrymandering, one party with 51 per cent of the vote in each district can capture every seat and leave a substantial minority with no voice in the legislature. With gerrymandering, a minority may win a majority or even all of the seats. If more than two parties engage in a contest, a majority or all of the seats may be won by pluralities, so that a party with 34 per cent of the vote could win every seat in a three-cornered contest, 26 per cent in a four-cornered election, and so on. Such objections are more than theoretical. The Republican Party, for instance, failed to win a majority of the House of Representatives in 1942, even though it won a majority of the votes cast. In the three-party situation that prevailed in Wisconsin from 1934 to 1940, majority elections became the exception and plurality elections the rule; in 1940, for instance, the Republican candidate for governor was elected with 40.8 per cent of the vote cast.²

¹ *Newark* (New Jersey) *Evening News*, November 13, 1946.

² Harold F. Gosnell, *Grass Roots Politics* (1942), p. 150.

For at least a century and a half philosophers, mathematicians, reformers, and others have been interested in introducing some form of voting which would produce a closer reflection of party strength than the single-member district system. A discussion of the schemes that have been proposed or tried lies beyond the scope of this book.¹ Only the chief methods now in use in the United States can be considered here.

Cumulative Voting in Illinois. Illinois has a system of cumulative voting for representatives in the lower house of the state legislature, who are elected from three-member senatorial districts. Each voter has three votes. He may concentrate these on one candidate by making an X in front of one name only; or he may split his three into one and one half each by putting an X before each of two candidates; or he may use one vote for each candidate.² The same system is used in the primaries. Under this system it is obviously to the advantage of a minority party to concentrate its strength upon one or two candidates, and because it is difficult to instruct voters, the election law permits the senatorial committee of each party (which is elected by party members) to "fix and determine" by a resolution which must be filed with the Secretary of State the number of candidates to be nominated.³ Thus party voters may be compelled, even though they vote straight tickets, to concentrate upon one or two candidates. A minority under this system is not absolutely assured of representation, but its chances of obtaining one seat out of three are much greater than they are under the single-member district system.

The Hare System. The system of voting which produces the most precise reflection of party strength is the single transferable vote, or Hare system, so named from an English barrister who invented it. It has been used in Eire and in various American cities. Ballots are marked with numerals instead of crosses — 1, 2, 3, 4, and so on, in the order of the voter's preference among the candidates. The following, from a

¹ There is a considerable body of printed materials on these voting and representation devices, of which the most timely and best-balanced is Harold F. Gosnell, *Democracy: the Threshold of Freedom* (1948), especially pp. 164-198. The leading work advocating proportional representation is C. S. Hoag and G. H. Hallett, *Proportional Representation* (1926); see also the files of *The Proportional Representation Review*, presently appearing as a department of *The National Municipal Review*. The National Municipal League advocates proportional representation for cities under the council-manager form of government and for state legislatures. Perhaps the best-known book opposing proportional representation is F. A. Hermens, *Democracy or Anarchy?* (1941).

² *Illinois Election Code*, Article 17, Section 13.

³ *Ibid.*, Article 8, Section 13.

Cincinnati ballot for an election of the city council, is a typical example of the instructions to voters appearing on proportional representation ballots:

DIRECTIONS TO VOTERS

Put the figure 1 in the square opposite the name of your first choice. Express your second, third, and other choices by putting the figure 2 opposite the name of your second choice, the figure 3 opposite the name of your third choice, and so on. You may express thus as many choices as you please, without any regard to the number being elected.

Your ballot will be counted for your first choice if it can be used to help elect him. If it cannot help elect him, it will be transferred to the highest of your other choices whom it can help.

You cannot hurt any of those you prefer by marking lower choices for others. The more choices you express, the surer you are to make your ballot count for one of them. But do not feel obliged to express choices which you do not really have.

After the polls close, all the ballots are assembled at a central point, and the total number of valid ballots cast is determined. This total is then divided by one more than the number of seats to be filled. In Cincinnati, with nine councilmen to be elected, that number would be ten. The resulting quotient is completed to the next round number, and constitutes the quota. Then all candidates whose first-choice votes equal or exceed the quota are declared elected. Ballots which an elected candidate receives beyond the quota are called surplus and are transferred to the next choice indicated on them. If, when this transfer is completed, seats still remain to be filled, those candidates with the smallest number of ballots are eliminated in turn and their ballots transferred to the next choices. This process continues until all the seats are filled. The ballots may be preserved, and in the event of a vacancy, counted one step further to fill it.

Harold F. Gosnell reduced the claims and counterclaims of proponents and opponents to the following conclusions, among others, regarding the operation of proportional representation.¹

1. It insures the representation of an existing majority and of every well-organized and sizable minority. . . .

2. The plan, involving as it does election from a larger constituency

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 188-189.

than the district plan, has improved the caliber of local representatives. Whether it is the larger constituency or the transferable vote feature that has brought this result is very difficult to determine.

3. While in some jurisdictions there have been higher ratios of spoiled ballots than under the plurality plan, the method has been reasonably well understood by voters. . . .

4. The plan has not been more expensive than the plurality system. . . .

5. Where a coherent majority does not exist among the electorate, this condition will be reflected in the results of the proportional representation system. The legislative body so chosen may not contain a working majority if the members elected show a lack of the spirit of compromise.

Whatever the ostensible reasons advanced, the real objection to proportional representation on the part of most of its opponents is its very success in representing minorities. When in 1947 the system was repealed in New York City, the

most important factor in the campaign was the unpopularity of the Communist and American Labor parties . . . each of which elected two councilmen [in twenty nine] at the last city election in 1945. These parties . . . cast 18 per cent of the first-choice votes in the city and elected 17½ per cent of the council. On the strength of this representation organization politicians of the majority (Democratic) party, who launched the attack on P.R. for quite other reasons, were able to persuade a majority of the newspapers and the public that they were voting on the foreign policy of the Kremlin instead of a feature of city government in New York.¹

The return to the district system promises not only to eliminate the American Labor, the Communist, and the Liberal representatives, but the Republicans as well, because Mayor O'Dwyer and the Democratic Party carried every district in 1945.

Ballot forms and forms of representation are not the whole answer to the problems of democratic government. At one extreme, fraud or gerrymandering or the single-member district may frustrate a clear-cut majority. A system of proportional representation may provide an accurate reflection of strength of the organized groups and parties. But the process of popular government involves more than this — among other factors, leadership, compromise, and consent to majority rule. Even so, any improvement in the method or machinery of elections, however small, is a move in the direction of more effective popular government.

¹ *National Municipal Review*, vol. 36 (December, 1947), p. 648.

VI

Party Evolution

Factors in Party Evolution

THE TWO-PARTY ALIGNMENT that has, over most of American history, characterized the party struggle has been shaped by the features of the Constitution, notably federalism. The system of separately elected executives has been a sort of centripetal force which has at least discouraged the multiplicity of parties usual in some other popular governments.¹ Although some 135 parties have at one time or another elected members of Congress, and although there have been uncounted strictly local parties, the American party battle has commonly been a two-sided rather than a many-sided contest; and furthermore, "There has been no sharp break in the sources of party strength, in policy, or in opinion," wrote Charles A. Beard. Rather, the different "alignments have been merely phases of one unbroken conflict originating in the age of George Washington and continuing without interruption to our own time."²

EARLY PERIODS IN PARTY DEVELOPMENT

THE FEDERALIST PERIOD

Various major and minor periods may be identified in American party history, but three principal ones stand out. Any dates for these periods must be regarded as approximate, because parties do not usually either spring up suddenly or die in a particular year, but instead they generally

¹ See Arthur W. Macmahon, "Parties, Political," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 11, p. 596. This article is a brilliant analysis of the forces which have affected American party history.

² *The American Party Battle* (1928), p. 29.

evolve from group nuclei and, having passed their prime, gradually fade away.¹ During the first period, from the ratification of the Constitution in 1788 to the Hartford Convention in 1814, the Federalists contended with Jefferson and his anti-Federalist associates, first called Republicans and later Democrats. It was during Washington's administration that the real basis for the American party division — between wealth in land and wealth in commerce and industry — emerged. The Federalist leaders never united in a formal party organization such as is common today, nor, after the death of Hamilton in 1804, did they have a recognized national leader. The party obtained power in Congress and in the states on the momentum of the campaign for the ratification of the Constitution. It was supported by the Society of the Cincinnati, the merchants, such manufacturers as there were, the holders of government bonds, and propertied persons in general. In a period of property qualifications for the suffrage, this type of support put the Federalists solidly in power, and their principal public policies strengthened the national government and advanced the interests of business and finance. The national government, under Federalist leadership, funded the national debt, assumed the Revolutionary debts of the states, passed the first tariff bill, set up the first Bank of the United States, and established judicial review.

THE JEFFERSON REPUBLICANS

There was opposition to Federalist policies and measures even before the adoption of the Constitution. The opponents were largely frontiersmen, small proprietors, and what were then called mechanics — that is, laborers. In Virginia, "As a group combination, it consisted of small farmers along the upper rivers, tobacco-growers from the ridges between, and hunters and trappers from the slopes of the Alleghenies . . . with whom were combined the hitherto inert and unorganized mass of small proprietors and slave-owners in the old counties."² Patrick Henry was an early leader of this movement and one of the leading opponents of

¹ There are several excellent party histories, of which the most recent and detailed is Wilfred E. Binkley, *American Political Parties: Their Natural History* (1943). Edgar E. Robinson, *The Evolution of American Parties* (1924), is older but useful; Harold R. Bruce, *American Parties and Politics* (3d edition, 1936), contains on pp. 78-213 a survey of parties; and the many American histories contain treatments of party history varying in amount of detail. An extensive bibliography will be found in Binkley.

² Binkley, *op. cit.*, p. 55; cf. Charles A. Beard, *Economic Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy* (1915), and Claude G. Bowers, *Jefferson and Hamilton* (1925).

the Constitution, but the anti-Federalists were never a real party. The first leader to fuse into an organized party the discontented agrarians was one of the most skillful politicians that the country ever produced, Thomas Jefferson. His election in 1800 was a victory for the back country as well as a proof of the value of organization in politics.¹ The party Jefferson established lasted for twenty-eight years, while the Federalist Party, as Beard put it, died a lingering death; its last candidate for President was overwhelmingly defeated by Monroe in 1820, and for a time the Republican Party had no organized opposition.

The party of Jefferson was loyal to the landed interest in which its support lay; it expanded the national domain by the purchase of Louisiana in 1803, and it hoped to expand even more by the War of 1812. The charter of the Bank was allowed to expire, and the second Bank of the United States was later established only because of the necessities of the second war with England. A small army and navy, freedom of opinion, *laissez faire*, and a critical attitude toward judicial review marked the Jeffersonian period. The Jeffersonian Republicans were not strictly agrarian; as is pointed out elsewhere in this book, they welcomed the immigrant and the city laborer.

THE JACKSON PERIOD

By 1828, the balance of political power had shifted from the seaboard states to the West. Property qualifications for voting had nearly disappeared, and in only two states of the twenty-four were presidential electors chosen by the legislatures. It was in the West that the leveling ideas of Jefferson were most realized, and under Andrew Jackson what would be called today the left-wing or proletarian faction of the party emerged as the Democratic Party, bearing the name it has today. The new alignment was predominantly western and southern, combining laborers, small farmers of the West, and southern slave-owners and cotton planters.²

¹ Since the legislatures in ten states still chose the presidential electors in 1800, there is no satisfactory measurement of Jefferson's popular following, but the map in Charles O. Paullin and John K. Wright, *Atlas of the Historical Geography of the United States*, plate 102, shows clearly enough the location of Jefferson's support.

² The Jackson period has been of great interest to historians. See, for example, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Age of Jackson* (1945); Claude G. Bowers, *Party Battles of the Jackson Period* (1922); and Marquis James, *Life of Andrew Jackson* (1938).

The Jacksonian Democrats were strongly attracted by the personality of their imperious leader. They were anti-British, free from any colonial complex, "and consequently," wrote Binkley, "they constituted the first genuinely American party. It is significant that the counties where Jacksonians predominated had been largely settled by non-English stock — the Scotch-Irish, the Germans, and the strictly Irish."¹ The party was also anti-bank, anti-monopoly, low-tariff; it favored the rapid settlement of the western lands and expansion at the expense of Mexico. It supported, in general, policies that favored debtors. Jackson designated Van Buren as his successor, and the Democratic Party went on to win most of the elections until it split in 1860.

THE WHIGS

The enemies of Jackson scattered about the country formed in 1831 a loose party, first called National Republican, and later Whig. Like the Federalists, the Whigs formed the party of property, particularly of tariff-protected and financial property. The bankers and manufacturers who hated Jackson were Whig. In the South, the big planters and slave-owners were Whig. But in addition, the party curiously attracted anti-slavery support in the North, plus anti-Masons, nativists, and the contractors who wished to see more national expenditures on internal improvements. This heterogeneous party, whose policies were a tissue of compromises, failed to elect its hero, Henry Clay, as President, but it did elect two generals, William Henry Harrison and Zachary Taylor. "Of all our major political parties, the Whigs were least successful in translating the pressures of their component interests into established national policy."² The party never had a firm sectional base, and in spite of the compromises for which its leader, Clay, was famous, it passed out of existence with the election of 1856, a victim in part of the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854 and the dispute over whether slavery should be extended in the territories. If the first period of party history may be said to have ended with the passing of the Federalist Party in 1816, the second period ended with the death of the Whig Party. The third has continued to the present day.

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 128.

² Binkley, *op. cit.*, p. 171.

THE THIRD PERIOD

THE SPLIT IN THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY

In the early fifties, as the Whig Party was visibly failing, the conservative elements in it — and particularly the planter group in the South — went over to the Democratic Party. When the Kansas-Nebraska Act was passed, many of the Democrats of the North and West — the “Free Democrats,” also called “anti-Nebraska Democrats” — offended by the act, abandoned their party, so that it became more strongly a pro-slavery party. In 1860, the party split into two factions. One was headed by Stephen A. Douglas, who favored “popular sovereignty,” or the permission by Congress for each state on its admission to the Union to decide the question of slavery for itself. This was not a satisfactory position to the extreme Southerners, who held the view that Congress had no power to prevent slavery in the territories; this faction nominated John C. Breckinridge. Still another party, composed of Whigs and Democrats and called Constitutional Unionists, nominated John Bell on a platform that was silent on the issue of slavery.

THE THIRD REPUBLICAN PARTY

“The Republican Party [of today] is a unique phenomenon of our political history in that it originated spontaneously without the aid of an outstanding leader, such as Washington was of the Federalists, Jefferson of the first Republicans, Jackson of the Democrats, or Clay of the Whigs.”¹ Lincoln, who was to become its hero and idol, was a Whig, and played no part in its founding in 1854. Even during the campaign of 1856, although he endorsed the first Republican candidate for President, John C. Frémont, he refrained from calling himself a Republican. In the interval between 1856 and 1860, the Republican Party gained strength and won various local and congressional victories. To its western free-soil, anti-slavery nucleus it added the northern and western farmers and farm laborers who wanted a homestead law — “Vote Yourself a Farm!” — and the eastern manufacturers who wanted a higher tariff. “The factory on the one side and on the other the husbandry of pasture, cornfield, and prairie wheatland joined in an alliance which was the more tenacious

¹ Binkley, *op. cit.*, p. 207. Elections since 1860 are analyzed in C. A. M. Ewing, *Presidential Elections* (1940).

because the cold bargains it involved were overspread with sentiment.”¹

The Republican Party of 1860 was more than the Whig Party revived; it was a new party, formed of new combinations of diverse groups. Only in New England, and there not in Massachusetts, was it the old Whig Party in antislavery dress. It used the words of Jefferson, wrote Hesseltine, from the platform of Hamilton. The historians generally appear to agree that the Republican Party was not a third party even before the Civil War, because the Whig Party was too far gone when the new alignment was formed. The usual view is that from being a second party in 1856, the Republican Party became the leading party in 1860 when Lincoln obtained a majority of the votes in the electoral college, even though his popular vote was 1,866,000 to 2,816,000 for his opponents.² Four years later, during the Civil War, Lincoln was re-elected. For the election of 1864, in the hope of attracting northern Democrats, the party changed its name to National Union, dropped Hannibal Hamlin of Maine, the Vice-President, and ran Andrew Johnson of Tennessee. But it returned to the name Republican in Grant's administration and has used this name ever since.

THE PERIOD OF REPUBLICAN SUPREMACY

The long period from 1860 to 1912 was a period of Republican supremacy in the presidency, broken only by the elections of Cleveland in 1884 and 1892. But as has been said elsewhere, the party during these years did not have equal success in controlling Congress, and often one house was Democratic, or the Republican majority was too narrow for party comfort. The party attained its greatest strength, however, during the closing decades of the nineteenth century.

The policies of the Republican Party after the Civil War “were in accord with the historic principles of the Federalists and the Whigs, thus illustrating again the essential continuity of the American political battle.”³ A homestead law and railroad land grants gave away much of the national domain, but cemented to the party hundreds of thousands

¹ Macmahon, *op. cit.*, p. 599. Various splinter groups also joined the party, even temperance men and the remnants of the Brook Farm utopians. See Binkley, *op. cit.*, pp. 206-220; and William B. Hesseltine, *The Rise and Fall of Third Parties* (1948), pp. 58-60.

² The count here used is that of Paullin, *op. cit.*, p. 99. There was a fusion vote in 1860, differently apportioned by students of the period.

³ Beard, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

of farmers who felt that they owed to the Republican Party the very land they tilled. A series of protective tariffs raised the duties again and again to the satisfaction of eastern manufacturers. State banks lost their right to issue currency, and state laws likely to be offensive to business were, by the Fourteenth Amendment, brought under the review of the Supreme Court, which in due time declared hundreds of such state acts unconstitutional. The commercial empire was extended to the West and into the South Seas, and by the Spanish-American War the United States became a colonial power. Giant corporations grew up which were to dominate the business scene at home and to challenge rivals, even governments, abroad.

THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY AFTER THE CIVIL WAR

During the political campaigns after the Civil War, the Republicans waved the bloody shirt and branded the Democrats as the party of secession and disunion. Except that it became in the South the party of white supremacy, it was nationally a party of opposition, clinging to its old low-tariff stand and criticizing the Republican Party. It abandoned its essentially cautious and negative tactics in 1896 when, under the leadership of Bryan, the western and radical wing captured party control. Then agriculture, as Professor Macmahon aptly put it, made a last spectacular but unsuccessful sortie. To capture the presidency, the Democratic Party had to await the 1912 split in Republican ranks to elect Woodrow Wilson on a plurality of the popular vote cast. He was re-elected in 1916 in a close election, because the Republican breach had not healed. Then with the crushing defeat of Cox in 1920, the Democratic Party returned to its minority status until 1932.

THE PROGRESSIVE PERIOD

The period of Republican supremacy was marked by the dominance in the party of a number of state bosses, such as Aldrich, Penrose, and Platt, who were acceptable to business and industry. The core of the party organization was faithful to the Hamilton-Webster-Seward tradition, but the long decline in farm prices which began after the Civil War and continued until 1897 caused great discontent in the western agrarian wing. This discontent produced various minor parties, such as the Greenback and Populist Parties, which drew a large part of their following from

among disillusioned Republicans. There might have been a split in the Republican Party by 1912 under the leadership of Senator Marion F. La Follette, but Theodore Roosevelt seized the opportunity, and when Taft was renominated in 1912, Roosevelt led his followers in a bolt which set up a short-lived Progressive Party. In the election of 1912, the Republican Party fell to third place in both popular and electoral votes. Although the genuineness of Roosevelt's insurgency was suspect, the powerful state bosses, who had access to the sources of campaign funds, would have none of him. They preferred to go down with Taft and to keep control of the party.¹ Their expectations were justified; in 1916 Roosevelt deserted the party he had formed and had promised to stay with, and back alongside the "malefactors of great wealth" whom he had denounced, he supported Hughes.

Woodrow Wilson was originally a conservative, states' rights Democrat, but he became, especially under the influence of George Record, a progressive. During his first term and before World War I involved the United States, he exerted great leadership over his party in Congress, and a series of important bills were passed, such as the Clayton Act, the Underwood Tariff, the Federal Reserve Act, and the income-tax law. But war prosperity temporarily hushed agrarian complaints, and although Wilson was re-elected in 1916, the Democrats lost control of the House and two years later of the Senate as well.

THE RÉGIME OF CONSERVATIVE REPUBLICANS

The election of Harding in 1920, followed by that of Coolidge in 1924 and of Hoover in 1928, opened a period called by Binkley the régime of the conservative Republicans. The tariff went up, the Federal Trade Commission passed into hands hostile to the Clayton Act, income and inheritance taxes were reduced, the McNary-Haugen farm bill was vetoed, and while billions of dollars went abroad in foreign loans, the Senate refused adherence to the League of Nations and the World Court. A series of spectacular scandals in the Harding administration had little if any political effect.

¹ See Henry F. Pringle, *Theodore Roosevelt* (1931); Walter Davenport, *Power and Glory: The Life of Boies Penrose* (1931); and Claude G. Bowers, *Beveridge and the Progressive Era* (1932). There is a considerable and increasing literature on the Progressive period and many biographies and memoirs of the leading figures in it.

THE NEW DEAL

Franklin Roosevelt might well have won the election of 1932, even if there had been no great depression; but the bitter discontent of the farmers united with the desperate unrest of unemployed labor to produce a Republican disaster. In Franklin Roosevelt the Democrats had a leader with a popular appeal comparable to that of Jefferson, Jackson, or Bryan, and he went on to defeat in turn Hoover, Landon, Willkie, and Dewey. From 1932 to 1946, the Democrats maintained control of both houses of Congress, but their majority of more than two thirds of each house in the Seventy-Fifth Congress gradually fell away until they lost control of both houses in the Eightieth Congress.

The domestic legislative program which came to be called the New Deal was scarcely outlined in the campaign of 1932, but the elections of 1934 and 1936 showed that the measures were popular. For the farmers there were the Agricultural Adjustment Act, the Farm Credit Administration, the Tennessee Valley Authority, and the Farm Security Administration. For the unemployed there were the FERA, CWA, PWA, WPA, NYA, CCC, the Surplus Commodities Corporation, and the United States Employment Service. For labor there were the Wagner Act and the Social Security Act. For the middle class there were the Home Owners Loan Corporation, the guarantee of bank deposits, and the regulation of the sale of securities and security exchanges. In these and the other measures, there was something for everybody, and the Republicans were hard put to find a popular basis for opposition. Their candidates would seldom promise repeal of New Deal measures but would instead emphasize bureaucracy, debt, and taxes while intimating that they would administer the Roosevelt program along more businesslike lines. They never won a majority of the seats in Congress while Roosevelt lived, but after his death they won in 1946 both houses of the Eightieth Congress, using the negative slogan "Had Enough?" This Congress behaved much like the Republican ones that followed World War I. It reduced income taxes, passed the Taft-Hartley Act, which was extremely unpopular with labor, and threatened to allow the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act to expire so as to lay the ground for a return to protection. The Eighty-First Congress, elected in 1948, was Democratic in both houses.

THE TIDES OR CYCLES OF POLITICS

LIBERAL-CONSERVATIVE THEORY

The most casual student of politics will observe that there are alternations of party success and failure, cycles or tides. Even though a thread of continuity has run through American politics, first one party and then the other has been in the majority. A distinguished historian, Arthur M. Schlesinger, senior, thought that he could distinguish tides of liberalism and conservatism, which he traced back to 1765. He concluded that the political tides ebbed and flowed ten times between 1765 and 1931, with an average duration of 16.6 years. "A period of concern for the rights of the few has been followed by one of concern for the rights of the many. Emphasis on the welfare of property has given way to emphasis on human welfare. An era of inaction — for stability generally suits the purposes of the conservatives — has usually been succeeded by one of rapid movement."¹ Even though the rhythm be granted, and even though his periods be accepted — and questions can be raised on both points — still, liberalism and conservatism or concern for the rights of persons and property are rather loose concepts; their application to many episodes of history, such as the Mexican War, seems somewhat forced.


BUSINESS CYCLE THEORY

A statistician, Louis H. Bean, also attempted to chart the tides of politics, but only since 1854. He did not, however, undertake to connect them with any particular set of attitudes. "The political pendulum," he noted, "has not swung with regularity and does not furnish any reliable indication of its probable course for 1940 and after. Measured from peak to peak of Democratic dominance, there have been four major swings of the pendulum since 1854; the first swing took eighteen years, the second sixteen years, the third twenty-two years, and the fourth twenty-four years."² He measured his cycles in terms of the two-party vote cast in elections and of two-party membership in the House of Representatives. His cycles, therefore, do not coincide with Schlesinger's.

Instead of attributing political cycles to shifts in liberal-conservative

¹ "Tides of American Politics," *Yale Review*, N.S. vol. 29 (December, 1939), p. 220.

² *Ballot Behavior* (1940), p. 58.



DEMOCRATIC TIDES RIDE AN UPWARD TREND

The Democratic percentage of the two-party membership in the House of Representatives, 1854-1946, has fluctuated above and below 50 per cent. The alternating periods of Democratic and Republican control were associated with major depressions. Over the entire period there appears to have been an upward trend in Democratic strength. (From Louis H. Bean, *How to Predict Elections*; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1948.)

attitudes, Bean thought that they were more closely related to business cycles — to the fluctuations in industrial production and employment. Available statistical measurements of business activity are not entirely satisfactory, but using them for whatever they might be worth, he examined the forty-six elections, twenty-three presidential and twenty-three mid-term, over the ninety-two years before 1947. He concluded that

If business activity remains unchanged between a presidential and an off-year election, normal political apathy causes the party in power to lose about 8 per cent of the two-party membership in the lower house, or 35 seats. . . . In a mid-term election, the losses of the dominant party might be checked and cut in half if business activity has advanced 20 points since the previous election, or the losses might be doubled if business has declined 20 points. If the business index remains unchanged between presidential elections, the party in power neither gains nor loses, but an

advance of 20 points tends to give that party 35 to 40 additional seats. A similar decline in business tends to shift that many seats to the opposition.¹

Bean did not attribute turns in the political cycle solely to business trends: "other factors besides the business situation have influenced elections in the past, and will in the future." Among other factors influencing the political cycle he noted sectionalism, religion, and third-party movements. But the political tides have often enough followed the economic tides to lead to the conclusion that the electorate tends to blame the party in power for failure to produce or to maintain prosperity.

But what is the party in power? After the election of 1928 the answer was clear enough, because the Republican Party had elected a President and a majority of both houses of Congress. In 1948, however, there was a Democratic President while the Republicans had majorities in both houses of Congress. Who, then, could be blamed for the inflation? President Truman laid high prices at the door of the Republican Congress, and, according to the Gallup polls, largely succeeded in convincing the electorate. The Republican platform and Republican leaders, on the other hand, asserted that he had not adequately used the powers that Congress had given him to control prices. Under our constitutional system it is often impossible justly to hold any party responsible, and consequently any cycle theory that connects public dissatisfaction with turns in the political tides is at best rough and uncertain.

Bean charted the political tides after 1888 in terms of the seats in the House of Representatives and concluded that the Democratic Party reached its low for the current cycle with the congressional election of 1946. According to his calculations, moreover, the Democratic Party has, since 1888, been making long-term gains in that when it has lost control of the House it has lost by fewer and fewer seats, and when it has won, it has tended to win by greater and greater majorities.²

LIMITATIONS OF CYCLE THEORIES

Even though it may be noted that there have been since 1854 swings of the political pendulum, each of about twenty years' duration, still there are difficulties in the way of carrying any cycle theory very far. First, there are not enough cases to make observation very sure: four swings of

¹ Louis H. Bean, *How to Predict Elections* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948), p. 54.

² *Ibid.*, p. 169.

a pendulum are too few (as Bean admitted) to tell much about the behavior of the pendulum. Secondly, sectional differences, such as the suffrage in the South, gerrymandering, and other factors affect the statistics that must be used to calculate the swings. Thirdly, matters of constitutional structure, such as the four-year term for Presidents, may prevent cycles of sentiment, if these could be adequately measured after the fact, from being converted into cycles of power. No doubt there are tides in one-party states, but if there are they would have to be measured by means of the vote in primary elections, and such results are endlessly confused by factors of personal leadership, local issues, type of ballot and primary, and other elements.

A thoroughgoing cycle theory would be, as V. O. Key has observed, a non-rational explanation of political behavior.¹ The propagandists and lobbyists are wasting their money and efforts if great trends or swings are sure to occur no matter what they say or do. It may be that their work only amplifies or diminishes the swings, so that they are able only to hold back or to hasten the inevitable. Politicians are aware, of course, of these tides of politics, although their ability to predict and estimate them is not as successful as might be supposed.² But this knowledge does not persuade them to rest upon their oars if they think they feel the tide running their way, or to abandon the contest if they feel sure of defeat. Rather, they work as hard as they can, either to make victory more certain and sweeping, or to save something from the wreck if they can. Minor parties which have no real hope of winning nevertheless continue their campaigning in the hope that if they make a good showing at one election, they can make a better at the next and some day win.

GROWTH OF OPPOSITION

Men long in public life are conscious of the fact that inevitably they must antagonize certain groups, factions, or interests. It is simply impossible to please all of the people all of the time. An official may, of course, try to compensate for the animosities he must create by taking actions that please other groups or interests. But there is a feeling among many politicians that the memory of favors done tends to fade more rapidly than the memory of favors refused. Injuries or fancied injuries rankle for years, but as Machiavelli observed long ago, the glow of appre-

¹ *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups* (1947 edition), p. 278.

² Claude E. Robinson, *Straw Votes* (1932), pp. 1-13.

ciation rapidly diminishes. Some single action may serve as a catalyst to bring a man's enemies together, but his friends are less likely so to unite. Many politicians will serve for a number of years in legislative bodies until the accumulation of opposition threatens them with defeat; but before it does defeat them, they will, if they can, find places on boards, commissions, or courts where they can ride out the storm.

Something of the same tendency for opposition to build up may be observed in the evolution of parties. When a party has been in power for a decade, it has inevitably failed to please some groups and interests. These may go over to the other party or may form a minor party. Any party in power will, of course, seek to make such adherents among these groups as it can. Perhaps no party ever succeeded so well at this as the Democratic Party in the years 1933 to 1936, and the results appeared in the overwhelming victory of 1936. The farm groups were grateful for the agricultural program of the New Deal, the labor unions were grateful for the labor measures. There were other factors operating by 1938 — there always are — but the farmers were by that time forgetting their plight of five years before, and labor remembered less keenly how it had stood in pre-NRA days. The inevitable result was Republican gains. Especially in the Middle West, farmers tended to return to their traditional Republican adherence. President Roosevelt won re-election each time by a reduced majority, and his party lost the congressional election of 1946. This loss of control of the House had hitherto always signaled, two years in advance, the end of a political cycle. "Success in a presidential election will go to that party which already has majority control of the House of Representatives."¹ This precedent was broken in 1948, but on four consecutive occasions it had correctly forecast the turning of the tide. The cycle theory of political behavior is not lightly to be dismissed; rough as the cycles have been, they are discernible. As the public opinion polls continue to explore and record public sentiment, students of politics may be able to refine the cycle theory until political tides can be more accurately measured and predicted.

CAUSES OF CHANGE IN PARTIES

MINOR PARTIES

Like the loss of the House, another factor that often signals fundamental changes in party alignment, or perhaps turning points in their

¹ C. A. M. Ewing, *Congressional Elections* (1947), p. 24.

evolution, is the multiplication of minor parties. Thus, in the decade before the Civil War, the Abolitionists, the Free Soilers, and the Liberty Party, among many other groups and parties, vociferously proclaimed their dissatisfaction with the Democratic-Whig division, until the Whig Party broke up. Similarly the agrarian discontent of the post-Civil War period produced the Greenbackers, Grangers, and Populists, forces which captured control of the Democratic Party in 1896. Defeated, the forces of agricultural discontent contributed to the Republican split in 1912 and again in 1924. Other effects of minor parties on major parties will be discussed in the next chapter.

CHANGES IN THE ECONOMY

The evolution of parties is also affected by shifts in the economy, and parties that resist or resist too long are likely to go the way of the Federalists. The rise of cotton-growing in the South changed the attitudes of the Jeffersonians toward slavery and made the Whig alliance always an unnatural and uncertain one. In our own generation, the continued shift of the economy from agriculture to manufacturing has compelled labor, which long followed the nonpartisan guerrilla policy of rewarding its friends and punishing its enemies in either or both parties, to change to more active participation in politics. The rise of great cities and metropolitan areas has had great effects upon parties, not all of which are as yet fully worked out. It is apparent, however, both from election returns and from the public opinion polls, that the Democratic Party has had more success than the Republican in attracting the urban workers.

External Affairs. Foreign affairs and colonial policy have affected American parties at various times. The Federalists were horrified by the French Revolution, and the Jeffersonians were attracted by its social and political implications. Henry Clay and his "War Hawks" helped, at least, to bring on the War of 1812. Imperialism was the issue that Bryan sought to make paramount in 1900, but when the Republicans won again, the Democrats came to accept the results of the Spanish War almost as much as their opponents did. In 1916, isolationism won for Wilson on the slogan (which he neither made nor repudiated): "He kept us out of war." But as in 1940 the issue was not clear-cut, although the Republicans tended toward isolation and the Democrats toward intervention. Both major parties have shown an evolution toward world-mindedness, reluctant and gradual but nonetheless real.

RACIAL, RELIGIOUS, AND NATIONALITY FORCES

The acceptance or rejection of racial, religious, and nationality groups has crisscrossed American parties. The matter is more fully discussed in a later chapter, but it may be noted here that the Democratic Party, perhaps making a virtue of a necessity, has been more hospitable to the immigrant than the Republican. This acceptance has contributed to the evolution of the Democratic Party, still incomplete, from the party of the South and slavery to the party of labor and the lower economic classes generally.

Since neither major party forms a unified, disciplined mass of voters, compromise has always been the mood of American politics. Not only compromise on issues in legislative bodies, but compromise within each party. Under such conditions party evolution is facilitated, and a party may in one election be set against a policy which four years later it will accept and defend as its chief issue. Thus both parties have been on both sides of the states' rights argument. It is in this mood that the slow mutation of parties takes place.

The Minor Parties

IGNATIUS DONNELLY, a Populist leader, said of William Jennings Bryan that "We put him to school, and he wound up by stealing all the school-books."¹ This tendency of the major parties to absorb the minor ones has been observed since the first minor party, John Randolph's Quids.²

THE MINOR PARTIES MAY TAKE UP ISSUES THAT THE MAJOR PARTIES AVOID

But in absorbing their little rivals, the major parties have been affected by them. Perhaps it is too much to say that the minor parties have invented issues which the major parties have come, generally with reluctance, to accept. For issues grow out of wants felt by many people, and the first expression of these wants in political demands cannot usually be traced back to one person, to one date, or even to one group.³ A minor

¹ Quoted by John D. Hicks, *The Populist Revolt* (1931), p. 356.

² John D. Hicks, "The Third Party Tradition in American Politics," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, vol. 20 (June, 1933), p. 4. The terms *third party* and *minor party* are commonly used interchangeably to refer to all parties other than the two major contenders for power. Even when a short-lived party, such as the Progressive Party of 1912, comes in second, it is called a third party; see, for example, Fred E. Haynes, *Third Party Movements Since the Civil War* (1916); and William B. Hesseltine, *The Rise and Fall of Third Parties* (1948).

³ The Socialist Party claims that the two major parties are always stealing their thunder. "It has been a favorite indoor sport of political commentators," wrote Norman Thomas, "Socialist and non-Socialist, to tabulate how many immediate demands of former Socialist platforms have been enacted after some fashion into law by Republicans and Democrats." See his "Do Left-Wing Parties Belong in Our System?" *Annals*, vol. 259 (September, 1948), pp. 24-29.

party may have been the first to make a platform plank of an issue, but if so, the demand has been generally current at the time and earlier. What the minor parties have done is to take up some issues that the major parties avoided, such as farm relief, and when these issues proved to have vote-getting strength, one or both of the major parties have accepted them. Some issues, such as public ownership and the single tax, have long been urged by minor parties without their being taken over by major parties. The minor parties, however, with little or no hope of winning, have been less willing to compromise, and they have urged views that they knew would lose them votes. It may well be questioned whether this function of feeding issues to the major parties is likely to continue; rather, the present tendency in American politics seems to lie in the direction of more pressure politics than more minor party politics. For the election of 1948, nevertheless, seven minor parties got on the ballot in one or more states. These were Wallace's Progressive Party, the States' Rights ("Dixiecrat") Party, the Socialists, the Socialist-Labor, Prohibition, Greenback Parties, and Gerald L. K. Smith's Christian Nationalist Party. The Vegetarian Party held a convention and nominated candidates for President and Vice-President, but did not get on the ballot in any state.

TYPES OF MINOR PARTIES

SECTIONAL PARTIES

Sometimes the people of an area or section have felt that their interests were ignored or insufficiently recognized by the major parties. In such instances they have at times supported minor parties such as the La Follette Progressives, the Farmer-Labor Party of Minnesota, or the American Labor Party of New York. Few, if any, such groups would admit that their objectives were sectional; rather, they would insist that from a sectional base they hoped and expected to expand to attain national importance. But in advancing sectional interests, pressure groups and tactics appear to be increasingly used; some of the reasons are discussed in later chapters on pressure politics and on the programs of the sectional minor parties, most of which have been agrarian in their dominant interest.

SINGLE-ISSUE PARTIES

Some single, burning issue may seem to a number of people to have such importance that they will not wait for the uncertain date when a major party will take it up. They may form a minor party around that issue, as did the Prohibition, Anti-Mason, Liberty, and Greenback Parties. Such parties do not usually confine themselves exclusively to the one central issue from which they commonly get their names, but take stands on other matters as well. Thus the Prohibition Party, while putting first its opposition to the sale and use of liquor, has had planks on agriculture, the Bible in the schools, and woman and the home. Perhaps the closer a minor party comes to winning, the greater is the temptation for it to take up a variety of issues in the hope of adding more voters to its ranks. But no new single-issue party of any importance has appeared in the last forty years. The current tactic of persons seeking to advance some one scheme is to form a pressure group and to use pressure methods. The reasons for this change are discussed in Chapter 18.

SPLINTERS FROM MAJOR PARTIES

About every twenty years a splinter or fragment of one of the major parties has broken off to form a minor party. Usually these are sectional parties as well as splinters, and commonly they burn out in one election. Thus in 1872 the Liberal Republican Party, led by the reformers who were appalled at the scandals of Grant's administration, nominated the editor Horace Greeley for President, and when Grant was overwhelmingly re-elected, the party disappeared. The election of 1896 caused splinter parties to form from both of the major parties, the Silver Republicans, or National Silver Party, and the Gold Democrats; but neither of them so much as carried a single county in the United States. The Progressive Party of 1912 and its cousin, the La Follette Progressive Party of 1924, elsewhere discussed, were splits from the Republican Party. The name *progressive*, like *republican*, has been popular; Henry Wallace's third party movement of 1948, which was chiefly a Democratic splinter, took it again. The States' Rights, or "Dixiecrat," Party was another Democratic splinter of 1948. Its candidate for President, Governor J. Strom Thurmond, carried four southern states with 36 electoral votes; he obtained 1,169,300 popular votes. The election of 1948, notable in many respects, was also unusual in that the Democratic Party won in spite of two splinters

which together obtained 2,326,400 votes, most of which would normally have gone to the Democratic candidate.

Most splinter parties are composed in large part of the following of some conspicuous political leader who is personally dissatisfied with his treatment in the major party in which he made his reputation, and if this leader dies or returns to his earlier allegiance, the party disappears. A recent example was Henry Wallace, who announced his candidacy before he had a party, even before he had a name for his party or a candidate for Vice-President to run with him. It is conceivable that on some occasion a highly popular leader may head a revolt which will bring him success — Theodore Roosevelt came close in 1912 — and then a splinter party may become a major party. But the difficulties of tradition, organization, and finance are very great, and no major party has begun in this way.

It has been noted that 135 parties have at some time or another elected members of Congress. In addition there have been scores of other parties which, like the Texas Regulars, are little known even in their heyday outside the section or state where they are formed. As a general rule they pass from the political scene and leave such a slight impression upon history that they are of interest only to the specialist. The parties of socialism, however, have been so persistent and have aroused so much controversy that they deserve some discussion here.

AMERICAN SOCIALISM

The origins of socialist thought may be traced back to Plato. In the early nineteenth century in the United States the Brook Farm and other utopian socialist groups conducted various experiments, but modern, Marxian, or "scientific" socialism was an importation from Germany. "The modern socialist movement of the United States," wrote a leading socialist, Harry W. Laidler, "may be said to have begun with the arrival of numbers of revolutionists from Germany, following the uprisings of 1830 and 1848."¹ The First International, a loose organization of Socialist groups, unions, and parties, was formed in London in 1864 under the leadership of the prophet of modern socialism, Karl Marx. Various sections of the International were set up in the United States, but the First International broke up in 1876 in a schism between Marx and Bakunin,

¹ *Social-Economic Movements* (1944), p. 577. See also his *History of Socialist Thought* (1927).

the anarchist. In the United States several Socialist parties resulted from the breakup; some of them, like the Illinois Labor Party and the Workingmen's Party, were short-lived, but the Socialist Labor Party, established in 1877, was the ancestor of the party of today, even though it never received more than 39,000 votes, which it polled in 1924.¹

A Second International, established in 1889, sought to join in another loose federation the various Socialist parties of the world. The Social-Democratic parties of central Europe were particularly strong in it. But the Second International was torn to pieces by World War I, when the Socialist parties of the various countries followed their own national flags into an international war. The Third, or Communist, International will be discussed below.

THE SOCIALIST-LABOR PARTY

The three outstanding leaders of American socialism were Daniel DeLeon, Eugene V. Debs, and Norman Thomas. DeLeon, originally one of the supporters of Henry George, the advocate of the single tax, left George's party in 1890 and joined the Socialist Labor Party, in which he soon rose to leadership. He favored the closest connection between the party and labor and tried unsuccessfully to capture the Knights of Labor. When he was expelled from this organization, he and his followers set up a rival organization, the Socialist Trade and Labor Alliance. The high-handed methods of DeLeon caused a split in the party in 1899, and in a free-for-all fight for possession of party headquarters in New York City the capitalist police intervened and preserved the headquarters for DeLeon's followers. But the rivals, formally ousted from the Socialist Labor Party in 1901, founded the Socialist Party of the United States.² The Socialist Labor Party is still in existence, and in the election of 1944 it got 44,600 votes, in 1948, 27,900.

THE SOCIALIST PARTY

The second great leader of American socialism was Eugene V. Debs, one of those responsible for the formation of the Socialist Party. Debs got into socialism from labor-union activity in the Brotherhood of Loco-

¹ For its history and candidates see Nathan Fine, *Labor and Farmer Labor Parties in the United States, 1828-1928* (1928), pp. 88-117.

² For details of "DeLeonism" see Fine, *op. cit.*, pp. 147-183.

motive Firemen, and he soon became the acknowledged leader of the party and its perennial candidate for President. Under his leadership the Socialist vote for President rose steadily to 920,000 in 1920, even though Debs was serving a term in the federal penitentiary at Atlanta for violation of the wartime Espionage Act at the time of the election. During the first twenty years of the present century socialism was strong among labor-union members, and the Socialist Party succeeded in electing various mayors and members of state legislatures, but the party was seriously weakened by its opposition to World War I. In 1924 it endorsed La Follette.

The central theme of the Socialist Party has always been the public ownership of the means of production. The platform of 1904 defined socialism thus: "Socialism means that all those things upon which the people in common depend shall by the people in common be owned and administered. It means that the tools of employment shall belong to their creators and users . . . that the making of goods for profit shall come to an end. . . ."¹ But until this goal could be attained the party urged a long list of social reforms, many of which were later adopted, such as social security, the income tax, the prohibition of child labor, woman suffrage, and relief for the unemployed. Pure Marxian socialism called for world revolution and for the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, but the Socialist Party, like the Social-Democratic parties on the Continent and the Labour Party in England, sought the triumph of socialist principles through peaceful and constitutional means.

Decline of the Socialist Party. Eugene V. Debs died in 1926, and the party selected Norman Thomas as its candidate for President in 1928. Thomas had joined the party in 1917 during the campaign of Morris Hillquit for mayor of New York, but, as an eloquent speaker, he soon rose to leadership. He followed Debs' example in becoming the Socialist candidate every fourth year, and he worked vigorously in socialist front organizations, such as the League for Industrial Democracy. The party, however, was torn by dissensions, especially by the Communist split discussed below, and only in 1932, when the discontent of the depression was at its worst, did Thomas approach Debs' vote. He received that year 884,000 votes. But in 1936 his vote was 187,000; in 1940, 116,000; and in 1944, 80,518. In 1948 Thomas was credited with 132,138 votes, but the Socialist party is declining in strength. Although it is popularly thought of as having its strength in the cities, actually it obtained, in the

¹ Kirk H. Porter, *National Party Platforms* (1924), p. 268.

years from 1904 to 1936, its highest percentage of the total vote cast in the states of the Middle West, where agrarian discontent was greatest. Of the first ten states in Socialist strength Wisconsin was highest with an average of 4.64 per cent; New York was fourth, with 4.15 per cent. Except for New York all of the ten were west of the Alleghenies.¹ Dues-paying membership in the Socialist Party varied from 16,000 in 1903 to 108,000 in 1919.² The vote cast for the Socialist candidate for President was often ten times the membership, but even at that, many an American pressure group has more members than the Socialist Party usually had voters.

THE COMMUNIST PARTY

The Third or Communist International. After the Russian revolution of 1917 succeeded in establishing Lenin and his followers in power, this group called a meeting of left-wing Socialists from the various parties of Europe and in Moscow in 1919 established a Third, commonly called the Communist, International. In a list of twenty-one points published by this first congress of the Third International, the moderate Socialists, such as MacDonald in England and Hillquit in the United States, were specifically and violently denounced, along with their "reformism." In order to make the break between prewar socialism and postwar communism distinct, "all parties wishing to belong to the Third International must change their names. Every party wishing to belong to the Communist International must bear the name: Communist Party of such and such a country [section of the Third International]." The new program of action was thus stated: "The Communist International has declared war upon the whole bourgeois world and all yellow social democratic parties."³ Eugene V. Debs for the American Socialists condemned the program as one of armed insurrection.

The Communist-Socialist Split. The Socialist Party had earlier built up in the United States various foreign-language federations or Socialist clubs. All of these were small, but among them the Slavic groups were most numerous. These groups sought to change the character of the Socialist Party to make it a revolutionary party and then to have it affiliate with the Third International. In June of 1919, however, the left wing split into two factions. The language groups then urged the forth-

¹ C. A. M. Ewing, *Presidential Elections* (1940), p. 124.

² Laidler, *op. cit.*, pp. 588, 591.

³ The entire list of the twenty-one points is printed in Fine, *op. cit.*, pp. 332-337.

right establishment of a Communist party, but other left-wing Socialists favored an attempt to capture the Socialist Party at its convention in August. When that convention was held, both factions bolted, and the language groups set up the Communist Party, while the other extreme radicals established the Communist Labor Party. But both Communist parties ran into the anti-red drive of Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer. Their headquarters were raided, some of their members were deported, and the parties were banned until 1921. During the period from 1919 to 1921, the Communist movement continued, but underground; and the Communist Party affiliated with the Third International, by this time also called the Comintern. The two factions were brought together by a representative of the International sent from Moscow. Under the name of the Workers Party William Z. Foster, a Communist, obtained 33,000 votes as candidate for President in 1924. The name Workers Party was used until 1929, but by that time it was considered safe or expedient to follow the 1919 directive of the Comintern and to assume the title Communist Party of the U.S.A., a section of the Third International.

Structure and Organization. The structure of the Communist Party, U.S.A., follows the pattern of the party in the Soviet Union. This structure is different from that of the American major parties, elsewhere discussed in this book. Indeed, the twelfth of the twenty-one points of the First Congress of the Third International ordained the general organization for each Communist party, which had to be "organized along extremely centralized lines" and be "controlled by iron discipline." Any resident of the United States, eighteen years of age or over, who accepts the principles of the party as set forth in its constitution or by its conventions, who is active in behalf of the party, and who pays dues regularly may become and remain a member, provided his application is endorsed by a member.¹ There is an initiation fee of fifty cents, and dues vary from ten cents a month for unemployed to two dollars a month for persons earning more than sixty dollars a week.

Members are organized into local clubs, also called, in the party press, cells and nuclei. These are the equivalent of soviets, groups of party members in a factory, office, town, or city. In proportion to their membership, the clubs elect delegates to the state conventions, which select the state committees. The state committee selects from its own membership a state board. There may also be districts, composed of two or

¹ The constitution now in force (the second one) was adopted July 28, 1945; it was printed in the *Daily Worker* August 7, 1945.

more states, as determined by the national committee. The national conventions, which meet every two years, are made up of delegates elected by the state and district conventions, in proportion to party membership in the states and districts. These national conventions "are authorized to make political and organizational decisions binding upon the entire party and its membership."¹ The national conventions select the national committee, and this in turn picks the national board, a sort of executive subcommittee, composed of members of at least five years' good standing. The national committee also selects a national review commission, which is directed "to guard against violations of party principles, to maintain and strengthen discipline," and to audit books and records.² Grounds for discipline are rather vague: any "conduct or action detrimental to the working class," or "to the interests of the party"; or "violation of decisions of its leading committees"; or "conduct unbecoming a member of the party." The penalty may be censure, removal from party posts, or expulsion; but appeals are provided up to the national convention. This tight, hierarchical organization, with its high degree of concentration of leadership and its disciplinary machinery, is called in the party press "democratic centralism."

There is nothing in the Communist constitution about sabotage, force, or violence, no expression of devotion to a program looking to a dictatorship of the proletariat. There is on the contrary an expression of approval of the Bill of Rights. Any conclusions as to the revolutionary nature of the party must be inferred from the behavior of Communist parties abroad.

Struggles Within the Party. Throughout the twenties the bitterest disputes took place within the party. One of these was the battle between the Stalinists and the Trotskyites, who were expelled. Another struggle occurred between Jay Lovestone and William Z. Foster, rival leaders, each of whom claimed to represent the true doctrine. The Comintern at length recognized the minority or Foster faction, and Lovestone and his assistants were denounced and expelled. The internal struggles so depleted the party's strength that in 1932 it had only some 14,000 dues-paying members and got 103,000 votes. Its vote fell to 80,000 in 1936 and to 49,000 in 1940.³ It did not run a candidate for President in 1944 or in 1948.

¹ Article VII, Section 1.

² Article VIII, Section 1.

³ The story of the splits and factions within the Communist Party lies beyond the scope of this book. See for Trotskyism James Oneal and G. A. Werner, *American Communism* (1947 edition), pp. 237-246.

The United-Front Policy. The revolutionary objectives were reiterated until the rise of fascism in Europe led the Third International in 1935 to change its policy to that of the "united front," or co-operation with liberal and Socialist organizations and parties. The Communist Party, U.S.A., obediently followed the line indicated by Russian foreign policy. "After that," wrote one observer, "it evolved into a mere pressure group and propaganda organization working on behalf of a great power, the U.S.S.R."¹ During the twenties and early thirties the Communist Party, U.S.A., was apparently in close contact with Moscow, but as it failed to make significant progress in the United States — indeed its vote showed that it was losing ground — its relations with the international headquarters deteriorated. Perhaps it was regarded with contempt. At any rate, it was not advised of impending changes in the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, so that its propaganda was continually made to look ridiculous. For instance, Earl Browder, the secretary-general of the party, asserted on August 24, 1939, that the U.S.S.R. would come to the rescue of Poland should that country be attacked by Germany, but the terms of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact later revealed that the two powers had already agreed upon a partition of Poland. Then, after some embarrassment, the American Communists took a strong anti-war stand, opposing Lend-Lease, the draft, and aid to Britain. But when Germany attacked Russia in 1941 the party line changed again, and from the encouragement of strikes in war industries the Communists came to urge the no-strike pledge. The Third International was dissolved in 1943, and the following year the Communist Party, U.S.A., at the urging of Browder, became the Communist Political Association. It did not run candidates but instead endorsed pro-war and pro-Roosevelt candidates, even Frank Hague, boss of Jersey City, who had done his best to drive all Communists out of his domain. In this period the party used the slogan "Communism is Twentieth Century Americanism."

Re-establishment After World War II. But the Communist Political Association had a short life. Not long after the war ended, a French Communist leader, Jacques Duclos, alleged to be Stalin's representative for western Europe, returned from a visit to Moscow and published in France an attack upon Browder's strategy. William Z. Foster then assailed Browder for "anarcho-syndicalism," and Browder replied that

¹ Barrington Moore, Jr., "The Communist Party of the USA," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 39 (January, 1945), p. 32. This article is an excellent summary of communist tactics.

his critics were guilty of "ultra-left sectarianism." Amid this battle of Marxian epithets, Browder was in 1946 expelled from the party. The Soviet line had changed, but he had not changed fast enough. The following year nine Communist parties of Europe established a Communist Information Bureau, soon called Cominform, which looked like another international under a different name.

The Voorhis Act. In 1940 Congress passed the Voorhis Act, which requires that every organization affiliated with any foreign government or international political organization must register with the Attorney General and reveal its officers, lists of members, finances, publications, and so on.¹ The Communist Party, U.S.A., thereupon severed its connections, at least formally, with the Third International; and when the Cominform was set up, the National Board of the Communist Party issued a statement, November 2, 1947, to the effect that it had decided not to join, even though it took advantage of the opportunity to praise the Communist parties who did join as "the champions of national freedom, social progress, economic reconstruction, democratic advance, and world peace."

American Communists naturally resent the charge that their party is merely an agent in the United States of a foreign power, because to admit that it is would be to injure their propaganda position severely. Consequently they refer to early American Socialists as Communists, and they quote whenever possible from the Declaration of Independence and from Lincoln. In an open letter to Attorney General Tom Clark in 1947 Eugene Dennis, general secretary of the Communist Party, U.S.A., asserted that "the Communist Party is an independent organization making its own decisions, according to its own understanding, to promote the welfare and progress of our country and people. And now, as always the Communist Party owes its first and only allegiance to the sovereign power that resides in the American people." That its independence is suspect in view of the repeated shifts of its party line to coincide with Russian policy he admitted: "I grant you that on more than one occasion the position of the American Communist Party on foreign affairs has in one or another aspect coincided with the foreign policy advocated by the U.S.S.R. So what? It was in each instance in accord with the interests of the United States and all democratic peoples." ²

¹ 54 Stat. at Large 1201.

² The entire letter is reprinted in the Communist magazine *Political Affairs* (formerly called *The Communist*), vol. 26 (May, 1947), pp. 391-394.

The word *democratic* is doubtless one of the most elastic in the language, but to stretch it to include peoples living under Communist dictatorships is to deprive it of all meaning. The mass of the American people, at any rate, think of the Communists as persons loyal to Russia. Several Gallup polls have asked the question, "In general do you think most American citizens who belong to the Communist Party in this country are loyal to America or to Russia?" The replies to the question on May 28, 1948, were:

Think loyal to America	16%
Think loyal to Russia	65
No opinion	22

Size and Strength. The Communist Party, U.S.A., has about 74,000 members.¹ As compared with many pressure groups, such as the American Legion, this number is insignificant. Its total vote cast is probably never fully reported, but since the reported vote has never exceeded 103,000, its voting strength is probably not more than 125,000. Moreover, most of this vote is concentrated in New York, where it is smothered by the millions of Democratic and Republican votes. In the election of 1946 the Communist candidate for governor received 95,000 votes and the two major candidates approximately five million. In fact, there were in the New York election of 1946 almost as many blank or otherwise void ballots cast as there were Communist votes. It is probably safe to say that no minor party with so few members and so few votes ever got as much publicity, paid or free, as the Communists have received.

This publicity can be justified only on the grounds that the party is really an espionage agency of a foreign state, and consequently more important and dangerous than its membership and voting power would indicate; or that it has a large number of non-member sympathizers who would, in a crisis, act with it; or that it actually controls other and bigger organizations; or by some combination of these factors. The behavior of Communists in other countries, even as close as Canada, would indicate that the suspicion of espionage for another state is not without some foundation in experience. And the same may be said of the exposures made in the United States in 1948 and early 1949. How many sympathizers

¹ *New York Times*, March 16, 1947. The figure was taken from a chart displayed at an international conference in London which gave world-wide figures. Martin Ebon, *World Communism Today* (1948), p. 492, estimates 75,000. The party is presently conducting a membership drive to bring its total to an announced goal of 100,000.

the party has is anybody's guess, but if the sympathizers vote for Communist candidates — an action which would appear to be a sort of minimum evidence of sympathy — their number is not greater than that of the *bona-fide* members.

"Front" Tactics. There can be no doubt that the Communists have sought to extend their influence beyond their own membership. They have done this in two principal ways, first, by setting up temporary "front" organizations to take advantage of a current issue or a social friction. Examples are the International Labor Defense, the League for Peace and Democracy, the National Negro Congress, the American Youth for Democracy. Whatever the title, it seems apparent that an effort is made to get the word *democracy* into it. Such groups obtain some publicity but usually are allowed to disintegrate after a year or two; it would not be good strategy to allow them to grow bigger than the parent party.

The second method is to seek control of existing groups and parties. How far Communists have succeeded in this tactic no one can say with certainty. A few labor unions have been dominated by Communists, as could be observed from the resolutions that emerged approving of each shift in Soviet foreign policy. But organized labor in general appears to be freeing itself from Communist officials and influence. There have been unproved charges that Communists or sympathizers have worked their way into some control of the American Veterans' Committee, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the Political Action Committee, and other organizations. Among foreign-language and nationality groups the Communists meet constant opposition from those elements in the group membership which seek independence for their native lands from dominance by Soviet Russia — the Poles, Lithuanians, Czechs, and the others. Virtually all of the Polish societies, with some six million members, united in 1947 in the Polish-American Congress, the object of which was announced as "concerted action against the Communist forces that have enslaved Poland."¹ To overcome such opposition, if possible, the Communists have their own foreign-language organization, the International Workers Order.

Invasion of Other Parties. Two fairly clear cases have appeared in which the Communists have invaded another minor party or have, perhaps, created one. The first of these was the American Labor Party, which was organized in New York in 1936 largely from the labor support of 250 unions. The founders wished to endorse Franklin Roosevelt for

¹ *New York Times*, December 18, 1947.

re-election and to defend the labor gains of the New Deal without becoming allied with Tammany. In 1938 the New York State Communist Party, because of its small vote in 1936, lost its standing as a legal party, and the Communists invaded the ALP. There was a riot between Communists and non-Communists at the 1940 convention when the labor leaders obtained a resolution of endorsement for Franklin Roosevelt, who was to the Communists at that time a "warmonger." By 1944 the Communists were in such control that the right wing seceded to form the Liberal Party.¹ When the Communist membership in 1948 obtained full control by electing Vito Marcantonio as state chairman, most of the labor unions which had established the ALP withdrew from it. The ALP endorsed Henry Wallace for President.²

Not all the evidence is in, but the candidacy of Henry Wallace and a third party were urged in Communist papers before he made his announcement late in 1947. After he made it, the Communist press praised and supported him, and the bulk of his contributions appeared to come from people who had been associated with Communist-front organizations.³

Effect of the Tactics. The technique or tactic of boring from within other groups and parties is a confession of weakness on the part of the Communist Party, U.S.A.; the implication is that it has so few members that it cannot stand on its own feet. It has to attempt to capitalize on the grievances of various groups in American society without being able to consolidate these groups into a real party. When it does succeed in infiltrating another group or party, either the Communists are expelled after their presence and influence become known, or the non-Communists withdraw; in either case the Communists appear to make little progress. The necessity of shifting and reversing policy to meet the continually changing Soviet foreign policy soon makes the Communists' position in other groups conspicuous, inconsistent, and illogical.

Failure of Communist Propaganda. Communism as an ideology has never been allowed to conform and adjust to American sentiments of nationalism. Even the language of its propaganda, full of Marxian terms such as *exceptionalism*, *reformism*, *revisionism*, has been ill-adapted to the American political scene. American radicalism has been agrarian, but

¹ Hugh A. Bone, "Political Parties in New York City," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 40 (April, 1946), pp. 272-282.

² See the *New York Times*, January 8, 1948, for a full account of the bolt.

³ See "Wallace's Angels," *Newsweek*, vol. 33 (May 10, 1948), p. 24. The Communist Party took credit for Wallace's party in the May 29, 1948, issue of *The Daily Worker* and announced that it would not run a Communist candidate for President.

communism, with its basic doctrine of the common ownership of land, has been unable to make any connection or alliance with the native American forces. It faces, of course, the most powerful opposition conceivable — vast and wealthy groups such as the American Legion, the Catholic Church, the Chamber of Commerce. The counter-propaganda of these groups has often been ill-advised, in that they have tended to brand every social reform as communism. But these and other anti-Communist organizations have been able more effectively than the Communists have to make their counter-propaganda conform to the middle-class attitudes common in the United States.

Some groups and some public figures, such as Harold Stassen, have urged that the Communist Party be outlawed. Even if such a procedure were constitutional, and even if the party could be legally dissolved and prohibited, the action would be, as Governor Thomas E. Dewey has insisted, of dubious expediency. For it would only drive the party underground without destroying it, and no claim of Communist power and influence, however inflated, could be examined and deflated; nor could individual Communists be identified. Some states, California and Illinois for example, have attempted to ban the party outright either by naming and forbidding it — which can be met by a change of name to Workers Party or something else — or by forbidding parties that owe allegiance to foreign powers or which advocate sabotage, force, or violence. But the Communist Party, U.S.A., pointing to its constitution and platforms, can then allege in court that it has no foreign connections and can assert that it does not advocate sabotage, force, or violence. Courts have held that a legislative declaration that a party had foreign connections or advocated violence did not constitute evidence of these matters.

VOTING STRENGTH OF MINOR PARTIES

Although the total vote of minor parties runs around 5 per cent of the two-party vote, the Gallup polls seem to show that about 10 per cent of the American people prefer some party other than the Democratic or Republican. In times of great discontent or when some leader emerges, this percentage may rise, as it did in 1924 to 16.5 per cent; but under ordinary circumstances the strength of the minor parties can be disregarded by the major parties. In some instances, however, the location of minor party strength may make a difference in a close contest. Under such circumstances, "in possibly half a dozen instances the third party

vote has snatched victory from one major party ticket to give it to the other.”¹ A notable example was that of 1844, when James Birney, candidate of the Anti-Slavery Party, obtained enough votes in New York so that James K. Polk received a plurality over Henry Clay and consequently won the presidency. But Polk was less acceptable to the anti-slavery forces than Clay, and the uncompromising, whole-loaf-or-none policy had produced none. It elected the President least liked by the minor party, a President who brought on the Mexican War and added to the slave territory in the Union. This peculiar operation of the electoral college — putting a dissident interest in a worse position if it establishes a minor party — is always possible. In 1948 most leaders of organized labor abandoned Henry Wallace, whose labor position was satisfactory to them, to favor Truman, whose labor record was not entirely satisfactory, because they realized that to support Wallace would produce a Republican victory, which they hated. They did not propose to repeat the mistake of 1844. Even though Wallace obtained 1,157,000 popular votes, he did not carry any state and therefore did not obtain a single vote in the electoral college. Differently distributed among the states the Wallace vote might have produced a Dewey victory; as it turned out, the Wallace vote only reduced Truman’s majority in the electoral college. Had it not been for the half million Wallace votes in New York, for example, Truman would almost certainly have carried that state.

In Congressional Elections. It is a rare minor party that can enter candidates in half the congressional contests; indeed, only in 1912 have all minor parties together contested 80 per cent of the seats. They all suffer, as Edward M. Sait observed, from political anemia, but in addition they meet varying but always considerable difficulties in getting their candidates on the ballot. Ohio perhaps presents the greatest obstacle in requiring that petitions bear 10 per cent as many names as votes were cast for governor in the previous election — at least 200,000. Since few minor parties have that many members, such a requirement amounts to barring them from the ballot.² In spite of all their difficulties, however, one or more members of the House are usually elected by minor parties. In only four elections from 1896 to 1944 did they fail to elect a candidate, and in all these elections they succeeded in returning 117 winners.³ Occa-

¹ Hicks, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

² The ballot requirements constantly change; see the current *Book of the States*, and Hesselstine, *op. cit.*, pp. 100-103.

³ C. A. M. Ewing, *Congressional Elections, 1896-1944* (1947), p. 71. Ewing counts twenty-eight Progressives of the 1912 movement, but in that election Theodore Roosevelt’s party rose to major party status.

sionally a United States Senator has been elected by one of them, usually an agrarian party, and from time to time a minor party wins control of a state or local government, though this control is usually short-lived.

Perhaps it is too much to say, as Ewing did, that "third parties, as real factors in elections, are on their way out."¹ But their future is not promising. Constitutional forms and election laws, among other difficulties, make their success unlikely. The direct-primary system, with its weakening effect upon party discipline, encourages insurgents, who might once have revolted and started splinter parties, to remain in the major parties. In legislative bodies insurgent members form blocs with like-minded members of the other major party. But either of the major parties might splinter at any time, especially if some popular leader in one of them — a man like La Follette or Theodore Roosevelt — should take his followers out; and it may be expected that the Communist Party, U.S.A., will continue, either above or underground, as long as communism is a force in the world.

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 69.

VII

Pressure Groups and Pressure Politics

Pressure Politics

Some Preliminary Considerations

ONE OF THE MOST ASTUTE of American political commentators, William Allen White, once put succinctly the importance of pressure groups in American politics. He wrote:

The fiction of one vote for one person still is maintained politely in high-school classes in civil government; but men and women who touch practical politics, if only obliquely, know that men and women now may have as many votes in government as they have interests for which they are willing to sacrifice time and thought and money. . . . If [a citizen] is content with one vote at the ballot box, or a vote and a half, as a member of his party, he is a pretty poor stick of a citizen. It's all right to stand proudly upon his constitutional rights and to decry the invisible government. But it is the real government. The ruling classes are those who use their craft societies, medical associations, farm bureaus, labor unions, bankers' associations, women's leagues, and the like to influence government. Of course, it takes time and intelligence, and a little money, but not much. For fifty dollars a year [in membership dues] the average family ought to be able to buy half a dozen powerful votes in government, each vote ten times as powerful as the vote guaranteed by the Constitution.¹

NUMBER OF GROUPS

No one knows how many of these groups are now active in American

¹ *Politics: the Citizen's Business*, pp. 15-16. Copyright, 1924, by The Macmillan Company and used with their permission.

life and politics. There is no general census of them, although there are enumerations (each admittedly incomplete) of certain types of them, such as professional associations, labor unions, fraternal orders with insurance benefits, and trade associations. In the instances in which counts have been published, they will be mentioned in the chapters that follow. For several years the *World Almanac* has been building up a list called United States Associations and Societies and now has about 525 entries. The collection, however, probably contains a disproportionate number of organizations with headquarters in the Northeast and middle Atlantic areas, particularly in New York. Donald C. Blaisdell counted about 500 organizations with permanent headquarters in Washington, D.C.¹ The Department of Commerce estimates that there are about 8000 trade associations; about 30,500 associations related to agriculture; "well over 50,000" women's associations; and about five hundred professional societies.² There are probably more than 100,000 associations of all types in the United States. Some are national, some state-wide, some local.³ The degree of political activity in which they actively engage varies immensely, of course; but almost every one of them, whether aware of it or not, is at least potentially a political force.

DIFFICULTY OF FOLLOWING GROUP POLITICS

It is difficult for the American voters, who as individuals have other matters besides governing to occupy their attention, to follow day by day the behavior of two major and two or more minor parties. It is obviously impossible for the voters to follow the activities of a hundred thousand pressure groups, many of which, moreover, are seeking objectives that are as clearly and as exclusively political as the objectives of parties. As private organizations, the groups have an immunity from newspaper inquiry that parties cannot claim. Few will reveal their lists of members, their sources of income, their expenditures, or all of their political activities. Only occasional and sporadic legislative investigations get at these

¹ "Economic Power and Political Pressures," TNEC Monograph No. 26 (1940), pp. 197-201.

² C. J. Judkins, *Trade and Professional Associations of the United States*, United States Department of Commerce, Industrial Series No. 3 (1942).

³ There are a few organizations which, as Pendleton Herring said, "are fakes, out and out, ruled by rogues and composed of dupes." He cites in his *Group Representation Before Congress* (1929), pp. 25-28, a number which were exposed by investigations by congressional committees.

matters. The internal politics of the organizations, which may be as important to the formation of a national policy as the factionalism in a party, is usually as secret as the group can keep it. The conventions of the biggest groups, such as the American Federation of Labor, the Congress of Industrial Organizations, or the American Legion, are national news; but the conventions of smaller organizations are of only local interest. When most newspaper editors regard major party platforms as of insufficient news interest to justify printing them, they will obviously be even less inclined to print the scores and hundreds of resolutions on public questions that emerge from conventions of groups. Yet these sets of resolutions are platforms on public policies, many of which will sooner or later be part of the law. Even less notice is given in the press to the sessions of the officers — the national council, the board of trustees, or whatever it may be called. Nevertheless it is these directors who commonly control in fact the proceedings of the convention and who usually are authorized by the charter or constitution of the organization to speak in its behalf during the interval between conventions. Much of the pressure that the groups bring upon administrative officers escapes wide public notice.

The "Invisible Government." For these and similar reasons William Allen White and others have given to the array of pressure groups the term which Elihu Root coined for the boss system, "the invisible government." The National Association of Manufacturers objected to Donald Blaisdell's calling them part of the invisible government in Washington: "Certainly nothing is clearer than the Association's constant effort to present its views on public questions in every form in which they could be discussed. If its views were not identified it was never because they were not marked with their authorship."¹ Notwithstanding the objection, the term "invisible government" is appropriate, because a great part of the activities of pressure groups are not in fact known to the public.

CAUSES OF NUMBER AND POWER OF GROUPS

Love of "Joining." No single cause can be identified as the reason for the proliferation of organizations in the United States. A number of contributing causes, however, can be enumerated. For a people who

¹ John Scoville and Noel Sargent, *Fact and Fancy in the TNEC Monographs* (1942), p. 392. For the quotation to which they objected see Blaisdell, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

have laid great stress upon individualism Americans have, paradoxically, been the quickest to form a multitude of organizations for acting, not as individuals, but as groups. Alexis de Tocqueville noticed this tendency in the early nineteenth century:

The political associations that exist in the United States are only a single feature in the midst of the immense assemblage of associations in that country. Americans of all ages, all conditions, all dispositions, constantly form associations. They have not only commercial and manufacturing companies, in which all take part, but associations of a thousand other kinds, religious, moral, serious, futile, general or restricted, enormous, or diminutive. . . . If it is proposed to inculcate some truth or to foster some feeling . . . they form a society.¹

Many other foreign observers have marveled at the multiplication of associations. For instance, a Canadian, J. A. Corry, recently wrote of the United States, "It is a country of 'joiners,' where the fullest advantage has been taken of freedom of association. No other government has to take account of so wide a range of diversity of interests, most of them organized." ²

The wide diversity of interests in a country of continental size; the identification of certain interests with sections or regions; a high degree of literacy; and easy means of communication have all been contributing factors to the immense number of organizations we have.

Political Causes. There have also been important constitutional and political causes. Federalism and the separation of powers, discussed in Chapter 2, make a national party responsibility difficult if not impossible; and this weakness of party produces the strength of pressure groups. When a national party cannot control in the states the nomination of persons who campaign under its banner, candidates are free to defy it and to win by any alliance of pressure groups that they can form. To put the same matter in another way, candidates have little to lose by defying their national party organizations, but may have everything to lose if they defy some group that is powerful in their constituency, such as the American Legion, the Farm Bureau, organized business, or labor unions. Each constituency is unique, and each candidate knows (or thinks he knows) what groups he must placate to win in his ward, county, city, district, or state.

¹ *Democracy in America* (Phillips Bradley trans., Alfred A. Knopf, 1945), vol. 2, p. 106.

² *Democratic Government and Politics* (1946), p. 210.

The control of legislation by committees also contributes to the strength of groups. Woodrow Wilson saw this long ago when he wrote that the powers of "lobbyists . . . are inherent in the very nature of Congress, for there can be no doubt that the power of the lobbyist consists in great part, if not altogether, in the facility afforded him by the committee system. . . . It would be impracticable to work up his schemes in the broad field of the whole House, but in the membership of a committee he finds manageable numbers."¹ Wilson's comment is equally applicable to state legislatures.

That pressure politics is not inherent in the nature of popular government may be seen by contrasting its reduction under a cabinet system: "In Britain and Canada, where the cabinet formulates policy and party discipline ensures its adoption in substantially the form proposed, pressure groups cannot hope to get far by lobbying individual members of Parliament or urging their case on parliamentary committees. These avenues of influence are not entirely neglected, but the most important representations must be made directly or indirectly to the cabinet."² Thus if a Prime Minister and his cabinet and the leaders of the opposition opposed a bonus for veterans, the proposal would never even be presented to the House. But in the United States a veterans' group was able to pass its bill over the vetoes of Democratic and Republican Presidents alike.

SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF GROUPS

A given pressure group may consist of only two or three individuals who have formed an association and started to get out publicity. Or it may be an organization with several millions of dues-paying members and a budget of millions of dollars a year. At one extreme, it may, like a taxpayers' association, have objectives solely related to public policies; or it may, like the American Legion, have many purposes that frequently relate to public policies. At the other extreme, it may, like a fraternal order, be only occasionally and casually interested in legislation or administrative action. Groups tend to state their objectives in general terms, such as "to reduce public expenditures," "to obtain justice for labor," or "to maintain the sacredness of the Sabbath," so that most of them, if they can raise the necessary funds, can look forward to an indefinite existence. They have the same attribute of immortality that the law

¹ *Congressional Government* (1900 edition), pp. 189-190.

² Corry, *op. cit.*, p. 211.

ascribes to corporations. The objectives of many groups, moreover, change from time to time as new needs are felt in the membership or as other groups arise, perhaps to seek the repeal of legislation successfully passed by earlier ones. Only an occasional organization has a single objective, so that when this is attained the need for the organization ends and the group dissolves. The Association Against the Prohibition Amendment was one such example. It turned in its charter when the Eighteenth Amendment was repealed. Moreover, when conditions and objectives change, a hard-and-fast consistency is not to be expected; the Chamber of Commerce may want teachers' salaries reduced in one period and increased ten years later. Thus at any given time, looking over the platforms of groups, the observer may be struck with what seem to him to be inconsistencies; in this respect groups are much like parties. Organizations are formed every day, usually with some fanfare of publicity; every day others collapse, disintegrate, or merge, usually with little publicity to mark their passing. Still other organizations, like some religious bodies, are age-old. While certain constants are apparent in pressure politics, the pattern is constantly changing.

Typical Organization. The typical group is organized on three levels: at the bottom are the locals, chapters, posts, sections — the names are greatly varied; above these are the state or, occasionally, regional departments; and on top of all is the national organization. Usually the locals elect delegates to the state convention, and it elects delegates to the national. The degree of autonomy of the state and local bodies differs greatly from one group to another. Although the hierarchical, federal arrangement is typical, there are many organizations which are unitary. In these there may be no local or state branches, but if there are, membership in the national organization gives the member admission to the locals. In these unitary groups, individual members often vote by mail for delegates to conventions and even for national officers. Perhaps these statements give an unwarranted impression that the structural organization of groups is simple; in some cases it is, but in others it is extremely complex. The American Medical Association is an example. In other instances all of the groups in a cluster of associations, each nominally independent, are actually dominated by one of them. The National Association of Manufacturers, for instance, is influential almost if not quite to the point of control over various other business groups.

Resemblances to the State. The typical group shows many striking similarities to the national state, not only in structure but in function.

Groups have their parties and factions, their majorities and minorities, their leaders and followers. As the state seeks to advance or protect the welfare of its citizens, the group seeks to improve or defend the welfare of its members. The state may defend its nationals to the point of conflict with other states; likewise groups contend with each other, some to the point of violence.¹ "All of these groups have their own sanctions or penalties. The state can throw a man into prison. But an employer [or a union or professional association] can take away his job. As the state can deprive a man of his life, the church can threaten his happiness in the future and make him extremely uneasy and unhappy while he lives."² These sanctions may even be formulated as codes of ethics or canon law. Groups also have their patriotism, their loyalties, which may be cultivated by ceremonies and oaths of induction and election to membership and reinforced by the use of titles and appellations of address, by special clothing, cards, buttons, and so on. Differences of rank within the group may be more complex than the varieties of status in the political society.³

The loyalty of the individual to his union, his church, or his racial group may exceed his loyalty to his country. When public policy runs counter to group policy it is by no means certain that the group will give way. The *Kulturkampf*, the general strike, the utility strikes, the milk strikes, all show that group loyalty may so far exceed patriotism that members of a group may defy public government and obey private government. The leaders of many groups know that leviathan is really helpless before their organizations — "You can't dig coal with bayonets." The so-called sovereign state might better be described as a registrar or referee among interest groups.

EFFECT OF GROUP ON PARTY DISCIPLINE

William Allen White, who favored more responsible parties, was appalled by the effects of pressure politics upon party politics: "Parties are

¹ The milk strikes of organized farmers against non-members, jurisdictional fights among labor unions, religious group battles in India and Palestine are some recent examples of inter-group violence.

² Charles E. Merriam, *Public and Private Government* (1944), p. 9.

³ Cf. A. F. Bentley, *The Process of Government* (1908); Harwood L. Childs, *Labor and Capital in National Politics*, especially pp. 238-260; Charles E. Merriam, *Systematic Politics* (1945). There are many related works on pluralism, such as W. Y. Elliott, *The Pragmatic Revolt in Politics* (1928), which cites most of the literature to the date of publication.

its tools when they are useful, but when they get in the way of organized minorities parties are ignored by this invisible government. . . . The presidents of the national farm organizations control a bloc of votes in Congress which neither party chairman, neither party whip, nor the President himself can move."¹ In many situations, in other words, groups are, within their fields of influence, more powerful than parties. Any analysis of the votes in Congress on controversial measures upon which groups have been active will show that party pressure gives way before group pressure, and the vote ignores party lines. Much the same results can be observed in any unbossed state legislature.

Groups and Policy. In the second place, the invention of public policy is coming to be more and more the work of pressure groups and administrative agencies, as will be shown more fully in a later chapter. Not only do party platforms tend to likeness, but there is no uniform party policy when a party attains control. The situation was well put by E. E. Schattschneider:

If the President sponsors a program, it may nevertheless be freely sabotaged by his own partisans in Congress. Is the presidential policy properly speaking a party policy at all? The fact is that no one has a right to speak for the party; no program or platform binds anyone, and only the faint outlines of a party policy are discernible in the chaos of undisciplined partisans in the government, each of whom seems to do about as he pleases with surprisingly little common action and cohesion.

He went on to say that the one point at which "party divisions show up clearly [is] in the scramble for patronage and the spoils of government. In this kind of politics the [party] organization moves with precision."² If party were the focus of policy-making, the agents of the interest groups, instead of besieging the legislative body, would flock to the party headquarters. But except for the quadrennial appearance of some of them before the resolutions committees which draft platforms for party conventions, most groups generally ignore the party leadership, as White noticed. If a party refuses to accept their proposals for platform planks, the group is not discouraged; it may still get what it wants from the legislative body. Thus the League of Women Voters got the Sheppard-Towner Act through a Republican Congress after the Republican Con-

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 14.

² "Partisan Politics and Administrative Agencies," *Annals*, vol. 221 (May, 1942), p. 30.

vention of 1920 had refused to include the proposal in the platform, and the bill was signed by a Republican President. That the interest groups, seeking to inaugurate some policy, will go where real power resides is further shown by their behavior when a party in city or state has strong leadership and a disciplined organization, as in a boss. For then the groups will ignore the city council or the legislature and go to the boss's office.

Groups, Minor Parties, and Public Policy. The minor parties have long been credited with performing the important function of inventing policy. It is said that they advance proposals which the major parties will not touch, because the minor parties, knowing that they cannot win anyhow, are less inclined than the major ones to trim and compromise on issues. Ultimately, so the argument runs, one or both major parties will accept the proposal first tested by a minor party. No doubt there is merit in the contention. The Socialist Party, for example, is able to point to a long list of proposals which it first offered and which were later enacted, in some instances by Republican Congresses. But in other cases the minor parties do not themselves invent the issues they advance, but rather they are more willing than the major parties to accept the proposals of the more radical pressure groups which have been rebuffed by legislative bodies. A great part of the ideology of the Populist Party, for example, was taken over from the Grange and other farm groups.

The current low estate of minor parties is due to various factors, but it may be that one of the most important causes of their eclipse is that more and more pressure groups are formulating policy and taking their proposals direct to legislative bodies or to administrative officers. The process of going through a minor party to ultimate enactment of a policy may take decades and lead into various side issues and collateral controversies. Apparently most interests would prefer, in an era of propaganda and publicity, to use the methods they have observed to be so successful when utilized by such non-party groups as the American Legion, the Farm Bureau, the Anti-Saloon League, and others.

Relations of Groups to Parties. No doubt the ideal relationship to party from the point of view of a pressure group would be a situation in which a major party, firmly in power, was in turn dominated by the group on the issues in which the group was interested. This state of affairs occurred after the Civil War when the Republican Party was dominated on veterans' issues by the Grand Army of the Republic, and again in recent years when in various prairie states it has been controlled on agricultural matters by the farm groups. Lacking such control of a major party, a

group would next prefer a situation in which both major parties were of such nearly equal strength that the votes of the group would form a balance of power. This is the policy followed by organized labor, and it is the one that in recent years Negro leaders have urged upon colored voters. But it is obviously a policy susceptible of use only by large groups. The American Legion has found it effective; the American Medical Association would not. A less desirable relationship is one in which the group finds itself closely allied to the fortunes of one party; such a group is "the American Tariff League, which may be appropriately described as an ancillary organization of the Republican Party."¹ The Liberty League of 1936 was another such Republican ally. In the event of the defeat of the party to which its fortunes are tied, such a group is also generally defeated, since it has probably made an organized enemy of the other party. The relationship least desirable is that in which neither party will have anything to do with the group or its objectives. This situation is most likely to arise when a small group, such as the Planned Parenthood Federation, is advancing a proposal to which a big and powerful group, such as the Catholic Church, strongly objects. The *New York Times* reported two instances of this sort for the New York legislature of 1949; the state bar association could not get a bill introduced to liberalize the state's divorce law, and the Euthanasia Society could find no legislator who would lend his name to a bill to authorize the mercy killing of the incurably ill at their own request. In such a situation the smaller group will find difficulty in getting its measures introduced and still more difficulty in getting them a hearing.

/ No one can pretend to understand the operation of American governments without some knowledge of the principal pressure groups, their policies and objectives, their political and social relationships, and the tactics and strategies they use. As Blaisdell aptly put it, the Chamber of Commerce of the United States is not mentioned in the Constitution, but "to consider our governmental system without including it is to deal with the form of government and not its substance."² For reasons that have already been touched upon, notably the vast number of these groups and their relative mobility and invisibility, no one can learn all about all of them, but an attempt will be made in the chapters that follow to arrange in categories — agriculture, labor, business, and so on — the biggest, most active, or most influential organizations. Certain groups

¹ E. E. Schattschneider, *Politics, Pressures, and the Tariff* (1935), p. 194.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 28.

will cut across any set of categories, as will be indicated of some of them, and therefore any classification must be rather more arbitrary than logical. But the categories are in themselves less important than a knowledge of what groups exist, what they are after, and how they propose to get it.

"GOOD" AND "BAD" OF PRESSURE POLITICS

Some writers, Stuart Chase for example, tend to condemn all pressure politics as a perversion of democracy.¹ Such a blanket indictment is at once too easy and too simple. There are undesirable aspects of pressure politics, but, as will be shown more fully hereafter, there are desirable aspects as well. The student of American politics should apply to the objectives and tactics of the groups discussed in the chapters that follow those economic, ethical, political, and religious standards that appeal to him. No book of this sort can possibly explore all the matters involved to determine what is "good" or "bad"; such an attempt would require many volumes, leading off into economics, sociology, and various other fields, and would require a social omniscience that the present writer does not feel that he possesses. Probably, standards of good or evil are inapplicable to many groups; the standard to be applied is rather expediency or practicability. For example, people will disagree upon whether it is socially desirable to use public funds and government controls to maintain the family size farm against the forces of the agricultural revolution. Some, like the National Association of Manufacturers, will believe that economic forces should be allowed to roll on their relentless way. Other people (the author among them) believe that social values are involved of such consequence to the whole nation that this objective of the farm organizations is justified. But to explain and defend that point of view would lead far from the field of politics into economics and sociology.

Further discussion of the behavior of groups, their effectiveness, and the tactics they use will be appropriate after consideration of the several clusters around the principal interests in American society.

¹ See his *Democracy Under Pressure: Special Interests vs. the Public Welfare* (1945); and Kenneth S. Crawford, *The Pressure Boys* (1939).

Farmers and Farm Groups in Politics

Those who labor in the earth are the chosen people of God, if ever he had a chosen people, whose breasts he has made his peculiar deposit for substantial and genuine virtue. It is the focus in which he keeps alive that sacred fire which otherwise might escape from the face of the earth. Corruption of morals in the mass of cultivators is a phenomenon of which no age nor nation has furnished an example. . . . Generally speaking, the proportion which the aggregate of the other classes of citizens bears in any state to that of its husbandmen is the proportion of its unsound to its healthy parts, and is a good enough barometer whereby to measure its degree of corruption.¹

MOTIVATIONS OF FARM GROUPS AND PARTIES

Jefferson's belief that farmers are morally superior to city people runs through our history. It could be matched with the views of the Grangers, and it has been used as an argument in state constitutional conventions to justify the under-representation of city people in state legislatures. Allan B. Kline, president of the American Farm Bureau Federation, wrote in 1948: "The farmer is close to the eternal verities of life. Maybe country living is conducive to the development of a wholesome philosophy of life and a sound sense of values . . ." ² When combined with plain economic interest, this conviction of the innate goodness of farmers has furnished a powerful drive for agriculture in American politics from colonial days to the present.³ The farmers of colonial America were attracted to the cause

¹ Thomas Jefferson, *Notes on the State of Virginia* (1800 edition), p. 163.

² "What the Farmers Want," *Annals*, vol. 259 (September, 1948), p. 127.

³ For an excellent short summary of the agricultural interest in American party and

of the Revolution by the Proclamation of 1763 which shut off westward expansion. At that early date they wanted cheap land and low land taxes, soft money and easy laws for debtors — desires that have run through farm parties and pressure groups to the present time. During the Revolution, estates of the Loyalists were confiscated and sold to small farmers, and after the war the agricultural interests succeeded in terminating other remnants of aristocracy, such as entail and primogeniture. The farmers pushed hard against the early limitations on the suffrage, and with Jefferson won the presidency in 1800. The Louisiana Purchase of his administration, opposed by the commercial interests of New England, was as strongly supported by southern and western farmers. The desire of farmers for more cheap land led to a long-time liberal policy with the lands in the public domain, which culminated in the Homestead Act of 1862.

When the first farmers' party, called the Agrarian Party, was founded in New York by Thomas Skidmore in 1829, one of its chief planks was free land. But the Democratic Party also sought new land, and by the Mexican War obtained a vast territory from Mexico, so that it was able to satisfy the farmers' demands until 1860. Then the new Republican Party, promising free lands and a protective tariff, combined western farmers and eastern business into a successful sectional alliance.

THE AGRICULTURAL REVOLUTION

Farm politics since the Civil War can be understood only in terms of the agricultural revolution, which is still in progress. Leaders of farm organizations appear to understand this revolution, but it is doubtful if most individual farmers do. The colonial farmer tilled his fields by methods not substantially different from those in use during the days of the Roman Empire. Since then, however, a series of inventions has transformed farming. The cotton gin in 1793 was followed by the steamboat, the railroad, barbed wire, the steel plow, the mechanical reaper, the pressure politics see Everett E. Edwards, "American Agriculture — the First 300 Years" in the *1940 Yearbook of the Department of Agriculture, Farmers in a Changing World* (cited hereafter as *1940 Yearbook*), pp. 171-276. Another excellent short summary is C. Arnold Anderson, "Agrarianism in Politics," in *Twentieth Century Political Thought*, Joseph C. Roucek, editor (1946), pp. 197-218. An older but a still valuable study is Stuart A. Rice, *Farmers and Workers in American Politics* (1924). The most complete sociological study of rural life is P. A. Sorokin, C. C. Zimmerman and C. J. Galpin, *A Systematic Source Book in Rural Sociology* (3 vols., 1931). A short history of farmers' parties and groups is S. J. Buck, *The Agrarian Crusade* (1921).

mechanical seed drill, the threshing machine (later the combine), and the internal combustion engine for tractors, cultivators, rakes, and other farm implements. Assisted by the Rural Electrification Administration, farming is at present in process of electrification. The steady mechanization of farming has continually reduced the number of persons necessary on farms.¹ Abundant land, the introduction of improved strains of grains, fibers, and animals, the steady spread of scientific farming, reductions in the cost of fertilizer — all have contributed to a constantly mounting production. These factors have also made necessary greater amounts of capital per farm, and consequently have made farmers feel less like laborers and more like capitalists.² Increased production has been an important cause of a long-term decline in the prices of farm commodities, a decline which has been interrupted only by wars and droughts. Wheat, for instance, declined from \$1.07 a bushel in 1870 to \$.63 in 1894, corn from \$.43 to \$.30; cotton from \$.15 to \$.06 a pound.³ The resulting bankruptcies, when coupled with feelings of grievance from other causes (such as railroad and warehouse practices), and augmented by unfavorable weather, have produced farm revolts with far-reaching political effects.⁴ The loss of foreign markets has further depressed farm economy. Farm income rose during World War II, but as soon as the war was over the old demon of the surplus reappeared. There was a succession of extraordinarily good crop years. Governor Thomas E. Dewey waited until late in

¹ At the time of the first census (1790), about 95 per cent of the adult population was engaged in agriculture. In 1940, in a total population of 131,669,000, the farm population was 30,390,000; the Bureau of the Census estimated that this declined to 25,630,000 in 1944. There are now about 7,800,000 farm families. The agricultural census of 1935 showed fewer than a million farms that reported any regular hired help; of these 722,000 had only one employee; 137,000 had two; and 11,000 more. — *1940 Yearbook*, p. 911.

² While there has been a constant decline in the number of farms and farmers, there has been an increase in the number of large farms (1000 acres and over); in the number of corporations engaged in farming; and in the number of nonresident owners. See Albert L. Meyers, *Agriculture and the National Economy*, TNEC Monograph No. 23 (1940), especially pp. 10–11. Since mechanization is the more profitable the larger the unit, and since mechanization is still far from complete, the trend toward fewer but larger farms may be expected to continue. The improvement of the cotton picker seems likely to displace several hundreds of thousands of southern Negroes; the social and political problems that will result will be tremendous.

³ Table in John D. Hicks, *The Populist Revolt* (1931), p. 56. For convenient compilations showing decline in farm compared to non-farm income, 1909–1939, see Donald C. Blaisdell, *Government and Agriculture* (1940), pp. 5–6.

⁴ See John D. Barnhart, "Rainfall and the Populist Party in Nebraska," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 19 (August, 1925), pp. 527–540.

the campaign of 1948 to endorse price-support legislation. Perhaps he waited too long; perhaps farmers did not trust the Republican Party to be enthusiastic on their issues. At any rate, he lost a number of farm states usually Republican, notably Iowa, and he carried others by narrow margins.

CONSERVATIVE-RADICAL PARADOX OF FARM POLITICS

The farmer in American politics has been a political paradox, at once the citadel of orthodoxy and the center of radical movements. Farmers have engaged in occasional violence from Bacon's Rebellion to the milk strikes and the Farmers' Holiday of the early 1930's. Opposing, in general, governmental activities that seem to them socialistic or paternalistic, farm groups and parties have at the same times obtained state milk-control laws to fix the prices on milk and other dairy products and billions of dollars from the federal treasury to maintain "parity." The paradox is explained by the fact that the farmer is a small landed capitalist. "This property and proprietorial basis of rural life, with its isolation of the individual and the family, explains both the radicalism and the lack of radicalism of the farmer. He is opposed to socialism and communism as a rule, but he soon becomes radical when the institution of landed property is assailed, or when his land or land rights are taken from him."¹ The farmers in Iowa and the other middle western states, who, during the Farmers' Holiday movement, stopped the processes of the courts by violence or threats of violence, were normally Republicans; but the threat to their ownership of their land was enough to move them to the most unorthodox measures, including state laws to suspend an important right of private property, the foreclosure of delinquent mortgages.

FARMERS' PARTIES SINCE THE CIVIL WAR

The radicalism of farmers when their way of life has been threatened was shown in the agrarian minor parties after the Civil War. The Greenback Party was formed in 1874.² It got its popular name from its advocacy of currency inflation to relieve the distress of farm debtors in the post-

¹ Sorokin, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 564.

² It was first and officially called the Independent Party. In 1878 it adopted the name Greenback-Labor. For its platforms see Kirk H. Porter, *National Party Platforms* (1924), pp. 91, 101, 124.

Civil War deflation. It also opposed the demonetization of silver, the "Crime of '73," which it regarded as deflationary, and the resumption of specie payments. The maximum strength of the party was shown in the election of 1878, when it elected fifteen candidates to Congress (twelve of them from the Middle West) and polled nearly a million votes. Its leader and candidate for President was General James Weaver of Iowa. The Greenback Party has been called the first party to organize the forces of agricultural discontent. It weakened in the late eighties, and in 1892 joined with the Farmers' Alliances (agricultural pressure groups) to form the People's or Populist Party.

General Weaver became the Populist candidate for President and in 1892 obtained twenty-two electoral and more than a million popular votes. The party showed further strength in 1894, but in 1896 it in effect joined the Democrats by endorsing Bryan, although it tried to maintain a separate organization as late as 1912.¹

A hybrid of party and pressure group, the Nonpartisan League, was organized in 1915 in North Dakota by Arthur C. Townley.² The League had captured the government of North Dakota by 1918. In some states it ran its own candidates; in others it invaded the Democratic or Republican primaries and nominated members of the League or persons who endorsed its program. It elected two United States senators and several governors and congressmen. Its program was radical; it advocated government-owned banks, elevators, warehouses, and stockyards. Much of the program was carried out in North Dakota, but the failure of some of the enterprises, especially of the Bank of North Dakota, and internal troubles, brought the collapse of the League and Townley's resignation in 1922. Its strength always lay in the Dakotas, Nebraska, Minnesota, and in the Rocky Mountain states of Colorado, Idaho, and Montana. It had at its peak about two hundred thousand dues-paying members.³ It was, of course, fought bitterly by the two major party organizations, which, upon occasion, united against it.

¹ The standard work on the party is Hicks, *op. cit.*; for its platforms see Porter, *op. cit.*, pp. 166, 196, 217, 254, 294.

² Two books favorable to the League are: Herbert E. Gaston, *The Nonpartisan League* (1920), and Charles E. Russell, *The Story of the Nonpartisan League* (1920); two hostile works are: A. A. Bruce, *Non-Partisan League* (1921), and William Langer, *The Non-Partisan League* (1920). There is a brief treatment in Edward M. Sait, *American Parties and Elections* (1942 edition), pp. 169-177, in K. C. MacKay, *The Progressive Movement of 1924* (1947), pp. 39-53, and in Boyd A. Martin, *The Direct Primary in Idaho* (1947), pp. 66-69.

³ Nathan Fine, *Labor and Farmer Parties in the United States, 1828-1928* (1928), p. 373.

In 1919 a Labor Party was organized, and the following year it changed its name to Farmer-Labor and polled about a quarter of a million votes for its candidate for President, P. P. Christensen of Utah. Its votes were scattered through the middle western and Rocky Mountain states.¹ The Nonpartisan League and the Farmer-Labor Party laid the groundwork for the campaign of Robert M. La Follette in 1924. Although La Follette obtained the electoral vote only of his own state, Wisconsin, he received nearly five million popular votes. MacKay, who has analyzed the returns, concludes that the farm vote for La Follette was 2,530,000.² Analysis by sections shows that he was weakest in New England, strongest on the Pacific coast and in the Rocky Mountain and middle western states. Since the defeat of La Follette, there has been no important national farmer or farmer-labor party, although there have been splinter organizations.³

The future for farm parties is not promising. A substantial proportion of their demands has been granted by the state and federal governments, so that the basis for the complaints of the old agrarian parties no longer exists. The largest number of victories was won in the years 1933-1939. "Even when farmers lost an election," wrote C. Arnold Anderson, "the major parties accepted some of their policies lest they revolt again." And since "no party could win without support from a large segment of western farmers," no party is likely to attempt to deprive them of their legislative gains.⁴ The agricultural revolution is making any alliance between farmers and organized labor more and more difficult. The present tendency is toward reliance upon pressure politics through the farm organizations, rather than upon separate parties, either farmer or farmer-labor.

FARM GROUPS

Long before there were agrarian parties in the United States, there were agricultural societies. Among the first was the South Carolina Agricul-

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 377-397.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 221. The remainder was chiefly labor, cast under various party designations.

³ For some discussion of the Farmer-Labor Party of Minnesota see T. P. Jenkin, *Reactions of Major Groups to Positive Government in the United States, 1930-1940* (1945), p. 336, and for other state agrarian and farmer-labor parties of the early thirties see Joseph R. Starr, "Labor and Farmer Groups and the Three-Party System," *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*, vol. 17 (June, 1936), pp. 7-19.

⁴ Rousek, *op. cit.*, p. 206.

tural Society, established in 1784.¹ Since that time there have been hundreds, perhaps thousands, of farmers' organizations, state, sectional, and national. There are at least a hundred active today, of which four are national and open to all types of farmers. The remainder are either regional or devoted primarily to the interests of certain kinds of farmers, such as dairymen. Some of the associations have family, others individual, memberships, so that it is impossible to ascertain the total strength. Their claims of membership, moreover, are often given in round numbers, and they may therefore be assumed to be somewhat inflated. A study made by Cornell University in 1942 reported that 20 per cent of the New York farmers, who are probably more highly organized than those of any other state, belonged to no farm association; *Fortune* found that, the country over, 70 per cent belonged to no organization.² The total membership is probably between two and three millions, including duplications.

The big four of the national farm groups are: the National Grange Order of the Patrons of Husbandry, commonly called the Grange; the American Farm Bureau Federation, usually referred to as the Farm Bureau or the AFBF; the National Farmers' Educational and Co-operative Union of America, known generally as the Farmers' Union; and the National Council of Farm Co-operatives. All except the Farmers' Union, which is regarded by the others as too radical, generally work together in an informal way, although there is "an apparent trend," wrote D. C. Wing, "toward a division of territory among the Grange, the Farmers' Union, and the Farm Bureau Federation. The Farm Bureau Federation has recently withdrawn from Pennsylvania, where the Grange has long been comparatively strong, but in a number of states two or all of the associations are active."³ The main strength of the Grange lies in New England and the middle Atlantic states; of the Farm Bureau in the Mississippi Valley; of the Farmers' Union in the western and south-western states. The farm co-operatives are widely distributed, often in connection with other organizations. Each organization publishes a newspaper or magazine of national circulation.

THE GRANGE

In January, 1866, President Andrew Johnson sent Oliver H. Kelley,

¹ 1940 *Yearbook*, p. 114. The early societies were aristocratic, often with a sort of sentimental attachment to the virtues of country life.

² 1940 *Yearbook*, p. 942, and *Fortune*, vol. 27 (April, 1943), p. 8.

³ 1940 *Yearbook*, p. 973.

a clerk in the Agricultural Bureau, on a trip through the South to study and report upon the conditions of agriculture.¹ Kelley was a member of the Masonic order, "and, appreciative of the benefits of fraternity, he came to the conclusion that a national secret order of farmers was needed for . . . the advancement of the agricultural class throughout the country."² In 1867 Kelley and six other men, all but one government employees, established the Grange with a secret ritual copied from the Masons, except that women were admitted. The titles in the order were given an agricultural color, such as pomona, flora, master, patron, and so forth. The organization grew slowly, but by 1875, at its peak, it had 850,000 members. Its organization is federal in type with local (subordinate) granges; county (pomona); state granges; and above them all the National Grange, which maintains a Washington office. It has about 8000 locals, and a total membership of about 800,000.

The Grange was intended as much to promote the educational and cultural life of the farm families as to advance their economic interest.³ It was, indeed, professedly non-political, but it was soon taking stands on a wide variety of public questions and actively at work in politics, particularly in the middle western states. Its chief accomplishment of the seventies was the passage of a series of state laws regulating railroads, known as the Granger Laws.⁴ The order has always stopped short of advocating public ownership of railroads. It claims credit for national regulation of railroads, stockyards, and grain elevators; for the establishment of the Department of Agriculture (the first Secretary was a Granger); for rural free delivery of mail; for pure seed laws; and for anti-margarine laws. Naturally it must share the credit for at least some of these legislative victories with other groups.

The Grange has always had more of a moral tone than the other farm groups. It was an early advocate of woman's suffrage. It has been an

¹ Solon J. Buck, *The Granger Movement* (1913), p. 41. This book is the standard work on the history of the Grange to the date of its publication. For later developments and platforms see *1940 Yearbook*, pp. 948-954.

² Buck, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

³ See Jennie Buell, *The Grange Master and the Grange Lecturer* (1921). The author prints (p. 2) a "Prayer for a Country Community" which shows why women were attracted to Grange "work"; one paragraph will illustrate: "Our Father . . . save the women of the country from the physical strain of overwork, and from the nervous strain of loneliness and isolation. Put into the hearts of the men of their families a willingness to lighten their daily burden of toil by the supply of labor-saving conveniences and by thoughtful consideration."

⁴ See Hicks, *op. cit.*, pp. 123-237.

advocate of temperance and prohibition. It favors strict laws against gambling.

As the years have passed, the Grange has lost its early radicalism until it is now the most conservative of the farm organizations. It opposes socialized medicine; it wants the House Committee on Un-American Activities continued with "an adequate appropriation"; and it is opposed to the reciprocal trade agreements.

More than any other farm group it has brought pressure upon state legislatures for rural education and traveling libraries. It has kept up its own adult education. It has succeeded fairly well in combining economic and cultural interests. "The Grange seeks to put dollars into the farmer's pocket and courage into his heart."¹

THE FARMERS' UNION

The second oldest of the national farm organizations is the Farmers' Union, which was established in Texas in 1902 and spread up the Mississippi Valley. It has always been based upon co-operatives, but it has urged various kinds of government aid to agriculture. At present it is organized by families, members of co-operatives; it claims 125,000 family memberships in forty states. This is far below its peak of 935,000 in 1928.² Its co-operatives suffered severely during the depression years, but its faith in them has not been shaken: "Co-operatives are essentially the means of achieving democracy in the economic field. Unless our co-operatives are built stronger, and thus the economic power of the masses is increased, neither economic nor political democracy will be continued for long."³

The Farmers' Union is not really radical. It is, rather, a sort of New Dealish farm group, the least conservative among the big four. It seeks to maintain by favorable legislation, even by a bonus for farmers, the family-sized farm as the unit of agricultural production. It strongly supported the Farm Security Administration, and unlike the other groups, it never adopted anti-union resolutions. But like other farmers when their landownership is threatened, the Farmers' Union reacts violently. The president of the Iowa union was Milo Reno, who led the Farmers'

¹ From a Grange pamphlet quoted by Wesley McCune, *The Farm Bloc* (1943), p. 154.

² McCune, *op. cit.*, p. 194.

³ 1940 *Yearbook*, p. 957. Interview with the national president of the Farmers' Union.

Holiday movement. Other state unions were active in it, perhaps because the most distressed agricultural areas in the early thirties were also the areas where the Farmers' Union was strongest.¹

THE FARM BUREAU

The biggest and most powerful of the farm organizations is the American Farm Bureau Federation. "Just before the [first] World War the idea of county agents, or 'agricultural experts,' had taken root. . . . The idea was later taken over by the United States Department of Agriculture and developed into the present system of agricultural extension, financed jointly by state and federal funds."² These county agents made the Farm Bureau a semi-governmental agency. McCune expresses the reason succinctly:

To put up their half of the federal-state matched funds for the work, state legislatures passed acts granting the money outright or setting up "County Farm Bureaus" to co-operate with the agricultural agents. Twelve states named the Farm Bureaus, and several of those chose the technique of granting funds only to counties whose farm bureaus had a certain number of members. This made the extension agent, whose salary was being raised, practically an organizing agent for the Farm Bureau.³

The local bureaus soon federated into state groups, and these, in 1920, into a national federation. It has about 16,000 locals in 45 states, but a

¹ For other details about the Farmers' Union see McCune, *op. cit.*, pp. 193-221.

² 1940 *Yearbook*, p. 960. Orville M. Kile, *The Farm Bureau Movement* (1921), pp. 71-127, contains an extended account of the formation of the organization; since Kile was a Washington representative of the Federation, and his book had an introduction by the first president, J. R. Howard, it may be regarded as an authorized history to 1921. In 1948 Kile published another semi-official history of the Farm Bureau with an introduction by the current president, Allan B. Kline, *The Farm Bureau Through Three Decades*.

³ McCune, *op. cit.*, p. 165. President Howard recognized this dependence of the Bureau upon the county agents. He is quoted by Kile, *op. cit.*, p. 211, "The county agent is the keystone of the federation. . . . Show me a weak, listless, ineffective county farm bureau, and I will show you behind it a weak, listless, ineffective county agent." The official assistance to the Bureau has continued. "Senator Robert La Follette," says McCune, p. 191, "asked FSA to supply him with any information available on instances of governmental encouragement to the Farm Bureau. The result was two pages of fine print detailing brazen use of the government franking privilege, county agents' offices, and outright Extension Service appeals to help the federation."

majority of the 1,275,000 claimed members live in the corn belt. The dues vary from state to state, two dollars to fifteen dollars per family. Part of the money goes to the local and state and part to the national organization, which thus collects more than a quarter of a million dollars a year for its pressure work.

This Goliath among the farm groups, with its semi-official connection with the Department of Agriculture and the state departments or commissions of agriculture, has tended to rely upon government action to obtain its objectives, which are primarily economic. It has less interest in educational, moral, or cultural matters than the Grange and the Farmers' Union. The Farm Bloc was organized in its office. It was the only major farm organization to support the McNary-Haugen Bill to dump the agricultural surplus abroad, which President Coolidge twice vetoed. In January, 1932, Edward A. O'Neal, then president of the Farm Bureau, called a conference of the major farm groups. The Farm Bureau obtained their support for a bill, introduced in Congress in the last months of the Hoover administration, which contained all the essential features of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, passed in the early days of the Roosevelt administration.¹ The Farm Bureau takes credit in its publications for almost every act of Congress passed since 1920 that farmers have desired, but powerful as the group undoubtedly is, it must on most matters share credit for the long list of farm victories in Congress with the other groups.²

Analysis of the membership of the Farm Bureau by *Fortune*, McCune, and others shows that it represents primarily the farmers in the highest income group. At any rate, it is, next to the Grange, the most conservative of the agricultural organizations; that is, conservative except on legislation to assist agriculture. It is critical of the Farmers' Union, which it regards as too sympathetic to the CIO; it opposed the Farm Security Administration, which sought to improve the lot of the small and tenant farmer; it opposed all efforts to bring farm labor under federal labor laws; and while it says that it supports organized labor in "all reasonable and legitimate" efforts that labor makes, still the Bureau goes on record as opposing one after another of the specific proposals of labor.³

¹ 1940 *Yearbook*, p. 963. For details of the part of the AFBF in the drafting of and lobbying for this famous statute see O. M. Kile, *The Farm Bureau Through Three Decades*, pp. 177-226.

² McCune, *op. cit.*, pp. 166-176, summarizes the claims of the Farm Bureau.

³ For examples, see 1940 *Yearbook*, p. 969.

NATIONAL COUNCIL OF FARMER CO-OPERATIVES

The farm co-operatives are big business. There are about 10,700 farmers' marketing and purchasing co-operatives in the United States, with a total membership of more than three million, and doing more than two billion dollars' annual business.¹ These producers' co-operatives are not allied with the consumers' co-operatives scattered throughout the United States. Indeed, the interests of these two groups are opposed to one another, as was shown in 1947 when four officers of the New York Dairymen's League were indicted for violating the federal Commodities Exchange Act. The League had spent some \$600,000 buying butter to keep up the price.² Membership in farm co-operatives cuts across membership in other farm groups, as is often shown by the names of the former groups, such as Grange Livestock Marketing Association, or Grange League Federation Exchange.

About 4500 of the 10,700 producers' co-operatives are organized into thirteen area or commodity groups, and these in turn into the National Council, although a high degree of autonomy is retained by the member organizations. Growers of oranges, cotton, milk, apples, wool, and scores of other foods and fibers are thus organized. One of the most famous of the producers' co-operatives is the California Fruit Growers Exchange, which owns the brand name Sunkist. As every reader of magazines knows, this co-operative is one of the biggest advertisers in the country.

Farm co-operatives have various state and national tax exemptions and preferences which they are naturally eager to maintain. The National Council has a close connection with the United States Chamber of Commerce, and both have similar ideas on organized labor:

Farmers' Cooperatives, more than any other farm group, have a tangible economic motive in keeping organized labor under control — or unorganized. The picking, packing, and shipping of citrus fruits, berries, and nuts, the shearing of sheep, and the milking and feeding of cows require considerable wage labor. In many respects these operations are similar to assembly-line jobs indoors; but farmer employers have historically opposed

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 977. The Department of Commerce disagrees; it estimates the number of co-operatives represented in the Council at 4000, with about 2,000,000 members. — C. J. Judkins, *Trade and Professional Associations of the United States*, Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Industrial Series No. 3 (1942), p. 4.

² *New York Times*, January 5, 1947.

efforts to bring their wage-earners under the same protective legislation enjoyed by industrial labor.¹

The farm co-operatives oppose the closed shop in industry as monopolistic and as an infringement upon private enterprise, but the dairy co-operatives have been the leaders in milk strikes and in the passage of state milk-control laws which fix prices and quotas among producers.² As McCune says, "The merits of a closed shop seem to depend on whether one is inside or outside."³ Farmers who have tried to sell their milk at prices regarded by the dairy co-operatives as too low have received the same violent treatment that some strikebreakers have received from members of labor unions.

OTHER FARM GROUPS

In addition to the big four, there are hundreds of state and regional or commodity farm associations, such as the American Wool Growers Association, the American Soy Bean Association, the United States Livestock Association. Not all of them maintain permanent staffs or headquarters in Washington, as do the national groups, but any proposed national legislation affecting their areas or their commodities will bring their officers before Congress. Like the bigger groups, they are constantly interested in the decisions of federal administrative officers, and they maintain such contacts as they can with the Department of Agriculture, the Forest Service, and other agencies that touch them closely.

The influence of farm groups in state politics varies with the type of agriculture in the state concerned. The dairy groups are influential in the New England states, in New York, in Minnesota and Wisconsin; the fruit growers in California; the sugar beet association in Colorado, and so on. The farm organizations commonly dominate the state departments of agriculture.⁴ These departments have a national society called the National Association of Commissioners, Secretaries, and Directors of Agriculture, which brings pressure upon state legislatures. In addition to state measures directly affecting farming, the agricultural associations

¹ McCune, *op. cit.*, p. 136.

² See Belle Zeller, *Pressure Politics in New York* (1937), p. 245.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 139.

⁴ In New Jersey the agricultural organizations have since 1916 legally administered the state department through a board of eight members, elected by groups named in Chapter 268, Laws of 1916; this board names the secretary of agriculture. See Dayton D. McKean, *Pressures on the Legislature of New Jersey* (1938), p. 147.

are interested in education, health, highways, motor vehicles, taxation, and many other types of legislation that affect them less directly.

THE LEADERSHIP OF FARM GROUPS

Paul H. Johnstone, senior agricultural historian in the Department of Agriculture, has made a study of the leadership among farm groups and parties. "A significant proportion of farm leaders have been farm youth who went to town, made or failed to make a fortune there, and then in later life became leaders of rural reform."¹ It has been noted that the Grange was founded by public employees, "one fruit-grower and six government clerks," as one early critic remarked; and not one "of the seven founders," Johnstone noted, "was by occupation a farmer for more than a small portion of his life." Managing a large pressure group, even one in state politics, is so likely to be or to become a full-time job that a practicing dirt farmer cannot do both. Most of the leaders of farm organizations are, therefore, ex-farmers.

Farmers apparently do not get elected to legislative bodies in numbers proportionate to their number in the population. Political leadership, even in farm states, is more likely to be in the hands of lawyers than farmers. Johnstone found that of 419 congressmen from Iowa elected between 1844 and 1938, only fifteen were farmers, but 309 were lawyers. The remaining 195 were businessmen, bankers, publishers, and members of professions other than the law.² Many, perhaps most, of these businessmen and lawyers were farm-reared and therefore sympathetic to the agricultural point of view, readily responsive to pressures from farm groups.

GENERAL OBJECTIVES

At their state and national conventions the farm organizations, like other groups, pass multitudes of resolutions on a wide variety of public policies, state, national, and international. These resolutions favor or oppose matters ranging all the way from allotments to weights and measures. The chief objectives of organized agriculture may, however, be collected into a few groups.

Parity. Of first importance is the maintenance of "parity." In passing the Agricultural Adjustment Act in 1933, Congress declared that its intention was to "give agricultural commodities a purchasing power with respect

¹ 1940 *Yearbook*, p. 156.

² *Ibid.*, p. 157.

to articles farmers buy, equivalent to the purchasing power of agricultural commodities in the base period 1909-1914." This is parity; the period 1909-1914 has been commonly accepted by the farm groups, but elements of costs to be calculated in the formula have been widely disputed. Parity is, at any rate, a policy of supporting farm prices, a policy accepted by all of the farm groups. It is an attempt by government to manage agricultural prices, as the farmers insist that the prices of manufactured articles are managed by industry. Through many of the resolutions of the farm organizations run demands for parity, couched in many ways. It is stated, for instance, that "Agriculture seeks economic justice"; that "we demand for the farmers a fair share of the national income"; that "farm income must be brought to a level which will permit farmers to buy the products of industry in normal volume." These objectives were enacted into law in the Agricultural Adjustment Act, and when that was declared unconstitutional in 1935, into the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act of 1938. By the control of production and by the purchase of surpluses, many farm prices were maintained, usually at under 90 per cent of parity.¹ As a result of World War II, most agricultural prices shot above parity levels, but the recollection of the days of the unsalable surpluses has remained so acute that Senator Arthur Capper, chairman of the Senate Committee on Agriculture of the Eightieth Congress, indicated in an interview that controls and support would be necessary as soon as world conditions returned to normal.² The resolutions of the farm organizations now often refer to parity as a "right" of agriculture and seek price floors equal to 110 per cent of parity, but the groups are beginning to express discontent at the administration of the necessary controls and subsidies by government. They would like to have them managed by, as well as for, the farmers.

Aids to Agriculture. A second group of objectives are those associated with various sorts of aids to agriculture, such as agricultural education and research, crop insurance, rural electrification, reclamation, road and highway building, weather reporting, and uniform laws affecting standards and grades for agricultural products. A third group are those related to money and credit for farmers. These demands, as has been noted, are of long standing. The farmers have, in general, approved of easy-money policies. In addition, they have obtained state farm mortgage laws to make foreclosures difficult, federal crop loans, and the establishment of the Federal Farm Loan Banks.

¹ Blaisdell, *op. cit.*, pp. 39-75.

² *New York Times*, December 16, 1946.

Sale of Products and Taxation. A fourth group of objectives relates to the mechanisms for the sale and distribution of farm products. The farm groups have sought and obtained the regulation of freight rates, stockyards, warehouses, commission merchants, exchanges and boards of trade. They tend to think of the buying and selling of farm products on the exchanges as mere gambling, to judge from their resolutions. A fifth group of objectives concerns taxation. In general, farm groups favor state laws to impose ceilings on tax rates on real estate. They prefer income to sales taxes. In fourteen states they have obtained tax exemptions of one sort and another on small farms, on the first several thousands of dollars of the value of all farms, and on homesteads — farms operated by the owners. They have obtained in most states preferential rates on the taxation and licensing of farm trucks. They want preferential tax rates or no taxes on the gasoline used in farm tractors.

The taxation of oleomargarine is the reverse of the other tax objectives of the farm groups. Instead of their seeking lower taxes, the objective in this instance is punitive taxation. McCune has summarized the results of years of lobbying by farm, and especially dairy groups, before Congress and the state legislatures:

All states except Arizona have enacted some type of law regulating margarine. . . . Idaho and Utah not only prohibit the sale of yellow margarine but tax it ten cents per pound. Twenty states ban margarine from use in state institutions, although a few of these allow their convicts to eat it. Twenty-three states have excise taxes ranging from five cents on uncolored to fifteen cents on colored margarine. Sixteen states require licenses to manufacture, sell, or serve the maligned product, with fees ranging from \$1 to \$1000. Wisconsin goes so far as to hunt down consumers who buy margarine from out of the state and taxes them \$1 a year. . . . It is the only food product discriminated against by Federal tax. . . .¹

Protective Tariffs. With the same single-mindedness, farm groups have consistently supported tariffs on agricultural products. "Give the American farmer," says the Grange, "the American market to the limit of his ability to supply it."² Within the Farm Bloc there has been a sugar bloc which has worked with the refiners to pass legislation limiting "off-shore"

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 105-106. New Jersey and a number of other states repealed their taxes on colored oleomargarine in 1948.

² 1940 *Yearbook*, p. 950.

(Cuban, Hawaiian, and so on) sugar sales in the United States. The United States Beet Sugar Association is the leading pressure group. The sugar interests strove for years to obtain independence for the Philippines. The Costigan Act and the Sugar Act of 1947 are other examples of their victories. Henry Wallace, when he was Secretary of Agriculture, estimated that the American people pay \$350,000,000 more for their sugar each year than they would have to pay if there were no tariff and no subsidy. Sugar sales in the United States are so important to the economy of Cuba that the Cuban Sugar Stabilization Institute maintains a lobbyist in Washington.

Most of the farm groups have had grave misgivings about the reciprocal trade agreements program. The Grange says that "It is wrong in principle and violates the Constitution."¹ The wool-growers are particularly apprehensive about any agreement with Australia. The farm groups allege that the whole scheme is intended "to sell American agriculture down the river" in order to assist the manufacturers of exportable machinery. Future renewals of the act permitting the President to negotiate agreements may be expected to meet increasing opposition from the Farm Bloc and farmers' organizations.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL ADVANTAGES OF AGRICULTURE

Of all interests active in American politics, agriculture is most favored by the Constitution, as Jefferson no doubt would have thought proper. Since each state is entitled to as many electoral votes as it has senators and representatives, and since each state, no matter how sparsely populated, is entitled to one representative, the farm states have in practice a veto on any candidate for President. In 1948 approximately 131,000 votes were cast per presidential elector in New York as against 33,600 in Wyoming. In other words, an individual voter in Wyoming has about four times the voice at electing a President as a voter in New York. The disparity is still greater between New York and Nevada. In that same election, 6,177,337 votes were cast in New York for forty-seven electors, whereas only 3,459,253 votes elected forty-eight electors from the ten farm states of Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. The sectional distribution of the two parties is such that it is very difficult for either to win without carrying some of the farm states. The sectional position of

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 951.

the Republican Party, already discussed, leaves it particularly exposed to agrarian pressures, and Governor Dewey's failure to carry enough farm states in 1948 contributed to his defeat.

THE FARM BLOC

The framers of the Constitution gave farm interests a virtual veto in the national Congress when they provided that each state, no matter what its population, should have two senators. Although the farm population grows smaller both absolutely and relatively with each generation, the agricultural areas maintain their advantageous position in the Senate. Indeed, their over-representation becomes steadily greater as the United States becomes more and more urban. The ten farm states mentioned above, which cast a little more than half as many votes as New York, nevertheless have twenty senators. The famous Farm Bloc was therefore always led by senators, and Senator Capper complained that the House members of the bloc could never be as effectively organized as the senators.¹

The formation of the Farm Bloc showed in one example the constitutional advantages of agriculture, the operations of a pressure group, and the behavior of parties with respect to a group interest. Senator Capper, one of the original members, was present at its birth and thus described the origin of the bloc:

The agricultural group, later named the "Bloc" by popular writers, was formed at a meeting called by Senator Kenyon, May 9, 1921, held at the Washington office of the American Farm Bureau Federation, at which twelve Senators met to decide on a program for immediate attention. It included an equal number of representatives of the two leading political parties, principally Senators from the Middle West and South, our great agricultural sections, where the situation was most acute. Those present were Senators W. S. Kenyon, of Iowa; Arthur Capper, of Kansas; G. W. Norris, of Nebraska; F. R. Gooding, of Idaho; E. F. Ladd, of North Dakota; Robert M. La Follette, of Wisconsin; E. D. Smith, of South Carolina; J. B. Kendrick, of Wyoming; Duncan U. Fletcher, of Florida; Joseph E. Ransdell, of Louisiana; J. T. Heflin, of Alabama; and Morris Sheppard, of Texas.

At this meeting there were also present representatives of government departments, asked in to act as advisers on the program that should be adopted. There were representatives of the farmers who were asked to

¹ Arthur Capper, *The Agricultural Bloc*, Harcourt, Brace, and Company (1922), p. 12.

tell what farmers felt was [*sic*] their outstanding needs. The declaration of purpose by Senator Kenyon, of Iowa, was that this group give thorough and earnest consideration to the outstanding proposals to the end of securing action by Congress.¹

Thus the bloc not only cut across party lines in the Senate, but it included as well representatives of the administration and the farmers' pressure groups. It took in men of conservative, progressive, and even radical sentiments, but united on one aim, to improve the economic position of agriculture. Senator Kenyon and later Senator Capper were the leaders of the bloc when the Republicans had a majority in the Senate; Senator Ellison D. ("Cotton Ed") Smith became leader when the Democrats won. With the group in possession of more than a score of sure votes in the Senate and as many more that they could pick up on occasion, the passage of farm legislation was made the price for the passage of any legislation. As Senator Capper said, "the Bloc had organized for action and not merely for agitation." But when the members needed outside pressures put upon their colleagues they "were in constant touch with the representatives of farm organizations located in Washington," whom Capper mentioned by name.² These leaders of the farm groups had such influence within the Farm Bloc that Congress could not even adjourn without their consent. On one occasion, according to the historian of the Farm Bureau, "Senator Kenyon sent for Gray Silver [Washington representative of the AFBF] and after consultation with Mr. Howard [then president of the AFBF] they agreed that if six of the pending twelve bills of particular interest to agriculture were enacted, they would consent to adjournment."³

The Farm Bloc had been in existence for less than a year when Capper published his book about it, but he was able even then to point to an impressive list of victories. Typical accomplishments were the agricultural schedules in the Emergency Tariff Act, a reduction in farm loan interest rates, the Futures Trading Act, the Packer Control Act, the Co-operative Marketing (Capper-Volstead) Act, and an amendment to the Federal Reserve Act to include a representative of agriculture on the Federal

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 9-10. Later, says Capper, twelve more senators officially joined the bloc, making twenty-four in all. Included among them were important party leaders in each party, such as Republican Senator Charles L. McNary of Oregon and Democratic Senator Pat Harrison of Mississippi. The membership changed, of course, with elections.

² *Ibid.*, p. 147.

³ Kile, *op. cit.*, p. 102.

Reserve Board.¹ The further objectives of the bloc as Capper outlined them have long since been attained. Although it no longer has formal meetings and a recognized organization, it is just as effective as ever, and is quick, says McCune, "to scent the most remote threat to its supremacy."

ALLIES OF THE FARM GROUPS

Farm organizations have powerful allies in their political and pressure activity. The old animosity of the farmers toward business and industry has died down, in part perhaps because of mutual dislike of labor unions. Business organizations no longer attack plans for a managed agriculture with quite the old vehemence. The United States Chamber of Commerce has an agriculture committee which defends crop restrictions, but the National Association of Manufacturers still stands pat for a completely uncontrolled agriculture: "Not all is well with agriculture," the manufacturers admit, "but it does not follow from this that when the foreign demand returns to more normal proportions, government should step in with artificial supports of one kind or another. Quite the contrary. . . . The wise government policy in connection with agriculture from here on is to give farming its head. . . . The law of supply and demand must be permitted to operate through free, competitive markets."² A business organization with such ideas is not going to make friends among the farm groups. The National Highway Users Conference, which has state associations as well, is an alliance of automobile manufacturers, oil, rubber, and cement interests, and farm groups to promote the building and improving of roads, to oppose increases in taxes on gasoline and motor vehicles, and to resist diversions of such tax moneys from road purposes.

There is no important organized opposition to the farm groups, at least none comparable to the opposition of organized business to organized labor. Taxpayers' associations complain about the costs of farm legislation, but their protests go unheeded. There is no urban block in Congress to offset the Farm Bloc; indeed, it would seem to be very difficult to organize an effective one in the Senate because of the constitutional over-representation of rural areas. There are farm blocs in state politics, and farm areas are also over-represented in state legislatures, but again there are no urban blocs to offset them. City politicians like Plunkitt of Tammany

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 159.

² Pamphlet, "Present Economic Conditions," published by the National Association of Manufacturers, December, 1946, p. 17.

Hall may complain that "New York is pie for the hayseeds," but they do not or cannot unite against agriculture as the farm groups unite for their interest. Predictions in politics are always hazardous, but it does seem probable that agricultural interests over the next few years will get most of what they want. Neither party can stand against them.

Labor in Politics

Labor has always been in politics.

It is difficult to conceive of any functioning labor organization which does not take part in politics. For the leaders of labor politics was, and is, the other side of the trade-union coin.

Every labor organization is, in principle, dedicated to the protection of the rights of its members and to the improvement of their conditions. If these objectives are to be attained, labor must ask for legislation of many kinds. Whether a union succeeds or fails in getting its demands depends entirely upon whether legislators are for labor or against labor.¹

The use of the word *always* in the first sentence of the passage above is too sweeping, particularly if it applies to organized labor in politics, for the organization of labor is primarily a development of the nineteenth century.² The remainder of the statement, however, is defensible.

EARLY LABOR UNIONS AND PARTIES

The earliest labor unions in the United States were formed in 1790. The first labor party, the Working Men's Party, appeared in 1828. It was based upon the early unions, but the panic of 1837 was disastrous both to the unions and to their party. There was some revival of union activity in the forties, but the long depression that began in 1857 and lasted until the outbreak of the Civil War was so severe that few unions were able to survive it. After the war, unions were formed again, notably the Knights

¹ Joseph Gaer, *The First Round: The Story of the CIO Political Action Committee* (Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1944), p. 49. Italics in the original.

² J. B. S. Hardman, *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 8, p. 706.

of St. Crispin, "a progenitor of the modern industrial union," which had at its peak 50,000 members.¹ An attempt was made to federate local unions into the National Labor Union, which lasted from 1866 to 1872, but which disbanded after an unsuccessful attempt to form another labor party called the National Labor and Reform Party. Meanwhile the Knights of Labor was formed in 1869. Like the present-day British Labour Party, it took in not only union members but farmers and professional people as well. The organization rose to 700,000 members by 1886, but the railroad strikes of the late eighties came as a disastrous defeat, and it was virtually extinct by 1900.²

CONTEMPORARY UNIONS

THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR

Highly skilled workmen disliked the loose organization and general membership of the Knights of Labor and formed their own craft unions, which in 1881 joined in the Federation of Organized Trades and Labor Unions, renamed in 1886 the American Federation of Labor.³ The first president of this organization was Samuel Gompers, who was annually re-elected, except for one year, until his death in 1924. His long leadership both impressed his ideas upon the Federation and trained the leaders who were to follow him, notably William Green. It was Gompers's long-standing policy not to permit the AFL to affiliate itself with any political party, not even to the extent of endorsing a party. He departed from this policy only in 1924, when the Executive Council endorsed the La Follette Progressive Party. The usual policy was to endorse candidates, to "reward labor's friends and punish its enemies."

¹ Florence Peterson, *American Labor Unions* (1945), p. 3. This book, written by the former Director of the Industrial Relations Division of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, is an analysis of contemporary labor movements in the United States; her *Handbook of Labor Unions* (1944) is a convenient reference book of data on labor unions. The standard history is John R. Commons and associates, *History of Labor in the United States* (4 vols., 1920-1935). For bibliographies see H. D. Lasswell, R. D. Casey, and B. L. Smith, *Propaganda and Promotional Activities* (1935), pp. 104-109, and B. L. Smith, H. D. Lasswell, and R. D. Casey, *Propaganda, Communication and Public Opinion* (1946), pp. 203-209.

² For its history see Terence V. Powderly, *The Path I Trod* (1940). Powderly was the Grand Master of the Knights of Labor.

³ Lewis L. Lorwin, *The American Federation of Labor* (1933), pp. 21-23.

THE CIO

Although the AFL had long had in its organization various vertical or industrial unions, it was always dominated by the craft unions, especially by the building-trades unions. During the early 1930's, John L. Lewis, president of the United Mine Workers, led a movement within the Federation to organize the mass-production industries. A favorable resolution was adopted at the 1934 convention, but when the high command of the AFL seemed reluctant, Lewis in 1935 led his union and seven others to set up the Committee for Industrial Organization. For this "dual unionism" they were suspended in 1936 from the AFL. The name was changed in 1938 to the Congress of Industrial Organizations. Although later Lewis broke with the CIO and took his United Mine Workers back to the AFL, the schism has not yet been healed, in spite of many overtures on both sides. Conflicts of jurisdiction, among other difficulties, have so far stood in the way.

There have been a variety of labor and farmer-labor parties in the United States over the last half century.¹ None of them, however, has presented any serious threat to the major parties, since none has permanently shaken the attachment of the members of organized labor to the old parties. Out of the whole group, the two minor parties that obtained the largest number of votes were the La Follette Progressive Party of 1924 and the Farmer-Labor Party of Minnesota, which existed from 1919 to 1922.

POTENTIAL POLITICAL STRENGTH

Although the AFL, with 7,600,000 members and the CIO with 6,000,000, are the giants of organized labor, there are various independent unions, notably the four railroad brotherhoods. Union membership tends to rise in times of prosperity and when public policies encourage unionization, and it tends to fall in times of depression. It also varies from time to time with organizing drives. Total membership is currently about 15,000,000, a marked increase from the low point of 1933, when all unions had less than 3,000,000.² In terms of numbers of members and of potential votes,

¹ See Nathan Fine, *Labor and Farmer Parties in the United States, 1828-1928* (1928); F. G. Haynes, *Third Party Movements Since the Civil War* (1916); K. C. MacKay, *The Progressive Movement of 1924* (1947); and Stuart Rice, *Farmers and Workers in American Politics* (1924).

² Peterson, *American Labor Unions*, p. 56.

organized labor is among the biggest group interests active in American politics. Labor leaders claim that their unions can influence — they do not say control — 25,000,000 votes. The potential strength of labor is much greater. Only about one third of the wage-earners in the United States are members of unions. If the whole fifty millions of the estimated eligibles should ever be organized into politically conscious unions, the effect upon American politics would be overwhelming.

STRUCTURE OF LABOR ORGANIZATIONS

Both the AFL and the CIO are federations, and both are organized in much the same way. At the bottom of the pyramid is the local — generally a craft union in the AFL, an industry union in the CIO. These locals are usually federated into city centrals (AFL) or into city industrial union councils (CIO). The city units in turn elect delegates to the state federations (AFL) or to the state industrial union councils (CIO), and the state units elect delegates to the national conventions. But the locals also elect delegates to their own international conventions, and these also send delegates to the national conventions.¹ In addition to the internationals, both the AFL and the CIO charter certain locals which are affiliated directly with the national organizations. These special unions are called, in the case of the AFL, federal labor unions; in the CIO, local industrial councils.²

SIMILARITY TO POLITICAL PARTIES

The constitutions of the unions do not, of course, reveal the dynamics of their internal politics, but these huge organizations are in many ways comparable to political parties. Indeed, the most significant difference is that they do not usually run candidates for public office, as parties do. Their annual conventions adopt platforms of a hundred or more resolutions — the AFL adopted 166 in 1946 — upon the widest variety of national public questions. The state conventions adopt resolutions upon state and local issues. The labor organizations, by and large, are more

¹ The term *international* refers to unions or federations of unions with members in the United States and Canada; in the labor press it is often used to include federations of unions whose charters would enable them to admit locals in Canada.

² For organization charts see Peterson, *op. cit.*, p. 40. For the details of the election of delegates see the constitutions, available in pamphlet form (for AFL also in 1946 *Proceedings of the 65th Convention*), and in Peterson, pp. 289–316.

interested in public policy than parties are. Both the AFL and the CIO have their factions, as parties have; it was one of these disputes which took the CIO out of the parent organization. And factionalism, especially as between right and left, extends into the internationals and even down into some city centrals and craft or industrial locals. Deals among these factions sometimes bring together bedfellows as strange as those in any party. A case in point was the alliance between John L. Lewis, a lifelong Republican, and some Communists in the early CIO. To reconcile factions, the AFL has been forced into some unhappy compromises with principle, as parties often are forced to compromise. A notable instance is the formation of the "Jim Crow" locals.¹

Like parties, the unions have their traditions, their heroes, and their martyrs. Samuel Gompers is still the prophet of the AFL, and his words are often quoted in *The American Federationist* and in convention speeches. Gompers is to the AFL what Jefferson is to the Democratic Party or Lincoln to the Republican. John L. Lewis might have made himself a great hero of labor — he is the great hero of the United Mine Workers — except for his opposition to President Franklin Roosevelt in 1940.

Labor organizations also have problems of leadership comparable to those in political parties. The same oligarchical tendency for authority to concentrate and to remain concentrated in a few hands, is observable in both types of organization.² Leaders like Gompers and Green continue in office for many years, surrounded by the coterie of heads of internationals with whom they have come to terms and upon whom they rely for support. This group of leaders in the AFL was called by V. O. Key, Jr., "a cohesive ruling clique." William Green told how he worked his way up:

As I learned the trade of a miner and got on my own I began to learn for myself these miners' problems. . . . I went to union meetings regularly, for it was one of our few opportunities to meet people. I liked to listen to the discussion and now and then ventured to ask a question or to make a suggestion. The president of the union asked me to serve on many committees so that I soon knew everybody in the union. Then the union began electing me to office — secretary, treasurer, and president.³

¹ See Herbert R. Northrup, *Organized Labor and the Negro* (1944), especially pp. 1-16. "The CIO unions," says Northrup, "have, by and large, a consistent record of practicing what they preach in regard to the treatment of Negroes."

² H. L. Childs, *Labor and Capital in National Politics* (1930), p. 256.

³ *Labor and Democracy* (Princeton University Press, 1939), p. 7.

In addition to leaders, there are bosses and machines in labor organizations, some of them every bit as ruthless as any of their political counterparts. "Big Bill" Hutcheson's carpenters, "Dan" Tobin's teamsters and John L. Lewis's miners are examples.¹ Joseph S. Fay and James Bove, now serving long terms in Sing Sing, are the Pendergasts and Hagues of labor. On the other hand, just as parties also attract men and women of the highest ideals, so do unions.

GENERAL OBJECTIVES OF LABOR GROUPS

AFL AND CIO COMPARED

In general, the AFL is more conservative than the CIO, more inclined to rely upon economic pressure and less upon government action. This difference arises from the dominance of the skilled trades in the AFL, whereas the CIO has been based upon the semi-skilled and unskilled. As one writer says,

Predominantly, the AFL seeks to keep the trade union movement detached from politics and fears "too much government" both in industry and in unions. The CIO inclines to think that more government control in economic affairs is inevitable and that organized labor therefore should increase its political influence and participation in government; some of its unions have gone so far as to advocate tripartite (management, labor, government) industry councils, co-ordinated by a national planning board.

Since practical rather than theoretical considerations are the controlling factors with any labor organization, AFL as well as CIO unions may welcome government control in particular circumstances when such intervention will benefit their members.²

The general negativism of the AFL was shown in its long opposition to unemployment insurance, an opposition that lasted until 1932. But it

¹ For an interesting analysis of John L. Lewis see James A. Wechsler, *Labor Baron — A Portrait of John L. Lewis* (1944). Wechsler says that Lewis was not a product of rank-and-file support but of a political machine within the union. He quotes Huey Long as saying, "Lewis is the Huey Long of labor, that's what he is" (p. 258).

² Peterson, *op. cit.*, p. 38. Cf. William Green, *op. cit.*, p. 53, "Unions are not inflexible in their policies [toward government intervention]. As economic and social conditions change they change their views on the proper methods of meeting the situations. The Fair Labor Standards Act met the issue raised by the unions, fixing only the minimum standards by governmental regulation leaving unions free to negotiate higher standards in union contracts . . . to explore new possibilities."

welcomed section 7-a of the National Industrial Recovery Act and later the Wagner Act. To judge from recent resolutions, the general attitudes of AFL and CIO are coming closer together, toward positivism. The specific objectives of the two groups will be discussed below.

The chief political interest of the railroad brotherhoods has been in government actions affecting their own industry. The Adamson eight-hour law of 1916 and the Railway Labor Act of 1926 are two of their victories. Aside from such legislation their attitudes are much like those of the AFL. They have, in fact, joined with trade and business groups to oppose the St. Lawrence waterways.

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

An examination of the resolutions adopted by labor conventions will show that they run into the hundreds and range over a wide variety of topics from agriculture to wages. They may, however, be classified according to four groups of major objectives. Above and beyond all other objectives in the estimation of labor are those relating to collective bargaining. It was because the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 touched this primary interest that organized labor reacted so violently against it, denouncing it as a "slave-labor" bill and as a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment.

Labor organizations seek positive legislative guarantees of collective bargaining, such as those contained in the NIRA, the Wagner Act, and in a few state laws and constitutions. They seek permission to organize, and in order to carry out their organizing they desire permission to strike, picket, and boycott without such limitations as are contained in statutes prohibiting jurisdictional strikes, mass picketing, or secondary boycotts. The closed shop (required membership in a union before employment) is the ultimate objective of collective bargaining, for under closed-shop conditions the maximum bargaining power is obviously in the hands of the union. In banning the closed shop the Taft-Hartley Act struck at this ultimate objective. Labor also seeks positive legislation to forbid certain business practices which interfere with or limit the power of labor to bargain, such as the blacklist, exclusive company stores, the payment of wages in scrip, the use of private police, and yellow-dog contracts.¹

¹ Peterson, *op. cit.*, p. 275, defines a yellow-dog contract as "a document which many employers formerly compelled their employees to sign as a condition of employment wherein the employee promised that he would not join a labor union or otherwise participate in concerted action."

Naturally, organized labor is opposed to any legislation that weakens their bargaining position. For generations unions had attempted to obtain legislation which would limit the power of the courts to issue injunctions in labor disputes, and beyond doubt some injunctions issued were unfair and inequitable, such as those which forbade unions to spend their own funds to buy food for strikers or restrained miners from singing hymns in chapels they owned. The effect if not the form of some injunctions was to suspend the civil rights guaranteed by the First Amendment.¹ The passage of the Norris-La Guardia Act in 1932 which sharply limited the power of federal judges to issue injunctions and to punish for contempt in labor disputes was regarded as a great victory for labor. It was hailed (as the Clayton Act had been before it) as "Labor's Magna Carta." State federations obtained twenty-four similar laws imposing like restrictions upon the state judges. Labor was deeply aroused, therefore, when the Taft-Hartley Act in general effect weakened and in part repealed the provisions of the Norris-La Guardia Act.

In state politics labor organizations have long opposed state police systems, because they have had unhappy experience with the use of state police in labor disputes. When legislators friendly to labor cannot prevent the passage of laws establishing state police systems, they often attempt to attach amendments limiting the number of policemen who may be employed or restricting their operations to rural districts. Labor is also steadfastly opposed to laws establishing compulsory arbitration, such as the Kansas scheme that was held to be unconstitutional. Incidentally, business also is unenthusiastic about compulsory arbitration. Since 1940 a series of state laws and constitutional amendments have been passed over the opposition of labor which in various ways all limit organizing and bargaining. Examples are those which guarantee the open shop, or require labor organizers or officers to be citizens and residents of the state or to take out annual permits.²

SPECIAL LABOR GROUPS

The AFL long maintained that organized labor, if guaranteed the right to bargain collectively and if protected from coercion, could look after its

¹ Samuel Gompers wrote an interesting chapter entitled "Injunctions I Have Encountered" in his autobiography, *Seventy Years of Life and Labor* (1925), vol. 2, pp. 194-223.

² See *The Book of the States* (1948), p. 443, and Charles C. Killingsworth, *State Labor Relations Acts* (1948).

own interests without the intercession of government. Yet even that organization always recognized that there were special classes of labor that required the protection of government. Some of them, such as children, could not be organized, and from its earliest days the Federation favored legislation to prohibit child labor. It was active in obtaining the passage of the two acts of Congress of 1916 and 1919 which were declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.¹ Because women were difficult to organize, the AFL always favored legislation to protect women workers, such as laws regulating night work for women, forbidding their employment in mines and quarries, or setting up minimum wages and maximum hours. Anti-sweatshop legislation is perhaps in the same class. The workers injured in industrial accidents or contracting industrial diseases are likewise unable to benefit from organization. To provide for them labor has long sought, and now has generally obtained, workmen's compensation acts which pass back upon the employer part of the burden of care for the injured. Constantly, in every state legislature, labor organizations seek to broaden and extend the provisions of the statutes, making more types of illnesses and accidents compensable and providing that administrative officers, not courts, shall award the compensations.

GENERAL LABOR OBJECTIVES

Other things being equal, labor organizations will no more go out of their way to seek legislation to benefit non-members than other human associations will. But when the protections for the organized and the unorganized are inseparable, union labor will support the proposals. Mine and industrial safety laws, for example, benefit all labor; so does social security and maximum hour, minimum wage legislation. The AFL, a late convert, has, on the whole, less enthusiasm than the CIO for such statutes. The CIO leads, the AFL follows, in the campaign to broaden and extend social security.

The establishment of the Department of Labor in 1913 came as a result of long-continued pressure and many resolutions by the AFL. And just as organized industry wants a businessman as Secretary of Commerce, so organized labor seeks to have every President appoint a *bona-fide* labor man as Secretary of Labor. While this appointment has always been a difficult one for a President to make, since the great schism of 1935 it has become virtually impossible for the President to satisfy all of or-

¹ Mollie R. Carroll, *Labor and Politics* (1923), pp. 82-84.

ganized labor, because if he appoints an AFL man, the CIO will be indignant, and *vice versa*. Governors of states who appoint commissioners of labor are in similar dilemmas. There is no antagonism between the two federations, however, when they seek more powers and appropriations for departments of labor, both state and national.

Both the great organizations want full employment. To judge from their publicity, the AFL has a general feeling that an approach to full employment will be reached if government will only permit labor to organize and by its organization to bring wages up. The resulting high purchasing power, the federation seems to believe, will itself pretty much solve the problem. But the CIO, while fully agreed on the desirability of organization, would go further and have the government guarantee full employment by means of a general program of public housing, public works, government operation of government-owned plants, and so on. The CIO also aims at the guaranteed annual wage, although apparently its opinion is not fully crystallized as to methods of implementing it. Perhaps it would favor the use of tax rebates or offsets for losses to companies that enter into annual wage agreements.¹

In seeking statutes that will benefit all labor, the labor organizations sometimes behave much like trade groups; they want to reduce the supply of labor and to extend the demand for labor. The AFL, for instance, was long interested in the restriction of immigration, first by the imposition of a literacy test, and then by the use of quotas.² Similar objectives are the state and national laws to prevent the employment of prison labor on public works and to prohibit the sale or shipment in interstate commerce of prison-made goods.

GENERAL PUBLIC POLICIES

Many of the resolutions adopted at the annual labor conventions bear upon broad public policies which affect not merely labor but all citizens. Among these objectives are opposition to monopolies and to consumers' taxes, especially the retail sales tax. Labor has also long been very suspicious of compulsory military training; large standing armies are regarded as a menace to labor. The AFL in its 1947 convention would not reverse its historic stand, but it did approve "adequate military prepared-

¹ CIO pamphlet, "Guaranteed Wages the Year Round" (n.d.), p. 14.

² Gompers tells of his part in the campaign, and of the opposition he encountered, in his autobiography, *op. cit.*, pp. 151-173.

ness." Both the big organizations annually pass resolutions on foreign policy, especially expressing disapproval of communism and fascism.

Also, both large federations seek measures to promote public housing, though here again the CIO would favor more drastic steps than the AFL. Both seek more public funds for education and for teachers' salaries, but they tend to blame teachers for their own plight, because they have not, in large numbers, joined teachers' unions affiliated with labor. The state education associations federated in the National Education Association are regarded with great contempt by labor, as "company unions." Both AFL and CIO favor federal aid for education, but the CIO, or at least some of its officers, would have the aid extended to Catholic parochial schools. Such an attitude comes close to opposing federal aid, because a bill to grant funds to Catholic schools will probably be a long time getting the votes of southern and western congressmen and senators.

After a careful examination of the attitudes of labor toward government, Thomas P. Jenkin summarized them thus:

It may be noted that the methods of labor have traditionally been collectivistic. The principle of unionization is essentially collectivistic. As militant groups organized labor is in a position to understand this approach to social problems. However, the unities envisioned are not governmental. . . . Labor wants an application of equalitarian principles to the economy of the nation, and it wants the blessing of government in making the application; but it demands that the actual responsibility and power for securing these objectives be in private, not public, hands. . . . This permits private enterprise by social-minded industry and business.¹

POLITICAL TACTICS AND STRATEGY

There is perhaps no better illustration of the effect of constitutional forms and political traditions upon the strategies of an interest group than is to be found in the political behavior of organized labor. In England very similar objectives produced a powerful Labour Party which was able to translate the aims of labor into law. In the United States at the same time, and while unions had the largest number of members in their history, labor was unable to stop a bill, the Taft-Hartley Act, which it regarded as extremely inimical to the interests of labor. It is not that American labor

¹ *Reactions of Major Groups to Positive Government in the United States, 1930-1940* (University of California Press, 1945), p. 395.

has been politically unrealistic; its relative weakness in view of its large membership results in part from its constitutional and political position.¹

THE CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION OF LABOR

Paul H. Douglas put federalism first among the constitutional and political difficulties before labor: "The labor . . . movement must fight on no less than forty-eight separate fronts instead of upon only one as is the case in all of the countries of Europe with the exception of Switzerland."² Since the voting strength of labor is concentrated in cities, and since the size and make-up of state populations are ignored in the election of the Senate, labor in that body holds exactly the reverse of the position of agriculture. Regardless of its national strength, organized labor cannot hope to carry such states as Vermont, Iowa, the Dakotas, and Nebraska. Yet each one of these states, perhaps with fewer voters than are employed by General Motors, United States Steel, or Du Pont, has its two senators. Moreover, the constitutional requirement that each state shall have at least one representative loads the House of Representatives against labor, although not to the same extent: it would be possible for labor to win the House. The necessity of operating state by state drives labor, said Douglas, to use widely differing tactics and to contract differing alliances; it makes unified policy "virtually impossible to obtain."

Labor has long recognized that the separation of powers in the Constitution works to its disadvantage. Its experience with courts, particularly in their uses of the injunction, has led labor leaders to urge the election of judges and the recall of judicial decisions.

Because of the great powers in the office of the President — his control over the army, his veto, his appointment of the Secretary of Labor, for instance — labor leaders are conscious of the great stake their organizations have in the selection of the President. But the operation of the electoral college prevents them from bringing their maximum strength to bear upon the election of the President. To win a majority in the electoral college, major parties must find candidates who can carry some, at least, of the agricultural states. The situation means that at best labor must usually take an unknown or a compromise candidate. On the other hand,

¹ A CIO pamphlet, "Political Primer for All Americans" (n.d.), is highly realistic. It begins, "Politics is the science of how who gets what, when, and why. Politics exists in every civic group, church, labor union, family. The key man is always a politician. He keeps things going, wheels turning."

² *The Coming of a New Party* (1932), p. 130.

the election of the President by popular vote might well much enhance the political influence of labor, because then the voting strength of labor would count wherever that strength might lie.

THE GOMPERS POLICY

During his long leadership of the labor movement, Samuel Gompers proceeded empirically rather than according to any theory of constitutional forces. He observed the failure of labor parties: "Independent labor parties were organized," he said, "lasted a short time — a few years at the most — then disappeared to be replaced by others."¹ While he probably did not see the constitutional causes of this phenomenon, he nevertheless proved to the satisfaction of labor that its best hope of success lay in throwing its strength toward one or another of the existing parties, picking out individual candidates, whether Democratic, Progressive, or Republican, and trying to elect those who were friendly to the aims of labor and to defeat those who were unfriendly.

The AFL still follows the Gompers policy. So does the CIO. The Political Action Committee of the CIO announced in 1940 that it was not connected with any party and would "support any candidate of either party if he is in accord with the PAC objectives." The historian of the PAC also stated the same policy negatively: "The people knew that between the Republican Hamilton Fish and the Democrat Martin Dies there was little difference."²

Gompers also saw that sectionalism, especially the adherence of the South to the Democratic Party, made the prospect of an effective labor party dismal. He noted the traditional adherence, even of wage-earners, to one party or the other, sometimes in spite of their economic interests. These factors reinforced his determination to advance the cause of labor by the use of pressure rather than party methods.

VOTING IN PRIMARIES

These methods, for maximum effectiveness, had to include the invasion of the two party primaries; otherwise, as Gaer wrote, labor was "often confronted with the choice of electing the anti-labor Republican Tweedle-

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 268.

² Gaer, *op. cit.*, p. 56. The two congressmen, the first from New York and the second from Texas, both had voting records which the PAC regarded as anti-labor.

dum who ran against the anti-labor Democratic Tweedledee." The PAC therefore made great efforts to ascertain the labor views or records of candidates before they were nominated, and to get its members registered and to induce them to vote for labor candidates in both party primaries. This method was not very successful, however, especially in the Republican Party, because labor leaders were not always able to arouse the necessary interest in their own people. Organized labor, said Gaer, needs more political education.

POLITICAL COMMITTEES

In order to get union members to register, to take part in primaries, and to vote in general elections, labor organizations have found it expedient to organize a variety of committees. Among these have been the Conference for Progressive Political Action of 1922, the National Non-Partisan Political Campaign Committee (AFL) of 1924, the Good Neighbor League of 1932, and Labor's Non-Partisan League of 1936. Most notable among them is the Political Action Committee of the CIO, organized in 1943, which has operated in every election since, although most such *ad hoc* committees last for one election only. For the election of 1948 the AFL established a new group called Labor's Educational and Political League, and the Federation at its national convention amended its constitution to enable the executive council to levy a special assessment on union members in order to raise a million dollars for the work of the new League. Apparently this amount was not collected, however, because George Meany, the secretary of the organization, reported receiving \$319,000 in voluntary contributions during the 1948 campaign. But at a meeting of AFL leaders in Cincinnati after the election it was voted to continue the League, to seek to raise \$700,000 for its "educational" purposes, and to encourage it to establish a "political trade union steward" to work in every precinct in the United States.¹ Early in 1949 the League went still further and announced that it had "virtually decided" to augment the generally low salaries of state legislators induced to run or endorsed by labor when such lawmakers possessed insufficient funds of their own for their living expenses. This scheme was a leaf taken from the book of British labor unions, which for many years thus subsidized Labour members of Parliament, but the League announced that there was an American precedent in Wisconsin, where for nearly thirty years the state federation

¹ *New York Times*, November 18, 1948.

of labor had made regular monthly payments to some labor-sponsored legislators.¹ This ambitious League also proposes to pay the poll taxes for pro-labor voters in those southern states where this action is legal. These and other plans being formulated by the League could easily cost many millions of dollars a year.

OTHER TACTICS

Over the years labor has developed a variety of tactics for use in politics, some of which are, of course, used by other organizations. The national offices keep the record of how every member of Congress voted on bills of interest to labor, and the state organizations attempt to keep some records on people in state politics. These records are the basis for endorsements or opposition. Labor strives to obtain pro-labor planks in all party platforms, state and national. And while, as Gompers testified, these planks are not always adhered to, they still are convenient for purposes of argument with legislators and executives after the election: it is difficult to ignore them completely. Recently labor has taken to picketing the political meetings of candidates whom it does not like, such as Senator Robert Taft. Another weapon which it has always at hand is the petition. It can provide vast numbers of signatures on petitions to present to party leaders, party conventions, or to public officials.

POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS AND EXPENDITURES

From time to time union funds have been used to further the campaigns of favored political parties or candidates, sometimes by direct contribution and sometimes by expenditures in behalf of parties and candidates. Louise Overacker has calculated that between 1906 and 1925 "the AFL raised about \$95,000 for political purposes," although "in no instances were general funds of the AFL used for political purposes or contributed to the major political parties." This remained the general policy until 1936. "Labor's political contributions were small and sporadic; clearly labor was not interested in paying its political bills."²

But John L. Lewis changed this, as he changed so many other policies. His United Mine Workers spent \$490,000 in 1936, and other unions then in the CIO brought the total to \$770,000. This money was in part con-

¹ *Ibid.*, February 13, 1949.

² Louise Overacker, *Presidential Campaign Funds* (1946), pp. 49-50.

tributed to the Democratic Party and in part expended in its behalf through Labor's Non-Partisan League. In spite of this change in CIO policy, however, the AFL clung to its traditional practice and made no contributions. These actions of Lewis and the CIO signaled the beginning of a protracted legislative battle. When the Smith-Connally Anti-Strike Act was passed in 1943 over President Franklin Roosevelt's veto, it prohibited trade unions from making political contributions. Nothing was said in the act, however, about expenditures so long as the money did not go to parties or candidates directly; so the PAC and its subsidiary, the National Citizens' Political Action Committee, together spent \$1,327,000 in the election of 1944. The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 went further than the earlier measure, however, and prohibited expenditures as well as contributions, so that it became unlawful for "any labor organization to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any election" at which federal officials are chosen. The act also applied to primaries, conventions, and caucuses. Apparently, in prohibiting expenditures the act forbade a labor newspaper's setting forth a candidate's labor record; prohibited a union from paying for leaflets urging its members to vote; and barred a union from buying radio time on which its officials could discuss issues in a congressional election. Labor lawyers quickly asserted that this section of the act violated the First Amendment, and in order to challenge the constitutionality of the provision, labor leaders took part in the first special election that came along, announcing that their expenses were being paid.

The AFL urged a new tactic for 1948, an election-day holiday, during which all union members were to spend the day getting out the vote to defeat the members of Congress who voted for the Taft-Hartley Act and to elect members pledged to its repeal. Business groups were quick to denounce this proposal as a one-day general strike, and apparently the holiday tactic was not widely used. Labor is still learning its way in politics, and future elections will see new tactics.

LABOR PROPAGANDA

Like most interest groups, labor organizations engage in propaganda. Any estimate of their propaganda resources, however, must take into account certain disadvantages that labor has to face. A number of its disunities have already been mentioned, of which the most important is the division of labor into two large camps. There are also nationality

and religious clashes within the ranks of each camp. The jurisdictional disputes between AFL and CIO, and between crafts within the AFL, further weaken the propaganda position of labor as a whole. Even more damaging are cases of gangsterism, featherbedding, and such stand-by disputes as those provoked by James C. Petrillo of the AFL Musicians Union.

Public opinion polls, furthermore, indicate a considerable opposition to the chief objectives and methods of organized labor. Not only does public opinion range from cool to actively hostile, but the rank-and-file membership of labor is itself still unconvinced. Of many examples that might be cited, the following Gallup poll of January 19, 1947, must suffice. The question was asked, "Which of the three types of shop do you prefer — the closed shop, the union shop, the open shop?" Cards with definitions of the three were handed to respondents. The results were:

	<i>Closed</i>	<i>Union</i>	<i>Open</i>	<i>No Opinion</i>
Professional and business...	7%	14%	73%	6%
Farmers.....	3	11	78	8
White-collar workers.....	6	17	69	8
Manual workers.....	11	23	56	10
Union members.....	19	33	41	7

When 48 per cent of union members either favor the open shop or have no opinion, labor leaders have clearly not persuaded their own membership of the values of the long-standing and chief objective of labor unions. In the population as a whole, labor could find little comfort in the results:

Favor closed shop	8%
Favor union shop	18
Favor open shop	66
No opinion	8

Attitude of the Press. Labor leaders would explain this position in public opinion by the bad press that labor gets in the commercial newspapers. There is no doubt that, with few exceptions, most newspapers play up strikes, disputes, violence, and all news unfavorable to labor while they play down or omit entirely news favorable to labor. Mark Starr, educational director of the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, wrote that "Virtue has no gossip value. Hence, workers' education activities carried on by a number of outstanding trade unions, are completely un-

known to those to whom the term 'trade union' brings to mind only strikes and the exceptional union racketeer."¹ Perhaps to the city desk a dispute amicably settled has no news value, any more than the election of a Republican as head of a central labor union would have. But whether intentionally or unintentionally, the general impression built up by newspaper accounts of labor matters is unfavorable to labor.

The Labor Press. To overcome, as far as possible, the effects of the kind of treatment given to labor in the press, various labor organizations publish some five hundred newspapers and magazines, monthlies or weeklies. Most of the publications go to members in return for a part of their dues.² Among the chief of these organs, the official magazine of the AFL, *The American Federationist*, is well known and is sold on newsstands as well as sent to members. *The CIO News*, a weekly newspaper, is the official journal of the CIO. The weekly newspaper *Labor* is the joint publication of the railroad workers' unions. It need hardly be said that the treatment of news in these publications is strongly pro-labor, intensely pro-union, often bitterly anti-business. The particular hate of the labor press, year in and year out, is the National Association of Manufacturers.

CIO Pamphlets. The CIO, its unions, and its PAC have been notably successful at editing and distributing pamphlets to present labor's point of view. The pamphlets are not merely political. They also discuss various matters of interest to labor, such as housing, how to learn to speak in public, and the techniques of collective bargaining. In recent political campaigns the PAC has published a variety of pamphlets.³ Many of these political pamphlets have aroused the admiration of professional publicists.

Defects in Propaganda. A public relations counsel examining the propaganda of labor might say that technically it is too defensive. It is continually apologizing for or defending certain acts of unions or union officials, whereas these acts should, where possible, be prevented, and where they cannot be prevented, no attempt should be made to defend the indefensible. Rather, labor publicity should join in the condemnation. Labor publicists might learn from the propaganda of the National Association of Manufacturers. This group says as little as possible about the abuses in business, such as price-fixing, patent-pooling, or the allocation of

¹ *Saturday Review of Literature*, vol. 28 (September 15, 1945), p. 13.

² Peterson, *op. cit.*, p. 147. The author prints lists of the publications (pp. 153-160).

³ Those used in the 1944 campaign are reproduced in Gaer, *op. cit.* In that campaign the PAC, says Gaer (p. 305), distributed over 85,000,000 copies of their campaign literature.

markets. Instead, it attacks labor, and when it feels that business abuses must be mentioned, it deplores them. Such tactics of offense are often the best defense. The publicity of labor, moreover, is frequently couched in language that only a labor economist could understand. Editors of labor journals might examine with profit the readership surveys which show the vocabulary, education, and range of interests of their public. The writers of the CIO pamphlets, on the other hand, are not subject to this criticism; they reduce their materials to simple terms and use illustrations profusely.

Attitude of Politicians. In spite of its difficulties, organized labor is so important in American politics that its national conventions can obtain as speakers cabinet officers, the army chief of staff, occasionally a President or a Vice-President. State conventions can obtain governors and United States senators. Practical politicians, nevertheless, are far from being terrified by labor. Some will assert privately that there is no such thing as a labor vote except in some highly organized areas, and they will point to the fact that in 1942 and in 1946 labor was unable to "produce." They also call attention to John L. Lewis's failure to take the CIO with him to the support of Willkie in 1940.¹ But an examination of the election returns for the years from 1936 to 1944, and particularly those from industrialized states, will show that at least in recent presidential elections labor can make its voting strength enough felt so that the CIO can announce that from its point of view "a big vote is a good vote." Curiously the small vote of 1948 was also, judged by the interests of labor, a good vote.

Unquestionably labor is becoming more and more politically conscious. "Only through political action can we get full employment," says the CIO.² The results of political action, as in the Wagner Act and in the Taft-Hartley Act, are apparent to all members of unions who read any newspaper. Every indication points to more, rather than to less, political action in the future. When labor has once invoked political action to obtain its ends, or has had political action invoked against it, withdrawal from politics is difficult, even if it should turn out to be desirable.

¹ See Irving Bernstein, "John L. Lewis and the Voting Behavior of the CIO," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 5 (June, 1941), pp. 233-249. Bernstein concludes (p. 245), after a study of the election returns, that "there is little evidence that John L. Lewis' action moved any appreciable number of CIO workers, their families, or their sympathizers to vote for Willkie."

² PAC pamphlet, "The Answer is Full Employment" (n.d.), p. 22.

PRESENT POLITICAL POSITION OF LABOR

Some labor leaders have threatened to start a third party movement, but the success of a third party is always doubtful. The Republican Party has, at least temporarily, outraged labor by the Taft-Hartley Act. The alliance of labor — and it can hardly be called anything less — with the Democratic Party, which began in 1934, still continues. It is, on both sides, an unhappy coalition. Democratic strategists run into constant difficulties when they attempt to hold southern Democratic congressmen in line in order to make good on the party pledges and measures which are necessary to get the northern labor vote; and that vote, in turn, is necessary to elect Democratic Presidents. The behavior of President Truman, who got his political experience in a most practical school, the Pendergast machine, illustrates the party situation. When in 1946 he urged drastic legislation, which passed the House, to break the railroad strike, he was bitterly denounced by labor. A. F. Whitney, president of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, said on May 26, 1946, that President Truman was a political accident, and that Whitney's union would if necessary spend \$2,500,000 to prevent his re-election and to defeat the congressmen who voted for his bill. But a year later, the Taft-Hartley Bill was placed on the President's desk. What had he to gain by signing it? The approval of the southern Democrats, most of whom could be expected to vote for him (or for any Democrat) whether he signed or not. He could not hope by signing to get any support from business. On the other hand, if he vetoed it he could both restore his position with labor and widen the breach between labor and the Republican Party. Whether these considerations were actually in his mind only the memoirs of a decade hence may reveal; at any rate, his veto had these effects. Even A. F. Whitney publicly withdrew his opposition to Truman and pledged his union's support in 1948. The Democratic Party is always uncomfortable in the same bed with labor, but its sectionalism gives it no alternative.

Nor has labor any alternative. Its interests are incompatible with those of the Republicans, and any serious third party movement led by labor could not win and would probably defeat any Democratic candidate for President. The attempt would make it very difficult for labor to obtain any favors from such Democratic congressmen as survived a three-cornered election. Another possibility is for labor, in Al Smith's phrase, to "take a walk." That happened in 1942 and again in 1946, and the result was the Smith-Connally Act in 1943 and the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947,

both of which were passed over vetoes. Little as labor may like the conservative, Jim Crow, poll tax, anti-Catholic, southern Democrats, still it can get nowhere without them: labor needs the Democratic Party as much as the party needs labor, and one of the most curious of political alliances is thus preserved.

Business Interests and Business Groups in Politics

"IN THE ABSENCE of military force," said Charles A. Beard, paraphrasing Daniel Webster, "political power naturally and necessarily goes into the hands which hold the property. . . . Amid recent changes one thing remains certain. People must have food, clothing, and shelter before they can engage in politics or fighting. Whatever the formulas for the ownership and use of property, the state — despotic or democratic — must secure for itself an economic underwriting sufficient to sustain it, or it will in fact wither away, as many states and empires have in the past."¹ Approximately the same views were expressed by James Madison in the famous Number Ten of *The Federalist*, already quoted in this book. Madison thought that "the various and unequal distribution of property" was the "most common and durable" cause of parties. He saw, moreover, that different types of property — "a landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest" — would give their owners different political "sentiments and views," preventing a complete unity of property as a political force.

The influence of property on politics is not to be regarded as "good" or "bad," any more than that of any other interest, whether it be agriculture, labor, or religion. The widest conceivable value judgments may be collected concerning the effects of wealth upon popular government. Such a statement as "wealth, in many ways, is the best friend that democ-

¹ *The Economic Basis of Politics* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1945 edition), pp. 103, 107.

racy has had”¹ may be compared with “Government itself is, for the most part, timid and afraid of what big business will do.”² Whether the objectives or tactics of organized wealth are desirable or undesirable will depend upon the point of view of the observer. A man on relief is likely to have very different views on the public policies advocated and opposed by the National Association of Manufacturers from those of the man who has to pay a half million dollars a year in income tax.

THE POWER OF BUSINESS

Whatever one’s point of view, it is obvious that there has been a steady concentration of wealth in the United States into fewer and fewer hands. The statistical evidence on this matter is now so overwhelming as not to require proof here. The hearings and the report of the Temporary National Economic Committee, 1938–1941, are only the latest of many studies by private groups, economists, and government agencies going back many years and all showing this concentration.³ The tendency toward concentration of business was accelerated by World War II.⁴ In his final statement as chairman of the TNEC, Senator Joseph C. O’Mahoney called attention to many striking examples of the concentration of wealth; for instance:

There are only ten states which have within their borders property valued at more than the assets of either the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company or the American Telephone and Telegraph Company. Stated in another way, each of these two corporations is richer than any one of thirty-eight sovereign states.⁵

The thirty biggest corporations have assets greater than the total assessed valuation on any state. The income from property is similarly con-

¹ W. B. Munro, *The Invisible Government* (1928), p. 134. Munro (pp. 113–135) defends the “money power” in American politics.

² Robert S. Lynd in foreword to Robert A. Brady, *Business as a System of Power* (1943), p. xvii.

³ The materials and findings of the TNEC are summarized in David Lynch, *The Concentration of Economic Power* (1946). See also A. A. Berle and G. C. Means, *The Modern Corporation and Private Property* (1933); Harold G. Moulton, *America’s Capacity to Consume* (1934); National Resources Committee, *Consumer Incomes in the United States* (1938); Edward Chamberlain, *The Theory of Monopolistic Competition* (1938); and Robert A. Brady, *Business as a System of Power* (Columbia University Press, 1943).

⁴ Lynch, *op. cit.*, pp. 4–7, assembles the statistical evidence.

⁵ *Final Report*, p. 677.

centrated: "Fully one half of all corporate stock dividends are received by less than 75,000 persons."¹

Business became big in the United States before government became big. As the giants face each other, it is worth noting that big business concerns show in themselves the characteristics of big governments. For instance, they are bureaucratic:

To say that business enterprise in all major capitalistic countries is bureaucratic is to add nothing new. It is so well accepted in the technical literature as to no longer require proof. Obviously the vast control apparatus and the elaborate organizational machinery of large-scale enterprises, of cartels and trade associations, and of their various peak associations call for functional division of duties, for circumscription of tasks and fixation of special responsibilities, for hierarchies of command and subordination, for special systems of recruitment and training of personnel at different levels of competence.²

All of these are problems with parallels in governments.

Private enterprise, moreover, is now very largely corporate enterprise. By a legal fiction these corporations, created by the states, are given a legal personality — to sue and be sued, to enter into contracts, to own property, and so forth. What the states have given they could, in most cases, take away, and the national government could require a national corporation law; so in a sense corporate business is subordinate to government. On the other hand, business organizations have powers which the States do not have. The states are barred by the Constitution from entering into agreements or compacts with foreign powers. "Yet private organizations, created to carry on the large-scale commerce of modern times, customarily do that which the states themselves cannot do, when they enter into international cartel arrangements with foreign governments or with the corporate agencies of such governments."³

UNITIES AND DISAGREEMENTS

In its relations with government and politics business tends to unite on certain objectives, as will be pointed out below. But business must not be thought of as a completely unified interest, in spite of all the concentration that has taken place. The chain stores compete with the independents, big and little; the railroads compete with the trucking concerns;

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 679.

² Brady, *op. cit.*, p. 298.

³ TNEC, *Final Report*, p. 8.

the insurance companies oppose the sale of life insurance by savings banks, and so on. There is no one association or organization that can claim to speak for all business at all times; business, in fact, "still has great difficulty in finding its collective mind. Some businesses are big; some little. Some are interested in contraction, some in expansion; some in local markets, others in national and international markets. Commodities, businesses, trades compete with each other long after conditions of partial or complete monopoly have been effected in restricted areas. . . . Within this newer business world, as often as elsewhere, what is one man's meat may well be another man's poison."¹

As between the two major parties most businessmen have felt themselves more in sympathy with the Republican Party, especially perhaps since the campaign of 1896 when Bryan and his Populist associates gave business a bad scare.

There were exceptions, of course, especially among manufacturers and financiers whose fortunes depended largely on export and import business and in the South where political attachments were nominally Democratic for special reasons. But on the whole the major manufacturing and financial interests were Republican, with all that signified in terms of protective tariffs, taxation, banking, government promotion of private enterprise, nonintervention in "the natural distribution of wealth," and *laissez faire* in many forms.²

The Theodore Roosevelt heresy of 1912 did not shake this attachment.

In strictly local politics business tends to be nonpartisan and to work with either or both parties. Samuel Insull, for example, contributed to both Republican and Democratic organizations in Chicago, even though he made the greater gifts to the Republican Party. Where businessmen have been state or city bosses, the majority of them have been Republican, from Marcus Hanna of Ohio to Joseph Grundy of Pennsylvania.

PRINCIPAL BUSINESS GROUPS

THE UNITED STATES CHAMBER OF COMMERCE

Business is well represented in Washington. "Of the many organized groups maintaining offices in the capital, there are no interests more fully, more comprehensively, and more efficiently represented than those of

¹ Brady, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

² Beard, *op. cit.*, p. 92.

American industry.”¹ Foremost among these business groups is the United States Chamber of Commerce. It is the biggest in terms of membership and the broadest in terms of the types of business for which it speaks. It publishes a vast variety of leaflets, pamphlets, books, and a widely circulated magazine, *Nation's Business*. It has a handsome Washington headquarters which it calls “The Washington Home of American Business,” facing Lafayette Park across which lie the White House grounds.

FOUNDING AND ORGANIZATION

The Chamber of Commerce was organized in April, 1912, at the suggestion of Charles Nagel, President Taft's Secretary of Commerce and Labor. Secretary Nagel invited about two thousand commercial bodies throughout the country to send delegates to an organization meeting. Some seven hundred complied, and after President Taft and Secretary Nagel addressed them, the Chamber was set up.²

The organization of the Chamber is most complex.³ Primarily it is a federation of some four hundred trade associations and about twelve hundred local chambers of commerce.⁴ About seven thousand individual businessmen and corporations are also members.⁵

The Chamber says of itself that “This organization represents no special segment of business, but rather all forms of American business endeavor, large or small, wherever situated.”⁶ It likes to refer to itself in its publications as “The Washington Headquarters of American Business,” or as “the Washington, D.C., office of over 750,000 business people in America.”

Chamber of Commerce Polls. To carry out its announcement that it represents business, it has conducted among its members nearly a hundred referenda on questions of public policy. Typically, the membership is polled on a score or more questions at once by means of a pamphlet sent out from the Washington office, and the members are asked to write out

¹ E. Pendleton Herring, *Group Representation Before Congress* (1929), p. 78.

² Harwood L. Childs, *Labor and Capital in National Politics* (1930), p. 11.

³ For an organization chart see Childs, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

⁴ C. J. Judkins, *Trade and Professional Associations of the United States*, Department of Commerce, Industrial Series No. 3 (1942), p. 168.

⁵ Donald C. Blaisdell, *Economic Power and Political Pressures*, TNEC Monograph No. 26 (1941), p. 26.

⁶ Pamphlet, *Help Yourself to Better Government* (n.d.), p. 5.

and send in their answers. The questions cover a wide variety of topics from agriculture to urban transportation. A critic of polling methods would say that the phraseology of a majority of them is so leading that the result could be predicted in advance. The following is typical: "The government should refrain from entering any field of business which can successfully be conducted by private enterprise." Yes, 2609; no, 61. Such fields of business would, of course, include the post office, highways, the Panama Canal, atomic energy, and many others. The respondent was not offered a very intelligent choice; he had to take all or nothing.

Again, the wording of the following not only suggests the answer expected but is also couched in vague and emotional language: "Numerous examples of federal invasion of state sovereignty result not only in retardation of normal state enterprise and development, but are a source of continually increasing and wasteful federal expenditures." Yes, 2693; no, 19.¹ Yet defective as these polls are, the officers of most groups do not even go through the motions of consulting their membership before announcing how their organizations stand on various issues of public policy. The results of the referenda are transmitted to Congress, which the Chamber says it knows "like a book," and they are otherwise given the widest possible publicity.

Pressure on Government. To move Congress to its way of thinking, the Chamber apparently relies primarily upon publicity to establish a favorable national public opinion toward business and its objectives. It is not so much interested in the passage or defeat of particular bills as in the development of a particular state of mind. "Within the few years of its existence," said Herring, "the Chamber has come a long way toward realizing this goal."² Blaisdell called the Chamber the press agent of organized business in Washington and said that "as a pipe line for steady, relentless, and timely opinion dissemination the Chamber of Commerce is probably unequaled."³ The president of the Chamber of Commerce becomes automatically with his election a national figure, and his speeches throughout the country are widely reported. One of the most articulate of recent presidents was Eric Johnston, later "czar" of the moving-picture industry.

Although its primary tactic is propaganda, the Chamber does not hesitate at direct lobbying in Congress. "The Department of Governmental Affairs," the Chamber says, "concentrates on Congress. In that body are found most often the beginning and the end of the governmental affairs with which Business is most concerned. Congress is the birthplace

¹ *New York Times*, July 22, 1945.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 81.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 25.

of bills for Business, and may be the last resort against bills against Business. The Department knows Congress. It knows the individual members of the House and Senate . . . and it knows how to translate this wide knowledge into plain speaking and writing. . . ."¹ When an especially important bill is before Congress, the Department of Governmental Affairs "mobilizes" business opinion concerning it. If the bill passes, the Chamber is so powerful that it can demand and receive for its president an audience with the President of the United States to urge him to sign or veto, whichever may be the position of the Chamber. It may not prevail, especially not upon a Democratic President, as William K. Jackson, president in 1946, failed to persuade President Truman to sign the Case Bill, which organized labor opposed.² But it can make itself heard at the highest levels of government.

In fulfilling its service function to business, the Chamber seeks by means of leaflets sent out from Washington to keep business concerns informed of pending legislation and administrative decisions that may affect them. It has available at its Washington office a mass of documentary material on business which it makes available to businessmen and to writers on business affairs. Its staff will assist visiting members to facilitate contacts with government, especially with the Department of Commerce.

"The Chamber's policies," it announces for itself, "are humanitarian and liberal in the true sense of these words." The sense in which its policies are humanitarian and liberal is not, however, the usual sense. There is nothing philanthropic in its platform; on the contrary, the Chamber long opposed social security legislation and public housing, and it wants unemployment relief left to the states. Its liberalism is primarily *laissez faire*: it is opposed to federal licensing of corporations, to the St. Lawrence waterway project, and to similar regional authorities, unless the power is developed by private companies. But curiously it favors the Robinson-Patman Act and its state counterparts, usually called retail price maintenance or price-fixing laws, which by preventing price competition surely limit private enterprise. In spite of its professions of liberalism and humanitarianism, the Chamber is generally very conservative in its policies. More of its attitudes will be discussed below.

¹ Pamphlet, *Help Yourself to Better Government*, p. 25.

² For an account of the interview showing the types of arguments advanced see *New York Times*, June 4, 1946.

THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS

The National Association of Manufacturers states that it was organized as a result of the depression of 1893. Its organization meeting in 1895 was addressed by William McKinley, then governor of Ohio.¹ In form, it is a nonprofit corporation, organized under the laws of New York, with its official headquarters in New York City, though it has, of course, a Washington office. It is not a federation, but an integrated association of some 16,500 corporations. Trade associations and individuals are not admitted to membership.² Unlike the Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers makes no systematic attempt to poll its membership on issues; rather, positions on public questions are taken at conventions, by the 138-member board of directors, or by an executive committee between meetings of the board. The president of the Association is usually a small manufacturer of very conservative views, who serves for one or two years. The presidents of the giant corporations, which by general agreement dominate the Association because their concerns provide the funds by which it operates, do not serve as its president. About 5 per cent of the total membership contribute about half the money; fewer than one hundred corporations have, over the years, had a majority of the members of the board.³ Policy-making rests in the hands of "the executive elements of the Association," that is, in "the full-time secretariat."⁴

Subsidiary Groups. Although the National Association of Manufacturers is not a federation, it seeks to encourage state associations and vertical associations of manufacturers, which are allied with it in the National Industrial Council. One president of the National Association in an annual address thus expressed the organizing objectives of the parent group:

¹ John Scoville and Noel Sargent, *Fact and Fancy in the TNEC Monographs* (1942), p. 388. For an account of its early history see Clarence E. Bonnett, *Employers' Associations in the United States* (1922), pp. 300-302.

² Committee on Campaign Expenditures, 1946, of the House of Representatives, *Report* (December 31, 1946), p. 32. The Association does not publish its membership lists.

³ Brady, *op. cit.*, pp. 211-212. Alfred S. Cleveland has calculated that "from 1933 to 1946, 125 corporations have held 63 per cent of all directorships, 885 executive committee memberships, 79 per cent of finance committee memberships, and 52 per cent of the major executive offices. This group constitutes 0.8 per cent of current membership." For further analysis of the NAM see Cleveland's article, "NAM: Spokesman for Industry?" *Harvard Business Review*, vol. 26 (May, 1948), pp. 353-371.

⁴ Cleveland, *op. cit.*, p. 364.

"Ours was the first and has continued to be the only general organization of manufacturers exclusively embracing all trades, conditions, sections, and sizes of industrial units. We have witnessed and often assisted at the birth of nearly every state association . . . and of many of the special organizations now serving particular trade, geographic, or other homogeneous groups."¹ The National Association, however, disclaims any control over the National Industrial Council; and its leadership in that body "arises out of the fact that the NAM is a source of accurate information with respect to matters of common interest."² This disclaimer is probably too modest.

A similar relationship exists with regard to the National Industrial Conference Board, which claims to be an "independent fact-finding body." Some members and officers of the National Association of Manufacturers "participated in its organization and supported its development," but "the NAM has no influence other than as one of the many organizations which are constituent members."³

The Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers are not rivals, but allies. Among the founders of the Chamber "were delegates from the NAM which for many years was a member of the Chamber."⁴ Since the Chamber has a bigger base and a broader membership, it was only natural that the already organized manufacturers should welcome and assist at its establishment. The two groups do not always see public policies exactly alike, but their differences are minor.

Opposition to Labor. The common impression given by the publicity of the National Association is well summed up in the words of Brady, who has written, "The history of the NAM has shown that, except for certain short intervals, its overshadowing interest has been in labor relations. A common interest in opposing organized labor has served to hold the membership together, to dominate the motives in organizing and perfecting the machinery of the NIC, and to provide a never-failing bond of opposition to liberal-social legislation of the New Deal variety."⁵ The manufacturers would assert, however, that such a statement is not strictly accurate. Their spokesmen say that never throughout its history has the Association "challenged the right of labor either to organize or to bar-

¹ John C. Edgerton, quoted by Brady, *op. cit.*, p. 192. For accounts of state manufacturers' associations in state politics see Dayton D. McKean, *Pressures on the Legislature of New Jersey* (1938), pp. 104-110; and Belle Zeller, *Pressure Politics in New York* (1937), pp. 49-63.

² Scoville and Sargent, *op. cit.*, p. 390.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 391.

⁵ Brady, *op. cit.*, p. 213.

gain collectively.”¹ What it has done is to oppose virtually every objective that organized labor has sought.²

In 1904 the NAM adopted a set of nine labor principles, which came to be called Parryism from the name of the man then president of the Association, David M. Parry. Later presidents have reaffirmed the position of the Association on these principles, and one president went so far as to call them the bible of the NAM. The most important of the doctrines is the open shop: “No person should be refused employment or in any way discriminated against on account of membership or non-membership in any labor organization. . . .” Other doctrines grow out of this; for example, “it is the right of the employer to discharge any employee when he sees fit.” And “employers must be free,” in the determination of wages, from “interference or dictation on the part of individuals or organizations not directly parties to such contracts.”³

Over the years the NAM has opposed the exemption of labor unions from the Anti-Trust Act, the limitations in the Norris-La Guardia Act upon the right of federal courts to issue injunctions in labor disputes, and the eight-hour day for federal employees. It put its opposition to federal child-labor legislation on the high constitutional ground that Congress had no right to regulate manufacturing or production. It asserted similarly that the Wagner Act was unconstitutional and besides was unfair to employers. It favored the Case Bill and the Taft-Hartley Act, which it alleged would redress the balance.⁴ As organized labor has recently come to favor the guaranteed annual wage, the NAM has opposed that; Earl Bunting, president in 1947, said the guaranteed annual wage is impracticable, that it “promises pay for idleness.”⁵

In spite of all its protestations to the contrary, the publicity of the

¹ Scoville and Sargent, *op. cit.*, p. 389.

² “The National Association of Manufacturers is opposed to practically everything that the American Federation of Labor and similar unions advocate, from closed-shop agreements to labor legislation.” — Bonnett, *op. cit.*, p. 305. Bonnett (pp. 303–308) quotes a series of statements by presidents of the NAM to show the attitude of the Association toward labor. The following is a short example: “The National Association of Manufacturers is not fighting labor unionism as such. It is only fighting the vices and follies which have crept into some of the unions through their ignorant, corrupt, and autocratic leaders.”

³ All the principles are reprinted in Blaisdell, *op. cit.*, p. 83, and in Bonnett, *op. cit.*, p. 296.

⁴ Scoville and Sargent, *op. cit.*, pp. 388–400, summarize the views of the Association on labor legislation over fifty years.

⁵ *New York Times, Sunday Magazine* (October 12, 1947), p. 48. This long article is a convenient résumé of the attitudes of the NAM on many current problems.

National Association of Manufacturers makes it appear to oppose labor unions as unions. Its boilerplate sheet, *Industrial Press Service*, which it claims is used by 4750 country newspapers, carries cartoons of labor leaders to make them look like fat political bosses. The columns usually contain some pat quotations which attack labor in a general way, such as, "Free collective bargaining is being replaced by collective demanding." And the prepared editorials have an anti-labor slant. It blamed "wage demands" for the postwar inflation. The publicity also seeks to widen the breach between agriculture and organized labor by reiterating that the farmer has no eight-hour day, no portal-to-portal pay. A recent cartoon showed a farmer looking at his field and saying, "Suppose all us farmers joined a Union and quit raisin' food; we could collective bargain a pretty good contract in just about three days!"¹

Propaganda Methods. The National Association of Manufacturers does not control many popular votes through its 16,500 corporation members. Association publicity sometimes refers to the millions of stockholders in its member concerns, but it may well be doubted if many of these people realize that they are represented, even indirectly, in the NAM. To influence legislation it has to depend primarily upon its propaganda, though where expedient it has engaged in electioneering. One of its presidents testified that "We have endeavored both to elect and to defeat candidates for office. We have tried to elect to Congress men whom we have known to possess the courage of their convictions, and to get under the skin of this industrial question, and who fearlessly opposed the legislation we have been opposing."² More recent testimony would indicate that it has abandoned this tactic and depends upon what it calls the "bank account theory" of public relations, which it states thus: "It necessitates making regular and frequent deposits in the Bank of Public Good-Will so that valid checks can be drawn on this account when it becomes desirable to fight for that which is right or against that which would harm or destroy the Enterprise System."³ Some three or four millions of dollars a year are put into and drawn from this bank of public good-will, according to the Association's reports. It spends about \$75,000 a year for the services of public relations counsel and public opinion research, experts who show the Association whom to draw the checks to. National advertis-

¹ Issue of October 6, 1947.

² *Hearings*, on Senate Resolution 92, Sixty-third Congress, First Session, Part 56, p. 4502.

³ National Association of Manufacturers, *The Public Relations Program of the National Association of Manufacturers* (pamphlet, 1946), p. 5.

ing receives the most money, nearly \$2,000,000; next is \$332,000 for the "Opinion Moulders Program" — that is, "meetings with leaders in the fields of education, religion, women's clubs, agriculture, and veterans. They also involve the production and distribution of four regular periodicals — *Trends*, which goes to 36,500 educators; *Program Notes*, which goes to 40,000 leaders of women's clubs; *Agricultural News Letter*, which goes to 30,000 farm leaders; and *Understanding*, a new periodical for the clergy." Publicity and "literature" together cost nearly half a million dollars. The *Industrial Press Service*, for instance, is charged to publicity; and in the first nine months of 1946 alone, NAM "turned out 816,110 copies of 45 pamphlets, booklets, leaflets, etc.," including teaching aids for schools. A speakers' training program costs \$224,000 a year, and radio \$140,000. The Association has produced six motion pictures, which in nine months were "shown to 4620 audiences comprising an estimated total of 455,000."¹ In any four years the Association will spend more for this all-around publicity than any political party. And the material is technically excellent — very shrewdly and carefully prepared — whereas much party propaganda is crude and poorly adapted to its recipients.

Other attitudes of the NAM will be discussed below. Its objectives, which "have not altered appreciably since the turn of the century," have been summarized by Alfred Cleveland thus:

- (1) reduction of the bargaining power of organized labor, both with respect to employer-employee relations and to indirect governmental sources of union power; (2) minimization of the tax burden on industrial profits and managerial compensation; (3) elimination, modification, and prevention of public regulation or government participation in industrial functions and processes; and (4) encouragement of direct and indirect public aid to industry if not in conflict with the other objectives.²

The NAM will usually be found in opposition. "Throughout the entire period of the 1930's and well into the war years, the Association opposed, never did it lead," wrote Cleveland, and cited a long list of measures which the NAM was against, from the Securities Act to the renewal of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act. When, on rare occasions the NAM has favored legislation, "*Without exception* the measures favored by the NAM provided some sort of aid to business and industry. *Without exception* rigid opposition was maintained against similar assistance to other groups and against all regulatory measures pertaining to industry."³

¹ Figures and quotations from pamphlet cited above.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 356.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 357. Italics in the original.

THE TRADE ASSOCIATIONS

The Department of Commerce estimates that there are about 8000 state and national trade associations in the United States, which have approximately 600,000 total membership. The department defines a trade association as "a voluntary non-profit organization of business competitors (usually in one branch of the manufacturing, distributing, or service fields) the objective of which is to assist its members and its industry in dealing with mutual problems" in several areas, such as accounting practices, business ethics, or relations with government.¹ Examples from each of the three fields would be: the American Iron and Steel Institute, the American Retail Federation, the Copper and Brass Research Association.

Size and Variety. Although there were some trade associations before 1800, national associations were rare until after the Civil War. Several claim to have been the first to be organized nationally or the "first of national scope." Even though many, like the American Bureau of Shipping and the National Association of Wool Manufacturers, have been in existence for more than three quarters of a century, "Mortality is heavy among newly established associations, especially if annual revenue depends on small firms."² This mortality and the complexity of industry together account for the haphazard growth and overlapping of functions of the associations. The cotton industry, for instance, has sixty-two trade associations; iron and steel, ninety-eight; paper products, sixty-one. "The owner of a department store in Columbus, Ohio, may hold membership in such national and local groups of distributors as the Columbus Retail Merchants' Association, Ohio Retail Dry Goods Association, Ohio State Council of Retail Merchants, and National Retail Dry Goods Association."³ Some associations are federations of state and local groups; others are integrated; still others are complex combinations of both forms of organization with various types of memberships. Some are staffed only by a part-time secretary; others, like the Association of American Railroads, have a substantial budget and a large staff which engages in wide publicity. The average income of 1166 associations in 1938

¹ Judkins, *op. cit.*, p. 2. This definition excludes single-purpose organizations, such as credit bureaus; chambers of commerce; producers' co-operatives; and professional associations. But such "professional" organizations as the New York Dress Institute or the Venetian Blind Institute are intimately associated with their industries.

² *Ibid.*, p. 5.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

was \$48,000 per annum; the biggest, \$250,000. Fifteen hundred associations reported total income in 1938 of \$70,000,000.¹

Types of Activities. The activities of the associations are variously classified. Fainsod and Gordon put first among seventeen categories, "Government relations, including contacts with administrative agencies and legislative lobbying." Other objectives also touch the work of government, such as "elimination of supposedly undesirable methods of competition" which may lead to lobbying for price-fixing laws, or take associations before the Federal Trade Commission. Still other activities, such as "development of new uses for industry products," may produce little or no contact with government.²

Although World War I stimulated the formation of trade associations, it was the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 which made them quasi-public agencies for the administration of the codes of fair competition and consequently produced the thousands of associations now active. There were only about 500 in 1931; by 1938 there were 1300; each census of them finds more. Since most of them came into existence because of an item of legislation, it is not surprising that their leading activity should be government relations.

Interest in Government Relations. Perhaps fifty thousand bills are introduced in American legislative bodies during each session. An unknown but substantial number of these bills, state and national, are drafted by and introduced for trade associations. The associations of railroads sponsor bills to limit the sizes of trucks; the retail druggists' associations favor bills to prevent the sale of medicines by department stores; insurance associations seek the right to issue new types of policies — the items favored and opposed run into the thousands. In the years before the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, the associations were active in lobbying for tariffs to favor their industries.³ Now they have turned to working for the termination of the act or to put pressure on the State Department in order to obtain favorable agreements.

In addition to the types of legislation that affect all business, discussed below, almost any important proposal, an appropriations bill, a labor relations bill, a bill reorganizing the administrative branch of a government,

¹ Charles A. Pearce, *Trade Association Survey*, TNEC Monograph 18 (1941), p. 7.

² Merle Fainsod and Lincoln Gordon, *Government and the American Economy* (1941), pp. 529-530. This entire book is well worth examination by students interested in the relations of government and business.

³ See E. E. Schattsneider, *Politics, Pressures, and the Tariff* (1935).

will involve the interests of a number of the trade associations. The Portland Cement Association wants more roads, especially if they are built of concrete; consequently, it is interested in almost every appropriations bill. The utilities associations, such as the Edison Electric Institute, are opposed to appropriations for public-owned power projects. The National Council of American Shipbuilders wants appropriations for the merchant marine and the Navy. Bankers' associations are interested in the form, means of sale, and interest rates of public bonds. The possibilities of arousing the trade groups are endless.

Many of the associations have had trouble with the federal government under the Sherman and Clayton Acts. From 1928 to 1937, cases against sixty-five important trade associations took them before the Federal Trade Commission.¹ The TNEC study found 125 cases in the period between 1935 and 1939.² There is an abundance of evidence to indicate that the groups tend to act like domestic cartels; "price and production control is potentially implicit in any scheme of institutionalized co-operation among supposed competitors. Adam Smith once propounded the classic remark that 'people of the same trade seldom meet together even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices.'" ³ The associations, wrote Brady, are part of the "implementation of monopoly." The specific devices which they use (and which may lead to complaints against the groups by the Department of Justice) are listed and fully discussed in the TNEC monograph. Price agreements, the allocation of sales territories, and uniform discounts are samples. To judge from their trade journals, most of the associations would like to see the Sherman and Clayton Acts amended to permit what they like to call the "self-regulation" of industry, so that concerns already established could legally prevent "chisellers" from using price-cutting to get into the market, and so that other "abuses" and "excesses" of competition could be eliminated.

¹ Brady, *op. cit.*, p. 212.

² Pearce, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

³ Fainsod and Gordon, *op. cit.*, p. 532. The Department of Justice is inadequately manned to keep up with all of the activities of the trade associations which violate the Sherman and Clayton Acts, but now and then the lawyers of the department bring down big game. On September 23, 1948, for example, the *New York Times* reported, "The Brake Lining Manufacturers Association, Inc., was dissolved and with seventeen of its corporate members and nine officials of the concerns was fined a total of \$152,000 through an order signed by Federal Judge Edward A. Conger yesterday. This followed the defendants' pleas of *nolo contendere* to three indictments charging violation of the anti-trust laws. . . ."

BUSINESSES OPERATING UNDER LICENSES OR FRANCHISES

There is a special group of businesses which exists because of licenses, charters, or franchises. These interests have long had a peculiarly intimate relationship with governments. Their right to do business at all depends upon positive action by government, and many of them, once granted permission, are regulated with varying degrees of minuteness by appropriate agencies. Radio and other public utilities, the liquor industry, motion pictures, horseracing and gambling, dance and pool halls, amusement parks, stockyards, and grain elevators are a few such enterprises. They have, of course, their trade associations; there are twenty connected with licensed beverages alone, among them the American Brewing Industry and the Distilled Spirits Institute. The motion-picture industry has about a dozen, of which the best known is the Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America. The National Electric Light Association got such a bad name as a result of a congressional investigation of its activities that it was dissolved, and the electrical utilities are now represented in the Edison Electric Institute. It is not necessary to multiply examples.

The possibilities for profit inherent in the granting of monopoly privileges by means of franchises or licenses have, over the generations, offered temptations to corruption that neither businessmen nor politicians could always resist. The land grants to the railroads, the *Crédit Mobilier* scandal, the purchase of legislatures and city councils by streetcar and interurban traction interests, and many similar incidents are familiar to students of American history.

In State Politics. In the politics of most states there is an observable tendency for these licensed enterprises to work together, and they do so for a variety of purposes — to prevent regulation or certain types of regulation; to obtain the selection of favored persons for administrative boards or commissions; to limit the number of licenses and to prevent publicly owned competition with licensees; to hold down license fees or franchise taxes; and to obtain the renewal of licenses and franchises under terms favorable to the enterprise concerned. Even when a perpetual franchise has been obtained — and few legislative bodies grant such a thing today — the holder cannot relax his political vigilance lest the franchise be taxed or condemned, or lest some publicly owned competition be established against it. California, for instance, was notable for the long dominance of its politics by the Southern Pacific Railroad:

Since its beginnings the Southern Pacific has been in politics to attain its ends. But there were other elements, with ends to be secured, in politics. The liquor traffic, licensed as well as unlicensed, guilty of grave abuses, found itself constantly confronted with adverse public opinion. Gamblers were maintaining enormously profitable establishments. . . . Segregated vice districts, also enormously profitable to their exploiters, [existed] in practically every important city in the state.

These various interests . . . were in politics to head off adverse legislation, and even adverse action in the courts. As time went on, these various interests united for political control. That control was known as "The Southern Pacific Machine." This machine dominated not only the state legislature, but the legislative bodies of practically every municipality and county in the state. Statutes and ordinances, clearly without the approval of the general public, were enacted by such legislative bodies, and the people were powerless to resist. On the other hand, needed legislation to meet the requirements of the developing state was repeatedly denied.¹

Persons not intimately familiar with state and local politics frequently assert that the influence of licensed business upon local governments is not as great as it was a generation ago, in the era of the "muckrakers." But when at-the-track betting on horse races runs close to two billions of dollars a year, licenses to conduct such enterprises are obviously valuable; and when unknown billions pass through the hands of bookmakers who operate illegally at the sufferance of local authorities, the stakes of this politics are probably as great as those in the heydays of the gas and tractions rings, if not greater.

In Miami, according to Henning Heldt,

All the leading night spots have gambling rooms which usually run unmolested during the season. True, there are sporadic raids, but they come, as a rule, toward the end of the winter when no one cares. The operators seem immune from arrest and pleasantly pay the few hundreds of dollars in fines assessed against their hired help. . . . And the city can budget a couple of hundred thousand dollars annually in its fine and forfeiture fund with perfect assurance that the figure will be met.²

Thus there can be a kind of unofficial licensing.

In every state where dogracing is permitted, it is very active in politics.

¹ Frank Hichborn, "Sources of Opposition to Direct Legislation in California," in *Proceedings of the Commonwealth Club of California*, vol. 25, p. 512 (n.d.), quoted by Dewey Anderson, *California State Government* (1942), p. 194.

² In *Our Fair City*, Robert S. Allen, editor, Vanguard Press (1947), p. 89.

The slot machines in many localities exist only because of protection extended by local officials. The numbers game is perhaps by itself as big a business as horseracing, although its records are, of course, not open to public inspection. But as a sample, the attorney general of New Jersey in 1945 seized records of lottery operators in the small city of Bayonne which showed that they were taking in more than a million dollars a year.¹

In those states where saloon, tavern, package store, or beer licenses are issued — and especially in those in which the number of licenses is limited in proportion to population — it is a sort of rule of thumb that a would-be licensee must, to obtain his license, pay the controlling political organization at least as much as the license fee, and he must be prepared to repeat this contribution in each election campaign. If he does not, he will be closed up and lose his license for some alleged or framed-up violation of the law. One of the simplest devices for dealing with a reluctant contributor is to have a minor who looks older than his years purchase, in the presence of witnesses, a drink of liquor.

State legislatures are more reluctant than Congress to conduct investigations, and when they do conduct investigations of local politics they seem to be easily frustrated. When the New York legislature went after the O'Connells in 1945, it found itself — or perhaps better, it found the expense and payroll accounts of its members — investigated by the district attorney of Albany County, elected by the O'Connells, and nothing happened. In that instance it was alleged that beer licenses were issued only to saloons which bought O'Connell beer.

It seems unlikely, therefore, that the days of the Black Horse Cavalry are gone forever and that businesses which operate under franchises and licenses are not active in politics. It would probably be closer to the facts to infer that the operators have learned what not to do. As one Philadelphia politician put it, "Any man who invites in two witnesses to see him take a bribe deserves the full penalty of the law." The use of propaganda, especially publicity, may be just as effective and is certainly much safer.

Clearly some licensed businesses have, through the advertising done by their trade associations, been making big deposits in what the National Association of Manufacturers called the Bank of Public Good-Will. The weekly advertisements entitled "From Where I Sit," published by the brewers in country newspapers and drafted to look like columns of commentary, are an example. The immense amount of good-will advertising done by the electric utilities, the railroads, and the American Telephone

¹ *Newark* (New Jersey) *Evening News*, August 4, 1945.

and Telegraph Company is known to every observant reader of newspapers and magazines. The racetrack corporation in New Hampshire annually has a charity week, during which its profits, amounting to about sixty-five thousand dollars, are set aside for distribution to churches, orphanages, hospitals, and other charitable organizations. The governor of the state, at the request of the officials of the corporation, appoints a committee of bishops, other church officers, and heads of charitable organizations, to divide the money. If on some future occasion there may not be enough legislators on the track payroll to obtain a majority to renew the franchise of the racetrack, the operators may be able to call for these deposits they have made in the Bank of Public Good-Will.

GENERAL OBJECTIVES OF BUSINESS IN POLITICS

Enough of the specific objectives of different types of businesses have been discussed to indicate that it is hazardous to speak of business as a united interest. There are, however, a number of political objectives upon which all, or nearly all, businesses and business groups agree. These policies are fairly stable and persistent in American politics. There are, of course, variations in the degree to which one public policy or another will affect a particular business, with consequent variations in the response of the interest affected. A discussion of some of the more important of these policies upon which business takes a stand follows.

TAXATION

No businessman, it seems safe to say, likes to have his company taxed. Most business organizations assert that taxes in general, and upon them in particular, are too high. This complaint, needless to say, is age-old; it has been discovered on the clay tablets of Assyria. The taxpayers' associations now active in state and local politics are dedicated to the proposition that taxes are too high.

The publicity of business organizations tends to give the general impression — without making the assertion explicit — that tax money is wasted money. The phrase "government spending" is common, and no stress is ever laid upon the services and subsidies that government provides for business with the money it gets from taxes. The implication is always that "taxeaters" and bureaucrats live in luxury at public expense, in-

dulging in "waste and extravagance," while the taxpayers' dollars go "for needless and often political projects."¹ A recent issue of the *Industrial Press Service* offered to the country newspapers a cartoon of one farmer talking to another and saying, "If we had the guts our forefathers had we wouldn't be payin' these high taxes. We'd rare-up and kick the Bureaucrats into the middle of next week."² No hint was conveyed that some, at least, of the tax money might be going to carry the debt left over from the war. Rarely does any business group make a direct attack upon another organized group, such as veterans, whose activities result in high taxes; rather, the publicity assails the anonymous bureaucrats.

The form and incidence of taxes interest business groups in many ways. The tariff, of course, is a tax — one of the few widely favored by many industries. Occasionally one kind of business will seek to have punitive taxes put upon a competitor, as the independent retail grocers and druggists' associations have advocated the special taxes on chain stores. Retail merchants' associations in general dislike sales taxes because of the additional cost of collecting them for the state or city, and because such taxes reduce mass buying power. But the landlords organized in the state conferences of real estate boards prefer the imposition of sales taxes to any increases in the general property tax, and the NAM has advocated a federal manufacturers' sales tax. Business groups representing corporations continually complain about the double taxation of dividends and income from dividends, and they are bitterly opposed to taxes on undistributed and excess profits. Corporations seek low taxes on the intangible property they own, and if they fail to get them, they will move their legal situs to states that have low taxes on such property. The same is true of taxes on shares of stock issued, and the states vie with one another to offer such low taxes that corporations will move within their borders. When such a movement is complete, the total of the taxes collected at low rates is impressive. Delaware seems to have won this race.

The big tax drive after World War II was to reduce the graduations of the federal income tax, especially, as President Bunting of the NAM said, on "those with incomes above \$10,000 a year."³ The theory of this was the same as that of the Mellon tax plan after World War I, that the reduction of taxes on the wealthy would produce investment and so create employment. The continuance of the system of free private enter-

¹ National Association of Manufacturers, pamphlet, *Present Economic Conditions* (December, 1946), p. 7.

² Issue of October 20, 1947.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 49.

prise, says the Chamber of Commerce, depends "upon permitting taxpayers to retain sufficient income after taxes to reward incentive and risk-taking." Without going into the economics involved, it may be noted that Mr. Bunting admitted at another place in the same article that the theory did not work out in the years before 1929. At any rate, the business groups led the campaign in the Eightieth Congress for the reduction of income taxes, which resulted in two bills which were vetoed by President Truman and in a third passed over his veto. The business groups see no inconsistency in urging tax reduction at the same time that they point with alarm at the inflationary dangers involved in and the tax burden resulting from a huge postwar debt.

BUSINESS AND REGULATION

In general, business groups also oppose government regulation of business and industry. There are a few, like the radio industry and the air lines, which recognize that without regulation their own business would be in chaos; so they insist upon "reasonable" regulation. More groups will recognize that regulation for public utilities is desirable, if only for the well-being of other business enterprises. But the general political attitude of business is negativism, a kind of blanket opposition to positive government.

Devotion to States' Rights. One important form this takes is a deep devotion to states' rights. "The industrial and business groups do not permit the auditor to forget that the United States represents a federal system. . . . The emphasis on federalism is in large measure the implicit suggestion of a hope of dividing and not being ruled."¹ The possibility of avoiding a regulation by the insistence that the matter must constitutionally remain with the states is very real, because it can always be alleged to a state legislature that a proposed regulation would put business concerns in that state at such a competitive disadvantage that they would have to move to a state where they are unregulated in order to avoid bankruptcy. This argument was effectively used against state minimum-wage and maximum-hour laws, against state prohibitions of child labor, against social security legislation, against the compulsory insurance of bank deposits, against workmen's compensation acts, and against many other types of social legislation. It is the inability of the states to overcome the

¹ Thomas P. Jenkin, *Reactions of Major Groups to Positive Government in the United States, 1930-1940* (1945), p. 302.

fact of interstate competition that has broken down the function of the states as laboratories of social legislation. The Chamber of Commerce has insisted that unemployment relief and other welfare activities must be left to the states; that while the failure or inability of the states to provide adequate funds for education is deplorable, nevertheless education must not be subsidized by federal funds; that while there are abuses possible under loose state corporation acts, there must not be a federal act, and so on.

Opposition to Public Planning. Opposition to regulation also takes the form of opposition to public planning. At its most extreme this opposition extends to measures seeking to conserve natural resources, such as oil and timber. The spokesmen for the National Association of Manufacturers identify planning and communism. When he was president of the NAM, H. W. Prentis, Jr., said in an address at the University of Cincinnati, "If we ever do lose our freedom in America, I predict that it will be due to planned economy coming as a wolf in sheep's clothing."¹ Regional plans, such as the TVA, are anathema to the business groups. It is difficult to determine from the statements of the leaders of business associations the limits of their opposition, or just what it is they include in the planning they condemn with such vigor. Surely they do not object to all planning, for a tariff is an economic plan, and so are ship subsidies, immigration laws, and many other acts. The opposition does not extend to all governmentally operated enterprises, for such public projects as the Panama Canal and the Port of New York Authority are not generally attacked.

Devotion to Judicial Review. Opposition to regulation is further reflected in the advocacy of such measures as the Walter-Logan Bill and the Administrative Procedures Act, the latter drastically limiting the discretion of federal administrators and facilitating appeals to courts.² In their drive for this measure the business groups had the active support of the American Bar Association. The lawyers had long resented the growth of administrative adjudication, and this bill grew from what has been described as their desire "to have the maximum opportunity to participate in the process of administration, to block administration, and to subject the administrative process to judicial methods and judicial controls at every point."³

¹ *New York Times*, January 26, 1945.

² Frederick F. Blachly and Miriam E. Oatman, "Sabotage of the Administrative Process," *Public Administration Review*, vol. 6 (Summer, 1946), pp. 213-227. The Act, these authors say, "proposes to place all administrative activity in a judicialized straitjacket" (p. 226).

³ *Ibid.*, p. 226.

This devotion of business groups to the doctrine of judicial review is comparable to their devotion to states' rights. The hope is always implicit that if a court does not cut the heart out of a regulatory statute, as the Supreme Court did with the Sherman Act, at least the delays incident to judicial review will allow businesses to study a statute and to find ways to accommodate themselves to it. The legal staffs of the big trade associations seem to be set up primarily for this purpose.

Opposition to Communism and Socialism. Business organizations are, of course, violently opposed to communism and socialism, which doctrines in their publicity they tend to lump together. The measures of the New Deal were frequently treated as socialism in the business publications, even though many of the statutes, except those on labor, have now been tacitly accepted. The National Association of Manufacturers sees Communists everywhere, "in our schools, in Hollywood, in our literature, our unions — even in our government."¹ The Chamber of Commerce similarly sees many organizations as Communist fronts:

At times this [Communist] control is extensive, as with the Southern Conference for Human Welfare or the American Veterans' Committee. At other times it is local, as is the case with some chapters of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. . . . Communists have striven successfully to infiltrate the American labor movement."²

The Chamber of Commerce recognizes now that much anti-Communist propaganda has gone wide of its mark:

There were those who visualized all New Dealers as starry-eyed radicals. Some labeled any program which changed the established order of things as Communist. This loose use of terms has caused considerable mischief. The result has been that at times the Communists could take credit for widely popular reform measures. Indiscriminate denunciation threatened to make Communism quite respectable.³

The Chamber proposes not to suppress the Communist Party but to compel it "by law to reveal its membership, funds, and activities"; to drive Communists and sympathizers from government service; to educate labor to the benefits of the system of free private enterprise; and to oppose every assumption by government "of the functions which traditionally have been the field of individuals and of private business."

¹ *Industrial Press Service*, September 9, 1946.

² Pamphlet, "Communist Infiltration in the United States" (1946), pp. 16, 18.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

INTEREST IN EDUCATION

Virtually all business groups, because of their opposition to socialism and communism, have been interested in the public school system.¹ This interest takes two forms: to see that unorthodox economic and social views are not taught; and, second, to encourage teachers to teach the social studies so as to inculcate admiration for *laissez-faire* economics and for traditional attitudes toward the structure and rôle of government.

In the first or censoring activity, the business groups have had the active assistance of the veterans' and other patriotic groups discussed in another chapter. Business organizations have also, however, been active in their own behalf. It was an article in the *Nation's Business* that opened the attack upon the Rugg series of social science textbooks and led to their actually being burned in some localities.² The National Association of Manufacturers engaged Ralph W. Robey in 1940 to hire a staff and to make abstracts of social science textbooks in print. More than six hundred textbooks were examined to find what the authors said about trusts, monopolies, advertising, the Constitution, and similar matters. The resulting volume of abstracts was made available to members and libraries for whatever use they were inclined to make of its information.³

The positive type of interest in the schools has been shown by the free distribution by the NAM of pamphlets, moving pictures, and teaching suggestions concerning business and economics. In 1933 the Chamber of Commerce advocated a determined drive to reduce educational costs. It urged local chambers to seek to increase the sizes of classes and increase teachers' hours so that some teachers could be dismissed; it urged that teachers' salaries be reduced, and that tuition be charged for high-school education.⁴ These recommended policies were widely followed, and they

¹ There is an extensive literature on interferences with academic freedom by business and other groups. See publications of the American Civil Liberties Union, the American Association of University Professors, and the titles cited in these bibliographies: H. D. Lasswell, R. D. Casey, and Bruce L. Smith, *Propaganda and Promotional Activities* (1935), and Bruce L. Smith, H. D. Lasswell, and R. D. Casey, *Propaganda, Communication, and Public Opinion* (1946). Two reports of the American Historical Association are particularly useful: Bessie L. Pierce, *Citizens' Organizations and the Civic Training of Youth* (1933), especially pp. 237-275, and Howard K. Beale, *A History of Freedom of Teaching in American Schools* (1941), especially pp. 165-167, 240-243.

² Harold Rugg, *That Men May Understand* (1941), p. 76.

³ Ralph W. Robey, *Abstracts of Social Science Textbooks* (1941).

⁴ P. H. Odegard and E. A. Helms, *American Politics* (1947 edition), p. 275.

caused in part the acute shortage of teachers after World War II. The Chamber gradually changed its position, and in 1945 specifically repealed some of its earlier statements by a referendum. Its view now is that "Wherever inadequate educational processes exist, proper expenditures should be made to improve them." But there still must not be federal aid for education: "The public education system of each state should be financed by funds raised within the state."¹ There are intimations in the recent business publicity on communism and socialism that teachers cannot be expected on the (1947) average pay of thirty-seven dollars a week to defend the free enterprise system with the enthusiasm that the business groups feel it deserves. At any rate, during the post-World War II attempts to raise teachers' salaries, although the taxpayers' associations grumbled, no concerted efforts were made by business groups to block the proposed increases.

THE FUTURE OF BUSINESS IN POLITICS

It may be, as Charles A. Beard said, that in the absence of military force, political power naturally and necessarily goes into the hands that hold the property. The hands that held the property suffered a series of defeats beginning in 1932 and interrupted only in 1946 — and that was an incomplete victory. Even if Beard's theory is correct for the long run, the constantly shifting nature of property, the shifts in ownership, the rise of new demands for different regulations and privileges, the effects of world politics on property ownership — all these and many more factors promise to keep business actively in politics. In spite of the either-or beliefs of business groups, the United States seems likely to continue to have a mixed economy, not completely free private enterprise, not complete collectivism. The boundaries of each are likely to be subjects of contention for years to come.

¹ *Declarations of Policy*, pamphlet (1945), p. 6.

Veterans' and Patriotic Groups in Politics

"IN THE NEXT GENERATION," said President Truman, "the veterans of this war are going to run this country."¹ This prediction of the political future of the veterans of World War II may be compared with William Allen White's appraisal of the political power of the veterans of World War I: "The head of the American Legion appears in Washington, waves his hand, Congress jumps into a bellboy's uniform, takes orders, goes down to the White House, and insults the President. Party leaders, party chairmen, elder statesmen, stand around watching the spectacle, aghast but helpless."² Or, to go back to the days after the Civil War, Speaker Thomas B. Reed said (privately) of the Grand Army of the Republic, "They saved the country, and now they want it."

The problems of veterans' benefits are apparently as old as wars. Ancient Greece had trouble with her ex-soldiers, and "Rome, the greatest of law-givers, expert for ten centuries in military matters, was never able to solve the problem of her demobilized armies."³ The Roman Republic had its counterpart of the American Bonus Army in Sulla's veterans, who took part in the conspiracy of Catiline; probably many of the schoolboys who have laboriously translated Cicero's orations against Catiline have

¹ Speech at Portland, Oregon, June 25, 1945.

² *Politics: the Citizen's Business* (1924), p. 14.

³ Talcott Powell, *Tattered Banners* (1933), p. 10. This book is a semi-popular survey of veterans' groups and their pressures; the first two chapters (pp. 3-54) summarize the experience of other governments. The remainder is devoted to the United States.

failed to realize that the heart of the matter was veterans' politics. The bonus army led by Catiline was put down only after a bloody battle and massacre. Caesar, seeking to prevent a repetition of this struggle and also to establish himself in power, gave a bonus of two thousand sestericii to each veteran of the Gallic War, and he also got three hundred veterans into the Roman Senate, perhaps the earliest veterans' bloc.

PERSISTENCE OF VETERANS' POLITICS

VETERANS OF THE REVOLUTION

In America, bonuses of land and individual pensions were a familiar aftermath of the colonial Indian wars; but the first real pension system, according to Powell, was established by New York in 1691 for wounded or disabled veterans of King William's War. During the American Revolution, both the Continental Congress and the state legislatures offered land bonuses to men who would enlist, and thousands of acres were thus given away. Speculators bought up the soldiers' paper claims and at intervals held auctions of them in New York City.¹ The famous Ordinance of 1787 provided that one seventh of the Ohio lands should be drawn by lot for the Continental veterans. The Reverend Manasseh Cutler, a former chaplain in the Continental Army, was probably the first important veterans' lobbyist; he and his associates in the Ohio Company obtained liberal land grants from the Continental Congress. "In the settlements following the Revolution," wrote Willard Waller, "was initiated America's traditional policy of paying on account of veterans' claims too much, too late, in the wrong way, and to the wrong persons."²

The officers of the Revolutionary army established in 1783 the hereditary Society of the Cincinnati, which is still in existence with headquarters at Washington. From a veterans' group it developed into a patriotic society, a fairly common pattern. The Sons and the Daughters of the American Revolution were not established until 1889 and 1890 respectively.

Veterans' politics were important in the post-Revolutionary years. Veterans' interests were reflected in various clauses of the Constitution, and a majority of the members of the early Congresses were veterans. And with Washington, the United States began its long tradition of vet-

¹ Dixon Wecter, *When Johnny Comes Marching Home* (1944), p. 89.

² *The Veteran Comes Back* (1944), p. 8.

eran-Presidents. But real dominance of politics by a veterans' group did not come until after the Civil War.

THE GRAND ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC

The Grand Army of the Republic, an organization of Union Army and Navy veterans, was established in 1866 by a former surgeon in the Federal Army, Dr. Benjamin Franklin Stephenson, who did not live to see its rise to power, within the next twenty years, under General John A. Logan of Illinois. From the outset the GAR was intimately associated with the Republican Party:

The early GAR repeatedly declared itself "above and independent of partisan feeling and action," as did the Legion in 1919. But unlike the latter, which represented both major parties while always remaining pro-Legion, the Grand Army naturally went Republican. "Vote as you shot!" became its watchword. From this position it never budged. . . . In essence the Grand Army made itself the citadel of orthodoxy about the Civil War — scrutinizing history books, protesting "false emphasis" or too liberal concession to the Lost Cause, scolding publishers for selling separate texts to Northern and Southern schools, glooming over Democratic successes from Cleveland to Wilson as somehow a betrayal of their blood and sweat.¹

Its maximum membership was about four hundred thousand (in 1890), but this was an important bloc of votes in the days before woman suffrage and during times when the total vote cast in presidential elections ran from three to six millions. The GAR vote, moreover, was concentrated in the North, where it could show its maximum effect upon the Republican Party. State legislatures in the North, dominated by the veterans, elected GAR members to the United States Senate, and a long succession of congressmen, governors, and Presidents were members.

Objectives. Aside from Republican ascendancy in politics, the chief objectives of the GAR were benefits for veterans. It was a veteran and Republican President, Grant, however, who in 1875 vetoed the one GAR attempt to obtain a bonus. From that time on, the Grand Army worked for pension schemes, general and individual. In his first term alone, Grover Cleveland vetoed 233 pension bills, among them one for "a man alleging 'long and faithful service' who had spent the war in prison for desertion," another for a widow whose husband had been killed by a neighbor who was shooting at an owl. Cleveland also vetoed a GAR plan

¹ Wecter, *op. cit.*, p. 246.

to pension all unemployed veterans who had seen ninety days' service. This action, plus an executive order returning the captured battle-flags to the South, contributed to Cleveland's defeat in 1888. "'May God palsy the hand that wrote that order!' cried the then national commander."¹

But the GAR succeeded in obtaining general pensions, regardless of need, and pensions for veterans' widows, which are still being paid. Since the last pensioned widow of the Revolutionary War died as late as 1906, it may be expected that pensions of the war that ended in 1865 will be paid for some years to come. The Woman's Relief Corps, the auxiliary of the GAR, does what little lobbying is necessary for the few remaining veterans of the Civil War or their widows. Unlike the Legion, the GAR did not take in as members veterans of later wars, so that it moves to extinction; however, its traditions are to some extent carried on by the Relief Corps and by the Sons of Union Veterans of the Civil War.

THE VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS

The Spanish-American War produced in 1899 the Veterans of Foreign Wars, which now claims 2,000,000 members because it has accepted veterans of both World Wars who have served overseas. The United Spanish War Veterans, formed in 1904, is a much smaller group, with 85,000 members. The veterans of the Spanish-American War were not so numerous as the Grand Army, and they never had a comparable effect in politics. Their postwar program for benefits, however, followed the GAR pattern — no bonus, but pensions.

AMERICAN LEGION

Founding. But by all odds the most effective and successful veterans' organization, in the United States or in any other country is the American Legion, founded in Paris in 1919. Indeed, it is commonly regarded by Washington newspapermen as the most powerful pressure group of any sort.² One of its officers boasted, "We extracted more from Congress in

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 251.

² There is a considerable literature about the Legion. Its official history is Richard S. Jones, *A History of the American Legion* (1946); Marcus Duffield, *King Legion* (1931), is critical; William Gellermann, *The American Legion as Educator* (1938), is largely devoted to the attempts of the Legion to influence education. Both of these books contain bibliographies.

one year than the GAR did in its whole existence." It owes its beginning to a group of twenty officers of the American Expeditionary Force, led by Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., who held a meeting at which concern was expressed about postwar radicalism among the soldiers.¹ To forestall a swing to the left among veterans, they recommended to the high command the formation of an all-inclusive organization for men who had been in uniform at home or abroad. With the assistance of Headquarters, delegates were brought to Paris on March 15, 1919. After officers and men became accustomed to each other, they drafted the Legion Constitution, which begins

For God and Country we associate ourselves together for the following purposes:

To uphold and defend the Constitution of the United States of America; to maintain law and order; to foster and perpetuate a one hundred per cent Americanism; to preserve the memories and incidents of our associations in the Great Wars; to inculcate a sense of individual obligation to the community, state and nation; to combat the autocracy of both the classes and the masses; to make right the master of might; to promote peace and good will on earth; to safeguard and transmit to posterity the principles of justice, freedom and democracy; to consecrate and sanctify our comradeship by our devotion to mutual helpfulness.

It will be noted that there is nothing in this preamble about the activities and objectives for which the Legion has come to be most widely known: veterans' benefits, civil service preference, bonuses, pensions, censorship of schoolbooks, and rip-roaring conventions. In fact, a political self-denying ordinance was adopted in Section 2 of Article II: "The American Legion shall be absolutely non-political."

To get the new organization under way and to forestall possible rivals, Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., hurried back to the United States. He soon established a skeleton organization that printed posters, leaflets, bulletins, pamphlets, and *The American Legion Weekly*, later to become a monthly with a circulation of a million and a quarter. This preliminary work of course cost money, but some \$364,000 was provided in loans and gifts.² Unlike the GAR, the Legion was chartered by an act of Congress passed in 1919. The membership in the following year numbered 843,013; fell

¹ Jones, *op. cit.*, pp. 22-25.

² Duffield, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-9. The official history (pp. 308-309) says that loans of \$305,000 were repaid.

off to 609,407 in 1925, but increased rapidly thereafter, and reached 3,173,306 in 1946, with the opening of Legion ranks to veterans of World War II. "The American Legion," wrote its historian proudly, "enrolled more members, year after year, than all other veterans' societies combined."¹

Structure and Membership. The local unit of the Legion is the post. In most states there are district or county bodies, and above them the state organization, called a department. The territories and the District of Columbia also have departments. The national headquarters is in Indianapolis, although there is, of course, a Washington office. "In the South no Negroes were admitted to white posts, and states differed in their encouragement or discouragement of Negro posts. In the North Negro veterans usually joined established posts or formed their own, as they chose."²

Conventions. The legislative body of the Legion is the national convention, to which each department is entitled to send five delegates and one additional delegate for each thousand members, plus an equal number of alternates, all chosen at departmental conventions. The total number authorized to attend a national convention may, therefore, run into the thousands. The national convention elects the president and other officers, and by means of a series of resolutions expresses the views of the Legion on a multitude of public policies. The national commander for 1948 complained that the 512 resolutions of that year were too many. He thought that the effectiveness of the Legion would be greater if it took up fewer matters but concentrated its efforts upon them.³

Conventions of veterans have generally been exuberant affairs; after one experience with a National Encampment of the GAR, the authorities of Washington, D.C., padlocked the bars for the reunion of 1892. The veterans of most wars find the humdrum routine of civilian life "a bit irksome," as one Legionnaire said, and they go off to the convention city "for a big Armistice Day sort of celebration." Convention behavior would not be worth notice here, except that it is during this celebration of release from family and small-town inhibitions that resolutions are

¹ Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 344. He prints tables of the official national membership and membership by states.

² *Ibid.*, p. 349. Other patriotic societies commonly draw the color line: the DAR will not allow a Negro, even a distinguished one like Marian Anderson, to appear on the platform of its Constitution Hall in Washington.

³ James F. O'Neil, "We Spread Ourselves Too Thin," *American Legion Magazine*, vol. 45 (September, 1948), p. 15.

adopted which mobilize the great political and pressure strength of the Legion upon public questions:

On the morning of the fourth day a spare skeleton of officials and aggressive leaders is on hand to open the most important business session. It is noon before all of the delegates have recovered enough from their three-day jag to drag themselves to the hall, and when they arrive they are seriously concerned only with the election of officers and to choose the town that offers the widest-open facilities for the next convention. Resolutions which bear the weight of national destiny if carried out are droned off and passed with a ringing flourish, and legislative agents hie off to deliver the total influence of the Legion on measures which have never been submitted for debate or study to any Legion post, and whose implications are understood by very few of the comrades.¹

The resolutions are drafted by the little group of leaders known in the Legion as "the king-makers," who are commonly said to control the election of the national officers as well.² The surviving army officers who helped to establish the Legion, the national officials later elected, and the permanent paid personnel at the Indianapolis and Washington offices are important components of this oligarchy. Membership in it often opens the way to state or national political preferment; the careers of Frank Knox, Hanford MacNider, and Paul V. McNutt are cases in point.

OBJECTIVES OF VETERANS' GROUPS

BONUSES AND PENSIONS

In an attempt to forestall a postwar drive for pensions such as the GAR had carried on, the national government at the time the United States entered World War I embarked upon a system of life insurance for men in service. This insurance was carried on after the war, in part at public expense, but it did not satisfy the Legion. Pointing to the high wartime wages that had been paid to civilian workers, the Legion demanded for veterans an "adjusted compensation," more commonly called a bonus. "We must stop this bill," said President Coolidge, "or revise our definition

¹ Albion Roy King, "I Stay in the Legion," *Christian Century*, vol. 52 (November 13, 1935), p. 1451.

² Cf. Charles G. Bolté, *The New Veteran* (1945), pp. 54-61, and Sam Stavisky, "Where Does the Veteran Stand Today," *Annals*, vol. 259 (September, 1948), p. 131.

of patriotism." The bill, however, was not stopped. The Legion is credited by its official historian with the success of the bonus drive:

The idea had become active before the Legion was organized. Within a year it became the Legion's chief cause, and for almost two decades the Legion fought its battles and won them. It won against four Presidents of the United States, against Secretary of the Treasury Andrew W. Mellon and the banking industry in general, against the United States Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers, against many lesser organizations, and against various artificial veterans' societies organized for the purpose of opposing the legislation and discrediting the Legion.¹

Unlike the claims of some pressure groups, this one is amply borne out by the record. The Veterans of Foreign Wars gave some assistance to the drive, but the Legion deserves most of the credit it takes for overcoming perhaps the most formidable opposition that any pressure group has ever faced. To be able to override five presidential vetoes — two by Franklin Roosevelt at the height of his party strength — is an extraordinary feat of pressure politics.

The next drive, which in fact opened in 1948, seeks pensions of sixty dollars monthly for men who were members of the armed forces of World War I, upon their reaching the age of fifty-five, and subsequent drives will press for a bonus and later for pensions for veterans of World War II. In the demand for pensions, the VFW appears to be more determined and vociferous than the Legion. At the 1947 national encampment of the VFW, Representative James E. van Zandt, formerly their national commander, demanded, according to the *New York Times*, that Congress provide at once pensions of sixty-five dollars a month for veterans sixty-five years of age and older: "'We must tell Congress that we want action on this bill,' he shouted above the din of the convention. . . . Mr. van Zandt received an ovation as he finished, and a resolution was immediately introduced and seconded. It was adopted in a matter of seconds."² The American Veterans of World War II (AMVETS) early in 1949 demanded the immediate payment by Congress of a bonus up to \$4500 per person for men and women who served in World War II. They alleged that the total costs of their plan would run to about forty billions of dollars, but

¹ Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 165. Bonus certificates were issued to 3,240,000 veterans for \$3,710,036,627.

² *New York Times*, September 7, 1947.

other sources consulted by the *New York Times* thought that the costs would be closer to sixty-seven billions.¹

MISCELLANEOUS BENEFITS

The Legion and lesser veterans' groups have sought and obtained from the state legislatures and from Congress a wide variety of benefits for veterans. The national government has published a 250-page book to enumerate the federal benefits.² Items included in the long list are education ("GI Bill of Rights"), loans, insurance, hospitalization, burial — and even free razor blades for patients in veterans' hospitals. Fifteen states have also provided state bonuses, preferential treatment and exemptions on poll and other taxes, free hunting and fishing licenses, free notary services, railroad passes for Legion officials, free office space for the Legion at the capital, and a host of other benefits down to firing squads for veterans' funerals.³ The costs of many of these services cannot be calculated in money, and no general computation of those for which local, state, and federal moneys are appropriated seems ever to have been made; perhaps the total is about \$12,000,000,000 a year. In the federal government, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1947, appropriations for veterans amounted to \$8,623,000,000. At the 1948 election the voters of six states approved bonuses for veterans of World War II. Nine states had already adopted state bonuses, and the total to be paid out by these fifteen states was estimated at \$2,600,000,000. Other states will undoubtedly follow with other bonuses.

VETERANS' PREFERENCE IN CIVIL SERVICE

By an act passed in 1865, Congress provided that preference in the federal service should be given to veterans of the Civil War discharged for illness or wounds, provided they were otherwise qualified. The act set up no means for its administration, and it had become virtually a dead letter by 1919, when under veterans' pressure Congress passed a new act directing the Civil Service Commission to extend preference to veterans, their

¹ *New York Times*, January 17, 1949.

² *Manual, Explanatory of the Privileges, Rights and Benefits Provided for Persons Who Served in the Armed Forces of the United States . . .* House Document No. 772, Seventy-Ninth Congress, Second Session (1946).

³ Powell, *op. cit.*, p. 287. See also the current *Book of the States*.

wives, and their widows.¹ Since that time the act has been expanded, and those states which have civil service systems have accepted veterans' preference. There are several types of preference, the details of which lie beyond the scope of this book; they vary from state to state, and they change continually as the veterans' groups everywhere press to make them more and more favorable to veterans. Frequently, age limits are raised or waived for veterans; physical requirements are reduced or waived; time spent in military service is counted as experience at the job; veterans have special rights to reinstatement if they leave the civil service and to promotion if they remain; in the event of a reduction in personnel, they must be dismissed last, or in some states, cannot be dismissed at all; time spent in military service counts toward retirement; and they are given time off with pay to attend veterans' conventions.

In taking civil service examinations, both federal and state, veterans are shown preference in a variety of ways. In some states the passing mark for veterans is 65; for non-veterans, 70. In other states, veterans are given a certain number of points to add to whatever score they attain, provided they pass, e.g., $2\frac{1}{2}$ points for each month of service, plus $2\frac{1}{2}$ points for each month overseas. In still other states they receive a flat 10 or 15 points. Disabled veterans are given various additional preference ratings. Everywhere, if they pass, veterans receive certain preferences in appointment. An amendment to the constitution of the state of New York, advocated by Governor Dewey and the New York Legion, and adopted in 1945, provides that if a veteran attains a passing mark he must go to the head of the list, ahead of any non-veteran, even if the latter receives a grade of 100. And all veterans who pass must be appointed before any non-veterans, no matter how high their standing, can be considered.

The whole array of preferences, said Miller, "is a direct negation of the merit system. War service as such has nothing to do with the administration of affairs of state, nor does it necessarily endow those who have engaged in it with the capacity to perform the manifold tasks of government."² It is veterans' patronage. The United States Civil Service Commission estimated that partly as a result of these preferences there were, on January 1, 1949, 865,000 veterans on federal payrolls, 46 per

¹ The history of veterans' preference is summarized by John F. Miller in *Monograph No. 10 of Problems of the American Public Service*, Luther Gulick, editor (1935), pp. 243-256.

² *Ibid.*, p. 257.

cent of all government workers.¹ Political parties, which ordinarily resist any infringements upon their opportunities for patronage, have lost a long series of battles with veterans' organizations. The effects upon the general efficiency of the service are impossible to measure, but the effects upon morale are obvious when an employee of thirty years' service knows that he will be dismissed upon the first reduction in force while a veteran of thirty days' service will be retained. As morale is commonly thought to be depressed by political favoritism, so it must likewise be depressed when employees are promoted, not because of merit but because of service in the armed forces, perhaps twenty years previously.

OPPOSITION TO RADICALISM

In seeking bonuses, pensions, benefits, and preferences, the veterans' groups have won their victories largely on their own strength. In their opposition to all forms of radicalism, however, they have had the support of the DAR and other patriotic societies as well as the assistance of such business groups as the Chamber of Commerce and the NAM. The work of the veterans has been both positive and negative.

At its first convention in 1919 the Legion appointed an Americanism Commission which is still functioning. In addition, the Legion has sponsored state and national oratorical and essay contests for high-school students; urged universal compulsory military training for high-school boys; obtained teachers' oath and flag salute bills in various states; and attacked textbooks. The Rugg social science series, already mentioned, was declared by the Americanism Commission to be "poison," and three pamphlets were published attacking the books as too radical. The Legion was unable to find any textbook in United States history that met its requirements, so in 1922 it brought together representatives of twenty-six patriotic, veteran, fraternal, and other organizations to back the writing of one. The two-volume result, *The Story of Our American People*, was put together by a professor of English, Charles F. Horne, "with the assistance of a long list of statesmen, soldiers, and educators," in the words of the official historian of the Legion. But in spite of the fact that it satisfied the twenty-six groups, it still had "a limited success." It had to be privately published, and it was ridiculed by the professional historians.²

¹ This does not include members of the armed forces.

² For the Legion's statement of standards for textbook writing, see Bessie L. Pierce, *Public Opinion and the Teaching of History* (1926), pp. 329-333; for a summary of the Horne work, see Duffield, *op. cit.*, pp. 271-275, or Gellermann, *op. cit.*, pp. 218-221.

The Legion has been opposed to all forms of economic radicalism from the IWW of 1919 to the Communist Party of today. Slum clearance and public housing are measures too radical for the Legion. Like the VFW, it has urged that the Communist Party be barred from the ballot. It opposed the recognition of Russia and the pardoning of Eugene V. Debs, the Socialist. "In a number of cities the Legion posts persuaded public authorities to refuse Debs permission to make public appearances after his release. The efforts of American Legion posts to prevent public speaking by radical orators were spontaneous. . . . When Dan Sowers of Kentucky became Americanism Director of the Legion in 1927 he advised the whole organization to quit trying to prevent public speaking."¹ Not all posts took Sowers's advice, however. "In California, in 1934, when Upton Sinclair, that stern anti-Communist, presented his 'Epic' platform and proposed to run for governor upon it, resident members of the American Legion attempted in many cities to prevent Sinclair's ideas from being carried to his potential followers by visiting the homes of Sinclair supporters and, *per vi et armis*, preventing them from holding meetings in their homes."²

In a variety of other ways also, the Legion, the other veterans' groups, and the patriotic societies seek to stimulate patriotism and to put down ideas of patriotism different from theirs. In doing so they repeat the history of veterans' organizations of the past:

But after any war the generals die first (even in bed), and the last custodians of the faith, the champions of orthodoxy, are the once-young soldiers. Within fifteen or twenty years — sooner if a powerful veterans' bloc develops — they become leading citizens. . . .

Yet the average veteran, friendly, hearty, and something of a "joiner," is peculiarly susceptible to manipulation by the unscrupulous. This has been proved time and again. Moreover, his impulse to uphold sentiments, prejudices, causes for which he marched — still fighting the war in veterans' clubs and caucuses, harking back to the days when his emotions were stirred — makes him look like a jingo or a reactionary, waving the Bloody Shirt or cherishing the Lost Cause, suspicious of free speech and of labor.³

It may be added that veterans' groups and patriotic societies are strongly in favor of a big army, navy, and air force; they favor peacetime

¹ Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 282.

² Charles H. Garrigues, *You're Paying for It!* (1936), p. 207. For a more recent case of a Legion post breaking up a Democratic political meeting in a private home, see *New York Times*, December 24, 1947.

³ Wecter, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

conscription, and in general, a we-will-stand-no-nonsense kind of foreign policy. Furthermore, the official Legion attitude contains elements of anti-foreignism, as shown in resolutions favoring the deportation of aliens, the complete stoppage of immigration, and similar policies.

The American Veterans' Committee. At the end of World War II a veterans' organization different from the usual sort, called the American Veterans' Committee, was established by Charles G. Bolté and associates. It announced that its attitude would be "Citizens First, Veterans Second." It sought to be different from the Legion and the GAR.¹ The AVC was idealistic; it sought the support of labor and liberal groups, and it was soon accused of being a Communist front. Bolté resigned as president, and its future is uncertain.

PRESSURES ON ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

What the Department of Agriculture is to the farm organizations, the Veterans' Administration is to the veterans. The pressures of veterans' groups on this agency are virtually continuous. As long as Brigadier General Frank T. Hines was administrator, Legion officials dominated it. But his successor, General Omar Bradley, did not get on so well with the Legion. On February 2, 1946, the then national commander of the Legion, John Stelle, made public a letter he had sent to all members of Congress demanding an investigation of the Veterans' Administration and the removal of General Bradley. He said in part, "What we need in charge of the VA is a seasoned business man, not a soldier, however good a soldier he may be." Such an argument, it may be said in passing, proves too much: if valid, it would remove most of the veterans' preference in civil service. General Bradley retorted that the real reason for the dispute was his refusal to locate a veterans' hospital in Decatur, Illinois, at the demand of Stelle and the mayor of Decatur. The VFW, the Disabled American War Veterans, and the AVC came to Bradley's defense, and he was neither investigated nor removed.

Veterans' pressures are also brought to bear upon civil service commissions to have them issue rulings favorable to veterans and to interpret statutes in ways veterans wish. Pressures are put upon appointing officers for a variety of purposes: for example, to see that they do not set qualifications for jobs that veterans cannot meet; to urge them (if the law allows a

¹ Bolté, *op. cit.*, pp. 54-73, reviews the objections of himself and his friends to the purposes and behavior of the Legion.

choice) to pick veterans from a list of eligibles; and then to assign veterans to favored positions.

TACTICS AND EFFECTIVENESS

As the Legion historian noted, the veterans have had opponents to their bonus and pension objectives, but these have been overcome. The Civil Service League, a reform group, is a frail reed when the big winds of the Legion blow for veterans' preference; the League of Women Voters is no more effective. In sum, the veterans' groups have no effective opposition. A large membership, geographically well distributed, associated with politicians of both major parties, amply financed, the Legion is well-nigh invincible.

In almost every American community there is a Legion post — frequently more than one; in fact, the Legion owns property worth more than \$200,000,000. In towns too small for the VFW or the AVC to organize locals, the Legion exists. The Legion post commonly has a building which serves as a clubhouse, although the VFW rarely has one and must use the Legion's quarters. In many a small town the Legion Hall is the only club; around the pool tables and over the card games the Legion members decide what will be done at town meeting, who should have the Republican nomination for sheriff or the Democratic nomination for judge, whether the school board needs shaking up for letting "pinks" teach in the high school. The Legion is thus a kind of continuous caucus, and men who do not belong to it stand at a great disadvantage in local politics. With modifications, the same phenomena may be observed in city Legion posts. In fact, the Legion is so firmly fixed in the life of every community that no rival organization has a chance, and by hurrying to take in the veterans of World War II — offering a clubhouse already built and furnished — the Legion has forestalled what might have been a dangerous opposition. Where the liquor laws permit, there is usually a bar, the profits from which help the post in many of its activities. And whether or not the laws permit, there often are slot machines and punch boards, which also help Legion finances.

The Legion's own constitutional prohibition of political activity only makes its participation covert. The word is passed from post to post that certain candidates are members of the Legion, and should be supported; or that other candidates are known to have opposed bonuses or other Legion measures, and should not be voted for. Political leaders and bosses,

often themselves members of the Legion, must also "recognize" it in slatemaking: they try always to have some Legionnaires on the ticket. About half the members of each house of Congress are veterans. To have been a state commander is an important consideration in "availability." Disabled veterans are particularly desirable candidates in close constituencies.

In politics the Legion tends to put a candidate's attitude toward veterans' legislation above everything else. He may have proved himself a great statesman, but if he has voted against veterans' preference or the bonus, nothing else matters. Or the Legion will support a man of dubious reputation who promises to vote the Legion line. Thus the Pennsylvania Legion supported the Republican boss, William S. Vare, in the famous Republican primary campaign of 1926 and contributed substantially to the defeat of George Wharton Pepper. Pepper wrote in his autobiography that by opposing the bonus: "I thus incurred the opposition of the American Legion, and some of this opposition was incredibly bitter. It took various forms. Some Legion posts passed fiery resolutions. Individuals wrote threatening letters. A soldier who had lost a leg was employed in the interest of one of my adversaries to appear at political meetings and declare that he had sought an interview with me in Washington and that I had told him to get the h--l out of here."¹

Taking into account the history of veterans' politics in the United States and the present organized power of the veterans, President Truman's prediction, quoted at the beginning of this chapter, is entirely reasonable.

¹ George Wharton Pepper, *Philadelphia Lawyer* (J. B. Lippincott Co., 1944), p. 213.

Race and Nationality in American Politics

Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses yearning to be free,
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore,
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tossed, to me:
I lift my lamp beside the golden door.

THESE WORDS, written by Emma Lazarus for the pedestal of the Statue of Liberty, cannot be said any longer to represent the public policy of the United States. There was a time, however, when they did, and immigrants from almost every country on earth poured into the ports. No statistics were kept until 1820, but in the succeeding 124 years about 39,000,000 immigrants entered legally.¹ Immigration from the countries of northern and western Europe, which reached its peak in the 1880's, is commonly called the "old" immigration; that from southern and eastern Europe, the peak of which came twenty years later, is called the "new" immigration. More immigrants came from Germany than from any other country. In addition to the immigrants, the United States obtained various other nationality groups as a result of its territorial expansion — the French in Louisiana, the Mexicans and Spanish in the Southwest.

¹ For charts showing immigration and emigration by decades and by country of origin see Francis J. Brown and Joseph S. Roucek, editors, *One America* (1945), pp. 6, 7, 9. This book also contains (pp. 660–701) a selected bibliography on immigration and minority groups in the United States. Two standard works are M. L. Hansen, *The Atlantic Migration, 1607–1860* (1940), and Warren S. Thompson, *Population Problems* (3d edition, 1943).

Even though immigration has been drastically curtailed since the Act of 1924, the census of 1940 found 11,109,000 foreign-born persons in the United States and 23,157,000 native whites of mixed or foreign parentage. Furthermore, the institution of African slavery left a Negro racial group now estimated at about 13,000,000.

IMPACT OF NATIONALITY GROUPS ON POLITICS

These minority groups have had profound effects upon American politics. Even though immigration has been reduced to the point where in recent years it has sometimes been exceeded by emigration, and even though immigration were to be cut off altogether, as some pressure groups desire, still the effects of past immigration will be apparent in American politics for the indefinite future. Certain general tendencies of racial and nationality groups and certain reactions on the part of some native-born elements have been noticed by students of American politics.

NATIONALITY GROUP ORGANIZATIONS

First, none of the groups has formed a political party of its own. The American federal system and the election of officials by single-member districts have been powerful deterrents to the development of parties along nationality or racial lines. Indeed, there have been such conflicts within most immigrant groups that sufficient unity for a minority party was impossible in any case. They tend to split along religious lines (German Catholics versus German Protestants), or over some conflict of ideology (Austrian monarchists versus democrats), or they may represent the different sections of the foreign country from which they came (northern versus southern Italy). These factions have been separately organized into a wide variety of societies which have cultural, fraternal, insurance benefit, religious, and political aspects. Thus there are 10 Czech organizations, 23 German, 22 Polish, 18 Slovak, and many other fragments. In 1944 there were at least 155 nation-wide organizations with 32,000 branches, 2,883,000 members, and total assets of \$423,000,000.¹ The names of the societies usually but not always reveal the nationality organized. For instance, the oldest one in existence is the

¹ Brown and Roucek, *op. cit.*, p. 650. These figures do not include three French-Canadian societies with headquarters in Canada, which have 1479 branches, 156,000 members, and \$30,000,000 assets, part of each in the United States and part in Canada.

Czechoslovak Society, dating from 1854, and its name shows the nationality concerned; the International Order of Good Templars, on the other hand, happens to be a Swedish society.¹ Almost every society publishes its own newspaper or magazine, usually in the language of national origin.

AFFILIATION WITH MAJOR PARTIES

A second observable tendency has been for the members of a nationality to align themselves with one or another major party. Their choice of parties has depended upon various factors: the size of the group and its distribution in the United States; language and cultural barriers; partisan considerations by the parties (e.g., the Germans settling in the Middle West were necessary to the Republican Party in the 1850's); the type of employment sought by members of the group; the example set by immigrant "pioneers" who opened the way to party membership; and occasionally political issues (e.g., the opposition of Scandinavians to slavery took them into the Republican Party).² Whatever the factor or the combination of factors that attaches a group to a party, the early affiliation tends to become traditional.

ANTI-FOREIGNISM

In the third place, there has been a persistent nativism in American politics, an opposition to immigrants and immigrant voting. In this instance, anti-foreignism and anti-Catholicism have overlapped. The history of this conflict between native and immigrant from 1800 to 1860 has been traced by R. A. Billington.³ The Federalist Party had nativist sentiments which induced many immigrants, when they could vote, to follow Jefferson, and the succession of Democratic Presidents friendly to immigrants attached many nationality groups more firmly to the Democratic Party. In 1835 a Native American Party was formed, which had limited and local successes and passed away.

¹ For analysis and description of the leading associations, see Y. J. Chyz, "Fraternal Organizations of Nationality Groups," Brown and Roucek, *op. cit.*, pp. 392-399.

² For a more complete discussion of these factors see Wallace S. Sayre, "The Immigrant in Politics," in F. J. Brown and Joseph S. Roucek, editors, *Our Racial and National Minorities* (1937), pp. 643-660.

³ *The Protestant Crusade 1800-1860* (1938). See also H. J. Desmond, *The Know Nothing Party* (1905); and W. E. Binkley, *American Political Parties* (1943), pp. 187-205.

The Know-Nothing Party. In 1849 there was formed in New York a secret fraternal society called the Order of the Star-Spangled Banner, which had strong anti-foreign sentiments. Its secrecy was so great that its members would not even reveal whether they had joined the order; when asked, they would only reply, "I know nothing"; hence, when the expanding society took an active part in politics, sometimes secretly endorsing Whigs, sometimes under the name of the American Party, it was called the Know-Nothing Party, a name which has clung to it in history. The election of the Democrat Franklin Pierce as President in 1852 was ascribed by both Whigs and nativists to the immigrant vote.¹ The disintegrating Whig Party and the Know-Nothings formed a loose alliance which captured various states during the elections of the early fifties, but the collapse of the Whig Party and the rise of the new Republican Party, combined with the failure of the Know-Nothings in the states they controlled, and the refusal of Congress to restrict immigration, discredited the party. In the North and East most of its members went over to the new Republican Party in the years from 1856 to 1860. William E. Seward had been friendly with the Know-Nothings, and this fact in part explains why he failed to obtain the Republican nomination in 1860; the Republican Party needed the immigrant vote in order to win.

Nativist Associations. The Know-Nothing Party was the only significant anti-foreign political party, but there have been a number of anti-foreign associations, such as the American Protestant Association (1847), the American Protective Association (1887), and the second Ku Klux Klan (1915). "The modern Klan," wrote John M. Mecklin, "is a lineal descendant of Know Nothingism and the American Protective Association."² Like the Know-Nothing Party, the revived Klan mingled anti-Catholicism with its anti-foreignism. It reached its peak of membership and influence about 1924, when it had perhaps 6,000,000 members. In various western and middle-western states it dominated or influenced politics from 1920 to 1929. It elected a governor of Colorado; its head in Indiana, David C. Stephenson, was boss of the state; and it was also influential in Connecticut, Oklahoma, and Oregon. In the southern states it was anti-Negro as well as anti-Catholic and anti-foreign. The great McAdoo-Smith struggle in the Democratic National Convention of 1924 revolved around the Klan, and it likewise had some part in Smith's failure

¹ Billington, *op. cit.*, p. 381.

² *The Ku Klux Klan* (1924), p. 132. The nativistic element in the modern Klan is discussed by Mecklin, pp. 127-156.

to carry the usually Solid South in 1928.¹ The Klan still exists, but its political influence is generally regarded as negligible except in a few states in the Deep South.

EFFECTS OF PARTIES ON IMMIGRANTS

Political Clubs. It was noted in Chapter 1 that American political parties have been an assimilating influence. Roy V. Peel and his associates found 750 nationality and 32 racial political clubs in the New York area. "Naturally, these clubs are clustered in the sections where the various nationalities and races are situated, in the little Italies, Bohemias, Harlems, and Ghettoes. Indeed, they are sure signs of the locations of foreign-language enclaves."² The same phenomena are apparent in any city; a quick if rough determination of the racial and nationality groups active in politics may be made by consulting the city directory and the telephone book. Most of the titles of the clubs reveal both nationality and party alignment: "Fifth Ward Bohemian American Democratic Club," "East Side Italian American Republican Club." Sometimes the clubs are named for national heroes, and then only inquiry will reveal party attachment; for example, "Pulaski Association," "Garibaldi Social Club." A few are named for some person presently active in politics who is leader of the club.

An ambitious native political leader will sometimes start these nationality political clubs, keeping himself in the background. He or the central party organization will pay the rent for the clubrooms for a year or so and help it to get a liquor license. Competition between the major parties increases the number of clubs; if the Democrats get an Italian Democratic Club started in the Eighth Assembly District, the Republicans will start an Italian Republican Club in the same area, and vice versa.

There have been some abuses of these political clubs, such as their occasional harboring of criminals or violation of liquor and gambling laws, but they perform a distinct social service. They have been called gateways by which the immigrant enters into the political life of his new country. In a social atmosphere where his own language is spoken he may exchange stories about the old country while he learns about the new one. If the leader of his club is elected to the board of aldermen, he shares with all members of the club the prestige, the recognition, the

¹ See M. S. Handman, *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 8, p. 608.

² Roy V. Peel, *The Political Clubs of New York City* (1935), p. 251.

feeling of "belonging" that results. Leaders of the club help him with his English and with his naturalization. They try to get him a job if he needs one, or lend him money.

As the second generation grows up, the nationality aspects tend to diminish and the political aspects to increase. Many of the younger people cannot speak or read the language of their fathers. Their interest in the old country becomes sentimental only. Although there have been exceptions, such as Carl Schurz, Governor Peter Altgeld, and Mayor William O'Dwyer, political preferment tends to go to the second generation. The large number of elective offices in most states has facilitated this "recognition." At any rate, the nationality groups and clubs form an element in slatemaking; if 10 per cent of the population of a city is, say, of Italian origin, then the Italian Republican Clubs will demand that one out of each ten Republican candidates shall be Italian, and furthermore that they, not party headquarters, shall pick the man. They are likely to be deeply offended if the leadership picks an Italian candidate without "consulting" them.

GENERAL OBJECTIVES

Domestic Issues. Nationality groups have a multitude of political objectives, which change from time to time. These may be divided, in a rough way, into domestic and foreign issues. The groups commonly seek measures to make registration and voting easier; they oppose the poll tax and long residence requirements. They want naturalization made easier and simpler. They are opposed to sales taxes and prefer income taxes. Most groups opposed Prohibition and now favor low licenses and liquor taxes. Since they are quickly affected by hard times, they favor generous welfare provisions and broad social security.¹

The restriction of immigration by the Acts of 1921 and 1924 was opposed by most nationality groups and especially by those representing immigrants from eastern and southern Europe, whose countries were not favored by the quota system. Since World War II many of the societies have urged that the unfilled quotas of the war years be opened to current immigration and that special consideration be given to refugees and displaced persons.

Foreign Affairs. Some nationality groups have used their residence in

¹ For a more extended analysis, see Joseph S. Roucek, "National Minorities in Domestic Politics," in F. J. Brown and J. S. Roucek, *One America* (1945), pp. 400-414.

the United States as a basis of operations for revolutionary activities in the country of their origin. Many a revolt in Latin America has brought refugees to New York who used the nationality clubs as a place to raise money for a return to power. The Irish societies helped greatly to finance the long series of rebellions in Ireland; the Chinese in the United States provided funds for the revolution of 1911. These activities have often had the tacit approval of the federal government, which has looked with favor upon the establishment of democratic régimes abroad, and sometimes the government has officially welcomed such rebels as Kossuth.

The nationality groups are aroused whenever the foreign policy of the United States affects the old country. At the end of World War I, the Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Lithuanians, and others brought to bear all the pressure they could in behalf of self-determination for the countries of their origin. After World War II the Germans and Italians sought an easy peace for their native countries; the German-American Republican League, for example, protested against the Allies as "the most inhumane of all victors" and demanded "that the German people be allowed to put their own house in order." Whenever any war occurs in Europe, the nationality groups are particularly aroused over the sale of arms, the extension of credit, recognition of belligerency, and similar aspects of foreign policy.

EFFECTIVENESS OF NATIONALITY GROUPS

In the New England states (except for Maine and Vermont), in New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, West Virginia, Indiana, Illinois, and Michigan, the vote cast by immigrant groups is particularly important. In most of these states they have succeeded from time to time in forcing one or the other major party to recognize them to the extent of nominating members to high office, governor and United States senator. Governor Frank J. Lausche of Ohio, Governor John O. Pastore of Rhode Island, and Senator David I. Walsh of Massachusetts are recent examples. This block of doubtful states is of such crucial importance in the electoral college that each major party cultivates the nationality groups. In many local elections throughout these states it is necessary to have the support of one or more of the groups in order to win; Boston, Buffalo, Chicago, Cleveland, Manchester, Newark, New York, and Pittsburgh are cities where they are particularly important. In a close election, as has been noticed before, majorities in these cities will carry their states, and with them the electoral college.

PRINCIPAL NATIONALITY AND RACIAL GROUPS

It is impossible to discuss here the effect of each nationality and racial group upon the politics of the United States.¹ All that can be attempted is a listing of a few of the most important ones and their societies.

THE IRISH

All commentators agree that the Irish have been the most active politically of all nationality groups. They had had experience at politics in Ireland; they had a strong consciousness of group interest; and they were strongly bound together in their religious faith. Unlike the Germans, English, Scottish, or Welsh, they have never lost their group identity in the mass of the American population. They had a certain political advantage over later immigrant groups in that they were able to speak English, even though with a brogue. What Professor Merriam has said of their activities in Chicago is typical of other cities — and they concentrated in cities. There the Irish,

as elsewhere, have been most active. They arrived first and clung to the political domains, until driven out by the waves of other nationalistic arrivals. Some of the most fascinating stories of the political world are those of the transition periods when Irish battled with Germans, or with Italians, or with Poles, or with Scandinavians or Jews. Their political *savoir faire* and engaging personalities made it possible for them to hold their own long after they were overwhelmed numerically. . . .²

The Irish claim that the Tammany Society was founded in 1789 by an Irish veteran of the Revolution, William Mooney.³ At any rate, Tammany was long an Irish club, though by no means an exclusive one. The Irish have also dominated the politics of both Boston and Massachusetts in recent years. At one time there were three Sullivans on the bench in Chicago. Uncounted Irish names appear on the rosters of city councils, state legislatures, Congress, and cabinets, and several Presidents have been of Irish ancestry.

From one third to one half of the soldiers in Washington's armies were Irish.⁴ But the Irish did not follow Washington into the Federalist

¹ Brown and Roucek, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-367, treat forty-one racial and nationality groups.

² Charles E. Merriam, *Chicago: A More Intimate View of Urban Politics* (The Macmillan Co., 1929), p. 141.

³ Gustavus Myers, *History of Tammany Hall* (1917), p. 1.

⁴ Louis Adamie in *A Nation of Nations* (1944), pp. 320-324, reviews the evidence.

Party. Many of them, like Patrick Henry, were anti-Federalist. They opposed the alien and sedition laws passed by Federalists, and generally associated with the party of Jefferson and Jackson. They approved of the free immigration policy of the Democratic Party from Jefferson on, and of course they distrusted the Whigs for their dealing with the Know-Nothings. "The Irish, living in cities, were . . . disturbed at the prospect of Free Negroes as competitors in the labor market. Consequently, the Irish assented to Democratic policies devised to preserve the institution of slavery, and their loyalty to the party withstood the shock of the Civil War."¹ In the post-Civil War period of Republican supremacy, the Irish Democrats were active in municipal politics throughout the Northeast. Although there have been some noted Republicans of Irish ancestry, such as Patrick J. Hurley and William J. Donovan, the vast majority of the Irish have clung loyally to the Democratic Party, and in periods of Democratic success they have been high in party councils, as such names as Tumulty, Farley, Walker, Hannegan, and McGrath will suggest. It was a group of Irish bosses, Flynn, Hague, and Kelly, who picked Harry Truman for Vice-President in 1944. From the time when Franklin Pierce appointed an Irish Catholic as postmaster general, the Irish have laid claim to that office in the event of Democratic success.

There have been scores of Irish societies in the United States. The Friendly Sons of St. Patrick dates from 1784, the Ancient Order of Hibernians from 1836. The Irish revolutionary societies had their American branches; the American Association for the Recognition of the Irish Republic, for instance, was an affiliate of Fianna Fail. Irish nationalism to the point of anglophobia has been a unifying force in Irish groups and Irish pressures upon Congresses and Presidents. Irish enthusiasm for Cleveland's handling of the Venezuelan dispute, as well as Irish opposition to Wilson in 1916, were rooted in anti-British sentiment.

Louis Adamic wrote that the Roman Catholic hierarchy in the United States "has always been predominantly Irish. Through the National Catholic Welfare Conference, whose Washington headquarters is staffed mainly by Irish Americans, it controls a vast network of organizations through which it exerts a growing influence on the Administration in Washington, on the radio and the theater, on the movies and newspapers, on local and state politics. . . ." ²

¹ Wallace Sayre, in F. J. Brown and J. S. Roucek, editors, *Our Racial and National Minorities* (1937), p. 648.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 341.

THE ITALIANS

The Italians, coming in the "new" immigration, settled, like the Irish, chiefly in the cities of the Northeast and middle Atlantic states. But they were slower than the Irish to make their weight felt in politics. The language barrier, a lack of prior political experience, and a desire to accumulate some money and return to Italy were all factors that held them back. The second generation, however, showed much more political consciousness than the first and supplied an increasing number of political leaders, such as Vincent R. Impellitteri in New York and Joseph Margiotti in Pennsylvania.

Various students of their political behavior have noted that the first generation of Italian immigrants were inclined to follow the instructions of their employers and to vote Republican; the second generation, however, has been more independent. In New York City, under their leader, Generoso Pope, the Italians have allied themselves with Tammany, which has "recognized" them with appropriate patronage and nominations. In many urban areas the Italians exceed the Irish in the Democratic organization, and can displace them in power whenever they decide to do so; Mayor Hague and his Irish lieutenants had increasing difficulty over the 1930's and 1940's in keeping the Italians satisfied with jobs collecting garbage.

Among their societies may be mentioned the Sons of Italy (1900), the Independent Order of Sons of Italy (1911), and the Italy American Society (1918). The National United Italian Associations seeks to bring them all together. During the régime of Mussolini the Italian groups were divided into pro- and anti-Fascist elements, but with the entrance of Italy into World War II the anti-Fascists won out.

Although the Italians have been overwhelmingly Roman Catholic, their relation to their church in the United States has never been as close as that of the Irish. Frequently the parish priest could not speak Italian, and the Italians could not speak English. But in the Little Italies of the cities the Italians gradually acquired their own churches, and where Italian-speaking priests were available, the bishops assigned them.

THE GERMANS

The Germans claim that they "have contributed over 25 per cent of the flesh and blood comprising the present white population of the United

States. The English element (including Scots, North Irish, and Welsh) alone exceeds them with about 33 per cent.”¹ Since the United States began to keep immigration statistics in 1820, more than 6,000,000 Germans have settled in the United States, a group bigger than that from any other country. The German settlements in Pennsylvania (“Pennsylvania Dutch”) antedated the beginning of the immigration statistics. The peak year was 1882, when more than a quarter of a million Germans came to the United States. The earlier German immigration was predominantly Protestant; the later, partly Catholic. The Protestant Germans tended to settle on farms, especially in the middle-western and north-central states; the Catholics, in the eastern cities. German assimilation was very rapid. Many names were changed; Schmidt became Smith, Mueller became Miller, Braun became Brown. No German nationalism equivalent to Irish nationalism existed. In fact, the leaders of German societies constantly complained that the members threw off their nationality too rapidly.

The Germans who came in the 1850’s as a result of the revolution of 1848 were hostile to slavery and joined the Republican Party. Carl Schurz and other leaders in this “old” German group were recognized by the Republican Party, Schurz with a seat in Hayes’s Cabinet, and the adherence of the “old” German immigrants to the party became traditional. The later, Catholic, immigrants tended to be Democrats when the hierarchy of the Church inclined toward sympathy with that party. “The Church,” wrote Sayre, triumphed “over the intellectual exile leaders.” But Woodrow Wilson’s pro-British sentiments affected many Germans in 1916 in the same way they did the Irish.

The Order of Harugari (1869) claims to be the oldest of the many existing German societies, but the Steuben Society (1919) is probably the most widely known. Through their groups and through their membership in both major parties the Germans opposed Prohibition and urged its repeal. In the period between the rise of Hitler and the entrance of the United States into World War II, the German societies divided in their attitudes toward Nazism. The German-American Bund was the most widely known of the pro-Nazi societies.

The German-American vote, as studied by Louis Bean, illustrates particularly well the fact that while economic interests influence voting behavior, nationality may on occasion be more important. He found

¹ A. B. Faust, “German Americans,” in F. J. Brown and J. S. Roucek, *One America* (1945), p. 101.

that the core of isolationism in the Middle West before the United States entered World War II consisted of the German-Americans. He studied the vote in certain counties in Minnesota and the Dakotas in relation to the national Democratic vote and the normal behavior of the voters in those areas. In the

western tier of Minnesota counties bordering North Dakota . . . the Democratic vote dropped 3 to 22 percentage points between 1936 and 1940. These losses were in direct proportion to the number of German-Americans in the counties. Where only 3 per cent of the population was of German parentage, the Democrats lost 3 percentage points to Willkie, but in counties where, say, 15 to 20 per cent were of German origin, the vote shifted approximately 15 to 20 points to Willkie.¹

He found the same phenomena in Iowa, North Dakota, and even in Texas, where certain counties 70 to 80 per cent Democratic in 1936 swung 25 to 48 points toward the Republican Party. The shifts were almost exactly in the same proportion as that of the Germans to the entire population.

THE SCANDINAVIANS

The Scandinavians came late in the "old" immigration and settled in the belt of states from Wisconsin west to the Pacific. They passed as easily as the Germans into American politics, but names such as Stassen, Nelson, Olson, and Peterson are still useful in the politics of Minnesota, Wisconsin, and the Dakotas. The Scandinavians were at first heavily Republican, but the trials of the farmers in the Populist and Progressive periods shook their allegiance. Their dissatisfaction with Republican policies did not, however, turn them to the Democratic Party, but rather to independent and progressive movements such as La Follette's party or the Farmer-Labor Party of Minnesota. Many of them were influential in the Non-Partisan League. When they have remained in or returned to the Republican Party they have tended to align themselves with its liberal or progressive wing. Since virtually all were Protestant, there was no religious influence to attract them to the Democratic Party.

Like the Germans, the Scandinavians merged rapidly into the population. Few of the second generation were able to speak the native tongues, and almost none of the third. Few returned to the old countries.

¹ Louis Bean, *How to Predict Elections* (Alfred A. Knopf, 1948), p. 95.

FRENCH-CANADIANS

In what has been called "the second colonization of New England," a movement which is still continuing, the French-Canadians from Quebec have come into the northeastern states in large numbers. They are predominantly Democrats, although their attachment to the party is not as close as that of the Irish. Indeed, there is marked friction between them and the Irish because the French-Canadians want (and the Irish oppose) the use of French in parochial schools. The Irish have generally won this dispute, but the French-Canadians in some New England cities have been sufficiently embittered so that they will not attend Catholic churches which have Irish priests. Every Democratic primary in New Hampshire is an Irish versus French-Canadian struggle. The leaders of the societies, like the political leaders, are primarily second-generation immigrants. In the politics of New England such names as Benoit, Coutermanche, and D'Amour are beginning to appear. Gradually the Irish in the Democratic Party are giving way before the French-Canadians.

SPANISH-AMERICANS

In the southwestern states, especially in New Mexico, the Mexicans, or, as they prefer to be called, the Spanish-Americans, are of increasing importance. New Mexico has the only American state legislature whose proceedings are required by the state constitution to be conducted in two languages.¹ In most states the party of the upper economic classes tends to be the Republican, but the reverse is true in New Mexico. The "Anglos" are mostly Democrats, and the Spanish-Americans tend to be Republicans, perhaps an aftermath of the movement of Texas Democrats into New Mexico after the Civil War. There is a kind of gentleman's agreement, however, "that issues which might cause racial alignments" will be avoided "by both parties and both groups."² A bill to require a literacy test for voting, sponsored by the Democrats, was regarded as a violation of the code, because its principal effects would have fallen upon the Spanish-American Republicans. In recent years, one United States senator from New Mexico has been an Anglo-American, the other a Spanish-American.

¹ John C. Russell, "Racial Groups in the New Mexico Legislature," *Annals*, vol. 195 (January, 1938), p. 62.

² *Ibid.*, p. 67.

NEGROES

The situation of Negroes in American politics is different from that of the minorities so far discussed. Whereas most nationality groups are in varying degrees accepted by the remainder of the population, Negroes have not been. There has been some of what the Negroes call "passing," but the number of Negroes who can leave the race is very small. Their long, and still continuing, struggle for equal suffrage was discussed in Chapter 3. They also still suffer from wide political and social discrimination. No group of equal size is so little assimilated into American politics. Although there were once anti-Irish riots, no group but Negroes now fears violence if it tries to exercise its constitutional and legal rights.

In the states of the South — where about half of the 13,000,000 Negroes still live — they either do not vote at all, or they vote in small numbers. Harold F. Gosnell, who studied the behavior of Negroes in politics, wrote that in 1940, "In the North and border states the Negro vote was found largely in the metropolitan centers of the following eight states: New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Ohio, Michigan, Maryland, Indiana, and Missouri."¹

Former Allegiance to the Republican Party. From the days of Emancipation until 1936, whenever Negroes could vote they were about as solidly Republican as the Irish were Democratic. Almost alone among Democratic political organizations, Tammany Hall was able to break their allegiance to the party which the Negroes always credited with their freedom. The counter-revolution in the South confirmed them in their Republicanism. Gosnell summarized as follows the attitude of Chicago Negroes toward the Republican Party:

This party might desert them in other parts of the country, some of its leaders might fail to recognize the group, and it might fail to take a militant stand on behalf of Negro rights. However, it was still the party which had traditionally stood for the protection of the Negro, and as compared with its chief rival it was regarded as having more to offer. While political landslides, economic depressions, and the breaking of political scandals might cause the voters in other groups to shift their party allegiance, many members of this minority group remained in the party fold.²

¹ "The Negro Vote in Northern Cities," *National Municipal Review*, vol. 30 (May, 1941), p. 264.

² Harold F. Gosnell, *Negro Politicians* (University of Chicago Press, 1935), p. 366. In spite of a proliferation of books about the Negro this remains the best study of Negroes in politics.

Many astute Negro leaders recognized that this long-standing devotion to the Republican Party ruined the group's bargaining power. As long as the Republicans could count on a solid Negro vote, the members of that party in office were not moved to take any drastic action for the Negroes. As Walter White said, the Negroes got plenty of platform planks and resolutions but no action. On the other hand, the Democrats when in power were not inclined to do anything either; they saw no reason to annoy the Southern Democrats by favoring a group that always voted Republican.

Shift to the Democratic Party. Several developments over the last twenty years, however, have tended to shake the loyalty of Negroes to the Republican Party. For one thing, the "lily-white" Republican movement, encouraged by Theodore Roosevelt and Herbert Hoover, deeply offended the Negroes. Then, always economically insecure, they found their condition worsened in the depression that began in 1929, and it was the public works projects of Franklin Roosevelt's first administration that provided thousands of them with employment. Furthermore, Farley and Roosevelt followed the example of Tammany and appointed a considerable number of Negroes to public positions of prestige. Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt received Negroes at the White House, addressed Negro meetings, and otherwise treated them well. President Roosevelt urged upon Congress measures desired by Negroes. The Negroes thought that the CIO, which admitted Negroes to membership, was the President's favored labor union. The total result was that in the election of 1936 the Negro vote for the first time turned Democratic. The estimated Negro vote for Franklin Roosevelt in Chicago was 23 per cent in 1932, 49 per cent in 1936, and 52 per cent in 1940.¹ Later measures of Roosevelt's, notably his creation of the Fair Employment Practices Committee, encouraged the new adherence. The failure of Democratic Congresses to pass anti-poll-tax legislation through the Senate and to make the FEPC permanent perhaps weakened the new alignment, but a Gallup poll published February 16, 1946, indicated that among those Negroes who would express an opinion 60 per cent said they would vote Democratic, 40 per cent Republican; at the same time the white voters were polled as 58 per cent Democratic, 42 per cent Republican. Apparently President Truman polled a strong Negro vote in the election of 1948. The position of the Negroes in the Democratic Party is as curious as the position of organized labor; both interests are constantly being offended by the utterances and

¹ Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma* (1944), vol. 1, p. 495.

behavior of the Southern Democrats, but neither interest feels that the Republican Party will do as much for it as the Democratic. On its side, the Democratic Party needs the Negro votes in northern cities if it is to carry the doubtful states and with them a majority in the electoral college, and yet the party cannot keep its Bilbos and Rankins from offending the colored voters.

The Two Leading Negro Groups. The two leading Negro organizations active in politics are the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (1909), which claims half a million members, and the Urban League (1910), which is a federation of local societies chiefly concerned with social service. The majority of the locals of the League are called urban leagues (e.g., the Cleveland Urban League), but others have titles indicative of interest in social service, such as Carver Community Center, Negro Service Council, or Negro Welfare Association. Membership in both the NAACP and the Urban League is open to white persons as well as to Negroes, and the financing of both organizations has been assisted by white philanthropy. The journal of the NAACP is called *The Crisis*; that of the Urban League, *Opportunity*. Both associations exist to better the economic, political, and social conditions of Negroes, but they emphasize different aspects of the campaign. The NAACP seeks improvement through political action, statutes, and court decisions; the Urban League, through increased employment opportunities for Negroes. The two do not conflict; on the contrary, they frequently work together on such matters as FEPC legislation. The NAACP has been particularly active in litigating cases for Negroes, especially civil rights cases.

Changing Attitudes of American Negroes. The attitudes of American Negroes, or at least the attitudes of most articulate Negroes, have changed from Booker T. Washington's policy of accommodation to militant demands for full equality.¹ They are no longer content with the "separate but equal" concept. Congressman Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., Negro member from a Harlem constituency, represents the "new Negro." In order to prevent what he calls Civil War II, he demands for the Negro full equality, "not only economic and political, but educational, religious, and social equality as well."² This involves, he says, the removal of every kind of discrimination against Negroes, not merely in voting but in

¹ See Rayford W. Logan, editor, *What the Negro Wants* (1944), and National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, *An Appeal to the World* (Pamphlet, 1947), W. E. B. Du Bois, editor.

² Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., *Marching Blacks* (Dial Press, 1945), p. 135. Italics in the original.

employment and in admission to theaters, restaurants, bathing beaches, and housing. He and the other militant Negro leaders want Negroes admitted to jury service as fully as whites. They ask federal anti-lynching legislation, federal and state protection "against abuses by white officers of the law," and the "use of qualified Negroes" on boards and commissions. They oppose the segregation of Negro and white children in schools, and they want equal pay for Negro and white teachers of equal attainments.¹

The new Negroes refuse to admit that there is such a thing as a Negro problem; it is, they say, a white problem. They seek, therefore, state laws to restrain whites from discriminating against Negroes, and they would like federal legislation such as a permanent FEPC. They feel that if they could get these laws and have them adequately enforced, white prejudice would die away. Whether or not that would be the sequence of events, there are two hurdles they have to overcome.

The first is the opposition, already noted, of certain of the labor unions in the American Federation of Labor and in the Railroad Brotherhoods to rules or laws that would force the admission of Negroes to equal work opportunities. The militant Negroes denounce such labor tactics in vigorous language. Congressman Powell may serve as an example:

The majority of the AFL movement could easily have elected as their president, not Green but Ley, the head of the German [Nazi] trade-union movement. The American Federation of Labor is the greatest drawback to a developing democracy. The Jim Crow tactics of many of its unions allow Negroes to join but do not give them full rights. . . . Some of the internationals by actual law [rule] forbid the entrance of Negroes on any basis whatsoever into their unions. . . . The AFL with its huge salaries, high dues, and corrupt practices is a disgrace to the working-class movement. The CIO has always scaled its dues low, paid its executives decent but not too high wages, let democracy stand as the guiding rule and forced workers when they lacked individual character to be racially tolerant.²

To improve their situation in spite of all obstacles Negroes have taken an increasing part in local politics, especially in northern cities, where they are allowed to vote. In Chicago, as elsewhere, "Politics became an important, perhaps the most important, method by which the Negro sought to

¹ W. E. B. Du Bois, another of the militant leaders, assembles some of the evidence and arguments on Negro education in *Color and Democracy* (1945), pp. 91 ff.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 169.

change his status. It was often the only avenue open for struggle against class tendencies.”¹

Handicaps of Negroes in American Politics. In the political struggle, however, the Negroes suffered under important handicaps. Poor and propertyless, kept out of the best-paying occupations, Negroes as a group do not have the money necessary for political organizing. Their own press is read only by Negroes, and they do not have equal access with white groups to the commercial dailies. As a group they lack experience in politics. They have not learned, though perhaps they are learning, the importance to a minority of organization; this lack of group-consciousness may be partly a result of education, and the general low literacy level among Negroes has perhaps contributed to their inability to form tight blocs.

The leadership among Negro groups has not been adequate to their needs. Gosnell noted that among Negroes in Chicago, “Bitter complaints were heard about the lack of colored leaders. Those who called themselves leaders were sometimes looked upon by other members of the group as self-seeking, corrupt, and treacherous persons who sold out the race. . . . A few of the rank and file trusted white leaders more than they trusted their own leaders.”² Leaders of the Negro underworld are especially important because of the money they have, but their leadership cuts across that of the Negro preachers. The vice lords, moreover, are commonly subordinate to white overlords to whom they must look for protection, and consequently they are unreliable.

Religion has not served among Negroes as the unifying force that it has been among some other minority groups. Numerous conflicting sects compete with one another. Instead of being a means of group discipline, religion has furnished an emotional outlet from the hardships and discriminations of this world.

The Race Question in Negro Politics. The race question dominates Negro political thinking. Negroes have supported the most corrupt political machines, such as that run by William Hale Thompson in Chicago, as long as these would elect and appoint Negroes.

Much of the political history of Midwest Metropolis has involved the fight of reform groups against “machine politics.” Negroes, as a low-income group, looked down upon by the middle class and feared by white

¹ St. Clair Drake and Horace R. Cayton, *Black Metropolis* (1945), p. 343.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 358.

labor, have seldom supported the reformers. They have preferred to deal with the hardheaded realists who are willing to trade political positions and favorable legislation for votes. A cynical realism has pervaded Black Metropolis, which sees democracy as something granted to Negroes on the basis of political expediency rather than as a right. In the past this has meant dealing with "corrupt" machines, and even the clergy have not hesitated to play the game.¹

Although there is a great deal of apathy among Negro voters, this is thrown off if a white politician does or says something that offends their racial pride or opposes one of their racial objectives.² Mayor Edward J. Jeffries of Detroit had long been supported by Negro groups; but when in 1943 he issued a housing order which the Negroes called "a Jim Crow proclamation," and when he defended the conduct of the white police in a race riot, the Negroes turned against him so solidly that in some Negro precincts which he formerly had carried he did not receive a single vote.³ And in Chicago, "Mayor Kelly carried the Negro vote [when] on the Saturday before election, the Chicago *Defender* hit the streets with an enormous front-page facsimile of a restrictive covenant which the Republican candidate for mayor had signed barring Negroes from residence in his neighborhood. The exposé was a bombshell."⁴

Negroes in Office. Negroes get elected and appointed to public office in the North, but never in proportion to their numbers in the population.

¹ Drake and Cayton, *op. cit.*, p. 376.

² The apathy was shown for Detroit by a study of registered voters made by Edward H. Litchfield for elections from 1930 through 1940. In every instance fewer Negroes voted than either native whites or foreign-born. In 1940, for example, 85 per cent of the native whites voted, 83 per cent of foreign-born, 59 per cent of Negroes. — *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 5 (June, 1941), p. 268. Probably fewer Negroes than whites register. This was one of the conclusions reached in an elaborate statistical study of voting behavior in St. Louis for a number of elections, 1944–1948, sponsored by the St. Louis Chapter of the American Statistical Association. See Edward B. Olds and David W. Salmon, *St. Louis Voting Behavior Study* (1948), p. D-3. They found a negative correlation (— .35) between the percentage of the population over 21 registered and the percentage of Negro population in precincts. In the precincts where there was high ownership of homes (upper class whites), on the contrary, the correlation between registration and population over 21 was .64. This study indicated also that St. Louis Negro precincts strongly supported the Democratic Party, anti-discrimination legislation, and a 48-hour work week for firemen, but of all the precincts gave the least support to the revised Missouri constitution and to slum clearance and sewer bonds.

³ Louis E. Martin, "Detroit — Still Dynamite," *The Crisis*, vol. 51 (January, 1944), p. 8.

⁴ Drake and Cayton, *op. cit.*, p. 358. The *Defender* is a Negro newspaper published in Chicago.

Legislative districts are frequently gerrymandered to their disadvantage, although no study has been made to show the extent of this discrimination.¹ In spite of this, there are usually one or two Negro members of the House of Representatives. When Negroes are appointed to office, the general tendency is to name them to positions where they do not command white personnel. Whenever a Negro is appointed to a position of higher than clerical grade, it is news in the Negro press from coast to coast.² The appointment of James W. Johnson in 1943 as Collector of Internal Revenue for the Third New York District is a recent example.

Myrdal's great sociological study of the Negro in American life did not take up in detail the behavior of Negroes in office, but summarized it by saying that on the whole Negroes behaved like whites in politics. In civil service positions they seem to be just as competent as whites. In elective positions it is impossible to show on what little evidence has been assembled whether Negroes turn up more or fewer crooks and demagogues than whites do. Gosnell's study of Chicago clearly showed that they were no better than the run of Chicago white politicians:

The voting records of Negro legislators show that they have been opposed to efficiency methods in government, in favor of overloading the city and state budgets, opposed to laws strictly regulating the liquor traffic and amusement places, and in favor of laws which aided the white political bosses without appearing directly to work to the disadvantage of the colored people. . . . Although they represented constituencies which were largely working class, they opposed bills fostered by the trade unions, such as the anti-injunction bill and the eight-hour law for women.³

WELDING NATIONALITY GROUPS

Race, nationality, and religion make American politics endlessly colorful and complex. In a mixed urban constituency the political problems involved in keeping all the elements sufficiently satisfied to produce a majority of votes is one that calls for the highest degree of political skill. Vito Marcantonio, "a fellow traveler of the Communists who has built an all-party machine supported by practically everyone but Jehovah's Witnesses," seemed to Richard H. Rovere such a skillful politician, and

¹ Myrdal, *op. cit.*, p. 501.

² Myrdal, *ibid.*, p. 502, lists some of the appointments.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 372.

Rovere's vivid description of Marcantonio's tactics well summarizes the problems of race and nationality in American politics:

Marcantonio represents the Twentieth Congressional District, known in New York as East Harlem. East Harlem is a huge and verminous slum area that runs from the edge of the Negro district to the wharves of the East River. Its largest racial group is Italian. Next come Puerto Ricans, then small settlements of Negroes and Jews. . . .

The present Congressman has been able to offer something to each racial group. To the Italians it was enough, for a beginning at least, that his name was Marcantonio and that he had been blessed by the Little Flower. He ingratiated himself with the Puerto Ricans, who harbor no love for the Romans, by championing their nationalism, by flying to their island to defend some rebels beleaguered by the law, and by writing a bill to grant Puerto Rico immediate independence with staggering indemnities. Both the Italians and the Puerto Ricans are Roman Catholic, and Mother Church plays an important part in politics. On certain feast days Marcantonio can be seen, a lighted taper in hand, walking barefoot through the district with the pious. He seldom fails to put in an appearance at the annual celebration for the Madonna of the Miracles, Our Lady of Mount Carmel. Negroes and Jews in the district were won by his spirited denunciation of Jim Crow and anti-Semitism. On his staff of five or six secretaries, each race is represented.¹

¹ "Vito Marcantonio: Machine Politician, New Style," *Harper's Magazine*, vol. 188 (April, 1944), p. 394.

Religious Interests in American Politics

"FIFTY YEARS AGO General Grant remarked that 'in the United States there are three great political parties: the Republican, the Democratic, and the Methodist Church.'"¹ The Reverend Dr. High, in quoting this remark, agreed with the view that religion is a force in politics — "the churches today are more effectively in politics than ever" — but he felt that General Grant gave the Methodists perhaps an incorrectly unique notice, because, "It is inherent in Christianity to believe that the affairs of government can be ordered more perfectly and more in harmony with the will of God."² This idea is inherent in other religions, too; but at any rate, "It is a rare church convention . . . whose resolutions committee fails to secure the adoption of at least one declaration on national policy, one statement of opinion upon a question that is up for political settlement."³ In other words, like the conventions of most associations, they pass a wide variety of resolutions upon many public questions, from international affairs to whether children attending parochial schools shall ride free of charge in public school buses. It is just as inconceivable, said High, that a convention of a religious body should adjourn without a "ringing declaration" on public matters "as that they could convene without prayer."

PERVASIVENESS OF RELIGIOUS INTEREST IN POLITICS

Not only are religious bodies actively in politics today, but they always have been. The Old Testament is full of accounts of the pressures of the priesthood upon the Hebrew kings. Christianity was an active, disruptive

¹ Stanley High, *The Church in Politics* (1930), p. 1.

² *Ibid.*, p. 5.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

force in the Roman Empire, and in the Middle Ages the Pope was in varying degrees at different times ascendant over kings and emperors. When issues have burst from argument into violence they have at least as frequently been religious issues as economic, racial, or any other kind. From the wars of the Hebrews to the "Battle of North College Hill" of 1947, people have been ready to fight when government policy crossed their religious views.¹ The massacres of Hindus by Moslems and of Moslems by Hindus in India are instances from contemporary history.

Religious interests blend and fuse with economic ideas, with race and nationality, with reform and humanitarianism. They color literature and art as well as politics. Religions, like states, rise and fall. Religious views, like political ideas, change, even within any one denomination. Cotton Mather, for instance, favored a union of church and state, with civil punishments for citizens who failed to observe Puritan church law and ceremony,² but present-day Protestant leaders almost unanimously favor the separation of church and state.³ This evolution of Protestant thought may have taken place because of the great variety of Protestant denominations, but it would not be the first time that a virtue has been made of a necessity.

RELIGION IN AMERICAN POLITICAL HISTORY

Early Controversies. The interests of religious bodies have affected American politics throughout our history.⁴ Colonies were founded because of religious opinions; and other colonies in turn broke off from them because of religious differences. The Quebec Act of 1765, which established the Catholic Church in Quebec, aroused the indignation of New England; although the act is not specifically named, it is one of the grievances against George III enumerated in the Declaration of Inde-

¹ For one account of "The Battle of North College Hill" (Ohio) between Catholics and Protestants see *Time*, vol. 49 (June 30, 1947), pp. 49-50.

² Charles E. Merriam, *A History of American Political Theories* (1926), pp. 12-15.

³ Of scores of illustrations that might be cited, the Reverend Dr. Charles Clayton Morrison, founder and former editor of *The Christian Century*, speaking to the International Convention of the Disciples of Christ, said, July 30, 1947, "The church is the organized institution of religion, just as the state is the organized institution of political life. It is these two institutions that must be kept separate, according to our Constitution and our American tradition." — *New York Times*, July 31, 1947.

⁴ The best historical account is Vernon L. Parrington, *Main Currents in American Thought* (3 vols., 1927-1930). There are hundreds of other titles, many of which are cited in the bibliographies, especially those compiled by Lasswell, Casey, and Smith.

pendence.¹ The Democratic Party welcomed Catholics as it welcomed immigrants, but the Whig Party was predominantly Protestant. The Native American and Know-Nothing Parties of the 1840's and 50's were at least as much anti-Catholic as they were nativist; part of the ritual of the Order of the Star-Spangled Banner — the secret society which formed the basis of the Know-Nothing Party — was an anti-Catholic pledge that the member taking the oath would if elected or appointed to any office remove Roman Catholics as well as foreigners from offices in his gift.²

After the Civil War. The American Protective Association and the second Ku Klux Klan were likewise as much anti-Catholic as anti-foreign.³ Although the APA is gone, and the Klan is no longer of importance, memories of their activities survive among Catholic politicians. Arthur F. Mullen, long Democratic state chairman of Nebraska, wrote of the APA in Omaha:

The wave of intolerance passed, as such waves do. Before it was over, though, the custodians of the membership records of the APA were held up one night as they were leaving a meeting of the organization. The records completely disappeared. In reality they reposed in the safe in the office of a local undertaker. From there they were brought out, year after year, to check off all political candidates. If any one of them had ever joined or even applied for membership in the APA, he became the target of opposition. At the first election where this was done, every man with such a record was defeated.

It was the memory of what had happened, politically, to the members of the APA which kept every Omaha politician of any importance from joining the Klan in the Twenties.⁴

The candidacy of Alfred E. Smith for the Democratic nomination in 1924 led to the longest, and as Mullen said, the most futile, furious, and fanatical convention in party history. The Klan forces rallied behind

¹ A Catholic historian, Theodore Maynard, *The Story of American Catholicism* (1941), p. 117, says that the act was met with "screaming denunciations" by the Protestants.

² R. A. Billington, *The Protestant Crusade, 1800-1860* (1938), p. 385. The party, said Billington, was torn by dissensions over slavery and internal improvements; its one element of unity was its opposition to the Catholic Church.

³ For the anti-Catholic aspects of the Klan, see J. M. Mecklin, *The Ku Klux Klan* (1924), pp. 157-205. On the APA, see also Michael Williams, *The Shadow of the Pope* (1932).

⁴ *Western Democrat* (Wilfred Funk, 1940), p. 152.

William Gibbs McAdoo, the Catholics behind Smith. Sectional issues and Prohibition complicated the struggle, but the intraparty battle was primarily religious, as the few western Catholics who, like Mullen, had pledged themselves to McAdoo, found out. Smith himself did not call upon them for their support on the basis of their religion, but, wrote Mullen:

He had plenty of lieutenants, official and unofficial, who did, and who made life worse than miserable for the Catholics in the convention who didn't agree with them. We Western Catholics who stood with McAdoo knew that the best thing we could do for our religion, as well as for our West, was to stand firm against any argument based solely upon the basis that Smith was a co-religionist. But try to tell that to the New York or Massachusetts crowd who beset us!¹

The Campaign of 1928. During the Coolidge administration Catholic and anti-Catholic animosities smoldered. As Smith became the leading contender for the Democratic nomination of 1928, the conflict broke into the open in 1927 with the publication of an open letter from Charles C. Marshall to Governor Smith. Quoting extensively from encyclicals of the popes, he inquired how it would be possible for Smith, if elected President, to reconcile Catholic doctrines with American constitutional principles, particularly with the First Amendment.² Smith replied that he, a devout Catholic, had never heard of many of the issues Marshall raised, but "I recognize no power in the institutions of my church to interfere with the operations of the Constitution." And he went on to say that he believed in "the absolute separation of church and state" and in the public school system.³

Smith was the first Catholic to be nominated for President. Peel and Donnelly, who made a study of the 1928 campaign, wrote that a flood of rumors was loosed. Klan sentiment flared up. A false oath of the Knights of Columbus was widely circulated. The religious issue became so important that Smith felt that he had to answer it, and he did so in Oklahoma on his campaign tour.

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 244.

² "An Open Letter to the Honorable Alfred E. Smith," *Atlantic Monthly*, vol. 139 (April, 1927), pp. 540-549.

³ "Catholic and Patriot: Governor Smith Replies," *ibid.*, pp. 721-728. Marshall later said that Smith's statement was an expression of "lofty and generous sentiments in respect to religious liberty" but that Smith in reality repudiated long-standing Catholic doctrines. — Charles C. Marshall, *The Roman Catholic Church in the Modern State* (revised edition, 1931), pp. 177 ff.

There were, of course, other issues in the campaign, such as farm relief, waterpower, Republican scandals, Smith's relationship to Tammany, and Prohibition.¹ The issue of Smith's religion, however, overshadowed all the others, not perhaps in public discussion so much as in private. Norman Thomas, the Socialist candidate for President, asserted that the issue of Prohibition was being used as "a mask for religious partisanship." At least fourteen religious organizations took an active part in the 1928 campaign, and they spent unknown hundreds of thousands of dollars attacking Smith and supporting Hoover. One E. C. Jameson alone contributed \$172,800 to various anti-Smith groups.²

The results of the election seem to support the conclusion that the chief issue of the campaign of 1928 was religious. It is difficult to believe, so strong is the southern Democratic tradition, that Hoover could have cracked the Solid South as he did either because of his equivocal support of Prohibition as "an experiment noble in motive" or because of his use of the "lily whites," or both; it is especially difficult to believe when it is noted that the southern states that voted for Hoover generally returned Democratic candidates to other offices with their usual majorities. Harold F. Gosnell calculated normal average votes for various states and compared the results for 1928. He concluded:

Examination shows that in 1928 those states which had a high proportion of Catholics showed an unusually high vote for Smith as compared with the "normal" Democratic vote. Thus, in Massachusetts, where two thirds of the church membership was Catholic, Smith's vote was 15 per cent higher than what would normally be expected, and in Virginia, where only 3 per cent of the church membership was Catholic, Smith's vote was 20 per cent below what would have been "normal" had a Protestant been a candidate.³

In other words, Catholics tended to vote for Smith because he was a Catholic, and Protestants tended to vote for Hoover because he was a Protestant.

The campaign of 1928 has not been forgotten by practical politicians.

¹ Roy V. Peel and Thomas C. Donnelly, *The 1928 Campaign: An Analysis* (1931), pp. 52-71.

² Louise Overacker, *Money in Elections* (1932), pp. 259-267, lists the organizations and gives samples of their publicity.

³ *Grass Roots Politics: National Voting Behavior in Typical States* (American Council on Public Affairs, 1942), p. 17. Louis H. Bean comes to the same conclusions in his *How to Predict Elections* (1948), pp. 99-104.

Much as most Democratic state and local leaders liked James A. Farley as a person and as a politician, they regarded him in 1940 as "unavailable" because of his religion. And according to Farley's own account, Cardinal Mundelein thought it would be inexpedient for Farley to run for President in 1940; he asked Farley to call upon him, and when he did, told him that he hoped he would "do nothing to involve the Catholics of this country in another *débâcle* such as we experienced in 1928."¹ In a Democratic landslide such as 1932 or 1936, a Catholic Democrat could be elected, but in a close election — and it is impossible to tell in June how close an election in November will be — anti-Catholic sentiment alone could be sufficient to defeat a Catholic candidate. Catholic Republicans are so few that there is no immediate likelihood of one of them being a potential candidate.

As Stanley High said, religious bodies at their conventions pass multitudes of resolutions upon various public questions. In addition, religious leaders from their pulpits, in statements, through pastoral letters and encyclicals, touch upon matters in which governments are acting — or upon which they want governments to act. The immense religious press considers not only matters of theology and the internal affairs of the denominations supporting the periodicals but a host of public issues as well. The political and quasi-political issues in which religious societies are interested number in the hundreds, but it is possible to group the more important and persistent ones into a few categories.

ISSUES AFFECTING RELIGIOUS INTERESTS

CHURCH AND STATE: UNION OR SEPARATION

The most formidable problem is that of the separation versus the union of church and state. The issues growing out of this controversy have plagued western nations since the Reformation, and they are far from being settled today. The First Amendment forbade Congress to establish any religion, although it left the states free to continue, if they pleased, the establishments they then had or to create new ones; but the contemporary extension by the Supreme Court of the doctrines of the Fourteenth Amendment to cover most of the civil liberties of the first ten amendments

¹ James A. Farley, *Jim Farley's Story* (1948), p. 174. Farley went on to give reasons why he thought conditions had so changed from 1928 to 1940 that a Catholic could be elected President. Bean, *op. cit.*, p. 99, calculated that a Democratic Catholic could win if the country is at least 55 per cent Democratic at the time.

apparently forbids the states also to establish religions. Freedom of religion, as has been noted, was neither taught nor practiced in Puritan New England, whatever the attitude of Protestant faiths may be today, and the Roman Catholic Church has consistently opposed it. No utterance of any pope may be found to defend the separation of church and state; on the contrary, the whole argument of several encyclicals is in favor of the union of church and state. In a textbook widely used in Catholic schools, Monsignor John A. Ryan printed the Encyclical Letter *Immortale Dei* (1885) of Leo XIII, and in commenting upon it noted that "In governments which profess absolute neutrality toward religion, the actual policy is one of hostility."¹ The Catholic argument is that the state cannot be neutral; if it is not for religion, it is against it. The state, then, said Leo XIII, must make a "public profession of religion." "But Pope Leo goes further," says Monsignor Ryan, "He declares that the state must not only 'have care for religion,' but recognize the *true* religion. This means the form of religion professed by the Catholic Church."² This recognition means establishment, or the union of church and state.³

¹ John A. Ryan and M. X. Millar, *The State and the Church* (1922), p. 30. This book bears both the "Nihil Obstat" of the Censor of Books, Arthur J. Scanlan, and the "Imprimatur" of Patrick Cardinal Hayes, and may therefore be taken to represent an official commentary upon and translation of Catholic documents, but it is always possible for the allegation to be made that quotations are torn from their contexts, so that the student is advised to read the entire work for a full account of Catholic doctrines.

² *Ibid.*, p. 32. Italics in original.

³ In 1947 the majority of the Supreme Court commented in *Everson v. Board of Education*, 330 U.S. 1, upon the meaning of an "establishment of religion"; five justices agreed that: "The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force or influence a person to go to or remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and *vice versa*. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment was intended to erect a 'wall of separation between church and state.' " Five justices thought that the New Jersey state law authorizing payment by the Ewing Township Board of Education of fares on a public bus line for students to attend Catholic schools did not constitute the establishment of religion; four justices thought it did. Three opinions, one majority and two dissenting, were filed in this case, they are well worth reading for their examination and review of the church and state controversy, especially as it has been reflected in constitutions, statutes, and judicial decisions.

Other religions than the true religion must logically be suppressed, for as Monsignor Ryan says, error does not have the same rights as truth, and he raises the question, "Should such [non-Catholic] persons be permitted to practice their own form of worship?" He answers it by saying, "If these are carried on within the family, or in such an inconspicuous manner as to be an occasion neither of scandal nor of perversion to the faithful, they may properly be tolerated by the state."¹ This doctrine is obviously incompatible with that of the First Amendment.²

MORAL ISSUES

Both Catholic and Protestant faiths claim ethical and moral superiority over the state. But views of what is moral differ with different churches, and each seeks to direct the powers of the state to uphold its own version. The Protestants, for example, are opposed to gambling, but many Catholic groups want to use bingo and similar games of chance to raise money for their religious activities. To make the matter specific, the Methodist Board of Prohibition, Temperance, and Public Morals will make appropriate efforts to have a state legislature pass anti-gambling laws, and the Knights of Columbus will oppose such efforts.³

"Moral values," wrote Charles E. Merriam, "may be conjured up against Galileo, or against Darwin, or against the dissection of the dead, or against vaccination, or against birth control or sterilization, or against an amendment to a constitution, or against a form of tax which may be

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 35.

² Cf. Maynard, *op. cit.*, p. 152: "If these provisions [in the United States Constitution] have been a charter of freedom for the Catholic Church . . . the basis decided upon has never been considered by the Catholic Church as being, absolutely considered, the best basis, though American Catholics will not wish any change so long as our society is constituted as it is [i.e., with a non-Catholic majority]. According to Catholic doctrine, however, the union of church and state is still affirmed to be the most perfect solution, in itself." (Copyright, 1941, by The Macmillan Company and used with their permission.) Accordingly, it is not unreasonable to infer that if the Catholic Church had at some future time sufficient political support, it would seek the excision of the religious clause from the First Amendment.

³ Under the alliterative headline, "Churches Seek Bingo Ban Bloc," the *Newark* (New Jersey) *Evening News* reported October 11, 1947, that the New Jersey Council of Churches had sent out a questionnaire to all candidates for the legislature. The first question asked was: "In the event that a resolution is introduced in the legislature in 1948 on the question of allowing gambling by bingo playing for the benefit of churches, charitable institutions, lodges, and/or veterans' organizations, how would you vote?" Little squares were provided in which the candidates could mark their answers either "yes" or "no."

found 'immoral.' ”¹ Every one of these items except Galileo has produced a hot fight in American politics, state or national; and among other issues may be mentioned: marriage and divorce; the definition of crimes and modes of punishment; the censorship of plays, moving pictures, magazines, and books; euthanasia; Sunday closing of places of amusement and business; the use of tobacco and liquor; the suppression of various types of sex behavior; even the celebration of such holidays as Thanksgiving and Columbus Day and the singing of Christmas carols in public schools. Many of these are live issues today.

The way in which politicians tend to react to pressures on these matters was well described by Hazel C. Benjamin:

Few members of Congress felt that their political futures were dependent upon favorable action on these bills, while some feared that a vote for birth control might cost them their seats. Non-Catholics representing strongly Catholic districts, regardless of their own personal opinions, showed a consistent tendency to evade the issue. An inhibiting factor was the general reluctance to arouse religious controversy.²

EDUCATION

The longest continued, and today one of the most lively, disputes between sects and between the state and religious bodies has to do with education. The dispute may be said to have two aspects, the first of which is the effort to introduce religious observances and instruction into public schools. Protestants generally regret that there is so little religious education in the public schools, but they cannot unite upon what the content of that education should be: it is a long way, for example, from the Lutherans' views to those of the Unitarians. The Protestants will commonly compromise upon state laws requiring daily Bible reading.³ But Catholics do not accept the King James Version of the Bible, and the Jews do not accept either, or the New Testament; nor do Christian Scientists or Mormons, unless the Bible is considered in relation to *Science and Health* or *The Book of Mormon*.⁴ As a means of getting around these

¹ *Systematic Politics* (1945), p. 328.

² "Lobbying for Birth Control," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 2 (January, 1938), p. 60.

³ See Alvin W. Johnson, *The Legal Status of Church-State Relationships in the United States* (1934), pp. 3-126.

⁴ The Canon Law of the Catholic Church (Canon 1381) states: "The religious teaching of youth in any school is subject to the authority and inspection of the Church.

conflicts, what were called released-time laws were passed in a number of states. Under these statutes students whose parents requested it were released from school during certain hours each week for religious instruction in their respective churches, or by their priests or pastors in the schools. The United States Supreme Court in 1948 held these laws to be a violation of the First Amendment. Speaking for a majority of the court, Mr. Justice Black said:

Pupils compelled by law to go to schools for secular education are released in part from their legal duty upon the condition that they attend religious classes. This is beyond all question a utilization of the tax-established and tax-supported public school system to aid religious groups to spread their faith. And it falls squarely under the ban of the First Amendment (made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth) as we interpreted it in *Everson v. Board of Education*.¹

The second aspect of the dispute over education revolves around the provision of public funds for the aid or support of private religious schools. Among the Protestants, only the Lutherans maintain private schools in any numbers; hence the problem is primarily that of obtaining public funds for Catholic parochial schools. It is required by the canon law of the Catholic Church that Catholic children shall attend only Catholic schools.² When they do attend, it is only natural that Catholic parents and organizations should seek state aid. The assistance sought takes various forms, such as tax exemption, the payment of salaries of instructors, the provision of textbooks and supplies, state scholarships tenable

The local Ordinaries have the right and duty to watch that nothing is taught contrary to faith or good morals in any of the schools in their territory. They, moreover, have the right to approve the books of Christian doctrine and the teachers of religion, and to demand, for the sake of safeguarding religion and morals, the removal of teachers and books." — Waywod edition, *imprimature* of Archbishop Spellman (1940). Cf. Bishop John F. Noll, *Our National Enemy Number One: Education Without Religion* (1942).

¹ *Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education*, 333 U.S. 203 at 209. In a joint statement issued late in November, 1948, the Roman Catholic bishops of the United States criticized the decision saying, among other things, that its doctrine was "novel" and "ominous."

² Canon 1374 reads: "Catholic children shall not attend non-Catholic, indifferent, schools that are mixed, that is to say, schools open to Catholics and non-Catholics alike. The bishop of the diocese only has the right, in harmony with the instructions of the Holy See, to decide under what circumstances, and with what safeguards to prevent loss of faith, it may be tolerated that Catholic children go to such schools." — Waywod, *op. cit.*

in private schools, and free transportation to and from school. According to a survey reported in the *Yale Law Journal*, the constitutions of forty-six states prohibit the appropriation of public funds to schools controlled by religious organizations.¹ Notwithstanding, a variety of bills to provide public funds for students at parochial schools have been put through state legislatures; the Knights of Columbus are usually the most active group in providing the pressure. When the laws have been passed, they have met with various receptions in state supreme courts; six upheld them, usually on the ground that the aid was not being given to the school but to the student; but at least eight courts have held them to violate the state constitutions. New York amended its state constitution in 1938 to overcome such a decision. These state-aid bills are a source of controversy in the contemporary politics of various states; they arouse intense support and vigorous opposition. In the words of the *Yale Law Journal*, "Entrance of the state upon a program of religious subsidy, however benign, reawakens the slumbering forces of intolerance and hate and invites them to a contest for public support."² The campaign of the National Education Association for federal aid for education has never succeeded, in large part because of Catholic opposition to bills that would not permit the federal funds to be reappropriated by states to Catholic schools.

SOCIAL JUSTICE AND WELFARE

Most religious bodies are interested in legislation that affects public welfare, such as industrial democracy, social security, minimum wages, consumer co-operatives, the distribution of wealth, and so on. Disagreements on these issues have existed among the faiths, but the conflicts have not been so bitter or so intense as those on some other matters, such as education. Both Catholics and Protestants, for example, favor co-operatives. They disagreed on the proposed child-labor amendment to the Constitution, the Protestants generally favoring it, and the Catholics opposing it upon the ground that it would tend to weaken the family; but when Congress forbade child labor in the Wagner Act, and when this statute was upheld by the Supreme Court, the Catholic organizations made no great protest.

The Catholic Church, through the papal encyclicals *Rerum Novarum* in 1891 and *Quadragesimo Anno* in 1931, announced its social and economic

¹ "Catholic Schools and Public Money," 50 *Yale Law Journal*, 917 (1941).

² *Ibid.*, p. 926.

views. It regards private property as a natural right, but demands a "just" wage. It would apparently favor a sort of corporative state with employers, employees, and professional groups organized into strong associations.¹

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Foreign policy and foreign affairs involve religious bodies in various issues.² The maintenance of friendly relations with such Catholic countries as Argentina, Eire, and Spain is always a matter of interest to Catholic groups. When Harold Laski criticized Franco, for example, a later meeting at which he spoke in New York City was picketed by members of the Holy Name Society. On the other hand, conditions of religious freedom and the suppression of Protestant schools and churches in Catholic countries draw the fire of Protestant bodies. The council of bishops of the Methodist Church began a long resolution as follows:

We are aware of the denials of religious liberty in many countries where government, at the insistence of the Roman Catholic hierarchy, has passed legislation seriously limiting the freedom of other religious bodies. We refer particularly to the Argentine, where law now requires the teaching of the Roman Catholic religion even in the schools of Protestant churches. The situation in Italy and Spain denies to Protestants religious freedom which Protestants in the United States desire the Roman Catholics to enjoy. . . .³

The Catholic Church regards communism as its greatest enemy. Many addresses of popes and other prelates have been devoted to attacks upon it. The Catholic societies, such as the Knights of Columbus, publish a

¹ Maynard, *op. cit.*, Chapter 29, pp. 587-616, "The Corporate Vision," discusses the attitudes of the American hierarchy and cites the principal published works. He says (p. 596): "Belgium and France had very interesting Catholic labor movements until they were wrecked, along with so much else that was true and good and beautiful, by the abomination from Berlin. In America, unfortunately, not nearly so much positive effort to achieve Social Justice has been attempted, and to make matters worse, only too often the effort has been associated in the public mind with the name of Father Coughlin of Detroit. He might have done really valuable service had he not, like Father Edward Lodge Curran of Brooklyn, virtually identified Social Justice with Jew-baiting. . . ." (Copyright, 1941, by The Macmillan Company and used with their permission.)

² See C. C. Eckhardt, *The Papacy in World Affairs* (1937); F. R. Hoare, *The Papacy and the Modern State* (1940); and S. W. Baron, *Modern Nationalism and Religion* (1947).

³ *New York Times*, May 8, 1947.

variety of materials against communism and Communist-front organizations. The Association of Catholic Trade Unionists has as its principal purpose the opposition of communism in labor. In foreign affairs these and other Catholic organizations protest and petition whenever a Communist-dominated foreign country interferes with the Church or its officials.

Probably no matter involving foreign affairs has in recent years so stirred the religious bodies in the United States as the appointment by President Franklin Roosevelt of Myron C. Taylor as his special representative at the Vatican. Dr. L. D. Newton, president of the Southern Baptist Convention, called the appointment "unauthorized, unfortunate, and dangerous."¹ Protestant groups generally regarded Taylor's mission as a step toward the recognition of the Vatican state, and few if any conventions of Protestant bodies failed thereafter to pass resolutions denouncing the appointment. When a delegation of Protestant churchmen called upon President Truman shortly after he took office and demanded Taylor's recall, the President promised to recall him as soon as peace was established in Europe. When Taylor was not recalled, new waves of protesting resolutions emerged from the Protestant conventions. These led Cardinal Spellman, speaking at the commencement exercises at Fordham University in June, 1946, to say that the demands for recall represented "the anti-Catholicism of unhooded Klansmen sowing seeds of discord within our treasured nation." To be classed as an unhooded Klansman was too much for Bishop G. Bromley Oxnam of the Methodist Church; he retorted in a sharp reply, of which the following is a sample:

The respectful request for the termination of Mr. Taylor's appointment . . . was made because Protestants believe it violates the American principle of separation of church and state. . . . The Roman Catholic Church insists upon being both a church and a state. How can an American citizen be at once loyal to his own country and President and also loyal to another political state and its political rulers, if the two states differ in international policy?

Jewish groups take a keen interest in the questions arising from attempts to establish a Jewish "national home" in Palestine. They have obtained favorable platform planks from both major parties. In 1944, for example, the Democratic platform urged "the opening of Palestine to unrestricted Jewish immigration and colonization" and "the establishment there of a free and democratic commonwealth." The Republican platform advo-

¹ The *New York Times*, May 8, 1947, carries a summary of Dr. Newton's address.

cated the same objectives and took advantage of the opportunity to "condemn the failure of the President to insist that the mandatory of Palestine [Britain] carry out the provisions of the Balfour Declaration and the mandate while he pretends to support them."

President Roosevelt's meeting with the Arab ruler, Ibn Saud, who opposed Jewish immigration into Palestine, was denounced by Jewish organizations. Congressman Emanuel Celler, New York Democrat, was quoted in the press as saying on March 24, 1945:

There were 1,000,000 Jews in and around my district in New York who voted for Roosevelt unanimously. Their vote made the difference between his victory or defeat. The Jews do not propose to stand for this sort of thing. Roosevelt is going to have to learn that he can't fool all of the Jews all of the time.

PRINCIPAL RELIGIOUS BODIES

PROTESTANT DENOMINATIONS

It is estimated that a little more than half of the people in the United States are affiliated with religious organizations.¹ The largest set of denominations are the Protestants with some 41,943,000 members. But Protestantism as a political force is far below what the total membership might suggest, because the faith is divided into at least two hundred sects. Even the largest and best-known denominations are split up; there are, for instance, twenty-three Baptist bodies, twenty Methodist, and ten Presbyterian. The Federal Council of Churches, established in 1908, is the nominal federation of twenty-two Protestant and three Orthodox bodies, but it is a very loose alliance with no control over its member churches. It may well be doubted if one half of one per cent of the 27,000,000 Protestants represented by the Council have ever heard of it. The Council makes no attempt to produce organic unity among its members. It issues pronouncements upon race relations, world affairs, labor, welfare, and so on; it regards as its concern "all matters affecting the moral and social condition of the people." Occasionally it has conducted a notable investigation of a social problem. It condemned the use of the atomic bomb.

¹ No statistics of religious bodies are satisfactory; some groups count all communicants, some all baptized persons; some only active members. See *Statistical Yearbook 1946*, p. 65. The estimated total membership over thirteen years of age is 59,717,000; of all ages, 72,492,000.

The Federal Council of Churches is regarded as both too modernist in theological beliefs and too liberal in economic and social attitudes by the American Council of Christian Churches, which represents about a million members of fundamentalist denominations, chiefly Baptists and Lutherans.

Rarely has Protestantism in the United States marshaled its full potential political strength. One such occasion, however, was its support of Prohibition when Protestants worked through the Anti-Saloon League and the Woman's Christian Temperance Union.¹ Protestant strength is well distributed over the entire country, and even in those states which have a Catholic majority, the Protestants constitute an influential minority, as the occasional elections of Protestants show. Besides geographical distribution, another element of potential strength is in the body of sixty millions who claim no church affiliation, but who, as descendants of Protestants, are inclined to view public issues in the same way. Jews and Protestants, moreover, are closer together than Jews and Catholics on the questions they both regard as vital, such as separation of church and state, public education, marriage and divorce, and birth control. On bills to authorize voluntary euthanasia for persons incurably ill, the Protestant pastors and the Jewish rabbis unite, as 379 did in New York in January, 1949, when they petitioned the New York legislature to enact such a law. Catholic prelates, however, call such measures "legalized murder." The National Conference of Christians and Jews has come to be largely Protestant and Jewish. All in all, the latent political strength of Protestantism is so great that if aroused in a political contest it could carry all before it, even to the point of amending the Constitution.

THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH

The Roman Catholic Church with 24,000,000 members (17,500,000 over thirteen years of age) is more influential in politics than the Protestant churches, for it possesses a much higher degree of internal unity and exerts a much stronger group discipline. Catholics, however, are heavily concentrated in the states of the Northeast, as a glance at the list of Catholic members of the Senate and the House of Representatives reported in *The Catholic Almanac* will show. There is a sort of Catholic veto on a presidential candidate of either party, but the Catholics cannot

¹ See Peter Odegard, *Pressure Politics: The Story of the Anti-Saloon League* (1928), especially Chapter 1, pp. 1-35, "The Church in Action Against the Saloon."

pick one and be sure to nominate him, even in the Democratic Party. A Catholic has virtually no chance of election to any state-wide office in any of the southern and most of the western states. The Catholic hierarchy is conscious of this weakness, and an important aspect of the work of the National Catholic Welfare Conference is its Rural Life Conference, which has made some attempts to induce Catholics to leave the eastern cities and settle on western farms. At its 1947 meeting the Catholic Rural Life Conference went further than ever before and urged legislation "to discourage ever-increasing large land holdings and to provide opportunity for genuine family farm operations."¹

The pressure activities of the Catholic Church in national politics are focused in the National Catholic Welfare Conference (1919) with headquarters in Washington. The Administrative Board, which controls broad policy-making, is composed of ten archbishops and bishops elected at the annual meeting of the cardinals, archbishops, and bishops of the American hierarchy. The work of the NCWC is performed through nine departments, such as Catholic Action, Education, Social Action, and Press.² The organization is not markedly different in function or structure from that of other groups seeking to influence legislation. Its Legal Department, for example, serves as

a clearing house of information on legislation enacted or pending in Congress and in State Legislatures and affecting the Church. . . . This Department analyzes legislation and court decisions concerning matters of social and religious interest and provides information and advice to Catholic groups and institutions. It presents the Catholic point of view on legislation and represents Catholic charitable and welfare institutions before administrative agencies of government.³

The Knights of Columbus, the Holy Name Society, the Catholic Actors Guild, the Association of Catholic Trade Unionists, the Catholic War Veterans, and the Catholic Writers Guild are some organizations, not under the NCWC, which occasionally take part in politics. The Knights

¹ *New York Times*, November 26, 1947.

² For a full explanation of the work of each agency, consult the current *Catholic Almanac*; for a Protestant criticism, see Harold E. Fey, "Can Catholicism Win America?" a series of eight articles, especially the last one, in *The Christian Century*, vols. 61-62 (November 29, 1944-January 17, 1945).

³ C. J. McCabe, "NCWC: Expression of Our Unified Faith," leaflet (n.d.), p. 7. See also E. Pendleton Herring, *Group Representation before Congress* (1929), pp. 216-217.

of Columbus, a Catholic fraternal order for men, has more than half a million members.

THE JEWS

There are about 4,650,000 Jews in the United States, heavily concentrated in cities, and especially in New York City. Their religious organization is fully as loose as the Protestants', but although the Jews are divided into orthodox, conservative, and reformed branches, there is nothing comparable to the extreme sectarianism characteristic of the Protestant faith. The great majority of American Jews are adherents of Zionism, a movement begun in Austria in 1895 by Theodor Herzl.¹ It sought to establish a Jewish state in Palestine. The five chief political parties in the new state of Israel, all Zionist, have their branches in American Zionist associations which bear the same names. The largest of these is called the General Zionists.² Their principal activity has, since the establishment of the new nation, been the raising of money to prepare and settle the land, for few American Jews wish to emigrate. The American Council for Judaism, headed by Lessing J. Rosenwald, opposed Zionism, insisting that, because of their diverse national origins, Jews do not constitute either a race or a nationality, but a religion. This group has about 10,000 members and about one million sympathizers.

There is some anti-Semitism in the United States. A *Fortune* survey sought to measure it statistically, but the results are open to question. Some 6.5 per cent of the respondents gave what were regarded as anti-Semitic replies.³ Whatever the amount, it is an upper- and middle-class phenomenon, heavily concentrated in the Northeast and Middle West, and it appears to be decreasing. Jewish organizations such as B'nai B'rith, the Jewish War Veterans, and the National Council of Jewish Women have sought to combat anti-Semitism by engaging in positive propaganda, as through the National Conference of Christians and Jews and the Council Against Intolerance, and by advocating anti-discrimination and fair educational practice laws. These latter proposed statutes

¹ For a recent discussion of Zionism, see *Fortune*, vol. 36 (September, 1947), pp. 116-119, 146-157. For a discussion of the branches of American Judaism, see Milton Steinberg, *A Partisan Guide to the Jewish Problem* (1945).

² *New York Times*, December 27, 1948.

³ *Fortune*, vol. 33 (February, 1946), p. 257. See also Donald S. Strong, *Organized Anti-Semitism in America* (1941).

would remove the tax exemptions from educational institutions that discriminate against Jewish students.

Practical politicians with no personal anti-Semitic attitudes take account of the feeling in the country. Just as there is an unmentioned (and often denied) quota for the admission of Jews to some private colleges, so politicians often do not want to appoint so many Jews as to produce an anti-Semitic reaction. The results of political caution can be observed by looking over any well-balanced ticket, but comments on the matter, for obvious reasons, do not often find their way into print. James A. Farley, however, cites two instances in which Franklin Roosevelt refused to appoint Jews: "I cannot appoint a Jew in the District Court of Appeals," he quotes the President as saying, because "there is a strong feeling against the Jews throughout the country." And the President told Farley that, while he knew Felix Frankfurter wanted to go on the Supreme Court bench, "I told Felix that I could not appoint him in view of the anti-Semitic feeling. I couldn't appoint another Jew, but if Brandeis should resign or die, I told Frankfurter I would appoint him the same day without hesitation."¹

The Jews have never attached themselves to either major party. Boss Edward J. Flynn of the Bronx, who certainly ought to know, says that there is no such thing as a Jewish bloc: "The Jew is a discriminating individualist."² The Jews demand "recognition" on tickets, and they resent intensely any slurs at their faith, but they will not vote for a candidate just because he is Jewish. In the election of 1945 in New York City, for example, when Jonah Goldstein, a former Tammany Democrat, was candidate for mayor, he got 95,500 votes in the Bronx to 227,800 for O'Dwyer; in the city as a whole he got 431,600 to O'Dwyer's 1,125,300. On the other hand, a Jew whom they know and admire, such as Herbert H. Lehman, will probably get some extra votes.

RELIGION IN STATE AND LOCAL POLITICS

In state and local politics religion is often of peculiar importance. In Utah the Mormon Church dominates both parties and consequently the entire policy of the state. Non-Mormons are elected to office, but they are not re-elected if they prove unfriendly to the interests of the Mormon Church. In some southern states it is not enough for a politician to be a Protestant; he must be a Methodist or a Baptist. The issue in hundreds,

¹ Farley, *op. cit.*, p. 162.

² *You're the Boss* (1947), p. 222.

if not thousands, of school board elections has been not educational policy but the candidates' religion. Conditions vary from place to place, but in general it may be said that membership in the appropriate religious body is necessary to success in local politics — a candidate's religious connections are often more important than his economic views — and on the other hand, to offend any important religious group is a sure way to defeat or retirement.

In addition to the issues of public policy already mentioned, others peculiar to state and local politics arouse the various religious groups. What was known as the trusteeship controversy in the Catholic Church illustrates how public policy may run counter to religious policy. The laws of many states in the nineteenth century required that title to religious property must be vested in a board of trustees, but canon law requires that it be vested in the bishop. As a result, either one law or the other had to be violated until, after a series of pressure efforts, the laws of the states were changed.¹ The taxation of church property is another perennial source of controversy. Property actually used for religious and educational purposes and not for profit is invariably exempt, but disputes arise over the taxation of property used for quasi-religious purposes, such as YMCA buildings and Knights of Columbus halls. Some states provide that a fixed amount (e.g., the first \$5000) of such property is tax-exempt, the remainder taxable. The taxation of property serving as endowment for religious and quasi-religious groups is another source of friction.²

Many of the tactics of religious groups in politics have already been mentioned, such as the religious press and the use of other techniques of persuasion. Other tactics, such as the use of direct lobbying, are not substantially different from those used by other interests.³ It is worth

¹ In Missouri a group of trustees were excommunicated because they obeyed the state law. — Billington, *op. cit.*, p. 298.

² Wilbur L. Cross tells in his autobiography, *Connecticut Yankee* (1943), pp. 278–280, how he, a Protestant, unable to stop a bill from being passed over his veto to tax the athletic fields of Yale University, called the Catholic Bishop McAuliffe of Hartford and told him how the bill would also tax the athletic fields of St. Thomas Seminary. When the sponsor of the bill, a Senator Cooney, told Governor Cross it would surely be passed over his veto, “ ‘Bishop McAuliffe and Monsignor Flynn,’ I informed him, ‘are coming in for a conference with me at four o’clock, and I am sure they would like to hear you expound your views on the taxation of educational institutions.’ He stared, then smiled, and said a conference was not necessary. . . . In this manner the bill was quietly put to death.”

³ For a recent instance of lobbying, see Fey, *op. cit.*, vol. 61, p. 1410.

noting, however, that religious organizations are peculiarly sensitive to criticism. The Christian Scientists will boycott any newspaper that reflects upon their sect. Will Irwin wrote: "In the early days of Christian Science, the newspapers were critical of instances where the sick died under treatment of a healer. The new sect thereupon organized a committee to stimulate floods of protesting letters. This policy, continued year after year, stopped all criticism."¹ The First Amendment may forbid the official government to censor the press, but it does not prevent censorship by private government, not even pre-censorship:

The publisher [Annenberg] wanted to please the Catholics of his city under all circumstances, and there were in Philadelphia many thousands of them, whose archbishop, Denis Cardinal Dougherty, stood for no publishing nonsense. Any article or picture spreads prepared for the *Inquirer* referring to Catholics were taken to his office for inspection or approval, either from his Eminence . . . or subordinate prelates. This precaution was due to a still remembered contretemps which had happened on the Philadelphia *Public Ledger* years ago when something in print of a nature offensive to Catholics had slipped by, and the paper had lost a large number of readers before it could make amends.²

People who talk and write about American politics frequently appear to consider only or mainly its economic motivations. Or, like Governor Smith, they hope that such religious conflicts as that over the separation of church and state have been relegated "to the limbo of forgotten controversies." That this one is still a very lively controversy was shown in 1948 when a militant Protestant organization was established with the ponderous title: Protestants and Other Americans United for the Separation of Church and State. Its manifesto immediately drew the fire of the Knights of Columbus and of various Catholic bishops. The issues of religion in politics are as contemporary as the latest school board election, as world-wide as religious opposition to communism. "Church and state are not distinct associations with completely different functional objectives but rival organizations with objectives and ideologies at variance

¹ *Propaganda and the News* (1936), p. 273.

² Emile Gauvreau, *My Last Million Readers* (1941), p. 422. The Cleveland *Plain Dealer* once lost 70,000 in circulation because of a Catholic boycott. See Richard L. Maher in *Our Fair City* (1947), Robert S. Allen, editor, p. 147. *Time*, vol. 44 (October 23, 1944), p. 59, reports the boycott of the Scripps-Howard San Francisco *News* at the instance of Archbishop John J. Mitty because it refused to suppress a story about a priest who had pleaded guilty to drunken driving.

with each other at many points.”¹ There is a considerable dispute as to whether religious interests are advancing or declining in their hold upon the American people; in either event the degree of change does not appear to be marked, and religion may be expected to be a powerful force in American politics for the indefinite future. Indeed, if governments continue to expand their powers and functions, an increasing number of clashes between church and state may be anticipated.

¹ Floyd A. Cave, “Religion and Politics” in *Twentieth Century Political Thought*, Joseph S. Roucek, editor (1946), p. 188. This monograph goes further into the political theory of religious groups than it has been possible to do here, and cites the recent literature. Cf. *Annals*, vol. 256 (March, 1948).

Political Activities of Professional and Occupational Groups

"GROWLED COUNCILMAN MAPEL: 'Nobody can touch the American Medical Association. . . . Talk about the closed shop of the AFL and the CIO — they are a bunch of pikers.'"¹ The Denver councilman's surprised outburst occurred when the city council attempted to relieve the overcrowded condition of Denver hospitals by admitting private patients into the Denver General Hospital, which had 250 empty beds. The council discovered that its proposed action was intolerable to the American Medical Association, and gave way, providing one more illustration of the fact that public government must often bow to private government. Councilman Mapel, like many other citizens, did not realize the extent to which the professions in recent years have acquired the powers of the state, learned the tactics of organization, and have themselves become little governments.

PROFESSIONS AS ORGANIZED GROUPS

CHARACTERISTICS OF A PROFESSION

A profession is a vocation, recognized as such by law or custom, which commonly requires specialized intellectual training. The amount and kind of education or training differ widely; thus, a college professor possessing three degrees is a member of the teaching profession, and so is a district schoolteacher who has never advanced beyond the eighth grade.

¹ *Time*, vol. 45 (February 19, 1945), p. 53.

Members of certain professions or semi-professions, such as purchasing agents, are virtually indistinguishable from members of business groups.¹ Other professional groups, such as the American Association of State Highway Executives, are intimately associated with governments; still others, such as the American Society of Agricultural Engineers, with farming. Some honorific social status commonly attaches to membership in a recognized profession.

THE NUMBER OF PROFESSIONS

The Department of Commerce estimated in 1942 that there were about 400 professional organizations with national membership. In 1939 W. Brooke Graves found "well over 200" professions and occupations so far recognized by law that they were licensed in various states. The most commonly licensed, with the number of states licensing them, were: accountants (45 states), architects (40), barbers (37), beauticians (31), chiropractors (39), dentists (48), engineers (39), insurance agents and brokers (48), lawyers (48), midwives (25), mine foremen and mine operators (7), nurses (48), optometrists (48), osteopaths (35), pharmacists (48), physicians (48), real estate brokers (33), teachers (48), undertakers (48), veterinarians (40).² Opinions will differ as to whether some of these are professions and consequently whether their associations are not really trade associations; at any rate, a very limited number of these could be called "learned professions."

PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS

Membership in Professional Associations. The number of members in an association varies from 3000 in the American Institute of Architects to 386,000 in the National Education Association (hereafter referred to

¹ The Department of Commerce recognizes the difficulty of drawing a clear distinction between trade and professional associations and merges the two in its main list. It notes that professional associations are usually composed of individuals rather than business units or institutions, and in so far as organizations "serve primarily as agencies for regulating the commercial conduct or promoting the economic interests of their membership, or of the business or vocation in which the associates are engaged, a trade association status would seem to be created." — C. J. Judkins, *Trade and Professional Associations of the United States*, Department of Commerce, Industrial Series No. 3 (1942), p. 2.

² W. Brooke Graves, "Professional and Occupational Restrictions," 13 *Temple University Law Quarterly*, 341 (April, 1939).

as NEA). With rare exceptions, membership in a professional association falls below the number practicing the profession, varying from 10 to 60 per cent. Nevertheless, the associations commonly assert that they are representative and therefore speak for the whole profession. Many associations have various types of membership with varying privileges, such as honorary, life, contributing, constituent, and associate. The dues (which support the work of the association) commonly vary with the type of membership an individual holds, from a dollar a year to three hundred dollars. All types of membership usually entitle the members to receive the journal of the association.

Clusters of Associations. The associations in a field tend to form clusters around some big association. Thus, there are seventy associations connected in one way or another with education, from the American Association for Adult Education to the World Federation of Education Associations, but all in varying degrees are affected by or subordinate to the NEA. Similarly there are thirty associations of the medical and public health professions, generally dominated by the American Medical Association (referred to in its own and other publications as the AMA). The American Bar Association (ABA) has its cluster of thirty associations, from the American Association of Law Libraries to the Trade and Commercial Bar Association. In some fields the professional associations have a formal federation or peak association to represent them in Washington and before state legislatures. The Engineers' Council for Professional Development, for example, covers engineering societies from the American Institute of Chemical Engineers to the Society for the Promotion of Engineering Education. Even where no outright alliance is established, the societies in one field tend to work together; doctors, druggists, and nurses, for example.

Typical Organization of Professional Associations. Some small associations have only a national membership, but the great majority are federations whose structures parallel the levels of government in the United States. Thus, there are city or county locals, often called chapters; above them are the state associations; and above them all, the national. In many organizations, membership in a local chapter carries with it membership in all above; but in others — the bar, for example — an individual must take out separate membership at each level. In some groups, the state associations are virtually autonomous; in others, they are only stages in a hierarchy. The typical national association has an annual convention, a sort of plenary meeting of the profession, at which national

officers are elected and resolutions passed. There is almost always a national executive committee of some sort, called the council, the board of governors, the directors, or something similar, which may be elected by the convention, or by the state associations, or by mail ballot. It selects the executive secretary, who is often the only person who devotes his full time to the work of the group. The council meets between conventions and on call of the president or the secretary. Between conventions it is the voice of the profession.¹

Professional organizations in the United States, like labor unions, are a growth of the nineteenth century. Although there were local ones earlier, among the first of the national organizations were the American Medical Association (1847), the American Institute of Architects (1857), The American Educational Association (1857), the American Dental Association (1859), and the American Veterinary Medical Association (1863). Since 1900, scores of associations have been established.

AIMS AND PRESSURES OF PROFESSIONAL GROUPS

LICENSING THE PROFESSION

As the members of unorganized professions have observed the benefits of licensing to the long-established professions, they have organized and brought pressure upon the state legislatures to set up licensing boards, until, says Graves:

The licensing of practitioners of the various learned professions has come to be an important function of state government. It is carried on under the state police power, and is intended chiefly to protect the public health and safety, to prevent fraud and the exploitation of the public generally. . . . Licenses confer a privilege; they are not contracts which can be protected from any reasonable exercise of the police power. . . . In *Lambert v. Yellowley* [272 U.S. 581 (1926)] the court said, "There is no right to practice medicine which is not subordinate to the police power. . . ." ²

The motive of protecting the public from fraud and malpractice is mixed with a desire to keep down the numbers of individuals in the profession.

¹ The structure of some groups is extremely complicated; see, for example, the charts of medical societies, especially of the AMA, in Oliver Garceau, *The Political Life of the American Medical Association* (1941), pp. 14, 18, 22. This book is an excellent study of the internal politics of an important contemporary professional association.

² Graves, *op. cit.*, p. 341.

Commonly such statutes provide that those persons in the state engaged in the practice of the profession at the time the law is passed may be licensed without examination upon their payment of the license fee, but persons entering thereafter must pass an examination. The fees go to support the board and its work of policing the profession.

The Guild Tendency. Once established as a licensed profession, a group seldom relaxes its pressures on the legislature. On the contrary, it seeks statutes to increase the number of years of study required before examination, to raise the standards of professional schools, to increase probationary periods, and to permit the profession greater and greater control of the licensing board. Thus, the powers of the state are delegated to an essentially private group. What is called the integrated bar carries this guild tendency to its extreme; in about half of the states the bar association is incorporated by law, and every lawyer who wishes to practice must belong.¹ This system is clearly a closed shop in a profession. The ejection of a member from the association then carries a severe sanction: he is barred from earning a living at his profession.

Control of Examinations and Standards. The next step is to obtain laws which vest in the licensing board the power to refuse to permit persons to take the examinations who are not graduates of schools approved by the licensed profession. Thus, state medical boards have been upheld by courts in refusing to admit to examinations persons who were not graduates of schools classified as "A" or "B" by the AMA, and consequently foreign-trained physicians of the highest distinction may be barred without examination. If the examinations are unfair there is commonly no appeal to a court; the ABA, which is strongly in favor of the judicial review of most administrative determinations, is unenthusiastic about judicial review of the work of bar examiners.

The constitutional nostril of the court begins to sniff, however, when the legislature adopts not only the existing standards of some technical or professional group, but any which it may prescribe in the future. A law requiring all electric wiring to be in accordance with the national electrical code and making violation a crime was held unconstitutional [in *Kansas v. Crawford*, 104 Kan. 141, 177 Pac. 360 (1919)]. The code was the joint work of a number of professional associations and was subject to revision every two years. The court found it unjust to place a criminal law upon such a basis.²

¹ M. Louise Rutherford, *The Influence of the American Bar Association on Public Opinion and Legislation* (1937), pp. 32-33.

² Louis L. Jaffe, "Law Making by Private Groups," 51 *Harvard Law Review* 229 (1937).

There is no denying, however, that the present tendency is for legislatures to give in year after year before the pressures of the professional groups and to delegate to them more and more of the police power of the state.

Control of Licensing Boards. The licensing board is almost always composed of members of the profession that is licensed, and the members have, therefore, the same motivations as the rest of the profession to raise standards of practice and to make entrance into it more and more difficult. Even this, however, is not sufficient to satisfy the groups. They further seek and obtain statutes to vest the power to appoint the board in the professional group which the board is to license. Typical statutes require the governor to appoint the members of a board from a panel of nominees selected by the profession, either through the council of the association or through a vote at a convention or by mail, but in a number of states the profession names the members of the board without any action by the governor. In California, for instance, the medical association names the board of medical examiners. Regulation by the regulated could go no further than this.

Policing the Profession. In addition to the powers to admit to examinations and to set and mark the examinations, most professional boards have certain powers to police the profession. Virtually all professions have codes of ethics which are changed from time to time by the associations or by their officers. The boards commonly incorporate some or all of these canons of ethics into rules and orders. These codes and rules cover not merely matters that may be called moral, such as a doctor's responsibility to safeguard the secrets of his patients, but include as well such stipulations as cleanliness, quality of work, and professional advertising. Many boards receive enough money from license fees — few, if any, are supported by appropriations from a state's general funds — to hire investigators to check up on the practitioners to see that they abide by the codes of ethics and the rules of the boards. A violation discovered by the investigators may result in suspension or revocation of the license to practice.

The professions want the disciplinary power left in their own hands. Dr. Morris Fishbein, official historian of the AMA and for many years its secretary, noted that the first president at the first national meeting in 1848 "proceeded to tell the medical profession of his day what has been so frequently told it in the years that have passed: that the medical profession always cleans its own house, that it does not need extraneous assistance in bringing about reform."¹ No doubt labor, business, and

¹ Morris Fishbein, *History of the American Medical Association* (1947), p. 41.

other groups would like to be free to clean their own houses, too, without any extraneous assistance.

Many but not all of the canons of ethics have a strong tinge of economic interest. Medical societies, for example, regard it as unethical for a physician, unless he is employed by the Army, Navy, or Veterans' Administration, to engage in contract medicine; that is, to work for an annual salary rather than for fees. When in 1937 government employees in Washington, D.C., formed a co-operative called Group Health and engaged physicians on salary to care for their members, the AMA and the Medical Association of the District of Columbia refused to allow members of the AMA to consult with doctors employed by Group Health and refused to allow such doctors to take their patients to hospitals in Washington controlled by members of the AMA. For these actions the medical societies and their officers were indicted for violation of the Sherman Act. The societies were found guilty, and the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.¹ Mr. Justice Roberts in his opinion brushed aside the professional ethics involved, saying that the associations "were interested solely in preventing the operation of a business conducted in corporate form by Group Health."

The older professions of law and medicine have succeeded in having legislative bodies enact many of their ethical concepts into statutes. Clients' confidence laws, as well as statutes limiting or forbidding contingent fees and fee-splitting, are examples. If the guild tendency in professions continues, no doubt further pressures will be put on legislative bodies to write more of the ethical concepts of more professions into the criminal law.

SUPPORTING THE PROFESSION

Demands on Public Funds. The professions differ widely in their demands upon public funds. The bar and medicine want adequately supported law and medical schools attached to state universities, and they want (and have) tax exemptions for law and medical schools attached to privately controlled universities. Financial support or tax exemptions are also sought for hospitals, law libraries, teachers' institutes, and teachers' colleges.

The teaching profession, more than any other, is dependent upon public moneys. The NEA seeks federal aid for education, to be administered

¹ *American Medical Association v. United States*, 317 U.S. 526 (1941).

preferably by a Department of Education in the Cabinet, a minimum salary of \$2400 for teachers with college degrees, and teachers' retirement laws to which the states contribute. Teachers' associations also seek automatic increment laws so that teachers will be certain to receive raises in salary regardless of the will of local school boards. Many other demands, aimed primarily at the quality of education, cost money, such as "a professionally trained and competent principal at the head of every school," "a strong, adequately staffed state department of education in every state," and "reasonable class size and equitable distribution of the teaching load."¹

The attitude of organized medicine is the very opposite of that of the NEA. Instead of seeking more government support, as the teachers do, the AMA sees the socialization of medicine even in such measures as the Sheppard-Towner Maternal Welfare Act, which it condemned.² In 1928 its Bureau of Legal Medicine and Legislation called to the attention of the House of Delegates of the AMA "the manner in which the federal government had begun socialization of medicine through the expansion of the care given to veterans."³ Again in 1933 it was reported to the convention of the AMA that its "legislative committee had appeared before the Congress and had gone on record as opposing the erection of any additional hospitals for the care of veterans. . . . The legislative committee of the American Medical Association had proposed, moreover, that if the government intended to continue to provide [medical] service to veterans, those receiving such service should be permitted to select their own hospitals and their own physicians."⁴ Here, however, a professional association collided head-on with the American Legion, and it is perhaps superfluous to add that more hospitals were built in spite of the AMA. When the medical profession regards the public care of veterans as socialism, very naturally it views with horror such plans as those that Governor Earl Warren of California attempted without success to get through the legislature and the perennial bills for public medicine introduced in Congress for the CIO. At a secret meeting of the House of Delegates of the AMA on December 1, 1948, it was voted to assess each of the 140,000 members \$25 to build up a fund of \$3,500,000 to fight "socialized medicine" in the form of compulsory health insurance, as proposed by President Truman. "It was learned," reported the *New York Times*, "that the

¹ From "Victory Action Program Goals," *NEA Journal*, vol. 36 (October, 1947), p. 501.

² Fishbein, *op. cit.*, pp. 331, 384.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 374.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 399.

money would be used to enlarge the AMA's Washington office to facilitate lobbying activities before Congress, a 'factual and dignified' advertising campaign, and the employment of a top-flight advertising and public relations company."¹

Other Statutes Affecting Economic Status. Various statutes will affect the economic status of professions. Bills to bar the practice of chiropractic, if passed, will obviously end that profession in the states that pass them. What are called basic science bills — that is, bills that would require all persons who seek to practice any of the healing arts to pass certain examinations in science — limit the ability of the unorthodox practitioners of medicine to practice.

The American Bar Association has always been deeply devoted to the doctrine of judicial review. Arguments in the *American Bar Association Journal* are always put on a high constitutional plane and in the most dignified and public-welfare terms to the effect that judicial review is a protection for the individual. The non-lawyer may suspect that, while the bar is sincerely convinced of the merits of judicial review, other motives are also involved: the more judicial review there is, the more demand there will be for the services of lawyers. At least since 1933, wrote John Dickinson, the ABA has been interested in widening the scope of the judicial review of the actions of administrative officers and agencies, and as one association committee said, "To be effective, review of an administrative decision . . . must extend to the determination of both law and fact."² Literally considered, this would enable any appellate court to conduct its own hearings on a rate case. When this review provision was incorporated in the Walter-Logan Bill of 1939, President Franklin Roosevelt vetoed it, saying in part, "The bill that is now before me is one of the repeated efforts of lawyers who desire to have all processes of government conducted through lawsuits and of interests which desire to escape regulation."³ But when almost the same bill was passed by the Seventy-Ninth Congress President Truman approved it. The next step is what the *Journal* calls "Our Association's proposed Administrative Practitioners Act," which would limit the right of persons not members of the bar (e.g., tax experts, statisticians) to appear before administrative agencies except in the rôle of witnesses or by invitation of the agency.

¹ December 3, 1948.

² John Dickinson, "Administrative Procedure Act: Scope and Grounds of Broadened Judicial Review," *American Bar Association Journal*, vol. 33 (May, 1947), p. 435.

³ *Congressional Record*, vol. 86, Part 12, p. 13,943.

Obviously such an act would increase the need for the services of lawyers in the administrative process.

In the states, the bar associations, backed by the ABA, constantly press for bills to repress the "unauthorized practice of the law" by corporations and laymen. The announced objective of this effort is that "the public must be protected from chicanery and fraud."¹ But one New Jersey editor said of such a bill that it "seems to be designed to prevent anyone from signing on a dotted line without the advice and consent of the State Bar Association." The bills are very broadly drafted because the bar associations do not want to define unauthorized practice; they prefer to have the courts decide what it is as cases arise.

CONFLICTS OF INTERESTS

Conflicts Within Associations. Each profession represents a group of persons with a considerable identity of interest, but within any one association there are conflicts and politics. In the AMA there are those physicians who agreed with the majority of the famous Committee on the Costs of Medical Care, and there are those who agreed with the minority.² Intimate acquaintance with almost any association will reveal the existence of parties or factions. The question of whether Negroes should be admitted to membership gives rise in many associations to conflicts which are strikingly like those in the AFL unions. Negro doctors, for example, commonly have great difficulty in treating their patients in white hospitals. The racial friction in various professions has caused the Negroes to set up several associations of their own. Sometimes conflicts within an association become so intense that a schism occurs, such as the formation of the National Lawyers Guild. The teaching profession is divided between those who favor an alliance with organized labor, such as the Teachers Union has, and those who are content with the less militant tactics of the NEA and its state associations.

Conflicts Between Professions. No profession has everything its own way. There are frictions between architects and engineers; between medical doctors and chiropractors, naturopaths, and osteopaths; between doctors and lawyers, and many others. The organized realtors oppose

¹ Rutherford, *op. cit.*, p. 99. The drive for bills to repress unauthorized practice is reviewed by Rutherford to 1937, pp. 93-99. See also the annual reports of the ABA for accounts of efforts to obtain unauthorized practice legislation and its enforcement.

² Fishbein, *op. cit.*, pp. 433-435; and Garceau, *op. cit.*, pp. 86-96.

the bills to repress the unauthorized practice of the law, because realtors have constantly to deal with leases, mortgages, and bills of sale. For every story of an error or fraud on the part of a realtor that the lawyers can adduce, the realtors can bring up a case of error or fraud by a lawyer. The lawyers and the physicians clash over physicians' lien bills, which give doctors' claims priority over those of lawyers, undertakers, and others in the settlement of estates.

Conflicts with Non-Professional Groups. When a professional association goes before a legislative body seeking laws that primarily or entirely affect its own activities, the association is very likely to succeed, since legislators are prone to conclude that by voting for the measure they can make a few friends and no enemies. But if a proposal arouses the opposition of some nonprofessional group, particularly a large one, the professional society is very likely to meet defeat. Thus, the licensing bills will pass, more and more of them year by year, and bills to raise the standards of a profession, such as bills requiring college degrees for high-school teachers, will also pass. But bills to increase teachers' salaries or to appropriate funds to teachers' retirement systems will, in normal times, arouse the opposition of taxpayers' associations, chambers of commerce, and the real estate boards. And the great drive of the NEA for a Department of Education and federal aid met the opposition of the Roman Catholic Church and its organizations as well as of the Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers.

When, on the other hand, a nonprofessional group seeks a measure that runs contrary to the wishes of a professional group, it is likely to fail, particularly if the measure, to succeed, must be administered by the profession. The CIO, for example, has made no progress in its drive for public medicine because the AMA and all its associated societies are opposed; legislators are likely to say that it would be futile to establish a system of public medical care if it had to be operated by a profession that is opposed to it in principle.

PRESSURES ON ADMINISTRATION

Just as the farm groups think of the Department of Agriculture as peculiarly their own, and just as business regards the Department of Commerce as its service agency, so do the professional groups look upon the appropriate agencies as their provinces. The licensing boards they regard as particularly their own. Even attempts to convert accumulated

and excess fee money to the general fund of the state will be opposed by the secretaries of the associations upon the ground that "it's our money." The medical societies feel that departments of health are their adjuncts — "Why, we got the bill through to establish the department!" their secretaries will say. They feel, therefore, that they have a vested right to determine what types of medical practice shall be available to public patients. The societies representing the orthodox practice of medicine have generally succeeded in keeping osteopaths, chiropractors, and other heterodox practitioners out of the Army, Navy, and Veterans' Administration.

The bar associations feel that they have a special interest in the court system. They want only lawyers appointed or elected to courts, even the lowest. Where judges are elected, the bar associations often seek to have both political parties agree upon a slate of candidates approved by the bar. The ABA tries to get Presidents to nominate men acceptable to the bar. The frictions that result were reported in a recent issue of the *Journal*: of ten nominees to federal courts, a committee of the association approved of seven, who were confirmed; it succeeded in having consideration of one nomination postponed; but three were confirmed over its opposition.

Our Committee suffered its most serious setback in the nomination and confirmation of Representative Leo F. Rayfiel of Brooklyn. . . . The New York State Bar Association and our Association's Committee took the stand that the selection of Mr. Rayfiel by the political organization of his party had been made on the basis of rewarding faithful party service and that the nominee had not had sufficient courtroom and professional experience to warrant a disregarding of the reasons for his selection.¹

The organized bar brings discreet pressure upon judges to get them to appoint only lawyers as examiners, referees, masters, and so on, but here the associations meet the pressure of party organizations for patronage.

LEADERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL GROUPS

The same oligarchical tendencies that may be observed in most human organizations are particularly noticeable in professional associations, because the vast majority of the rank-and-file members are busy with

¹ "Federal Judicial Nominees: Favorable Results from Association's Scrutiny," *American Bar Association Journal*, vol. 33 (September, 1947), p. 10.

their own practices and pay little attention to the work of the association, except when they attend conventions or receive letters from the permanent secretary asking them to write or speak to their legislators or congressmen about some measure in which the society is interested. Year after year in most professional associations the same secretary is re-elected. The presidents are usually outstanding practitioners who serve only a single one-year term, and frequently do not suspend their private practices for that one year. They are, therefore, dependent upon the national or state secretary who thereby establishes his views over the years as the views of the association. Real leadership comes to be vested in the secretary, and a little revolution may be necessary to oust him. The position of Dr. Morris Fishbein, secretary of the AMA and editor of its *Journal*, is notable but not unique: "Today the bulk of lay and medical opinion centers on Dr. Fishbein as the czar of the industry, the boss of the machine. He is definitely the most dynamic, the most vocal, the most capable in terms of myth-making and business management. He knows more doctors and has made himself best known to the public."¹ As has been noted of the agricultural and other groups, leadership tends to become a full-time job; and just as a dirt farmer cannot hope to continue both his farming and his leadership in his farm organization, so the secretary of a large professional group cannot find time to continue the private practice of his profession.

TACTICS AND EFFECTIVENESS

Professional associations do not have the large number of members and therefore the potential voting strength possessed by agricultural, labor, and veterans' groups, and the membership of professional societies is so scattered that it cannot be made effective in terms of votes even when a group, such as teachers, is fairly large. Nor do the professional associations have sources of income comparable to those of the business groups. Their tactics have had to be adapted to these facts.

In some cases they can use the boycott and the blacklist against government agencies. When, under Governor Eugene Talmadge, conditions of academic freedom at the University of Georgia did not meet the standards of the American Association of University Professors, various associations of professional and graduate schools refused to admit graduates of the University of Georgia. This action contributed to Talmadge's defeat

¹ Garceau, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

and to a change in educational policy. Similar tactics were utilized by the NEA against school administrators in Chicago. The administrations concerned always dislike publicity attached to AAUP investigations of invasions of academic freedom by college authorities, but in an age of pressure politics mere publicity is relatively ineffective. The NEA has also relied upon publicity and has deplored teachers' strikes as unprofessional conduct; that the average salary is still thirty-seven dollars a week and that the association must press for a minimum of \$2400 a year for teachers with college degrees is sufficient evidence of the weakness of publicity as a tactic.

Because a certain monopoly of knowledge and expertness is possessed by the members of a profession, publicity issued by them may be effective on public measures of a technical nature. If the medical society asserts that a new sewage-disposal plant is necessary to public health, the citizens of a city are likely to accept this testimony rather than that of the politicians in the council. This expertness often extends to the bills drafted by or for professional associations. When physicians, for example, assert that some drug is sufficiently poisonous so that it should not be sold except on prescription, the legislators are unable of their own knowledge to assert otherwise, and as they say, they "go along" with the professional group. In addition, there is a kind of carry-over of the prestige attaching to expert knowledge in a professional field to other fields where the possessor has no real expertness. "The doctor has been brought up to believe that the layman is unfit to have an opinion in medical matters. It is unfortunately true that the doctor habitually extends this value judgment to include medical politics and medical economics, fields where it might almost be said that the doctor is inherently unfit."¹ The same tendency may be observed in other professions.

The special advantage of the bar in legislative bodies has already been noted. The numerous lawyer-legislators undoubtedly listen with special attentiveness to appeals from the bar associations, but they are subject to counter-pressures too; they might want to vote for unauthorized practice bills, but they dare not do so because of their parties or because of the pressure from realtors and others. In the laws of most states, however, so many results of bar association pressures will be found, such as statutes requiring that tax appeals boards shall be composed in whole or in part of lawyers, that it may reasonably be concluded that the bar has taken a considerable advantage of its over-representation in legislative bodies.

¹ Garceau, *op. cit.*, p. 155.

To show the precise extent of this favoritism would probably be impossible, particularly because the issue is invariably confused by being mixed up with the protection of the public from error or fraud.¹

Some professional associations do a considerable amount of free professional public service. The work of the bar in reorganizing and simplifying state court systems and improving court rules is an example. While the bar has opposed public defender bills, it has also encouraged the Legal Aid Society. Other associations have done considerable and useful research and statistical work — the NEA, for instance. That the collection of the statistics is necessary to make their publicity more effective does not detract from its usefulness. In this, as in the drives for licensing bills, motives of public good and professional interest are inextricably intertwined.

The rise of the professional associations and their entrance into politics is part of the pragmatic pluralism characteristic of contemporary political life. With some exceptions, the professions show a higher degree of self-restraint and more consciousness of the public good or the general welfare than do many other groups. They have not taken the advantage of their strategic positions in society or in legislative bodies that they might have and that some other groups, veterans for instance, have taken. "In general, the pressure activities of professional organizations should not be viewed with alarm. In fact, the entrance of these associations into the governmental field, whether on their own initiative or by invitation of different governmental agencies, appears to be a very promising way of bringing the expert into the service of the government."²

¹ M. Louise Rutherford examines the scattered evidence that exists in "Lawyers as Legislators," *Annals*, vol. 195 (January, 1938), pp. 53-61.

² H. F. Gosnell and M. J. Schmidt, "Professional Associations," *Annals*, vol. 179 (May, 1935), p. 33.

Reformers and Reform Movements

IN HIS YOUTH, wrote Frederic C. Howe, "I felt a responsibility to the world. I wanted to change things." And later in life he resolved, "I cannot escape the world into which I am born, but I will do what I can to change it."¹ His were the attitudes of the typical reformer. He saw evils in society; he felt personally concerned about them; he sought to correct them. Reformers are not revolutionaries, but liberals or conservatives who seek some specific social or political rectification or betterment.² A few reform groups, like some advocates of the single tax, look upon the scheme they advance as a sole and sovereign remedy for all the ills of the body politic; they are what Theodore Roosevelt called the lunatic fringe. Most groups, however, have more limited objectives; they seek to improve the lot of orphans, or of the prisoners in jails and penitentiaries, or to uphold freedom of speech and press; and they never claim that universal good will flow from one source.

THE NATURE AND NUMBER OF REFORM GROUPS

Wide disagreement will often be found as to whether the objective of some group will if attained improve or debase the persons to whom it applies. Thus, both the Anti-Saloon League and the Association Against the Prohibition Amendment insisted that right was exclusively on its own side and that the other group was seeking to damage American society. The Anti-Saloon League called attention to the evils of the liquor traffic; the AAPA, to the evils of prohibition, particularly to gangsterism. It is

¹ *Confessions of a Reformer* (1925), pp. 1, 224.

² Cf. Horace M. Kallen, *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 13, p. 194.

not necessary here to make ethical judgments between these or other contending groups; for all can be credited with sincerity of purpose.

Certain groups are clearly and exclusively reformist. Others have their reform motives mixed with religious, professional, financial, or even with mere pleasure-seeking objectives. When the American Medical Association seeks to improve the scientific practice of medicine and drive out quacks, it acts like a reform group, but judged on its total program, it would still be regarded as a professional association. The same might be said for most other professional societies: they have some reformist purposes. Even business groups, such as chambers of commerce, have their reform planks.

No one knows how many reform groups, local and national, are active in the United States today. Writing only of the civic organizations (such as citizens' unions), W. B. Munro said that their number must "run far into the thousands. Their combined membership must mount into the millions."¹ The membership in any one association will vary from a corporal's guard to millions. There is also a considerable overlapping of membership; that is, a person interested in one line of reform — child welfare, for instance — is likely to belong to various societies which may seek by different approaches to improve the lot of children. Although some groups have existed for a long time — the Euthanasia Society, for example, was established in 1838 — there is a high mortality among them, in part because their objectives are attained, in part because public interest or mores change, in part because many seem often to be reflections of the personality of one leader. Wayne B. Wheeler, for instance, made the Anti-Saloon League the power that it was, and the League was never equally effective after his death.

REFORM GROUPS AND POLITICAL PARTIES

Politicians are commonly very contemptuous of reformers and reform movements. "Morning-glories," Plunkitt called them, and Roscoe Conkling said that when Dr. Johnson had defined patriotism as the last refuge of a scoundrel he had overlooked the possibilities in the word *reform*. The politicians call them "do-gooders," "uplifters," "goo-goos," and less flattering names. Theodore Roosevelt, himself something of a reformer, was most contemptuous of them and gave a class of reformers of his

¹ *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 3, p. 502.

generation the term *muckrakers*.¹ The Socialists, on the other hand, have insisted that all attempts at reform within a society committed to the institution of private property are futile.²

But a longer look at the history of American politics must give reformers at least partial credit for many famous victories. If a group succeeds in having one or both major parties accept its objective, and if it is then enacted into law, the association must of course share credit for the final victory. The ending of slavery, the spread of the merit system in civil service, many improvements in public administration (such as budget systems), the wide adoption of the council-manager plan, the Australian ballot — these are only a few instances. Even Plunkitt, disdainful as he was of reformers, saw the “patriotism” of his Tammany braves, seeking to serve in public office, frustrated by the legislation the civic service reformers had got passed.

The individual citizen who feels, as Howe did, a responsibility for some abuse or error in society, and also a desire to change it, has two alternatives: he may work within a political party, or he may set up a reform group or join one already established. He may, indeed, often do both, as a man may be at once a member of the Republican Party and of the League to Abolish Capital Punishment. But he is likely to find at best that the party is interested primarily in office and only slightly, if at all, in the cause which has aroused his concern. The party, moreover, is inclined to compromise; it may even dally with groups whose objectives are the very opposite of what the reformer regards as just or right. He has also convinced himself that the arguments of his group are valid, and therefore he sees no reason for the slowness and delay that are characteristic of parties. The memories and traditions of the party that bind its members together mean little or nothing to the reformer, who may indeed regard these sentiments as worn-out, even dangerous, myths. For these reasons, among others, the relationship of party and reform group is not likely to be close.³

Instead of lining up, as nationality and religious groups tend to do, with one major party or the other, a reform group commonly seeks to maintain its independence of both, while urging both to adopt its objectives. It will also seek the support of other organizations; Hazel Ben-

¹ See his *The Strenuous Life* (1904), pp. 41–62, and *Autobiography* (1920), pp. 86–87.

² See John Chamberlain, *Farewell to Reform* (1932).

³ These considerations and others are more fully discussed by Lane W. Lancaster in “Political Parties and City Government,” *Annals*, vol. 199 (September, 1938), pp. 199–205.

jamin, for example, wrote that from 1931 to 1936 the advocates of birth-control legislation sought and obtained resolutions of approval from approximately a hundred other groups, from the General Federation of Women's Clubs to the American Medical Association.¹ The group always hopes thus by concerted efforts to move the party in power to take the action it desires. Few reform groups are well enough disciplined to be able to threaten a party with loss of votes for failure to accept a group's program; they tend, rather, to rely upon publicity and argument and not to promise votes they know they cannot deliver. The Anti-Saloon League became so big and powerful that it was a noteworthy exception. It could and did threaten congressmen and senators, and it made good on its threats. One congressman complained:

The Anti-Saloon League has adopted the methods of the Caesars and threatens us with proscription . . . if we Republicans and Democrats do not bow to its will. The legislative superintendent of the League who watches over this Congress published to the world the warning, "The graves of many state legislators and members of Congress can be seen along our line of march."²

OBJECTIVES

Reform groups will be found whose objectives will cut across any classification that may be made. Most seek at one or another level of government either to reform the structure or the policy of governments. Such organizations as the Foreign Policy Association (1918) and the American Association for the United Nations (1945) — established in 1923 as the League of Nations Association — are concerned with the foreign policy of the United States.³ The World Peace Association (1915)

¹ "Lobbying for Birth Control," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 2 (January, 1938), pp. 56-58.

² Quoted by Peter Odegard, *Pressure Politics: The Story of the Anti-Saloon League* (1928), p. 155.

³ See also John W. Masland, "Pressure Groups and American Foreign Policy," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 6 (Spring, 1942), pp. 115-122. Forty groups were sufficiently interested in the San Francisco Conference of 1945 to send delegates, who were recognized as "consultants." They held a meeting, addressed by Secretary of State Stettinius, who promised that the groups would be kept regularly and fully informed of the proceedings of the conference. The list of the forty was printed in the *New York Times*, April 27, 1945. It included not only the groups exclusively interested in reform and foreign affairs, but many labor, farmer, religious, and veterans' associations as well.

and the National Council for the Prevention of War (1921) are organized to urge specific foreign policies that they think will lead away from war. The list of those organized to advocate specific national domestic policies would be long indeed, but the American Indian Rights Association (1883) and the National Economy League (1932) will serve to illustrate the scope of reform interests.

A number of groups have objectives that concern both national and local governments, such as the American Civil Liberties Union (1920) and the National Civil Service League (1881). The Woman's Christian Temperance Union (1874) seeks at every level of government appropriate legislation or administrative action to restrict the use of alcoholic beverages.

LOCAL CITIZENS' GROUPS

But the greatest number of groups seeking to reform government are found at the state and local level. They have a great variety of titles, but common names for them are: city clubs, civic leagues, citizens' unions, civic federations, survey commissions, citizens' budget advisory commissions, and municipal leagues. A title that contains the word *research* is coming to be the most popular, for instance, municipal research bureau, civic research association, or institute of government research. Committees of one hundred, one thousand, or some other number are fairly common. The National Municipal League (1894) and the Governmental Research Association (1914) are not peak associations but rather central information and service agencies. The National Municipal League has drafted a model state constitution, a model city charter, and various model laws and ordinances which have had wide influence. In fact, the League has been perhaps the leading advocate for the reformation of state constitutions and for the council-manager plan of city government.¹

Howard M. Kline distinguished these categories of local citizens' groups:

- (1) Those organizations which are engaged primarily in fact-finding and research activities, both for the benefit of their own members and for the

¹ For a very brief account of its history, see Howard P. Jones, "Citizen Groups, Tool of Democracy," *Annals*, vol. 199 (September, 1938), pp. 176-182. Twenty organizations are discussed in Norman L. Gill, *Municipal Research Bureaus* (1944). A somewhat contemptuous discussion of reform, chiefly at the local level, is the first chapter of W. B. Munro, *Personality in Politics* (1934 edition), pp. 1-42, entitled "The Reformer in Politics."

general public; (2) those organizations which, equipped with their own or someone else's researches, are engaged in bringing various pressures for the adoption of their recommendations; (3) those organizations which are engaged in active campaigning for their own slate of candidates, or for a slate acceptable to them. Many writers have found a fourth type of organization, namely, those engaged in adult education, citizenship training, and public discussion programs.¹

Nonpartisan Civic-Interest Groups. These groups seek to do more than to turn the rascals out; they seek to keep them out, to encourage citizen interest in local public affairs, and to prevent waste in local government expenditures. The New York Citizens Union, the Cleveland Citizens League, and some others make a nonpartisan survey or investigation of candidates for local offices and recommend or disapprove. The following are examples from the *Voters' Directory* for 1946, published by the New York Citizens Union:

NATHAN A. LASHIN (Dem.) ENDORSED. Lawyer; 38; b. NYC; ed. NYU and St. Lawrence Law Sch.; Assemblyman since 1945. A very intelligent, industrious and public-spirited new member who made a real contribution to the work of the Legislature during his first term. He was one of the promoters of a state university, now being seriously considered. His initiative on behalf of public safety in hotels, apartment houses and places of public assembly led to the creation of a joint legislative committee to consider a state-wide building code and his appointment as secretary of the committee.

IRWIN STEINGUT (Dem.), real estate and insurance; 52; b. NYC; ed. Dwight Sch., NYU and St. John's Law Sch.; Assemblyman since 1922, Spkr. 1935 and Minority Leader other years since 1930. Mr. Steingut, former Speaker and for many years Democratic leader of the Assembly, has championed many good causes, but through it all has remained a machine politician of the old school. He has often mobilized his party on what the Citizens Union considered the wrong side of issues which should not have been matters of partisan approach, such as the City Airport Authority forced through against the wishes of many Democratic members in this year's session. Last year a grand jury charged him with spending money far in excess of his visible income and a court, though refusing to punish him for contempt as the grand jury requested, characterized his explanation of one item as belonging to "the age of Aesop." He has made

¹ "Citizen Groups in Review," *National Municipal Review*, vol. 30 (October, 1941), p. 577.

no attempt at a full public explanation and the legislature declined to investigate. In the circumstances the voters can have no assurance of his representing them creditably and have no self-respecting alternative but to retire him to private life.

Taxpayers' Associations. The local taxpayers' associations, sometimes federated into state associations, are a development of the years since 1925. Always vociferous and sometimes influential in state and local politics, they have sought to prevent the increasing costs of government from being passed on exclusively to the owners of real estate. Their primary motive has been self-preservation, said Lent D. Upson, not necessarily the improvement of local government.¹ Some of them have shown an unreasonable opposition to the improvement of those local public services which are necessarily expensive and commonly supported by the general property tax, such as schools, health, and public recreation; and some have succeeded in obtaining tax limitation laws which put local governments in financial straitjackets. But as most taxpayers' associations have passed through their militant phase, they have come to concentrate more on reformist objectives related to taxation, such as removing tax exemptions, opposing double taxation, and preventing waste and fraud. They commonly work with other civic groups to obtain simplified state and local governments.

Professional Associations. A significant set of reform organizations aiming to improve governments, especially state and local governments, are the semi-official professional associations, of which there are 133 with a general headquarters at the Public Administration Clearing House, 1313 East 60th Street, Chicago. Typical groups are the International Association of Chiefs of Police (1893), the American Society of Municipal Engineers (1894), and the National Association of Assessing Officers (1934). "The nexus of these [133] organizations is the same primary objective: the improvement of the organization, the administrative techniques, and the methods of government."²

Effectiveness of Citizens' Groups. "The history of every hamlet and metropolis contains instances of beneficial legislation promoted, harmful legislation prevented, and administrative practice improved by local

¹ *Organized Citizen Concern with Government* (Pamphlet No. 2 of Governmental Research Association) (May, 1946), p. 8.

² Hal Hazelrigg, "The '1313' Group in Chicago," *Annals*, vol. 199 (September, 1938), p. 183.

citizens' organizations." ¹ No doubt a large proportion of their victories have been negative, in that the civic groups have prevented waste, corruption, and extravagance. No doubt many are intangible, in that public morale has been improved or that machine politicians have been made more cautious. But the continued existence of the boss and the machine and the continued mismanagement of cities, as shown in such surveys as Robert S. Allen's *Our Fair City*, would indicate that the citizens' reform groups, in spite of their number and the amounts of money they spend, are not very effective.

There is little agreement among students of American politics on the reasons for the general ineffectiveness (some conspicuous exceptions being noted) of the local citizens' groups. W. B. Munro was inclined to attribute their weakness to a presumed dreamy, impractical nature characteristic of reformers. Frequently leadership is defective; leaders of reform groups tend to be prima donnas and so sharply critical of politicians that adjustment and compromise is impossible; or the leaders are part-time or amateur. Often conflict among the groups nullifies their effect — taxpayers' associations versus welfare associations, for example. Perhaps more fundamental weaknesses are in the nature of many of the groups themselves. Their objectives are frequently so narrow that they cannot attract the wide membership necessary for political effectiveness. Perhaps the group is not bound together by any intense motivation or interest. Or motives other than reform, such as the economic, may cut across loyalty to the local reform group; thus a Philadelphia businessman may find it necessary to contribute to the Republican machine, and he will only salve his conscience by making another (and probably smaller) contribution to the Philadelphia Bureau of Municipal Research. But the civic groups hammer away, year after year, at corruption and inefficiency. Occasionally a great scandal turns a party out of power, and the new régime adopts some of the reformers' proposals. It is in part through such a sequence of events that the council-manager form of city government has been widely adopted.

REFORM GROUPS WITH A RELIGIOUS SLANT

A considerable number of reform groups have a religious connection or have quasi-religious objectives. The relationship between the Anti-Saloon League and the Protestant churches has already been discussed.

¹ Kline, *op. cit.*, p. 636.

The Association Against the Prohibition Amendment had no such religious support.¹ The Prohibition forces, now joined in the National Temperance Council, even though defeated by the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment, have continued to apply pressure. Although they have never abandoned hope for the return of national prohibition, their immediate national objectives are the elimination of the liquor advertisements in magazines and newspapers of interstate circulation and the drying-up of the District of Columbia. Meanwhile they seek to obtain state and local prohibition, and they have been winning a series of quiet victories. On June 1, 1947, the *New York Times* published a survey indicating that about 19 per cent of the population now lives in "dry" territory; and "of 3162 local option elections held since 1934, 2586 have been won by the drys and 576 by the wets." This hundred-year-old reform struggle is still continuing. The Association Against the Prohibition Amendment dissolved at the end of 1933; the "wet" side of the argument is carried by the trade associations of the liquor industry. A minor party, the Prohibition Party, has been in existence since 1869; it has regularly nominated candidates for President, but the highest vote it ever attained was 270,000 in 1892.² The Prohibition candidate for President in 1948 received 103,000 votes, and the WCTU reported in January, 1949, that its membership was near the all-time high of 400,000. The dry forces, nevertheless, suffered a bitter defeat in the election of 1948 when Kansas repealed its constitutional prohibition clause, and the 1949 legislature permitted the legal sale of liquor in Kansas for the first time in 69 years. Only Mississippi and Oklahoma remained as totally dry states.

The American Bible Society (1816) and the Anti-Profanity League (1902) are groups with Protestant affiliations. The Legion of Decency (1934) is primarily a Catholic organization set up to obtain either the self-censorship of the moving-picture industry through the Hays (now the Johnston) Office, or, if this censorship fails to meet Catholic standards, state censorship boards. The Legion has been very effective.³ It can mobilize the Holy Name Society to provide pickets for a theater which ventures to show a film that disagrees with Catholic doctrine when such pictures occasionally slip through the Hollywood censorship or are produced by independents who do not submit scripts or films to the Johnston Office.

¹ Fletcher Dobyns, *The Amazing Story of Repeal* (1940), especially pp. 224-226.

² See D. L. Colvin, *Prohibition in the United States* (1926).

³ See Commission on Freedom of the Press, *A Free and Responsible Press* (1947), especially p. 58; and Raymond Moley, *The Hays Office* (1945).

GROUPS CONCERNED WITH CHARITY, HEALTH, OR WELFARE

Other reform groups have objectives related to charity and health. Typical societies are the Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor (1843); the Travelers' Aid Society (1905); the National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis (1938); and the American Seamen's Friend Society (1828). Many organizations for child welfare belong in this category such as the Save the Children Federation (1932). Sometimes the groups seek appropriations for health, hospital, or other institutional care; or they seek legislation to grant them tax exemptions; or they want reduced railroad fares for their patients or charges.

Associations of a looser type are those promoting some type of social legislation or seeking to change public attitudes. Examples are the American Eugenics Society (1926), the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (1866), the Planned Parenthood (birth control) Federation (1921), and the American Prison Association (1870). Local groups, such as the Watch and Ward Society of Boston and the New York Society for the Suppression of Vice, which changed its name in 1947 to the Society to Maintain Public Decency, watch public morals, seek repressive legislation, and strive to obtain its vigorous enforcement.

WOMEN'S GROUPS

The long agitation of women's organizations to obtain the right of women to vote was discussed in Chapter 3 in connection with the suffrage. When the Nineteenth Amendment was adopted, the National Woman Suffrage Association dissolved. The militant, feminist minority carried on in the National Woman's Party (1913) of which Mrs. O. H. P. Belmont and Alice Paul were the best-known leaders. The remainder of the original group went into the League of Women Voters, founded in 1920.

The National Woman's Party. Strictly speaking, the National Woman's Party is not a party but a pressure group; it does not run candidates for office but seeks to attain its ends by pressure methods applied to the major parties and to legislative bodies.¹ Although the party has worked for equal rights for women in statutes and treaties, it is best known for the agitation it has carried on since 1920 for what is called the Lucretia Mott Amendment proposed to the Constitution. This proposal, omitting the

¹ An official statement concerning its origin, officers, headquarters, objectives, etc., is printed in Inez Hayes Irwin, *Angels and Amazons* (1933), p. 481.

enforcement clause, reads, "Men and women shall have equal rights throughout the United States and in every place subject to their jurisdiction." Several committees of Congress have held hearings on the proposal, although it has not been put to a vote in either house. Both major parties accepted it as a platform plank in 1944 and 1948.

The League of Women Voters. The national League of Women Voters is completely opposed to the Lucretia Mott Amendment. The publications of the League admit that legal discriminations against women remain in some states, but

In a few respects women enjoy a position superior to that of men. Widow's pensions, alimony following divorce, and various laws protecting a wife's property are examples of legal assets to women. . . . Laws favoring women as members of a family have always been held justified by society as a whole. The husband is, for example, [legally] responsible for family support. Such laws are logical as long as the rôle of wife and mother in our society interrupts or impedes the woman's opportunity to develop or maintain her own earning power.¹

Existing state labor laws which set maximum hours and minimum wages and forbid certain kinds of work by women (e.g., in mines and quarries) would be unconstitutional if the equal rights amendment should be adopted. So would laws that limit night work for women. The League regards these laws as "in the general welfare" and therefore opposes the amendment. The League would prefer to remove by state action — it thinks there are no "important discriminations against women in federal laws" — such state discriminations as exist, and would retain the state laws that give women a preferred position. As long as this remains the attitude of the League, it seems very unlikely that the proposed amendment will be adopted.

The national League of Women Voters is a federation of forty-five state leagues, which in turn are made up of local leagues. There are about 60,000 members. The League is nonpartisan, but its predominantly upper- and upper-middle-class membership probably inclines most of the members to vote Republican. Its attitudes, however, are reformist and progressive, considerably to the left of the Republican Party. It favors, for example, public housing and slum clearance, government policies to maintain "maximum production and employment," extension of the coverage of the social security program, reciprocal trade agreements,

¹ Leaflet, *Brief for Action*, April 1, 1947, p. 2.

the council-manager form of city government, the "modernization of state constitutions," and similar projects.¹

Unlike many organizations, the League does not adopt a wide variety of resolutions at its conventions. It supports "selected issues" which have been considered first by the boards of the state leagues, then by the board of the national convention. The process of getting a resolution before the national convention (except by a two-thirds vote) requires at least six months and assures time for careful consideration. The leagues, state and national, do not endorse candidates, nor may any officer of a state or of the national body be a candidate for public office. The local leagues frequently work with the civic organizations already described.

The General Federation of Women's Clubs (1889) is a huge, loose organization with between two and three million members. Its local clubs have artistic, philanthropic, and social objectives, but it does adopt resolutions upon questions of public policy, such as conservation, the restriction of billboard advertising, and education.

In addition to these groups, there are many other women's organizations which occasionally take some interest in political questions, such as the American Association of University Women (1881), the National Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs (1919), and the Women's Trade Union League (1903).

Charles Edward Russell, who called himself a side-line reformer, thus summed up the nature of reformers and reform movements:

Of course, the upward progress might be greatly accelerated. Every attack upon every entrenched evil helps the onward motion. And it makes not the slightest difference if in men's eyes the effort is fruitless. There is no such thing in this world as a wasted protest against any existing evil; absolutely no such thing. . . . The common error and cherished delusion of reformers is to think that if the particular organization to which they belong goes ashore, all is lost. Reform is not so simple as that, but a vast, complicated, and often mysterious evolution.²

¹ Leaflet, *Program 1946-1948* (n.d.).

² *Bare Hands and Stone Walls* (Charles Scribner's Sons, 1933), p. 422.

Bureaucracy as a Political Force

It is possible that Congress might, in a saner age, especially if there were a revival of constitutionalism, gradually abolish the superfluous bureaus of the government, which not only offend the Constitution but are likewise hostile to the spirit of individualism, once the great characteristic of the American people. The only remedy is in the people themselves, and at present they are in such hearty accord with the ever-increasing centralization in government bureaus, that the hope of any reform has shrunk to the vanishing point.¹

EQUALLY DOLEFUL PREDICTIONS of the impending fall of popular government because of the rise of bureaucracy may be found in any recent volume of the *Congressional Record*; the halls of state legislatures ring with denunciations of state bureaucracies; and the party out of power deplores bureaucracy. "The times cry out," said the 1944 Republican platform, "for pruning and abolishing unnecessary agencies and personnel. . . ." And the party's 1948 platform expressed the same sentiment in somewhat less vigorous language: "We favor the elimination of unnecessary federal bureaus and of the duplication of the functions of necessary governmental agencies."

THE TERM BUREAUCRACY

Certain characteristics, commonly (and not always fairly) associated with bureaucracy, give it the bad name it has: a passion for routine; an undue insistence upon rules ("red tape"); the sacrifice of flexibility to

¹ James M. Beck, *Our Wonderland of Bureaucracy* (The Macmillan Company, 1932), p. 242.

order; a timidity and hesitation to embark upon experiment or to assume responsibility, combined with a certain arrogance or indifference toward the public; indolence; slowness; and quibbling.¹ The professional students of public administration do not, however, regard the growth of bureaucracy with the apprehension shown by publicists and platform writers; they call attention to the fact that large-scale organizations, whether in business, education, labor, or religious societies, show the same tendencies as governments.² They regard the rise of bureaucracy as an inevitable result of the manifold tasks imposed by present-day society upon the modern state.

The word *bureaucracy*, although often used as a derogatory epithet, will not carry any such connotation here. The term, in the words of Arnold Vieg, "means simply 'desk government' — management by bureaus. It denotes the sum total of the personnel, apparatus, and procedures by which an organization manages its work and achieves its purposes. The organization may be public or private, governmental, commercial, educational, ecclesiastical — but if it is of any size it must be a bureaucracy."³ By the familiar process of transfer the opposition to certain public regulations has been switched to the agencies doing the regulating to give bureaucracy its bad name.

Year by year the number of administrative agencies, state and national, increases, and naturally the number of employees increases too, until at the present time there are about six million civilian public employees.

BUREAUCRACY AND PUBLIC POLICY

DETERMINATION OF POLICY

Legislators fume and fuss at the administrative agencies, in part because they feel that the bureaucracy tends to assume the power of the legislature to determine policy. Early students of administration thought that a

¹ Charles E. Merriam, "Public Administration and Political Theory," *Journal of Social Philosophy*, vol. 5 (July, 1940), p. 305.

² See Marshall Dimock and H. K. Hyde, *Bureaucracy and Trusteeship in Large Corporations*, TNEC Monograph No. 11 (1940), Paul Appleby, *Big Democracy* (1945), Luther Gulick, editor, *Problems of the American Public Service* (1935), James M. Landis, *The Administrative Process* (1938), and Fritz Morstein Marx, editor, *Elements of Public Administration* (1946), especially pp. 3-9.

³ In Marx, *op. cit.*, p. 55. See also Pendleton Herring, *Public Administration and the Public Interest* (1936), p. 15. The term *administration*, although less colored by emotion, has such varied other meanings that it will not suffice as a substitute.

distinction could be made between the legislative and administrative functions: "Politics has to do with the guiding or influencing of governmental policy, while administration has to do with the execution of that policy."¹ Woodrow Wilson had expressed the same idea in 1887; moreover, he thought that administration should keep out of politics, and politics should keep out of administration.² The distinction between the formulation and the carrying out of policy, if it was ever worth making, is no longer much stressed, because in specific situations the two blend and blur until legislative and executive are determinable only in the extreme instances. Administration, wrote Donald Blaisdell, "is the application of innumerable revisions of policy."³ The initiation of a new or different policy cannot always be separated from the interpretation or reinterpretation of an old policy, whether the change is made by a legislature, a court, or an administrative agency.

ISSUANCE OF RULES AND REGULATIONS

Legislative bodies, state and national, delegate to administrative agencies the power to make regulations which, whatever the legal fiction, have the force of law. They lay down the broad terms of a policy and allow the statute to be filled out by rule and practice. Nor is this a New Deal development.

The first session of Congress was initiated by the passing of a statute [1 Stat. 28 (1789)] delegating general legislative power to the heads of the newly created departments. The chief of each department was authorized to "prescribe rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the government of his department, the conduct of its offices, the distribution of its business, the custody, use, and preservation of the records, papers, and property appertaining thereto."⁴

Long-established national administrative bodies, such as the Post Office, the Treasury, the Department of Agriculture, or the Interstate Commerce Commission, build up a large body of rules and regulations. Similarly,

¹ Frank J. Goodnow, *Politics and Administration* (1900), p. 20.

² "The Study of Administration," *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 2 (June, 1887), p. 210.

³ "Economic Power and Political Pressures," TNEC Monograph No. 26 (1940), p. 65. See also John M. Gaus, *Reflections on Public Administration* (1947), and Frank Waldo, *The Administrative State* (1948), especially pp. 104-129.

⁴ John P. Comer, *Legislative Functions of National Administrative Authorities* (Columbia University Press, 1927), p. 52. Cf. Landis, *op. cit.*, pp. 47-88.

state liquor, utility, tax, and other departments determine in detail what the state law will be. The legislature may determine how much money is to be devoted to road repair and snow removal, but in the very nature of the process of administration the highway department must decide what roads will be repaired and how, which will be kept free of snow and when. Thus, most administrative agencies tend to become little legislatures of limited scope.

AMENDMENT OR REPEAL OF LEGISLATION

It is not commonly realized, but in point of fact an administrative agency can sometimes in effect amend or repeal a statute passed by a legislature. The law remains on the books, to be sure; but it is not enforced, or only parts of it are enforced. A state tax department, for example, may oppose in the first instance a tax on billboards, as not bringing in enough revenue to be worth the cost of collection, and after a few perfunctory gestures to satisfy the legislature, may allow the law to become a dead letter. Or the department may in effect amend a statute. An inheritance tax act, for example, may require an accounting from every estate that exceeds \$10,000, but the tax department may feel that the requirement is futile on estates that pay no tax and consequently make no effort to obtain an accounting from small estates; such an action (or inaction) has the same result as if the law had been amended to read that only estates liable to taxation must file. The wide powers of a district attorney are well known. Even though the criminal law makes no provision for compromising an indictment for murder, it is done every day when prosecutors accept pleas of guilty to lesser charges, such as manslaughter. From the lowest administrative office to the very highest, the bureaucracy can often amend or repeal a legislative action. When, for instance, Congress passed a joint resolution favoring the immediate opening of Palestine to Jewish immigration, the State Department sent to the acting foreign minister of Saudi Arabia a secret cablegram which gave the very opposite impression.¹

¹ Bartley C. Crum, *Behind the Silken Curtain* (1947), p. 39.

BUREAUCRACY AND PRESSURES

GROUP PRESSURES ON BUREAUCRACY

(Private interest groups undoubtedly realize better than most citizens that the determination of many public policies is actually in the hands of the bureaucracy, and must necessarily be there, because no legislative body can keep abreast of the immense and many-sided work of contemporary government.) It has already been noted that many bureaus are created because of pressure on legislatures from private groups; the professional licensing boards are characteristic examples in the states.¹ In the federal government, wrote Pendleton Herring, "National associations have provided the impetus for the great extension of special governmental services during the past two decades. Governmental facilities for aiding commerce, industry, and agriculture in the pursuit of their private aims have expanded enormously. . . . Pressure rather than merit has determined the services that the federal government has undertaken."²

When the persons employed in an administrative agency know that the board, commission, or department in which they work was created as a result of pressure from some group, they are naturally inclined to be sympathetic with the objectives of that group. A labor department is more likely to listen appreciatively to the arguments of a labor leader who wants a certain interpretation of the factory law than it is to the secretary of the manufacturers' association. If an agency shows too many signs of independence, the officers of a group may tell the bureau chief, "We got this bureau created, and we can get it reorganized or abolished." Such threats are not often necessary, because there is such an identity of interest between the agency and the group that conflict over policy can seldom occur. The bureaucrats are often members of the group — sometimes the law requires them to be; they see its officers frequently; they attend and address its conventions; and they write for its publications. In the extreme instance the group is the administration; this situation occurs when the chief executive is required by law to appoint the members of a board or commission from a list of nominees submitted to him by the association or associations concerned. In lesser

¹ A number of groups which have been given federal powers of administration are discussed in Avery Leiserson, *Administrative Regulation: A Study in the Representation of Interests* (1942), especially pp. 189-220. Cf. his "Interest Groups in Administration," in Marx, *op. cit.*, pp. 314-338.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 344.

instances advisory boards or advisory committees selected by the interested groups meet regularly with the administrator. When this close relationship exists, administrative agencies perform a sort of representative function, overcoming to some extent the defects of geographical representation in legislatures.

The American bureaucracy has come into being over a century and a half in response to very definite and specific needs, more often than not at the instigation of those very interests which now complain of the overgrown government in Washington. The various administrative agencies that make up the bureaucracy serve a wide range of purposes, but one of the most important is supplying in some measure the functional representation that has long ceased to exist in the legislative branch.¹

Quasi-judicial or regulatory agencies, such as boards of tax appeals or the Interstate Commerce Commission, are not usually so close to the groups whose affairs they influence, but even the groups they affect may bring pressures to turn the purpose of the agency from regulation to service. For example, when William E. Humphrey became a member of the Federal Trade Commission, he succeeded in producing sweeping changes in the policy of the commission; from a quasi-judicial body it became one, in Humphrey's words, to "help business to help itself."² Such an objective was sought by business groups, particularly the United States Chamber of Commerce. Long-established, "old-line" agencies develop a higher degree of independence from group pressure, but it is safe to say that no administrative agency can go its own way, free from any group influence. Sometimes conflicts among groups, each of which seeks to persuade the agency to adopt its line of policy, will enable the administration to do pretty much what it pleases. Consultation before action is, however, the commonest of administrative tactics. The Department of Agriculture discusses proposed policies with the farm groups, the

¹ Charles M. Wiltse, "The Representative Function of Bureaucracy," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 35 (June, 1941), p. 515. Wiltse also observes (p. 511), that the bureaucracy "is the common meeting ground of the President and the Congress, and it is also the ground on which both executive and legislative functions may be brought into direct contact with the public in its organized and institutionalized capacity. The administrative process brings the administering agency into more or less direct contact with the individuals, groups, classes, or otherwise differentiated special interests upon whom the laws operate."

² See Herring, *op. cit.*, pp. 125-157. The commission, said Herring (p. 134), "kept within the letter of the law, but . . . statutes can be variously administered. Special interests recognized this and fought for their interpretation of the law."

Department of Commerce with business groups, the Veterans' Administration with the Legion, and so on. A state department of education is usually in the closest touch with the teachers' association. But the purpose of this consultation, wrote Paul Appleby, himself an experienced administrator, is agreement on action, and there must be a limit to the time and energy the bureaucrat can devote to it. "If government officials should attempt to discuss a proposed action with all the groups and individuals in the country who believe they are entitled to be consulted and for as long as they think they should be consulted, government would invariably do too little and always do it too late."¹ To determine for any given agency the degree and kind of relationship that it bears to organized groups, it is necessary to observe the day-by-day behavior of that agency. From the point of view of the interest groups, their representatives in Washington and in the state capitals spend such an increasing proportion of their time at administrative "contacts" that the term *lobbyist* is no longer really appropriate. Indeed, a man with wide acquaintance in the bureaucracy is for many organizations much more valuable than a man with merely legislative influence or experience.

BUREAUCRACY AS A PRESSURE GROUP

A bureaucracy is thus the subject of varying pressures from interested organizations. But it is itself a pressure group, an institution, acting upon the legislative body, upon the executive, and occasionally upon the courts. Individuals within the administration are moved by motives of pay and prestige — as the desire to hold or improve their salaries, to continue or to extend their authority. Many are sincerely devoted to the work they are doing and anxious to protect, continue, and extend it. Rarely, however, does a whole bureaucracy move as a unit. There are too many rivalries between agency and party. Perhaps only an attack upon the principle of the merit system in the federal government or in a state having civil service would move the employees to concerted action. This action, under the Taft-Hartley Act and under some state acts, cannot take the form of a strike, and partisan political activity is limited by the Hatch Acts.

Instead of being a concerted action, the pressure is applied by each department or agency for itself. "Each of thousands of budget estimates competes strenuously with all others for appropriations. Each bureau,

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 82.

each program, each project has to fight for life and funds.”¹ These departmental programs and projects serve to make up the general policy of the agency. It is not for the outsider to define this policy or set of policies, and a new appointee is only gradually initiated, but after a number of years in an agency an alert person can sense how the department will respond to any problem. This is part of the institutional behavior of the organization, part of its pattern of experience gained from doing its daily work. Testimony before committees reveals such habits of speech as, “The Army has always felt . . .” or “The commission is opposed to such open-end contracts . . .” or “The department has thought the state should impose a means test . . .” Institutional forms of procedure grow up, so that each agency has a preferred way of acting in a given set of circumstances. Each agency has its internal politics, its oligarchy, even its prejudices. A person thoroughly familiar with the behavior of a county purchasing department or of the State Department can often predict what it will do, and with reasonable accuracy, but he cannot always tell on what evidence he bases the predictions. Whatever the policy, it is known or felt from headquarters clear out to the most remote field office.

Bureaucratic Pressures on the Legislative Body. By and large, the initiation of public policy today lies not in legislative bodies but in pressure groups and in administrative agencies. In New York:

Many of the nongovernmental pressure groups have come to realize that the legislative battle is at least half won if they can get the state administration on their side. For this reason many of the bills sponsored by private agencies were drafted by them with an eye toward the administrative agencies. On the other hand, the reverse is true: many of the bills sponsored by administrative agencies were proposed to those agencies by private groups which, instead of going directly to a member of the state legislature, preferred to ask the state departments to initiate their measures.²

In Washington, practice differs from department to department and with the nature of a particular proposal:

Some departments have such peculiarly close relations to particular interest groups that almost everything they propose by way of legislation is certain to be “cleared” with these groups; in fact, they are likely to be

¹ Appleby, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

² Elisabeth McK. Scott and Belle Zeller, “State Agencies and Lawmaking,” *Public Administration Review*, vol. 2 (Summer, 1942), p. 209.

"in" at every stage of the departmental proposals to such an extent that it is difficult for an outsider to determine whether the initiative came from the department or the private organization or to decide which had the greater influence on the recommendations finally made to the Congress. This statement is true especially of departments which public opinion regards as the spokesmen for particular interests, such as the Veterans' Administration and the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor; but a much larger number of agencies have one and usually more organizations that they consult in advance on every important legislative proposal they offer.¹

There is no statistical study to show what proportion of the bills introduced in Congress originate in the federal agencies. James M. Beck thought, "The bulk of such legislation [considered by committees] is either drafted in whole or in part by the bureaucracy of the particular department concerned or by special interests, and then given to some member to introduce in Congress for reference to the appropriate committee."² With the aid of a grant from the Social Science Research Council, a study was made of the origin of the bills introduced in the 1941 session of the New York legislature. "Administrative agencies and officials . . . were the source of 769 of the 1641 bills introduced and of 502 of the 884 statutes enacted. . . ."³ Bills introduced for governmental employee associations were not included in this total. But it must always be remembered that a large part of the legislation adopted in any session is not an opening-up of new areas of public power but the amendment of existing law.

Intimate acquaintance with almost any fairly large state or federal agency will reveal that there is in it some person who has general charge of relations with the legislative body, and he may have one or more assistants. He may be a deputy commissioner, the department counsel, or a chief clerk. The head of the agency may do this work if he is himself a permanent employee and if his other administrative tasks permit; but most heads of departments rely upon a career man whose experience with past legislation affecting the agency and whose knowledge of other agencies and their needs and demands is necessary to success. This inter-departmental, informal, usually nonpartisan politics has never been fully studied. In the federal service:

¹ Edwin E. Witte, "Administrative Agencies and Statute Lawmaking," *Public Administration Review*, vol. 2 (Spring, 1942), p. 118.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 205.

³ Scott and Zeller, *op. cit.*, p. 205.

Bitter battles have been fought within the bureaucracy over such prenatal legislative proposals, centered in gaining the support of the department heads and ultimately of the President for the position taken by a particular group. Many of the important bills acted on by Congress were under consideration for months and even years in administrative circles before they saw the light of day. Most commonly the initial (informal) drafts of these measures were developed within the bureaus or departments which later were charged with their administration. Commonly, however, other interested departments have also been drawn into the consideration of these measures before their introduction in Congress, sometimes only through informal conferences, often through more or less formalized interdepartmental committees.¹

The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, supplemented by executive orders, directs that federal agencies must clear with the Bureau of the Budget proposals to be submitted to Congress, in order that conflicts may be avoided with some policy of the President's. Compliance is fairly general, according to Edwin E. Witte, because agencies want active support from the White House if they can get it, and at the least, they want to avoid a veto.² The same situation prevails in the states which have integrated state administrations, such as New York; there, according to the analysis made by Scott and Zeller, the governor agrees with the administration, over which he has considerable control, about 90 per cent of the time. But in the states in which agencies are headed by elected officials or by officials appointed for terms longer than the governor's, the agencies are much less likely to attempt to integrate their programs with his. Indeed, personal political ambitions may lead administrators to attempt programs counter to the governor's.

When an agency has adjusted as well as it can the interests of other agencies and of the groups upon which it depends for support, the measure is introduced. The experts of the department will testify before committees. These experts generally develop a degree of familiarity with the

¹ Witte, *op. cit.*, p. 117. Interdepartmental politics occur, of course, over many other issues besides legislative programs. Conflicts over jurisdiction (as between Treasury and Controller, or Agriculture and Interior) are a cause of controversy. Other disputes arise over the use of office space or other property or equipment owned by the government, over the allocation of funds, over differences between executive and administrative policy. Interagency disputes may be only public manifestations of disputes between outside groups which back different agencies in divergent policies.

² See also Carl R. Sapp, "Executive Assistance in the Legislative Process," *Public Administration Review*, vol. 6 (Winter, 1946), pp. 10-19; and V. O. Key, Jr., "Legislative Control," in Marx, *op. cit.*, pp. 339-362.

problem affected by the proposed legislation which the committeemen cannot equal, and the latter are therefore often unable to challenge the experts' testimony. One of the arguments advanced for the La Follette-Monroney Act was that it would permit the staffing of Congress so that the bureaucracy would not have a complete monopoly of expertness; but in the states there is no comparable staffing, and it is a rare legislator indeed who serves long enough or who serves on one committee long enough to develop experience equal to that of the career men of the administration.¹ If the pre-introduction planning has been successful, the experts hired by the private groups will offer their testimony to reinforce that of the departmental experts; consequently, unless some political or group counter-pressure is aroused by the proposal, the agency is likely to get its way.

The administration will also supply technical information — even material for speeches — to members of the committee, or of the house, who are favorably inclined. When a department bill is being debated, the department will, if the rules permit, have representatives on the floor to supply information, answer questions, and advance arguments. But if the agency is astute, it leaves to the supporting groups the provision of propaganda and pressure, because the publication, especially at public expense, of administrative materials intended to influence pending legislation is an invitation to attack or investigation.

Bureaucratic Pressures on the Executive. Administrative agencies are also able to bring pressure upon the executive, the mayor, the governor, or the President. They may do so to get a bill signed or vetoed, to obtain desired executive orders, to influence a policy as they desire, to obtain jurisdiction or budget recommendations, and for other reasons. Most agencies can do many favors for an executive, from providing patronage to writing messages. They can utilize their contacts with private groups to facilitate his general program, if he has one. On the other hand, if he does not respond to their wishes, they can sometimes delay his program, start rumors, and permit leaks, even "box him in" by demanding that he fulfill the letter of the law and personally attend to a vast amount of detail. The administration can give its own interpretation to executive orders and policies, as the State Department in secret messages to the Arabs watered down President Roosevelt's pro-Zionist pronouncements.²

¹ See Edwin E. Witte, "Technical Services for State Legislatures," *Annals*, vol. 195 (January, 1938), pp. 137-143.

² Crum, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

Bureaucratic Pressures on Governments at Different Levels. The complexity of American government is such that the agencies of one government frequently bring pressure upon the legislative body or the administration of another. In doing so they are often allied with private groups which have state and local branches. The pressures from federal agencies upon state and local governments are probably most publicized. To cite just one example, the old federal Social Security Board was able by the threat of withholding funds to compel the state legislatures to pass social security laws and to set up state administrations to suit the federal agency. But there is also pressure upon state legislatures from local governments, sometimes organized in state leagues of municipalities, associations of county commissioners, sheriff's associations, and similar groups. And the United States Conference of Mayors has on occasion brought pressure upon Congress and the President, notably for larger appropriations for unemployment relief. The Department of Agriculture, the state departments of agriculture, the county agents, and the farm groups form a loose but effective pressure alliance. There are many others that are comparable.

BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

"The expert in public affairs," wrote Harold Laski, "is an invaluable servant and an impossible master."¹ The bureaucrat who is not an expert is, *a fortiori*, an even less desirable master. All officials naturally tend to regard their own work as of the utmost importance. But when administrative agencies, either with or without the assistance of pressure groups, initiate and push through public policies, or when policies established by legislatures over their opposition may be unenforced or frustrated, party responsibility to the electorate for the conduct of public policy may be blocked. A coherent party program is difficult enough — perhaps impossible — under American political and constitutional conditions; but when a program can be thwarted or circumvented by a bureaucracy our representative government becomes even less representative. This is not to say that career administrators tend to an arrogant disregard for the popular will. On the contrary, the fault of the great majority is an excessive timidity. Nevertheless, the degree of their responsibility to

¹ *Fabian Tract* No. 235 (1931), reprinted in William Ebenstein, *Man and the State* (1947), pp. 159-170.

the electorate is so remote as to be virtually invisible.¹ Theoretically, the voters can retire a senator whose votes on bills they dislike — although actually the voters pay so little attention to their senators that few can give even their names, much less recite how they voted — but in no case can the voters retire a member of the Federal Trade Commission or a chairman of the Port of New York Authority whose official acts they might dislike. And yet the official acts of many an administrator are of greater importance to an individual citizen than any vote of his congressman or senator. Thus, there is a gap between electorate and officialdom which is not bridged by the legislative process. The election of a larger number of administrative officers — the long ballot — is a cure that is worse than the disease, because the voters cannot (or do not) follow the administrative actions of these officials, who consequently are swept into and turned out of office with political landslides, regardless of their merit. The election of any significant proportion of the federal administration would be fantastic.

Bureaucratic Publicity and Propaganda. The problem of the responsibility of the bureaucracy to the electorate grows steadily greater as governments undertake more tasks and as greater degrees of expertness are required of public personnel. The question of government publicity points up this whole situation. "Can one speak of government by consent," asked Herring, "when this consent is manufactured by official propagandists?"² He went on to point out four situations which "may be assumed as possibilities": first, certain agencies are identified with certain special interests, agriculture, business, veterans, and others, and while administrative propaganda may be couched in terms of the "general welfare," it may actually be aimed to serve some special or private interest. Second, the publicity may be aimed primarily, if indirectly, at creating for the agency a larger staff and more authority, whether or not these objectives are in the public interest. The present writer would offer J. Edgar Hoover and the FBI as a current illustration. Third, there is the danger that the publicity will be used for mere partisan advantage; fourth, that poor publicity may "vitate the program of even an able and conscientious administrator."³ It may be added that no agency likes unfavorable publicity, and consequently there is always the temptation

¹ The degrees and kinds of their responsibility are discussed by George A. Graham, "Essentials of Responsibility," in Marx, *op. cit.*, pp. 501-518.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 368. Cf. James L. McCamy, *Government Publicity* (1939).

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 369.

to suppress or censor information about the agency, by forcing news to "clear" through some person who, whatever his title, is the publicity man of the department. Often there is either an outright rule of the agency or an informal understanding that no employee is to make extemporaneous speeches, but that their addresses must be written out and approved in advance — that is, censored. Furthermore, the problem of getting out propaganda to counteract that issued by foreign governments against the United States raises a host of questions, not the least of which is that the agency which issues such counter-propaganda may interpret and defend domestic policies, particularly presidential policies, that Congress may not itself approve. The controversy over the radio broadcasts by the State Department is a recent instance.

For a number of years Congress has been sensitive to administrative publicity. By a rider to the Third Deficiency Appropriation Act of 1919 it provided for the removal from office, fine, and imprisonment of "any officer or employee of the United States" who thereafter used public funds "directly or indirectly" to pay for any kind of publicity, including a letter or a telephone call, "intended or designed to influence in any manner a Member of Congress to favor or oppose, by vote or otherwise, any legislation or appropriation by Congress, whether before or after the introduction of any bill."¹ How is an administrator to know what bills will be introduced in Congress at some future date, so that he can be careful not to write a letter to anybody which might some day lead some congressman "to favor or oppose by vote or otherwise" an item of legislation? This statute demands on the part of officials a degree of foresight that Congress does not ordinarily credit them with possessing and which few of them, surely, would claim for themselves.

The problem of administrative pressures on legislatures may well be one that cannot be reached by legislation. Defects and errors are possible, even in the most carefully drafted statutes, and grave injustices may be done to individuals and great losses incurred by a government if officials are forbidden to point out these shortcomings to the legislative body. The position taken by Congress, that officials must not speak until spoken to, is absurd, for in many instances it is only those persons in actual charge of enforcing some statute who recognize its defects. The development of the law of income taxation is a case in point. When

¹ 41 Stat. L. 68; U.S.C. 18: 201. Approved, July 11, 1919. Officers are permitted to communicate with members of Congress at the members' request, or "through the proper official channels," which are not in any way defined or explained in the statute.

defects in a statute redound to the advantage of private parties (e.g., incorporating yachts to create losses for income tax purposes), the beneficiaries will be last to complain to a legislator or to a newspaper. Pressure must come from the bureaucracy.

The federal statute mentioned above appears to be unenforced, as perhaps it is unenforceable. Some state legislatures, however, have taken the very opposite position; they have directed by law that officials should call the attention of the legislature to needed legislation.¹ And in those instances in which a government agency exists to provide the public or some segment of the public with a service (a state tourist commission, or a bureau of home economics, for example), how is the potential recipient of the service to know of its existence unless the agency is allowed to engage in publicity? Any legislation, moreover, which attempts to limit administrative propaganda, or which aims to prevent administrative lobbying, will only drive the officials to greater reliance upon the interest groups which, when they have issued the propaganda and done the lobbying, will be in an even better position than at present to demand special favors of the agencies they have thus befriended. Perhaps the public interest would be best served if bureaucracies were freely permitted to engage in all the propaganda they pleased, within their appropriations, with such checks as newspaper, legislative, and group criticism might provide.

Leonard D. White wrote in 1942 that for the immediate future

The formal seat of power will remain in representative bodies; but the determination of the necessary or practical modes in which power is brought to bear, the more precise definition of the circumstances under which power shall make itself effective, and the more exact understanding of the purposes which power is intended to achieve are all likely to continue to shift from directly elected representative bodies to authorities chiefly characterized by expertness and official responsibility rather than by representative qualities. The administration, in short, will wield more power over the citizen; but it will remain a responsible and controllable power. Whether organs to enforce responsibility will develop with speed equal to the increase in power is an open question.²

¹ Belle Zeller, "Lawmaker — Legislator or Lobbyist?" *National Municipal Review*, vol. 29 (August, 1940), p. 529.

² "The Public Service of the Future," in *The Future of Government in the United States: Essays in Honor of Charles E. Merriam* (Harper and Brothers, 1942), p. 209.

The Methods, Effectiveness, and Regulation of Pressure Politics

NO HISTORY of pressure politics in America has yet been written. A full account would be an undertaking of monumental proportions, only to be attempted by a score of people willing to work for years in tracing the entire history of American legislation and connecting it with the efforts and objectives of organized interests. For pressure politics is not a new phenomenon. It can be seen in the work of the colonial legislatures. And during the Revolution an outstanding instance occurred when Washington's veterans, demanding their pay in specie, aimed their guns at the state house in Philadelphia, where the Continental Congress was sitting; Congress hastily adjourned to Princeton, but found some specie and new clothing for the veterans before they were discharged.¹ And it is safe to say that there has been pressure politics in every American legislative body since the Continental Congress, even though rarely accompanied by threats of violence.

PREVALENCE OF PRESSURE TACTICS

Most students of pressure politics have found the subject so immense that they have perforce concentrated upon one interest, such as the Anti-Saloon League, the Farm Bloc, or the American Medical Association; or they have examined one level or agency of government, such as Congress or a state; or they have taken one item of legislation, such as a tariff bill;

¹ For further details of the incident, see Dixon Wecter, *When Johnny Comes Marching Home* (1944), pp. 31-35.

or they have studied some one person active in lobbying or pressure politics, such as Wayne B. Wheeler or Thurlow Weed. In the first edition of his *American Commonwealth*, published in 1888, Lord Bryce noted the operations of pressure groups both before Congress and the state legislatures, but he did not go into the matter in detail. "The Capitol and the hotels at Washington are a nest of such intrigues and machinations while Congress is sitting," he noted, and the state capitols, he thought, were worse; but Bryce's attention was focused on bribery and corruption to the virtual exclusion of the legal aspects of pressure.¹ He observed that Georgia had made lobbying a crime, and California had declared it to be a felony, although it was "openly practiced in every building where a legislature meets."² Edward B. Logan, in his study of the lobby, discussed briefly each of a series of pressure campaigns, the Central Pacific Railroad of 1876-1878; the *Crédit Mobilier*; the New York insurance investigation of 1906; the first Pure Food Bill; and others.³ The recent attention paid by students of American politics to its pressure aspects has not been due to the novelty of the problems involved so much as to a new realization of their importance. Some spectacular victories of pressure politics, such as the bonus, farm legislation, and Prohibition, have also called renewed attention to the weakness of parties before the efforts of interest groups; these successes also encouraged thousands of other interests to organize. Although propaganda is an ancient device of politics, the development of some new techniques and the improvement of some old ones during and after World War I encouraged many groups to shift from what has been loosely called the old lobby to the new lobby, or pressure politics. The qualities of newness can easily be exaggerated; in most cases the old devices, such as public speaking, are used in new channels of communication, such as radio or television.

METHODS OF PRESSURE POLITICS

In the preceding chapters some of the methods of pressure politics have been mentioned incidentally. In order to estimate the effectiveness of the groups and discuss the possibility of their further regulation, it

¹ Vol. 1, pp. 673-678; vol. 2, pp. 124-129.

² Vol. 1, p. 445. An account of lobbying in New York, published the same year as Bryce's classic work, is Hudson C. Tanner, *The Lobby and Public Men from Thurlow Weed's Time* (1888).

³ Edward B. Logan, *Lobbying*, Supplement to *Annals*, vol. 144 (July, 1929), pp. 3-52.

may be worth while here to bring together in chronological sequence a discussion of the pressure methods currently employed. Information about the methods in use is incomplete; some devices are used openly, but others are revealed only by occasional investigations, so that it is impossible to determine the extent to which these are utilized. Secretaries and other officers of pressure groups will never admit, unless confronted with tangible evidence to the contrary, that they do anything that is not perfectly ethical and legal. Indeed, many groups are so willing to answer every question and permit such free access to their records that it may be concluded that they have nothing to hide; the Political Action Committee is an example. Some groups, however, for whom pressure politics is only an incidental or occasional activity, will not reveal to a non-member the details of their pressure methods or admit that telegrams urging resolutions were sent to local chapters. Perusal of annual reports, when they are available, is often interesting but seldom illuminating, because in these, as in the periodicals published by the organizations, emphasis is always put upon the fact-finding and publicity methods employed and nothing is ever intentionally put down that could bring the organization or its officers into disrepute.

FORMATION OF A PRESSURE GROUP

Consciousness of Interest. The first stage in pressure politics may be said to be the growth among a number of persons of a sense of need, a consciousness of identity of interest — economic, patriotic, religious, sentimental, or whatever it may be — for the possibilities are almost infinite. Furthermore, it may not be a single interest that unites these people, but a complex of common concerns. There must also be present a certain amount of disagreement or dissatisfaction with existing groups or parties. Then some individual or a small group may undertake to set up an organization, either by founding an entirely new one or by breaking off from an older association. At this point there is likely to be a delimitation of objectives — though objectives may change — and a beginning of group regimentation and discipline. Soon there follows the establishment of a headquarters and a drive for membership. Perhaps at this point, perhaps even from the time of its establishment as an organization, the group is ready to participate in pressure politics.¹ It may be noted in passing that some interests have proved very difficult to organize — children,

¹ Cf. Harwood L. Childs, *Labor and Capital in National Politics* (1930), pp. 7-8.

consumers, Negroes, women, for instance — and consequently, they are either unrepresented or under-represented in pressure politics.

The Headquarters Staff. In the employment of a headquarters staff certain common tactics appear. The permanent secretary is usually a long-time member of the group, or he shares personally the interest which the group seeks to organize. Exceptions to this rule are men who serve as secretary of first one association and then another, making a career of group politics; this tendency is especially to be noted in business and trade associations, chambers of commerce, and taxpayers' associations. Fairly large groups, state and national, also usually employ at least one former newspaperman to edit their publicity; and if the association publishes a periodical, as most of them do, a staff of editors and writers is necessary. Salaries and conditions of employment are so much better in the offices of pressure groups than in journalism that thousands of men leave newspaper work, after gaining the necessary experience, in order to work in the Washington, New York City, and state headquarters of such organizations.

The Legislative Agent. Another kind of headquarters employee is the legislative agent, the man who makes appeals in person to legislative committees and to individual legislators. This lobbyist is usually an agreeable individual, ordinarily a man who is personally convinced of the merits of the group's cause. Some lobbyists, however, work for any interest or combination of interests that will employ them. They regard themselves as advocates, employed to put the best possible interpretation, regardless of any intrinsic merits, upon their clients' cases. Just as a lawyer will say that any defendant is entitled to a trial and therefore to a lawyer to defend him, so professional lobbyists will assert that any group or interest is entitled to representation before legislative bodies and administrative agencies. They are making a living, and eternal justice is not their affair. A notable tendency in the lobbying profession or business in recent years has been the formation of partnerships and corporations, often called public relations counsel. By thus joining together, the lobbyists may pool their experience, information, and contacts. The employment as lobbyists of former members of the house upon which pressure is to be brought has considerable advantages to an interest group, for not only are such persons acquainted at first hand with the members of the house and with the leaders, but some members may also be obligated to them for past favors received. The former legislator is also familiar with the rules of the house, and he has the privilege of the floor — that is, he can go onto

the floor and into the cloakrooms to talk to members while the house is in session, as other persons cannot. Sometimes such lobbyists manage to get into the executive (secret) sessions of committees, but when they cannot, they are often able to obtain from members of a committee or from its staff confidential information about what goes on behind the closed doors. Needless to say, this information is frequently of the utmost importance to a pressure group, which can adjust its further tactics accordingly. Washington has scores of former senators and representatives, most of them nominally engaged in the practice of law, who represent one or more clients, not before the courts but before Congress; and most state capitals have their counterparts. Toward the end of each session of Congress, one or more members of House or Senate usually announce that they will not seek re-election but will engage in Washington in "the general practice of the law." Sometimes their clientele has already been arranged; in other instances this announcement is an invitation to clients. But it is not necessary for an ex-senator or ex-congressman to practice law. Representative Fred A. Hartley, Jr., for example, was one of the authors of the famous Taft-Hartley Act; he did not seek re-election in 1948, but early in 1949 he announced his acceptance of the presidency of the Tool Owner's Union, an extremely conservative association of investors. He said that he would register as a Washington lobbyist. The ranks of the voluntary lobbyists are swelled by the "lame ducks" whose retirement was involuntary.

A group engaged in bringing pressure upon an administrative agency frequently finds it advantageous to induce an employee to resign from the government service and to join its staff. Since governments do not compete in terms of salary with private interests, experts and members of quasi-judicial bodies, state and national, frequently resign in order to accept private employment, and often appear in behalf of private clients before the very agencies of which they were formerly members or employees. Obviously, when they leave the public service, they take with them their contacts and their experience, which sometimes include a body of confidential information which may be of immense value to a private interest.

The "Inside Lobbyist." Most courts would rule that the payment of fees or salary by a private interest to a civil servant, or to a member of a regulatory agency which has jurisdiction over the interest, constitutes bribery. But no law touches the "inside lobbyist," especially the lawyer-legislator. Alfred E. Smith was reported to have stated humorously to

a member of the New York legislature, when the man was admitted to the bar, "Now you can take a bribe and call it a fee."¹ The relationship between lawyer and client is privileged at law, and consequently little is revealed, unless an investigation develops, or unless the legislator sues the client for a fee, as some have done. When the payment is made by an interest which is required by law to open its books to some commission, the payment of fees to lawyer-legislators comes out. A recent instance was the case of State Senator Frank S. Farley of Atlantic County, New Jersey, who left a sickbed in order to maneuver through the 1947 legislature some amendments to the racetrack tax act which saved the Atlantic City Racing Association an estimated \$339,000 a year in taxes. When it was disclosed that the senator's law firm was receiving a retainer of \$20,000 a year from the racing association — another firm was the regular counsel — the senator said that the arrangement was "nothing unusual."² He had on occasion also appeared before the State Racing Commission (the members of which had to have their nominations confirmed by the state senate) on behalf of the racing association.

Members of Congress are forbidden by statute to represent private clients in cases in which the government is a party, but apparently the law is readily evaded.³ One device is to have a relative appear as attorney of record to receive the fee. Another is for the congressman to go on a lecture tour, receiving fees and expenses and speaking in defense of retail price maintenance laws or the Taft-Hartley Act, to cite two recent examples.

But lawyer-legislators, although they are the best protected from publicity, are not the only insiders. Members of legislative bodies may have a personal interest in the measures on which they vote. Their election does not mean that they must divest themselves of property whose value is affected by statutes. Senator Maclay of the First Congress noted in his journal that members were personally interested in the federal assumption of the state debts.⁴ Certain senators in more recent

¹ Belle Zeller, *Pressure Politics in New York* (1937), p. 239.

² *Newark* (New Jersey) *Evening News*, April 17, 1947. The bar association took no action. The author discussed the matter with a justice of the state supreme court, who said that probably nothing would be done, because the senator was correct; it was not unusual for interests with matters before the legislature to retain members as counsel. "Why," he said, "if 'Hap' Farley could be disbarred for that, half the lawyers in the legislature could be disbarred."

³ Kenneth G. Crawford, *The Pressure Boys* (1939), pp. 21-29 presents a number of examples from Congresses of the 1930's.

⁴ *The Journal of William Maclay* (1927 edition), especially pp. 114, 204, 302.

years have made no secret of the fact that they and their families stood to gain from tariff legislation. Senator Warren Barbour of New Jersey, whose family was widely interested in the spinning industry, may serve as an example.¹ Again, Senator Charles W. Waterman of Colorado was an important stockholder in the Great Western Sugar Company, which stayed in business only because of the tariff on sugar. In most state legislatures, bankers, brokers, contractors, farmers, insurance agents, physicians, and members of other occupations and professions vote almost every legislative day on measures in which they have a personal, even if often an indirect, financial interest. Economic interest is, of course, important, but it is not the only one that legislators bring in with them when they take their seats; some are veterans, some are devoted to a religious or fraternal group, others to a reform organization, and so on.

A pressure group that has one or more of these inside lobbyists is obviously in a better position than a group which has none. When it has a number of them they may be called a bloc, like the Farm Bloc which held the balance of power in the Sixty-Sixth and Sixty-Seventh Congresses. The advantage of insiders to an interest is not merely that the group has one or more sure votes. More important, the insider may get bills assigned to favorable committees, perhaps to a committee of which he is a member. He may persuade a committee to hold hearings, and when it does he may defend his friends' witnesses and bait opponents'. He can both publicly and privately urge the group's case upon the committee; in Congress he may read the publicity material of the group into the *Congressional Record* and then use his franking privilege to mail the material out for them. And better than any non-member of the house, an insider can manage a bill if it comes on the floor or marshal opposition to a measure that his group does not favor. There are also scores of other possibilities open to the insider clear up to the time the measure is signed or vetoed.

The Legal Office of the Group. Any large group or any group with broad objectives soon finds that it must have a legal department. This office drafts bills for introduction; checks the statements of witnesses which may be prepared by the publicity division; represents members of the group or the association itself in court actions and before administrative agencies; and, perhaps most important, it watches as carefully as it can

¹ For an excellent discussion of this whole problem, see Chapter 4, "Insiders and Outsiders," pp. 164-213, in E. E. Schattschneider, *Politics, Pressures, and the Tariff* (1935).

all the bills introduced in the legislative body which might conceivably affect the group in any way. For an organization like a state or national chamber of commerce, this last obligation may mean the study of several thousand legislative proposals annually.

PROPAGANDA

As soon as a headquarters is operating, and sometimes even before, a group puts out its propaganda. The devices it will use were discussed in Chapter 5. The organization will use any appropriate methods which its finances permit and its leaders' ingenuity produce. The present tendency unquestionably is for groups to issue an increasing quantity of propaganda, but the more astute leaders do not neglect the other methods of pressure politics while they seek to build up or maintain for their interest a favorable public opinion.

Many groups — perhaps the greater number of them — cannot expect to arouse a favorable opinion in the general mass of the population, which has its attention scattered by many happenings and which has little interest in government and politics. Besides, there may be a latent majority opinion opposed to the objectives of the group, such as that of Protestantism to Catholicism, or of the middle class to labor organizations. In such instances publicity may not be helpful, for it will arouse opposition and counter-propaganda. No group would disdain a general favorable public opinion toward itself or its objectives, and when a group has among its resources money but not votes — the National Association of Manufacturers, for example — it may have but little choice except to spend its funds to establish a favorable public opinion. But it is not so much the opinions held by the whole public in which the group is interested as the opinions of that limited public, the party organizations and their members in the government.

METHODS OF PRESSURE ON PARTIES

Pre-Primary Activity. A skillful leader of a pressure group does not wait for the nomination of candidates before beginning his work. Instances have already been cited of racial and other groups bringing pressure upon both major party organizations to obtain recognition on slates and to make certain that opponents are not endorsed by party leadership. The Political Action Committee has been especially conscious of the

necessity for this pre-primary pressure, and it has sometimes obtained the nomination of PAC candidates in both primaries. A group or interest that has money but not many votes may be able to influence party choices by the promise of campaign contributions.

Participation in Primaries. Once the candidates have filed for the primaries, the best-led groups having a number of votes will endeavor to get their members to register and to vote in the primary. This is a very difficult undertaking because of the profound indifference of voters to primary elections, but a little extra work at this point would produce a kind of pyramiding of results in the later process of pressure politics. Many groups, however, do little or nothing until opponents are nominated, and then they attempt to raise funds and put on big campaigns to defeat them. In one-party areas, group participation in the primary of the dominant party offers the only effective means for a group which has votes but no money with which to reward its friends and punish its enemies.

Campaign Pledges. As soon as the primary is over, the groups begin to canvass the candidates with letters and questionnaires, asking definite commitments in return for promises of support. Threats of opposition are made for failure to reply or for unfavorable responses. The questionnaires differ widely; some demand answers to scores of questions, while others ask only a statement of attitude on a specific item of legislation. Another device for obtaining promises is to invite candidates to address meetings of the organization. This practice seems to be very widespread, and a large part of campaigning has come to consist of speeches to interest groups. Refusal to speak or failure to appear is likely to arouse the enmity of the organization.

There is generally an observable relationship between the closeness of a candidate's district and his willingness to commit himself to the program of a group. Only an unintelligent candidate will promise everything to every group, because the news of his contradictory pledges will get around, and he will be likely to lose more votes than he gains. If a candidate runs in a close district where, say, a thousand votes one way or the other will win or lose, he must calculate which groups to conciliate and which to ignore; if, for example, he cannot make his promises acceptable to both the American Legion and the taxpayers' association, he is likely to choose the Legion.

Platform Planks. Although all astute leaders of groups know that platforms are vague and that parties are not bound by them, and although

they prefer individual pledges, nevertheless they have planks drafted and appear before the resolutions committees of state and national conventions to urge their inclusion. When a party has a President seeking re-election, the platform is usually written in the White House before the convention assembles; and in state politics it is usually prepared by party leaders, who are not ordinarily on the resolutions committee. At conventions, nevertheless, the committees usually conduct hearings — at national conventions for a week or more before the convention assembles — at which spokesmen for the interest groups present their proposals.

Campaign Contributions and Expenditures. Campaign and party finance are discussed elsewhere in this book. It may be mentioned at this point, however, that groups as such are coming to be reluctant to make campaign contributions, and many are barred by law from doing so. Even when they can contribute, the publicity is not desirable, either for them or for the party. Two tendencies seem to be appearing. First, the group channels funds through individual contributors in the amounts permitted by law, or the group assists a party or a candidate in obtaining contributions from its individual members. The second tendency is for the group to carry on in its own name propaganda campaigns which assist a party or a candidate; the PAC has done this for the Democratic Party, the NAM for the Republican.

Getting Out the Group Vote. Getting out the vote on election day is a method that can be used only by well-organized groups which have blocks of votes. The Anti-Saloon League, the liquor dealers, the PAC, the Legion, and similar organizations have been able to use it. Medical societies, the NAM, the American Tariff League, and other groups with relatively few members do not attempt it. Even some large but loosely organized associations, such as the Federation of Women's Clubs or the Congress of Parents and Teachers, cannot do much at getting out their potential vote. The limit of their activity is reached when the pre-election issues of their periodicals urge members to vote. Getting out the vote is likely to be a more expensive undertaking than most groups can support because of the necessity of hiring workers and automobiles. When it can be done, however, it is very effective. Group leaders can then tell candidates and party leaders, "We have so many thousands of members in this state or this district, and as you can see for yourself by examining the poll books, we get out such and such a percentage of them for those candidates whom we support."

Post-Election Pressures. As soon as the election is over, the groups

attempt to get favorable committee assignments for their supporters who have been elected to legislative bodies. Both labor and business groups for example, are keenly interested in the personnel of appropriations, labor, and judiciary committees.¹ In many state legislatures the presiding officers of the houses have the power of life and death over bills, both in that they assign bills to committees and in that they control the house calendar; the selection of these men by the party caucuses is therefore of great importance to the pressure groups. Meanwhile, attempts may be made to have the President-elect or the governor-elect include in his inaugural address recommendations that coincide with the programs of the groups. In fact, it is a fairly common practice for the leading groups — business, farming, labor, veteran, and others — to submit to him drafts of sections of his message relating to their interests. Sometimes the executives-elect solicit these suggestions and pass around among the leaders of groups appropriate sections of their projected messages, for most Presidents and governors feel that both tradition and policy require that they say something on each of the principal policies of the leading interests. Messages, like platforms, therefore tend to have a certain sameness.

PRESSURES ON LEGISLATIVE BODIES

Introduction of Bills. As soon as a legislative body convenes, the groups seek to get their bills introduced. Few groups have difficulty in finding a sponsor. Even if a legislator does not agree with the bill, he introduces it as a favor for the group, although he may arrange secretly to have it referred to a committee from which he knows it will never emerge. Wayne B. Wheeler, an expert on pressure politics if ever there was one, commented as follows on early introduction and procedure:

It is best to have [a bill referred to] a regular committee, since a special committee may be packed hostilely. The bill should be introduced early in the session. During the closing days each member has some pet measures, and it is harder to get a fair consideration. . . . The introducer should be an able representative, with few enemies, one skilled in the procedural mysteries, who knows the bill from A. to Z.²

¹ Logan, *op. cit.*, pp. 10–11, cites specific examples of pressures on party leaders in Congress by the NAM for favorable committee assignments.

² Quoted by Peter Odegard, *Pressure Politics* (Columbia University Press, 1928), p. 115.

Hearings. Another reason for early introduction is to obtain a public hearing. In only a few state legislatures is there a rule that a hearing must be held on every bill introduced; indeed, too many thousands of bills go into the hoppers each session to make it physically possible to hold hearings on them all. In consequence, those interests which get their bills in early, before the committee schedules get jammed, have the best chance to get a hearing. Once the demand is granted and a date set, the organization rounds up its witnesses, has its lawyers prepare briefs and its statisticians graphs and tables. The expert nature of many of the witnesses has already been noted. On the date of the hearing as big and as representative a crowd as possible attends. Procedure varies, but in general witnesses are allowed to present first a prepared statement, which is followed by oral questioning. Usually the proponents are heard first, and then the opponents, and sometimes an opportunity is given for rebuttal. A committee may or may not be content to hear merely the witnesses who voluntarily appear; it has the power to subpoena other witnesses, books, records, and papers if it wishes to do so.

Because most legislative bodies tend to follow the recommendations of their committees, the hearing stage is critical to a pressure group. Great ingenuity has therefore been shown in attempts to influence committee opinion. The crippled victims of industrial accidents and diseases have been paraded before committees; specimens of adulterated or misbranded foods and drugs have been displayed; where committees have consented, moving pictures of poor schools, of slums, of conditions in prisons, have been shown. Hearings often draw larger crowds and obtain more notice in the press than the proceedings of the legislative body of which the committee is a part, and since the committeemen commonly welcome the publicity, they often allow the hearings to go on for days, even for weeks, listening to the same arguments over and over. In its function as a little legislature, the committee is bombarded with memorials, petitions, letters, and telegrams. Congressional committees commonly print in the records of their hearings a considerable proportion of this material, as well as the briefs and prepared statements. By examining such records it is possible to ascertain in a rough way what groups were publicly active on a given item of national legislation. The committees of state legislatures, however, rarely print their proceedings, and many do not even make a stenographic record.

The Calendar. After a hearing, the committee goes into executive session and decides whether to report the bill as introduced, to amend or

rewrite it, or not to report it at all. If the bill is reported, groups interested in its passage try to get a favorable position for it on the calendar; to do so they may have to get it cleared by a rules committee, a caucus, or by party leaders, depending upon the rules and practices of the legislative body concerned. If the date when the bill will be put to a vote can be established in advance, the groups interested may try to pack the galleries, unfurl banners, have pickets parading outside the hall, and have delegations call upon members in their offices or in the lobby. Wayne B. Wheeler called this tactic "petitions in boots."

Letters, Telegrams, Petitions. But the written petitions and resolutions are not neglected. When a large and well-organized group, such as the American Legion or the AFL, feels that one of its vital interests is at stake, it can flood Congress or a state legislature with mail and telegrams. On a controversial measure thousands and sometimes millions of letters and telegrams will be sent, so that the staffs of many congressmen fall days or weeks behind in their work. Much of the material cannot be acknowledged, still less answered. Its inspired nature is frequently shown by the identical wording of the letters and telegrams; indeed, both state legislators and congressmen have found it possible to trace the progress of a group's secretary or field representative around a state by the batches of similar letters and telegrams that are received from first one city and then another.¹

When a bill is coming up for a vote, members of the house concerned will be reminded of their campaign promises, if they made any; and threats of opposition or promises of support in future elections may be made. Sometimes newspaper editors in a legislator's town or state, friendly to the cause of a group, may be induced to write editorials commenting upon the campaign pledges. A similar tactic is to bring out platform pledges, if there were any; and since many planks are general and vague, such as "justice to labor," it is possible to apply them to many items of legislation.

Legislators, understandably enough, dislike roll-call or record votes on controversial measures in which groups are interested, because no matter how they vote they lose support. The groups, on the contrary, prefer record votes, because only then do they know with certainty upon whom

¹ For an interesting attempt to analyze the mail sent to members of Congress on a single issue, see L. E. Gleeck, "96 Congressmen Make up Their Minds," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 4 (March, 1940), pp. 1-24; on the mail sent to state legislators, see Dayton D. McKean, *Pressures on the Legislature of New Jersey* (1938), pp. 207-214.

their pressure has succeeded. The lobbyists often canvass legislators by telephone or in person in the days before a measure comes to a vote, and as a result of this survey they usually can make a fairly accurate prediction of how a vote will go. It will not be a conclusive one, however, for at the date of a canvass some members of a house cannot be reached, others will not have made up their minds, and still others will refuse to commit themselves. Occasionally votes on amendments, or votes on parliamentary maneuvers, such as to recommit or postpone, will reveal what is to come; but the final roll call is what counts, and groups will do what they can to prevent its being evaded by a viva voce or a teller vote. On one occasion when the Farm Bureau failed to obtain a roll call vote in the House of Representatives on a measure in which it was interested, its president sent a letter to each member of the House which called the attention of the congressmen to the large membership of the AFBF and continued: "We regret that the vote yesterday was not one of record. In order that we may do justice both to Representatives in Congress and to our own membership, will you kindly notify our Washington representative, Mr. Gray Silver, 1411 Pennsylvania Avenue, whether you voted for or against this proposition."¹ Naturally, some congressmen resented this demand and denounced the tactics of the Farm Bureau.

The Social Lobby. The entertainment of legislators by the representatives of interests, known as the social lobby, is used at various stages of pressure politics. This method of lobbying was the one most used in the nineteenth century. Pendleton's Palace of Fortune, "in its palmiest days," shortly before the Civil War, "might have been called the vestibule of the lobby. . . . Pendleton himself was an operator in the lobby. His professional [gambling] position gave him great facilities. He assisted in the passage of many useful bills of a private nature, involving considerable sums of money."² The title "King of the Lobby" was claimed for himself by Sam Ward, an operator of the same period, but Tanner insisted that Thurlow Weed deserved it.³ Frederic C. Howe, as a member of the Ohio legislature in the first decade of the present century, "dined and played cards with the lobbyists." He thought that "Money was rarely used. It was not necessary. Some men were kept in line by being per-

¹ Quoted by Orville M. Kile, *The Farm Bureau Through Three Decades* (1948), p. 97.

² Ben. Perley Poore, *Reminiscences* (1886), vol. 2, p. 44. See also pp. 454, 513-515.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 246-247; Tanner, *op. cit.*, p. 319. See also G. G. Van Deusen, *Thurlow Weed: Wizard of the Lobby* (1947), especially pp. 221-230. The social lobby is discussed in most of the state political histories, e.g., William E. Sackett, *Modern Battles of Trenton* (2 vols., 1895 and 1914), vol. 1, p. 53.

mitted to win substantial sums at poker. Others were compromised. . . . Indiscreet seekers after pleasure were made obedient by fear of exposure and blackmail.”¹ As was shown in the investigations of Army procurement that followed World War II, the social lobby is at least as useful in dealing with administrative officers as it is with legislators.² The social lobby is still in existence in Washington and in every state capital. When a whole legislature is given a free weekend at resort hotels by the hotel association, a banquet and free admission to the racetrack by the racing association, free football tickets by the state university, to cite a few examples, the social lobby is still operating.

Bribery. The wholesale bribing of legislators, as in the days of the Black Horse Cavalry, seems to be a thing of the past. Occasional instances of bribery, however, appear both in the states and in Congress. It may be that there is less bribery than there was seventy years ago; or that it is now more astutely done; or, as Garrigues thought, that “the statutes governing bribery are, in most states, drawn to make a conviction as difficult as possible.”³ Certain interests, such as racial groups, may be powerful in terms of votes, but do not have the funds for bribery; others, like labor unions, may have money but cannot preserve the necessary secrecy. The temptation to use this method is probably strongest with business interests that have an unfriendly public opinion against them; businesses associated with gambling, such as horse and dog racing, are usually suspect.

The Conference Committee. Assuming that a bill in which a group is interested passes one house, it must still go through the other, and the whole procedure must be repeated. If the bill is amended in the second house, it usually goes to a conference committee, although in some state legislatures it goes to a joint majority caucus. Here in a secret meeting points of difference may be reconciled. To have access to a conference committee or caucus gives a lobbyist extraordinary opportunity to have a bill amended to meet his wishes; here secret pressures may be exerted.⁴

¹ *Confessions of a Reformer* (1925), p. 172.

² “In 1925 Senator Kenyon asserted that ‘the social lobby has been the most powerful steam roller in Washington in recent years. Working with the subtle stuff of social position, family tree, and general prestige, as well as wealth, the social lobby functions through dinner invitations, exclusive luncheons, and social recognition generally.’” — Logan, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

³ Charles H. Garrigues, *You’re Paying for It!* (1936), p. 120.

⁴ See Schattschneider, *op. cit.*, pp. 210–212.

PRESSURES ON THE EXECUTIVE

Pressures Before Executive Approval. After a bill has passed both houses, it must be signed or vetoed by the executive. In the interval between the time the bill is passed and the time it is approved or disapproved, delegations and individual representatives of groups call upon the governor or President to urge him to act as they wish. He too is reminded of any promises he made during his campaign and of any party platform planks that apply to the proposed legislation. The promises of support in future elections may be as freely made as they are to legislators, but since the executive's office carries more prestige, threats of opposition are less frequent. He is bombarded with briefs, statements, petitions, telegrams, letters, and memorials, just as the legislative body was. Indeed, since 1933 the White House mail appears to have increased out of proportion to congressional mail. Some governors hold their own public hearings on bills they have received and allow the groups concerned much the same opportunities to advocate or oppose that they had before the legislature. One reason for this practice lies in the variable responsiveness of groups: some are not so alert as others and do not find out until a bill has passed both houses that it affects their interests; then they demand a public hearing before the governor. But other governors, Thomas E. Dewey, for example, refuse to hold these hearings on grounds that they serve only to exacerbate group animosities.

Pressures After Executive Approval. Usually the work of a pressure group does not end when a bill has been signed or vetoed. Those who favored the legislation must shift their attention to the administrative office which has charge of its enforcement to see that it is carried out to their satisfaction. It may be necessary annually to appeal to the legislative body for funds for the agency and to watch lest legislation be passed to weaken the measure. Pressure will be brought upon the executive to appoint administrative personnel sympathetic to the group and to the legislation it obtained. The act may have to be defended in court. All these steps were taken by labor organizations with regard to the Wagner Act.

The opponents of a measure do not ordinarily give up when a bill to which they objected is approved by the executive. At once they begin propaganda and pressure for its repeal, repeating in each succeeding legislature every tactic that seems promising. They will try to obstruct the effective enforcement of the statute by whatever means seem to them

appropriate. "In varying degrees, federal administration of the laws governing the generation and transmission of electric power, the labeling of foods, and marine inspection, among others, has been obstructed by groups in these industries."¹ If possible, test cases will be brought, or the group will intervene *amicus curiae* in cases otherwise arising, in the hope that courts will find the statute unconstitutional.²

PRESSURES ON THE JUDICIARY

The judicial veto possessed by American courts naturally arouses the interest of groups in the personnel of the courts which will pass upon their legislative projects. When, for instance, President Hoover in 1930 nominated Judge John H. Parker to the Supreme Court, the American Federation of Labor through its president, William Green, protested so vehemently that the Senate rejected the nomination, 41 to 39. In that case the Washington headquarters of the AFL sent out requests to 35,000 affiliated unions asking them to bring pressure on their senators because of a "yellow-dog" decision in which Judge Parker had participated. Business groups are interested in the attitudes of judges toward the government regulation of business and toward "due process"; racial groups, in their position on restrictive covenants; religious organizations, in their views on the separation of church and state; and so on.

EFFECTIVENESS OF GROUPS

When a legislator answers "aye," "nay," or "not voting," what factors in his personality, his personal interest, his relationship to his party, his knowledge of public opinion on the issue, his response to pressures, or other factors, have affected his decision? No one knows, not even he; for being human, he will probably tend to rationalize his response into a conviction that his judgment of what was right, patriotic, expedient, and practicable coincided with his own interest, his party's, and that of some or all of the groups who brought pressure upon him. Even if these factors could be isolated, what weight should each have? It is impossible to weigh them. Useful as a calculus of pressure politics would be, our present

¹ Donald C. Blaisdell, "Economic Power and Political Pressures," TNEC Monograph No. 26 (1940), p. 73.

² Blaisdell, *ibid.*, pp. 73-79, presents a number of instances of groups which have litigated the constitutionality of measures they had opposed in Congress and in state legislatures; in many instances they were successful.

knowledge of psychology is insufficient, and adequate social data are also wanting, for its construction.¹

It might be thought that the re-election or defeat of a legislator who had favored or opposed a group program would serve as an index of group effectiveness.² But almost invariably a legislator in the course of a session will please some and offend other organizations, all of which in the next election will undertake to re-elect or defeat him; and unless their efforts can be separately identified and measured, it is impossible to assign weights to each. The use of sampling techniques might make this separation possible, but even then other imponderables, such as his personal organization, his party backing, the other issues of the election, and the ebb or flow of the political tides, will affect the result. It may be said that, in general, the closer a member's state or district, the greater the effectiveness of group pressure upon his behavior.

✓ If it is at present impossible to weigh the factors determining the effectiveness of a given group, so as to reduce these elements to a pressure formula, they may at least be indicated and described. For convenience they may be divided into those within and those outside the group. The internal factors are: the number of members a group has; the intensity and cohesion of this membership in the group drives; the quality of leadership; the geographical distribution of locals; and financing. External considerations include: public opinion toward the proposals of the group, its leaders, or the group itself; attitude of legislators or other officials toward the group; its relationship to the political parties; the alliances it can make with other groups, or the opposition it meets from others; and the legislative or political situation of the time when it operates. So many examples of each of these factors have been cited in earlier chapters that it is unnecessary to repeat them here. Instead, it may be recalled that there is one group, the American Legion, which, because it meets almost perfectly each of these conditions, obtains virtually everything it wants. It is so generally effective that other groups may be measured against it.

¹ For a further discussion of the problems involved, see Childs, *op. cit.*, p. 233; E. Pendleton Herring, *Group Representation Before Congress* (1929), p. 246; McKean, *op. cit.*, pp. 218-236.

² V. O. Key, Jr., attempted to measure the effectiveness of the pressures of the American Legion by comparing the re-election of those representatives who supported with those who opposed Legion policies. Too many assumptions of "other things being equal" prevented the results from being entirely satisfactory. See "Veterans and the House of Representatives: A Study of a Pressure Group and Electoral Mortality," *Journal of Politics*, vol. 5 (February, 1943), pp. 27-40.

REGULATION OF PRESSURE GROUPS

Congressional committees made eight investigations of lobbying activities before the La Follette-Monroney Act of 1946 undertook to regulate the Washington lobby. Until that time Congress had been content to forbid specific types of activity by designated interests, such as public utilities.¹ Long before Congress took action the states had been experimenting with lobby legislation. The Georgia constitution of 1877 made lobbying a crime; but this extreme provision was apparently never enforced, and the first serious attempt to regulate lobbying was a Massachusetts act of 1890, followed by a Wisconsin statute of 1899. These two have given the pattern to modern legislation.² A survey in 1943 showed thirty-five states with some sort of regulation, aside from prohibitions against bribery, which are found in all states.³ The federal statute and some state laws exempt (1) persons appearing in their own behalf or in behalf of a government agency or a political committee and (2) persons acting without pay, even though they may be relieved of their regular duties to engage in lobbying during a session. The laws commonly require that other lobbyists register, reveal their employers and the measures they promote or oppose, and file expense statements; prohibit contingent fees; and establish a scale of penalties. Critics, such as Professor Zeller, believe that the laws commonly contain too many exemptions; do not define lobbying with sufficient precision to make clear what is permitted and what is forbidden; provide no adequate machinery for enforcement; and fail to reach either the "inside" lobbyist or the propagandist who does not appear in the capital.

The statutory regulation of political parties, still far from perfection, has been the result of nearly a century of legislative accretion. The regulation of pressure politics is just beginning; perhaps it is at a stage comparable to the regulation of parties about 1880. It seems reasonable to expect that there will be further regulation of groups in the future if majority rule is to protect itself against minority control. The problems

¹ The present act is officially designated as the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, Title III of Public Law 601, Seventy-Ninth Congress, Second Session, 60 Stat. L. 839. For a full analysis and detailed criticism of the act, together with suggestions for its improvement, see Belle Zeller, "The Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 42 (April, 1948), pp. 239-271.

² Logan, *op. cit.*, pp. 65-67.

³ Belle Zeller, "State Regulation of Lobbying," *Book of the States* (1948 edition), p. 124. A tabulation of the principal features of the state laws appears on pages 129-130.

to be solved, however, go to the very heart of the American constitutional system, and it cannot be said that either the electorate or their political leaders are even conscious of them.

BENEFITS OF PRESSURE POLITICS

It must be recognized that pressure groups, like parties, have for popular government both their desirable and their undesirable aspects. Legislation should encourage the features that contribute to a more responsive and responsible government and discourage those that have the reverse effect. Pressure politics has come to be as much a part of the American political scene as party politics; neither should be indiscriminately condemned. It is appropriate to notice first some of the creditable functions of pressure groups.

✓ PROVISION OF FUNCTIONAL REPRESENTATION

In the first place, the groups superimpose upon geographical representation a rough kind of functional representation. "It is futile to attempt to legislate the lobby out of existence," wrote Herring. "The lobby has become part of the American system of representation. . . . Lobbying organizations exist because thousands of citizens [millions would be nearer the facts] give them support. This is evidence of a feeling that some matters are of so much concern to the welfare of the individual that the formal political representation is not adequate."¹ The parties, preoccupied with office-seeking, and resting upon broad sectional and traditional bases, are insufficiently refined instruments to represent the multitude of differentiated interests in contemporary society. The functional representation in pressure groups is, moreover, continuous, not subject to the landslides of party politics. It is more flexible than party politics; for in order to establish a pressure group, it is not necessary to wait until the next election, nor to work through a series of elections under the manifold rules of state election laws; rather, if the need is felt with sufficient intensity by enough people, a huge organization can be set up and be functioning with great force in a few days or weeks.

¹ E. Pendleton Herring, *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 9, p. 567.

INITIATION OF POLICY

As a second constructive function, the groups provide the politics of policy that the parties are unable to do. They invent policy, pointing out the need for legislation or administrative action, for the amendment of legislation or regulations. They perform a fact-finding and critical function to a degree that parties cannot. This critical function is particularly evident in appearances before hearings and in bill drafting. They do the work, to be sure, because their interests are affected, but it may be none the less valuable on that account. Some of that done by reform groups has a high degree of disinterestedness.

PROVISION OF CHECK ON OFFICIALS

Whether a legislator or executive thinks of himself as a kind of delegate, elected to do what the people in his constituency want done, or whether he thinks that he is like Burke's ideal member of Parliament, selected to use his own best judgment, still the elected official should be aware of the needs and desires of important segments of his state or district. In a rough and uneven way the groups do keep him so informed. They also keep his constituency, or parts of it, informed of his actions; the process works both ways. If a candidate seeking office is sufficiently eager for election to make promises, he must expect to abide by them when elected. Thus, in holding officials to their pledges the groups may be said to perform a service for popular government.

EDUCATIONAL FUNCTION

Still another useful function of pressure groups is the work they do in helping to educate the public on controversial issues. A judgment as to whether the propaganda they issue is good or bad will depend upon the point of view of the observer. The same, of course, may be said of party propaganda. The issuance of the group propaganda doubtless has some educational effect upon the public, in that groups will call the attention of the electorate to issues that parties will not or cannot take up, either because the issues are too narrow or too local, or because they run counter to the interests of both party organizations. The propaganda of reform groups is an example. And perhaps to some extent group propaganda helps to clarify party propaganda; for it may on occasion drive parties to

more specific statements and commitments than they otherwise would make.

COUNTER-INFLUENCE TO SEPARATION OF POWERS

Finally, the pressure groups help to overcome some of the disadvantages inherent in the separation of powers. The constitutions of the United States and of the states, with their provisions for bicameral legislative bodies and separation of powers, encourage deadlocks rather than positive governmental action. A President or governor of one party with a Congress or legislature (even with one house) of the other is very likely to find his program hindered or blocked; in these frequent circumstances there is a tendency toward stalemate. But pressure groups, most of which are nonpartisan, work with both sides, and they can overcome to some extent the propensity of American governments to inaction. The Farm Bloc is both Democratic and Republican, and so are the American Legion and the American Bar Association. By crossing party lines they can get legislation through. The intrinsic desirability of the legislation may be another question, but they do produce action from a form of government which easily comes to a standstill.

UNSOLVED PROBLEMS OF PRESSURE POLITICS

MULTIPLE REPRESENTATION OF CITIZENS

If the present statutes affecting groups could be corrected to define more clearly what is permissible and what is forbidden, to provide adequate enforcement, and to cure their other defects, still they would not begin to reach the real objections to pressure politics, as it is presently operated. First, they do not touch the multiplicity of representation that William Allen White noted, whereby he thought the average family could, for fifty dollars a year, "buy half a dozen powerful votes in government." The one-man-one-vote theory does indeed break down when one person, contributing to, or perhaps merely working through, groups with branches in various constituencies, may influence the election of scores of officials in both parties. His influence is further extended when the powers of government are delegated to groups. And the individual thus active in group politics may be beyond the jurisdiction of the states or districts where his pressure is felt; a citizen of New York, say, may be active in a number of

business and professional associations, and he may influence elections and public policy in Arizona, Indiana, South Carolina, and many other states, but he neither pays taxes in those states nor is he answerable to their governments in any other way. The parties tend to be mutually exclusive, so that under the one-man-one-vote theory of representative government the voter is expected to align himself, for maximum political effectiveness, with one party or another; but groups are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Some, like PAC and NAM, are; but there are hundreds of instances in which group interests do not conflict, and membership by one person in these gives his influence in government a cumulative effect. As long as freedom of association is permitted, no fully satisfactory solution of the problem White put so vividly has been suggested. Full and continuous publicity of the membership, financing, and methods of all groups — an immense undertaking for the hundred thousand of them — would be useful so far as it went, but it obviously could not prevent interstate and interdistrict influence. The greatest objection to pressure politics, then, is its violation of the principle of majority rule.

REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE GROUPS

Another problem is the group's representative character, the proportion of the people in the occupation, profession, religion, or other interest that the group represents. The secretaries and other officers appearing before committees commonly assert, but are rarely required to prove, that their groups speak "for all" or "for ninety per cent" or "for virtually one hundred per cent" of the apple-growers, lawyers, teachers, or whatever the interest is, when in point of fact the great majority of the rank and file may not belong to the organization; if they did, and if they were articulate, they might have quite different views from those expressed in their name. The internal government of a group is another problem of its representative character. When a group influences public government, then its own private government properly becomes a matter of public concern — its constitution, the conduct of its elections, the way in which it determines the policies for which the organization will stand, who pays its bills, and so on: Perhaps the first step toward the intervention of public government in private government occurred when the elections in factories for labor-union representation were supervised by public authority. It is not inconceivable that the time might come when, before a group would be allowed to engage in propaganda or pressure, its constitution, its method

of selecting spokesmen, its determination of the opinion of its members, and other aspects of its structure and behavior would have to meet certain tests, imposed by public authority, for adequacy of representation. It would seem to be particularly appropriate that groups, notably the professional associations, which exercise the police powers of the state should as much as political parties have their internal affairs regulated in the public interest.

INEQUALITIES AMONG GROUPS

In the *laissez-faire* of contemporary pressure politics there are immense inequalities among interests. Some, like business and industry, may be represented by a multitude of associations, seemingly organized to speak for every conceivable sub-interest; whereas other interests, like consumers, are either not organized at all or are inadequately or incompletely organized. There are great inequalities as well in the financial resources of groups: some have millions of dollars to spend on pressure politics each year, others have little or nothing. And there is no relationship between the number of persons in the total membership of a group and the number of dollars the group has. Other inequalities appear in the varying relationship of groups to inside officials and to the parties; in the use that may be authorized of the powers of government to carry out group purposes; and in access to the channels of communication, especially the press and the radio. Liberty does not produce equality, but "Within limits, every régime can choose and formulate the pressures to which it will be subjected. Indeed, the history of the tariff indicates that governments can and do create and extinguish pressures."¹ Much of the invisible government could be made visible if Congress and the state legislatures wished to make it visible.

Charles E. Merriam thought that, on the whole, the groups do more good than harm to the process of popular government:

We would not destroy all private governments if we could, but on the contrary encourage and foster them. Sound private governments of private groups will not destroy public government. They are themselves a part of the system of order and justice, of which the state is a symbol and an instrument for the realization of human values. The first step of despots is the disintegration of legal bodies, of parties, of churches and schools, of unions, of industrial and agricultural associations. . . . In the

¹ Schattschneider, *op. cit.*, p. 288.

government of the many, on the contrary, these associations are the bases of liberty, order, justice, democratic habit and practice, bulwarks of the republic.¹

The problem of pressure politics is not to abolish it but to articulate it with party politics in order to effect a government more responsible to the general will.

¹ *Public and Private Government* (Yale University Press, 1944), p. 18. For a different view, see E. E. Schattschneider, *Party Government* (1942), pp. 187-205.

Parties, Pressure Groups, and Democracy

THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY is tied up with the future of the party system. Representative government is the only form through which a great people can govern themselves, for direct democracy is possible only in the smallest units or by the occasional use of the initiative or referendum; and representative government on a large scale can be made to work only by parties. Many of the difficulties and uncertainties in present-day American government arise from the inadequacies of parties, from their inability to form effective majorities. The problem has been well put by Professor E. E. Schattschneider: "The source of difficulties is political, the failure to mobilize the power of the nation to govern itself, the failure to organize the majority over the government. Difficulties which seem insuperable otherwise would seem less formidable if *the political base of American government* were such that the nation could express its will more unmistakably."¹ Only political parties can produce the synthesis or compromise of interest necessary to make representative government work. The consent of the governed must be organized along broad lines of policy and interest and a government empowered to act, and yet this government cannot stop to ask for approval of every action. Representative government in the United States has within one generation survived two world wars and a severe economic depression. During the wars there appeared a bipartisan agreement or understanding, even though not always complete, upon the conduct of military affairs; and probably this agreement would be repeated if another war should occur. But neither party, it seems fair to say, has any program or broad policy for preventing another great economic crisis or for coping with one when it comes, and yet unem-

¹ *The Struggle for Party Government* (pamphlet, 1948), p. 3. Italics in the original.

ployment and widespread business disasters may well present popular government with a more dangerous emergency than an international war.

PRESENT STATUS OF PARTIES

PERFORMANCE OF AN IMMENSE TASK

American major parties have faced an immense task, and on the whole they have performed it well. This in spite of the fact that often local party machines — and occasionally the national parties — have been little better than organized appetites. Faced with an uninformed and uninterested electorate, compelled to operate in a federal system with its resulting decentralization of party administration, always unequally financed, they have mobilized some sort of majority again and again. Their problems have not been adequately appreciated either by the public or by publicists, who have been all too ready to disparage all politicians and both major parties; to blame them, for instance, for their vague and equivocal platforms when in fact the systems of the electoral college and federalism are more responsible. Except in 1860, the parties, in their compromising way, have always succeeded in obtaining from the public and from their memberships a willingness to accept the results of elections without violence, even though these elections have not always represented a majority vote and even though they have sometimes been fraudulent. The parties show no signs of becoming more intransigent. On the contrary, compromise and concession is still their mood. There is no party, major or minor, which professes a willingness to engage in revolution if its demands are not met.

Parties change and evolve, as has been shown in Chapter 16, and we may expect American parties to change. Pressure groups emerge which affect the parties in profound ways. The future effect of party and group on democracy may be only dimly seen, and it is always possible that drastic changes may suddenly occur. Some probabilities, however, may be noted.

PUBLIC SATISFACTION WITH TWO-PARTY SYSTEM

In the first place, the American voters appear to be, on the whole, satisfied with the present two-party system. Gallup polls taken over a decade have always shown a majority in favor of the existing alignment, and the majority has been steadily increasing. There is no imperative demand for

a realignment of the parties into a liberal-conservative pattern.¹ It is always possible that some minor party might arise which would displace one major party or the other, but such a development does not appear likely in the immediate future. Henry Wallace's Progressive Party, the latest attempt, attracted only about 8 per cent of the voters, according to Gallup's estimate, at its peak; and it steadily lost ground as the campaign of 1948 continued, until on election day it polled only about 2.4 per cent, or 1,157,100 votes.


Unless clear evidence is offered of new forces being at work, the presumption should be that for the foreseeable future the parties in the United States will continue to be pretty much what they have been. Too many predictions of imminent and drastic changes in American politics have gone astray to lead one to trust the prophets who see class politics, a liberal-conservative realignment, the end of the political machines, the rise of a powerful third party, or some other development right over the horizon.² It is more likely that gradual shifts in population and in economic and other interests will slowly produce changes in parties. Some voting along lines of economic class can be shown in the elections of 1896, 1924, and 1936, but even in these elections the sectional and traditional voting was important. It may be that in future elections the Republican Party

¹ At intervals Gallup polls have asked the question: "It has been suggested that we give up the present Republican and Democratic parties and have two new parties—one for the liberals and one for the conservatives. Would you favor this idea?" The results, assembled by G. H. Smith and R. P. Davis, are:

	Yes	No	No Opinion
Date			
August, 1937	22%	52%	26%
April, 1938	24	55	21
September, 1938	15	65	20
January, 1946	12	67	21
April, 1947	13	72	15

See "Do the Voters Want the Parties Changed?" in *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 11 (Summer, 1947), p. 238.

² The prediction of Professor Holcombe in 1933 that "the old party politics is visibly passing away," to be replaced, he expected, by class politics, has already been noted in Chapter 4. Twenty-three years earlier Ostrogorski predicted, in his *Democracy and the Party System*, pp. 442-444, the end of the permanent old parties; the new arrangement he thought he saw arising was not class politics but a multiple-party system with the various parties each "formed specially for a particular issue." He had advocated this scheme at length in the second volume of his *Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties* (1902), pp. 651-695, and perhaps allowed his desire for what he thought should happen to influence his judgment of what would happen.



DEMOCRATIC PERCENTAGE OF THE TWO-PARTY MEMBERSHIP IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1888-1948, AND PROJECTION TO 1960

The downward course of the New Deal tide, 1936 to 1946, paralleled the downward phase of an average or typical tide based on three previous tides (1856, 1890, and 1912). The typical tide points to Democratic congresses in the 1950's. (From Louis H. Bean, *How to Predict Elections*; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1948.)

will rely more on the upper and middle classes (whatever they are) and the Democratic Party more on the lower, but at present the attachment is more by groups and sections than by classes. It is easy to assert, but difficult to prove, that the major parties are becoming more aligned with economic classes. The Socialist and Communist Parties, which make direct appeals to class interest, appear to be losing ground.

CONTINUING IMPORTANCE OF SECTIONS AND INTERESTS

Sectional Alignments. "The national parties," said Herring, "have been little more than devices for aligning sections and balancing interests."¹ This is an important, even an indispensable, service, and the parties show few signs of ceasing to perform it. On the contrary, the sectional bases upon which they rest still remain firm, as the pattern of the

¹ "Political Parties and the Public Interest," *Essays in Political Science in Honor of W. W. Willoughby* (1937), p. 121.

votes in the electoral college and in Congress will show. "The Democrats can start every campaign with the knowledge that more than 100 Democratic congressmen will come, almost without opposition, from the South."¹ Sectionalism was clearly shown in the developments in the Democratic Party in 1948 when a block of northern delegates forced into the platform a more drastic civil rights plank than the southern Democrats would tolerate. As a result, a splinter party, the Dixiecrats, was set up in the South, clearly a sectional minor party. Whether it would live for more than one election was highly doubtful. What was perhaps more significant was that the Democratic Party was willing to defy the southern wing and if necessary to shift its sectional base northward. As one newspaper editor put it, the South is not so much withdrawing from the Democratic Party as the Democratic Party is withdrawing from the South. The political sectionalism of the future may be different from that which has prevailed since Reconstruction; but that there will continue to be important sectional interests contending in each major party seems certain.

Urbanization of Politics. Along with sectionalism there is a steadily increasing concentration of population in cities and a continual growth of big cities and metropolitan areas. The interests of the people in these great cities will constantly affect the politics of the sections in which they lie, even though urban areas are almost everywhere under-represented in legislative bodies. The continual urbanization of American life seems likely to increase the impact of pressure politics upon party politics, because the ease of communication characteristic of population concentration makes every method of pressure politics more effective. In this respect the political machines are likely to change, but to continue. Instead of having to induce voters to join political clubs and associations, astute bosses are increasingly able to deal with the organizations of voters already formed into their own societies, unions, leagues, and so on. In a sense, the organizational work of the urban boss is being done for him, and his machine becomes a sort of peak association. In cities where by tradition one party is supreme, as the Democratic Party is in New York City or the Republican in Philadelphia, the political machines will probably continue in spite of changes in Congress and the presidency. But in cities where the traditional attachment to one party is weak, shifts of control are likely to occur with shifts in federal patronage. The federal government, moreover, appears more and more willing to use its powers against political machines of the opposite party. For instance, Governor Dewey promised

¹ Cortez A. M. Ewing, *Congressional Elections, 1896-1944* (1947), p. 103.

in 1948 that if elected President he would attack the Hague machine — though he did not promise to attack the Philadelphia Republican machine or Jaeckel's Republican machine in Buffalo.

Governmentalization of Life. Along with urbanization has gone industrialization. The increasing reliance upon government action necessary in an industrialized society — what may be called the governmentalization of life — will make politics more important to more people. It seems unlikely that consciousness of this new importance will lead to strong new parties or to any great increase in popular participation in the internal management of existing major parties except as the leaders of pressure groups learn to mobilize their members in primaries. The increasing governmentalization of life will undoubtedly keep many groups, such as labor unions, active in politics and will also encourage other interests either to form new groups or to take old ones into politics. This service state necessarily means an increasing amount of public employment, a bigger bureaucracy. As veterans' patronage runs its course, the parties may be expected to renew their interest in spoils, but generally working within rather than by repealing civil service laws; the revived Long machine in Louisiana, which in 1948 repealed outright the state merit system laws, may be regarded as an exception. To be sure, the expert in government is here to stay; but as the Eightieth Congress showed in its staffing of committees with the experts provided by the Reorganization Act, Republican as well as Democratic experts are to be found. The wholesale turnout with change of party, characteristic of the spoils system of Jackson's time, is giving way to a slower type of displacement which works within civil service regulations. But to some extent bureaucracy is already developing its own group interest against the spoils system.

POSSIBILITIES OF VIOLENT POLITICS

Dictatorship and government by violence is always a real possibility:

The precarious foundation of American democracy and the two-party system is clearly shown by the events of the past twenty years in the state of Louisiana and the urban community of Jersey City. In these two widely scattered jurisdictions we have seen the rise of a type of political control which bears some strong resemblances to dictatorship. . . . The citizens of Louisiana and of Jersey City did not rise up and fight for their basic democratic freedoms. They were apparently content with their lot. ¹

¹ Harold F. Gosnell, *Grass Roots Politics* (American Council on Public Affairs, 1942), p. 135. For an account of the re-establishment of the Long machine under Earl and

The group violence of the Farm Holiday, the milk strikes, and the sit-down strikes are also of such recent memory that it would be rash to assume that pressure politics in the future will be confined to the use of peaceful methods. The American party system survived the economic crisis that began in 1929; whether it could survive another or worse crisis, if organized groups began to take direct action, is unpredictable.

THE PRESENT PULL OF POLITICAL FORCES

Within the sectionalism characteristic of American politics there is a kind of triangular pull of forces "among the principal forms of political organization in the United States: (1) the presidential parties, (2) the local party bosses, and (3) the pressure groups."¹ In this three-way struggle only the presidential party and the pressure groups are interested in issues. The local party machines "are profoundly indifferent to questions of public policy and have no desire or capacity to create public issues or to influence the course of government by exploiting the discussion of public affairs." Congress, that "no man's land of American politics," is the arena in which the three-way struggle is conducted.

THE AMERICAN PARTY SITUATION

In England, "parties have been primarily parliamentary institutions looking for public support for their work in Parliament."² The very reverse is true of the American party situation; the United States never has party government whereby all the voters may hold one party or the other accountable for what happens or for what does not happen in Washington. Bicameralism, federalism, and the principle of separation of powers produce at best a working but shifting and uncertain coalition of the President and his supporters in Congress. At worst there is deadlock and stalemate, a condition that might not have been dangerous to popular government in the eighteenth century but which in the atomic age holds possibilities for disaster.

Russell Long and the record of its first legislative session, see Lennox L. and Helen R. Moak, "The Rape of New Orleans," *National Municipal Review*, vol. 37 (September, 1948), pp. 412-415.

¹ E. E. Schattschneider, *Party Government* (1942), p. 206.

² L. S. Amery, *Thoughts on the Constitution* (1947), p. 43.

There is no general party voice, no party council. The huge conventions which meet every four years do not and cannot formulate party policy. The control of parties by the states makes national party platforms little but advisory, even if they were not such tissues of compromise and evasion as to be largely meaningless to the few voters who look at them. Thus, the constitutional system does not encourage real party rivalry, with one set of proposals advanced against another for the voters to take their choice. Based as the major parties are upon the states and with no effective control over the state organizations, these loose leagues of state and local parties cannot be expected to do much better than they have done. The President may attempt to define party policy, but if he dares, the experience of Franklin Roosevelt in 1938 proves what is likely to happen: he will be repudiated by his own partisans, not only in Congress but in the states, because he can no more control what sort of Democrat or Republican (as the case may be) is nominated in Arizona or Maryland or Wyoming than he can control the votes of congressmen and senators who may have been elected on the same platform that he was.

The national committee, while smaller than the convention and therefore conceivably of a size appropriate for a party council, is still a creature of the state election laws. The committeemen are not generally top political leaders in their states, and in no event are they answerable to the President; if accountable to anybody, they are responsible only to their state organizations. The national committee, therefore, has never developed into a body which can formulate or enforce party policy upon anybody. No more than the President is it able to discipline mavericks; indeed, a man with communistic ideas may call himself a Democrat or Republican, file his nominating petition, and get himself elected in spite of anything the national committee may do or say.

Since the federal system prevents strong party leadership in Congress, such party leadership as there is falls upon the President. But the administrative tasks of his office are alone enough to overwhelm one man, without the additional burden of being the commander-in-chief of a political army of millions of men and women. Both jobs simply cannot be done well by one person. The Cabinet might have developed, more than it has, into a party council to assist him, but the constitutional power of the President to appoint and dismiss members of the Cabinet without consulting party leaders in or out of Congress tends almost inevitably to make the Cabinet a meeting of subordinates, not a meeting of national party leaders.

Difficult as it is for the party which elects the President to maintain

leadership and unity of program and purpose, it is even more difficult for the party that fails. Its leaders in Congress cannot speak for the party with any authoritative voice. Its state governors, many of them usually receptive to the next presidential nomination, find that any clear commitments on national problems are politically hazardous; furthermore, they are ordinarily inexperienced and uninformed on national questions.

PARTY WEAKNESS AS PRESSURE-GROUP STRENGTH

Into this weakness of party move the pressure groups. The major parties find the formulation and execution of broad policies difficult, or impossible; but the organized minorities, not responsible to the electorate, concentrate on policy. Unlike the parties, they know what they want. If the parties cannot discipline members of legislative bodies who refuse to follow a party program, the pressure groups can and do discipline legislators — and executives — who fail to do their will. In the process they are increasingly utilizing the machinery of politics which the parties once had largely to themselves. For example, they engage in propaganda for or against candidates and officials; they make contributions and expenditures; they get out the vote. In those states in which one party is supreme, the groups invade the primary of the dominant party and nominate officials who are then in reality more responsible to the groups than they are to the whole party on whose ticket they run. The Non-Partisan League and the Anti-Saloon League showed the way; the defeat of Governor Robert D. Blue in the Iowa Republican primary of 1948 by a coalition of groups he had offended was a recent instance. In 1936 in Colorado the organized advocates of old-age pensions captured the primaries of both major parties and wrote into the state constitution and the statutes a little Townsend Plan which has at times threatened to bankrupt the state.

The pressure groups cannot govern. But they are not interested in governing. They are instead interested in the particular policies that brought them into being, and even though a group may at its annual convention announce its position on several hundred issues, still these do not constitute a general plan of action for a government. Not even the reform groups are prepared to govern, and they are so specialized that they cannot mobilize the electorate into a working majority. "It is going to be difficult to work out policies of high-level employment [as well as other broad policies] in a disintegrated government structure driven by an

amorphous mass of interested minorities under circumstances conducive to nervous prostration, although that is the traditional procedure."¹

NECESSITY FOR STRONGER NATIONAL PARTY LEADERSHIP

The prime problem of American politics, and hence of representative government in the United States, is to strengthen the national or presidential party as against both the bosses and the pressure groups. The general interest or the will of the majority cannot be reflected through either bosses or groups, both of which are essentially irresponsible to the electorate. Only a national leadership can view national problems and policies from a base sufficiently broad. Only the President (and Vice-President) are voted for, even if indirectly, by citizens everywhere. Only these two can in any way — and it is a very imperfect way — be held accountable to the whole electorate for action or inaction. The question of just what steps can or should be taken to improve party responsibility is a widely controversial one. If a new constitutional convention could be called and a new constitution written, or if the two major parties could be convinced of the desirability of responsible party government, and hence could agree upon a series of constitutional amendments to provide for it, the necessary changes could be made.

POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING PARTY RESPONSIBILITY

PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION

Over the last thirty years a number of books have been written by advocates of substantial or complete constitutional revision.² Although the books seem to be appearing with increasing frequency, and although some of them are coming from persons who could not be said to be merely academic students of politics, still it must be admitted the prospect for federal constitutional reform appears very dim indeed. No major party — in fact, no major politician — has taken up the matter. Powerful pres-

¹ E. E. Schattschneider, "Party Government and Employment Policy," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 39 (December, 1945), p. 1150.

² See, among others, William MacDonald, *A New Constitution for a New America* (1921); W. K. Wallace, *Our Obsolete Constitution* (1933); W. Y. Elliott, *The Need for Constitutional Reform* (1935); Henry Hazlitt, *A New Constitution Now* (1942); Alexander Hehmyer, *Time for Change: A Proposal for a Second Constitutional Convention* (1943), and Thomas K. Finletter, *Can Representative Government Do the Job?* (1945).

sure groups, such as the DAR, the Legion, and the Committee for Constitutional Government, could be expected to go into action against revision the moment any proposal looking to a general rewriting of the Constitution reached the stage of practical possibility.

Parliamentary Form of Government. Complete party responsibility to the electorate cannot be attained short of a parliamentary form of government. This would mean, as Hazlitt has seen most clearly, that the Senate would have to be abolished or reduced to a status subordinate to the House; the Executive would have to be responsible to the House; and elections would occur not only at fixed dates but also whenever the Executive lacked the confidence of his party in the House. National election law would have to supersede state election laws; a national system of proportional representation in Congress instead of the single-member district system would be necessary to prevent over-representation or under-representation; and residence requirements for members of Congress would have to be abolished. There would be other matters of detail, but under such conditions real party unity and national party leadership and responsibility could be attained, and the pressure groups would be reduced to much the same impotence that they have in Great Britain and in Canada.

PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS

Abolition of Electoral College. The prospect for a second constitutional convention to rewrite the Constitution in a way that would provide for complete party government is so remote as not to justify more extended discussion here, but there is some agitation for certain amendments which, without fully correcting the present haphazard, decentralized condition of the parties, might yet improve the situation somewhat. In any such list of proposals the abolition of the archaic and undemocratic electoral college must come first. Among the effects of the electoral college in our present political system have been: overweighting certain large and doubtful states; reducing the parties' choices for candidates to residents of these states; encouraging and preserving sectionalism; making possible the election of minority presidents; enhancing the power of pressure groups; driving the two major parties toward meaningless similarity; and discouraging minor parties and parties with coherent programs. Furthermore, as the Dixiecrats showed in 1948, it is possible for a state legislature to permit a state central committee to substitute electors, after the nominee

has been picked, for those pledged to the candidate of a major party, so that the voters of a state may find themselves unable to vote for a presidential candidate of a major party. This condition would seem to be intolerable in a nation that regards itself as a democracy. Equally intolerable was the situation which almost arose in the presidential election of 1948, when a shift of 35,300 votes in the three states of California, Illinois, and Ohio would have elected Governor Dewey president, notwithstanding a plurality of approximately two million popular votes for President Truman.

The outright abolition of the electoral college, to be superseded by the direct, popular election of the President and Vice-President at large would be desirable. Such an amendment would get rid of many if not most of the ill effects of the electoral college mentioned above. There would still remain the possibility, of course, that if more than two parties of nearly equal strength ran candidates, no candidate would attain a majority. That is the present situation, not only in the election of President, but also in the election of governors, senators, and representatives, as well as of other officials. Plurality election is sufficiently rare so that it is not generally regarded as important; but if it were more common, it could be prevented by a system of preferential voting or by a run-off election.

Other Proposed Amendments. Other amendments with even less chance of adoption have been proposed. Among them are the abolition of the Senate; proportional representation for election to Congress; and recall of senators and representatives. One pending amendment, to reduce the President's tenure to two terms, ought to be defeated, because it would weaken or destroy his party leadership in his second term.

REFORM BY STATUTE AND PARTY PRACTICE

A National Election Law. Short of constitutional reform there are some steps the two major parties, acting together, might take to clarify and concentrate party responsibility. It is barely possible that the Supreme Court would uphold a national election law, and if so Congress might provide that the national committee or some other national party agency could bar a candidate from the party nomination if he did not subscribe to party principles or if his record in Congress showed disloyalty to his party. Then men with communistic ideas could not get nominated as Republicans; but of perhaps more frequent and general importance, the national party would be greatly strengthened as against the pressure

groups, because in most instances a pressure group could not discipline a member of Congress as much as his own party could. Along with such a change would have to develop a tradition of increased willingness on the part of the national organization to discipline its unruly members.

Abolition of Seniority. The assignment of congressional committee memberships, and especially chairmanships, on the basis of seniority doubtless saves bickering and prevents some ill feeling, but it does not contribute to party responsibility. When the Rules Committee can arbitrarily block a measure approved by a party platform and by a party's President, party action is frustrated. Any party in control of Congress could reform the rules to improve party discipline by withholding committee memberships, and especially chairmanships, from recalcitrant partisans.

Repeal of the Hatch Acts. Congress could, without any constitutional question, modify or repeal the Hatch Acts. Probably they should be repealed, because they have done more harm than good. They have weakened rather than strengthened the national parties. The financing of party activity should be approached from another direction than by the impositions of low limits upon party expenditures. If mere publicity is thought to be insufficient, Congress should move toward public financing of the parties, which are now in reality organs of government. Then prohibitions upon contributions by certain persons or certain interests or prohibitions upon contributions in excess of certain limits would have a better chance of enforcement.

Improvement in Party Staff Work. Each party could provide better staff work for itself, particularly better research and publicity. The possibilities were shown by Charles Michelson, but what is more needed than the collection of ammunition to fire at the other party is the serious study of national problems and issues, year in and year out, by a permanent group of experts. Neither party does for itself what the National Industrial Conference Board does for business, and yet each party could do so, and each needs this sort of service even more than business. The political staff work around the President needs to be improved, and it could be improved; but in view of the essentially leaderless character of the party out of power under the Constitution, whether anything of importance could be done for it is highly doubtful.

DESIRABILITY OF STRENGTHENING THE PARTIES

Professor Schattschneider, who has written extensively on the problem of obtaining party government in the United States, appears to believe that much improvement could be obtained if partisans could only be brought to see the necessity for strengthening the national parties as against both the bosses and the pressure groups. "What the parties require," he writes, "is a better morale, a better conception of their potentialities, and more intelligent public support based upon a better understanding of the meaning of party government. Once the parties are aroused, the struggle between the parties and the pressure groups is certain to be an unequal one."¹ This hope may be vain, but it is still a hope.

On the whole, American parties have never been perfect instruments either to reflect or to carry out the popular will, or when there is no popular will, to invent or formulate policy. But within the conditions imposed upon them by the Constitution, they have probably done better than anyone had a right to expect. There is no reason to suppose that they will in the future perform their tasks less well, but they will rather do the best they can to form the voters into peaceful majorities and to keep local and special interests reasonably co-operative without becoming dominant in American society.

¹ E. E. Schattschneider, "Pressure Groups versus Political Parties," *Annals*, vol. 259 (September, 1948), p. 22.

Party Platforms-1948

The Democratic Party Platform

The Democratic party adopts this platform in the conviction that the destiny of the United States is to provide leadership in the world toward a realization of the four freedoms.

We chart our future course as we charted our course under the leadership of Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman in the abiding belief that democracy — when dedicated to the service of all and not to a privileged few — proves its superiority over all other forms of government.

Our party record of the past is assurance of its policies and performance in the future.

Ours is the party which was entrusted with responsibility when twelve years of Republican neglect had blighted the hopes of mankind, had squandered the fruits of prosperity and had plunged us into the depths of depression and despair.

Ours is the party which rebuilt a shattered economy, rescued our banking system, revived our agriculture, re-invigorated our industry, gave labor strength and security, and led the American people to the broadest prosperity in our history.

Ours is the party which introduced the spirit of humanity into our law, as we outlawed child labor and the sweatshop, insured bank deposits, protected millions of home-owners and farmers from foreclosure, and established national social security.

Ours is the party under which this nation before Pearl Harbor gave aid and strength to those countries which were holding back the Nazi and Fascist tide.

Ours is the party which stood at the helm and led the nation to victory in the war.

Ours is the party which, during the war, prepared for peace so well that when peace came reconversion promptly led to the greatest production and employment in this nation's life.

Ours is the party under whose leadership farm owners' income in this nation increased from less than \$2,500,000,000 in 1933 to more than \$18,000,000,000 in 1947; independent business and professional income increased from less than \$3,000,000,000 in 1933 to more than \$22,000,000,000 in 1947; employees' earnings increased from \$29,000,000,000 in

1933 to more than \$128,000,000,000 in 1947; and employment grew from 39,000,000 jobs in 1933 to a record of 60,000,000 jobs in 1947.

Ours is the party under which the framework of the world organization for peace and justice was formulated and created.

Ours is the party under which were conceived the instruments for resisting Communist aggression and for rebuilding the economic strength of the democratic countries of Europe and Asia — the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. They are the materials with which we must build the peace.

Ours is the party which first proclaimed that the actions and policies of this nation in the foreign field are matters of national and not just party concern. We shall go forward on the course charted by President Roosevelt and President Truman and the other leaders of democracy.

We reject the principle — which we have always rejected, but which the Republican Eightieth Congress enthusiastically accepted — that government exists for the benefit of the privileged few.

To serve the interests of all and not the few; to assure a world in which peace and justice can prevail; to achieve security, full production and full employment — this is our platform.

FOREIGN POLICY

We declared in 1944 that the imperative duty of the United States was to wage the war to final triumph and to join with the other United Nations in the establishment of an international organization for the prevention of aggression and the maintenance of international peace and security.

Under Democratic leadership, those pledges were gloriously redeemed.

When the United States was treacherously and savagely attacked, our great Democratic President, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and a Democratic Congress preserved the nation's honor, and with high courage and with the invincible might of the American people, the challenge was accepted. Under his inspiring leadership the nation created the greatest Army that ever assembled under the flag, the mightiest air force, the most powerful Navy on the globe, and the largest merchant marine in the world.

The nation's gallant sons on land, on sea, and in the air, ended the war in complete and overwhelming triumph. Armed aggression against peaceful peoples was resisted and crushed. Arrogant and powerful war lords were vanquished and forced to unconditional surrender.

Before the end of the war the Democratic administration turned to the task of establishing measures for peace and the prevention of aggression and the threat of another war. Under the leadership of a Democratic President and his Secretary of State, the United Nations was organized at San Francisco. The charter was ratified by an overwhelming vote of the Senate.

The United Nations. We support the United Nations fully and we pledge our whole-hearted aid toward its growth and development. We will continue to lead the way toward curtailment of the use of the veto. We shall favor such amendments and modifications of the charter as experience may justify. We will continue our efforts toward the establishment of an international armed force to aid its authority.

We advocate the grant of a loan to the United Nations recommended by the President, but denied by the Republican Congress, for the construction of the United Nations headquarters in this country.

Just Peace Treaties. We pledge our best endeavors to conclude treaties of peace with our former enemies. Already treaties have been made with Italy, Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania. We shall strive to conclude treaties with the remaining enemy states, based on justice and with guarantees against the revival of aggression, and for the preservation of peace.

We advocate the maintenance of an adequate army, navy and air force to protect the nation's vital interests and to assure our security against aggression.

We advocate the effective international control of weapons of mass destruction, including the atomic bomb, and we approve continued and vigorous efforts within the United Nations to bring about the successful consummation of the proposals which our Government has advanced.

The adoption of these proposals would be a vital and most important step toward safe and effective world disarmament and world peace under a strengthened United Nations which would then truly constitute a more effective parliament of the world's peoples.

The Truman Doctrine. Under the leadership of a Democratic President, the United States has demonstrated its friendship for other peace-loving nations and its support of their freedom and independence. Under the Truman Doctrine vital aid has been extended to China, to Greece and to Turkey. Under the Marshall Plan generous sums have been provided for the relief and rehabilitation of European nations striving to rebuild their economy and to secure and strengthen their safety and freedom.

The Republican leadership in the House of Representatives, by its votes in the Eightieth Congress, has shown its reluctance to provide funds to support this program, the greatest move for peace and recovery made since the end of World War II.

The Marshall Plan. We pledge a sound, humanitarian administration of the Marshall Plan.

We pledge support not only for these principles — we pledge further that we will not withhold necessary funds by which these principles can be achieved. Therefore, we pledge that we will implement with appropriations the commitments which are made in this nation's foreign programs.

We pledge ourselves to restore the reciprocal trade agreements program formulated in 1934 by Secretary of State Cordell Hull and operated successfully for fourteen years — until crippled by the Republican Eightieth Congress. Further, we strongly endorse our country's adherence to the International Trade Organization.

Regional Pacts. A great Democratic President established the good neighbor policy toward the nations of the Western Hemisphere. The Act of Chapultepec was negotiated at Mexico City under Democratic leadership. It was carried forward in the Western Hemisphere defense pact concluded at Rio de Janeiro, which implemented the Monroe Doctrine and united the Western Hemisphere in behalf of peace.

We pledge continued economic co-operation with the countries of the Western Hemisphere. We pledge continued support of regional arrangements within the United Nations Charter, such as the Inter-American Regional Pact and the developing Western European Union.

Israel. President Truman, by granting immediate recognition to Israel, led the world in extending friendship and welcome to a people who have long sought and justly deserve freedom and independence.

We pledge full recognition to the State of Israel. We affirm our pride that the United States, under the leadership of President Truman, played a leading rôle in the adoption of the resolution of Nov. 29, 1947, by the United Nations General Assembly for the creation of a Jewish state.

We approve the claims of the State of Israel to the boundaries set forth in the United Nations resolution of Nov. 29 and consider that modifications thereof should be made only if fully acceptable to the State of Israel.

We look forward to the admission of the State of Israel to the United Nations and its full participation in the international community of

nations. We pledge appropriate aid to the State of Israel in developing its economy and resources.

We favor the revision of the arms embargo to accord to the state of Israel the right of self-defense. We pledge ourselves to work for the modification of any resolution of the United Nations to the extent that it may prevent any such revision.

We continue to support, within the framework of the United Nations, the internationalization of Jerusalem and the protection of the holy places in Palestine.

Subjugated Countries. The United States has traditionally been in sympathy with the efforts of subjugated countries to attain their independence, and to establish a democratic form of government.

Poland is an outstanding example. After a century and a half of subjugation, it was resurrected after the first World War by our great Democratic President, Woodrow Wilson. We look forward to development of these countries as prosperous, free, and democratic fellow members of the United Nations.

DOMESTIC POLICIES

Inflation. The Republican Eightieth Congress is directly responsible for the existing and ever increasing high cost of living. It cannot dodge that responsibility. Unless the Republican candidates are defeated in the approaching elections, their mistaken policies will impose greater hardships and suffering on large numbers of the American people.

Adequate food, clothing and shelter — the bare necessities of life — are becoming too expensive for the average wage-earner and the prospects are more frightening each day. The Republican Eightieth Congress has lacked the courage to face this vital problem.

We shall curb the Republican inflation. We shall put a halt to the disastrous price rises which have come as a result of the failure of the Republican Eightieth Congress to take effective action on President Truman's recommendations, setting forth a comprehensive program to control the high cost of living.

Housing. We shall enact comprehensive housing legislation, including provisions for slum clearance and low-rent housing projects initiated by local agencies. This nation is shamed by the failure of the Republican Eightieth Congress to pass the vitally needed general housing legislation as recommended by the President. Adequate housing will end the need for rent control. Until then, it must be continued.

Fiscal Policy. We pledge the continued maintenance of those sound fiscal policies which, under Democratic leadership, have brought about a balanced budget and reduction of the public debt by \$28,000,000,000 since the close of the war.

We favor the reduction of taxes, whenever it is possible to do so without unbalancing the nation's economy, by giving a full measure of relief to those millions of low-income families on whom the wartime burden of taxation fell most heavily. The form of tax reduction adopted by the Republican Eightieth Congress gave relief to those who need it least and ignored those who need it most.

We shall endeavor to remove tax inequities and to continue to reduce the public debt.

We are opposed to the imposition of a general Federal sales tax.

Taft-Hartley Act. We advocate the repeal of the Taft-Hartley Act. It was enacted by the Republican Eightieth Congress over the President's veto. That act was proposed with the promise that it would secure "the legitimate rights of both employes and employers in their relations affecting commerce." It has failed.

The number of labor-management disputes has increased. The number of cases before the National Labor Relations Board has more than doubled since the act was passed, and efficient and prompt administration is becoming more and more difficult. It has encouraged litigation in labor disputes and undermined the established American policy of collective bargaining.

Recent decisions by the courts prove that the act was so poorly drawn that its application is uncertain, and that it is probably, in some provisions, unconstitutional. We advocate such legislation as is desirable to establish a just body of rules to assure free and effective collective bargaining, to determine, in the public interest, the rights of employes and employers, to reduce to a minimum their conflict of interests, and to enable unions to keep their membership free from Communistic influences.

We urge that the Department of Labor be rebuilt and strengthened, restoring to it the units, including the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service and the United States Employment Service, which properly belong to it, and which the Republican Eightieth Congress stripped from it over the veto of President Truman. We urge that the department's facilities for collecting and disseminating economic information be expanded, and that a labor education extension service be established in the Department of Labor.

We favor the extension of the coverage of the Fair Labor Standards Act as recommended by President Truman, and the adoption of a minimum wage of at least 75 cents an hour in place of the present obsolete and inadequate minimum of 40 cents an hour.

We favor legislation assuring that the workers of our nation receive equal pay for equal work regardless of sex.

Broader Social Security. We favor the extension of the Social Security program established under Democratic leadership, to provide additional protection against the hazards of old age, disability, disease or death. We believe that this program should include:

Increases in old-age and survivors' insurance benefits by at least 50 per cent, and reduction of the eligibility age for women from 65 to 60 years; extension of old-age and survivors' and unemployment insurance to all workers not now covered; insurance against loss of earnings on account of illness or disability; improved public assistance for the needy.

National Health Program. We favor the enactment of a national health program for expanded medical research, medical education, and hospitals and clinics.

We will continue our efforts to aid the blind and other handicapped persons to become self-supporting.

We will continue our efforts to expand maternal care, improve the health of the nation's children, and reduce juvenile delinquency.

We approve the purposes of the Mental Health Act and we favor such appropriations as may be necessary to make it effective.

Education. We advocate federal aid for education administered by and under the control of the states. We vigorously support the authorization, which was so shockingly ignored by the Republican Eightieth Congress, for the appropriation of \$300,000,000 as a beginning of federal aid to the states to assist them in meeting the present education needs. We insist upon the right of every American child to obtain a good education.

Veterans. The nation can never discharge its debt to its millions of war veterans. We pledge ourselves to the continuance and improvement of our national program of benefits for veterans and their families.

We are proud of the sound and comprehensive program conceived, developed and administered under Democratic leadership, including the GI Bill of Rights, which has proved beneficial to many millions.

The level of veterans' benefits must be constantly re-examined in the light of the decline in the purchasing power of the dollar brought about by inflation.

Employment and economic security must be afforded all veterans. We pledge a program of housing for veterans at prices they can afford to pay.

The disabled veteran must be provided with medical care and hospitalization of the highest possible standard.

Farm Aid. We pledge our efforts to maintain continued farm prosperity, improvement of the standard of living and the working condition of the farmer, and to preserve the family-size farm.

Specifically, we favor a permanent system of flexible price supports for agricultural products, to maintain farm income on a parity with farm operating costs; an intensified soil conservation program; an extended crop insurance program; improvement of methods of distributing agricultural products; development and maintenance of stable export markets; adequate financing for the school lunch program; the use of agricultural surpluses to improve the diet of low-income families in case of need; continued expansion of the rural electrification program; strengthening of all agricultural practices, and to find new uses for farm products.

We strongly urge the continuance of maximum farmer participation in all these programs.

We favor the repeal of the discriminatory taxes on the manufacture and sale of oleomargarine.

We will encourage farm co-operatives and oppose any revision of Federal law designed to curtail their most effective functioning as a means of achieving economy, stability and security for American agriculture.

We favor provisions under which our fishery resources and industry will be afforded the benefits that will result from more scientific research and exploration.

Small Business. We recognize the importance of small business in a sound American economy. It must be protected against unfair discrimination and monopoly, and be given equal opportunities with competing enterprises to expand its capital structure.

We favor non-discriminatory transportation charges and declare for the early correction of inequalities in such charges.

Development of Resources. We pledge the continued full and unified regional development of the water, mineral, and other natural resources of the nation, recognizing that the progress already achieved under the initiative of the Democratic party in the arid and semi-arid states of the West, as well as in the Tennessee Valley, is only an indication of still

greater results which can be accomplished. Our natural resources are the heritage of all our people and must not be permitted to become the private preserves of monopoly.

The irrigation of arid land, the establishment of new, independent, competitive businesses and the stimulation of new industrial opportunities for all of our people depends upon the development and transmission of electric energy in accordance with the program and the projects so successfully launched under Democratic auspices during the past sixteen years.

We favor acceleration of the Federal reclamation program, the maximum beneficial use of water in the several states for irrigation and domestic supply. In this connection, we propose the establishment and maintenance of new family-size farms for veterans and others seeking settlement opportunities, the development of hydroelectric power and its widespread distribution over publicly owned transmission lines to assure benefits to the water users in financing irrigation projects, and to the power users for domestic and industrial purposes, with preference to public agencies and rural electrification administration co-operatives.

These are the aims of the Democratic Party which in the future, as in the past, will place the interest of the people as individual citizens first.

We will continue to improve the navigable waterways and harbors of the nation.

We pledge to continue the policy initiated by the Democratic Party of adequate appropriations for flood control for the protection of life and property.

In addition to practicing false economy on flood control, the Republican-controlled Eightieth Congress was so cruel as even to deny emergency Federal funds for the relief of individuals and municipalities victimized by recent great floods, tornadoes and other disasters.

Material Stockpiling. We shall expand our programs for forestation, for the improvement of grazing lands, public and private for the stockpiling of strategic minerals and the encouragement of a sound domestic mining industry.

We shall carry forward experiments for the broader utilization of mineral resources in the highly beneficial manner already demonstrated in the program for the manufacture of synthetic liquid fuel from our vast deposits of coal and oil shale and from our agricultural resources.

We pledge an intensive enforcement of the anti-trust laws, with adequate appropriations.

Regulation of Business. We advocate the strengthening of existing anti-trust laws by closing the gaps which experience has shown have been used to promote the concentration of economic power.

We pledge a positive program to promote competitive business and to foster the development of independent trade and commerce.

We support the right of free enterprise and the right of all persons to work together in co-operatives and other democratic associations for the purpose of carrying out any proper business operations free from any arbitrary and discriminatory restrictions.

Civil Rights. The Democratic Party is responsible for the great civil rights gains made in recent years in eliminating unfair and illegal discrimination based on race, creed or color.

The Democratic Party commits itself to continuing its efforts to eradicate all racial, religious and economic discrimination.

We again state our belief that racial and religious minorities must have the right to live, the right to work, the right to vote, the full and equal protection of the laws, on a basis of equality with all citizens as guaranteed by the Constitution.

We highly commend President Harry Truman for his courageous stand on the issue of civil rights.

We call upon the Congress to support our President in guaranteeing these basic and fundamental rights: (1) the right of full and equal political participation, (2) the right to equal opportunity of employment, (3) the right of security of person, (4) and the right of equal treatment in the service and defense of our nation.

Displaced Persons. We pledge ourselves to legislation to admit a minimum of 400,000 displaced persons found eligible for United States citizenship without discrimination as to race or religion. We condemn the undemocratic action of the Republican Eightieth Congress in passing an inadequate and bigoted bill for this purpose, which law imposes un-American restrictions based on race and religion upon such admissions.

Territories. We urge immediate statehood for Hawaii and Alaska; immediate determination by the people of Puerto Rico as to their form of government and their ultimate status with respect to the United States; and the maximum degree of local self-government for the Virgin Islands, Guam and Samoa.

Personal Rights. We recommend to Congress the submission of a constitutional amendment on equal rights for women.

We favor the extension of the right of suffrage to the people of the District of Columbia.

We pledge adherence to the principle of nonpartisan civilian administration of atomic energy, and the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes through free scientific inquiry for the benefit of all the people.

Freedom of the Press. We urge the vigorous promotion of world-wide freedom in the gathering and dissemination of news by press, radio and television, with complete confidence that an informed people will determine wisely the course of domestic and foreign policy.

We believe the primary step toward the achievement of world-wide freedom is access by all peoples to the facts and the truth. To that end we will encourage the greatest possible vigor on the part of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights and the United Nations Economic and Social Council to establish the foundations on which freedom can exist in every nation.

We deplore the repeated attempts of Republicans in the Eightieth Congress to impose thought control upon the American people and to encroach on the freedom of speech and press.

We pledge the early establishment of a national science foundation under principles which will guarantee the most effective utilization of public and private research facilities.

We will continue our efforts to improve and strengthen our Federal civil service, and provide adequate compensation.

We will continue to maintain an adequate American Merchant Marine.

We condemn communism and other forms of totalitarianism and their destructive activity overseas and at home. We shall continue to build firm defenses against communism by strengthening the economic and social structure of our own democracy. We reiterate our pledge to expose and prosecute treasonable activities of anti-democratic and un-American organizations which would sap our strength, paralyze our will to defend ourselves, and destroy our unity, inciting race against race, class against class, and the people against free institutions.

Subversive Activities. We shall continue vigorously to enforce the laws against subversive activities, observing at all times the constitutional guarantees which protect free speech, the free press and honest political activity. We shall strengthen our laws against subversion to the full extent necessary, protecting at all times our traditional individual freedoms.

We recognize that the United States has become the principal protector of the free world. The free peoples of the world look to us for

support in maintaining their freedoms. If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world — and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our own nation.

Military Strength. For these reasons it is imperative that we maintain our military strength until world peace with justice is secure. Under the leadership of President Truman, our military departments have been united and our Government organization for the national defense greatly strengthened.

We pledge to maintain adequate military strength, based on these improvements, sufficient to fulfill our responsibilities in occupation zones, defend our national interests and to bolster those free nations resisting Communist aggression.

This is our platform, these are our principles. They form a political and economic policy which has guided our party and our nation.

The American people know these principles well. Under them we have enjoyed greater security, greater prosperity and more effective world leadership than ever before.

Under them and with the guidance of Divine Providence we can proceed to higher levels of prosperity and security; we can advance to a better life at home; we can continue our leadership in the world with ever growing prospects for lasting peace.

The Republican Party Platform

To establish and maintain peace, to build a country in which every citizen can earn a good living with the promise of real progress for himself and his family and to uphold as a beacon light for mankind everywhere the inspiring American tradition of liberty, opportunity and justice for all — that is the Republican platform.

DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES

To this end we propose as a guide to definite action the following principles:

Maximum voluntary co-operation between citizens and minimum dependence on law; never, however, declining courageous recourse to law if necessary.

Our competitive system furnishes vital opportunity for youth and for all enterprising citizens; it makes possible the productive power which is the unique weapon of our national defense, and is the mainspring of material well-being and political freedom.

Government, as the servant of such a system, should take all needed steps to strengthen and develop public health, to promote scientific research, to provide security for the aged, and to promote a stable economy so that men and women need not fear the loss of their jobs or the threat of economic hardships through no fault of their own.

Rights of Labor. The rights and obligations of workers are commensurate with the rights and obligations of employers and they are interdependent; these rights should be protected against coercion and exploitation from whatever quarter and with due regard for the general welfare of all.

The soil, as our basic natural resource, must be conserved with increased effectiveness, and farm prices should be supported on a just basis.

Development of the priceless national heritage which is in our West is vital to our nation.

Administration of Government must be economical and effective.

Faulty governmental policies share an important responsibility for the present cruelly high cost of living. We pledge prompt action to correct these policies. There must be decent living at decent wages.

Our common defense must be strengthened and unified.

Our foreign policy is dedicated to preserving a free America in a free world of free men. This calls for strengthening the United Nations and primary recognition of America's self-interest in the liberty of other peoples. Prudently conserving our own resources, we shall co-operate on a self-help basis with other peace-loving nations.

Constant and effective insistence on the personal dignity of the individual and his right to complete justice without regard to race, creed or color, is a fundamental American principle.

We aim always to unite and to strengthen; never to weaken or divide. In such a brotherhood will we Americans get results. Thus we will overcome all obstacles.

REPUBLICANS' ACHIEVEMENTS

In the past eighteen months, the Republican Congress, in the face of frequent obstruction from the Executive branch, made a record of solid achievement. Here are some of the accomplishments of this Republican Congress.

The budget balanced;

Taxes reduced;

Limitation of Presidential tenure to two terms passed;

Assistance to veterans, their widows and orphans provided;

Assistance to agriculture and business enacted;

Elimination of the poll tax as a requisite to soldier voting;

A sensible reform of the labor law, protecting all rights of labor while safeguarding the entire community against those breakdowns in essential industries which endanger the health and livelihood of all;

A long-range farm program enacted;

Unification of the Armed Services launched;

A military manpower law enacted;

The United Nations fostered;

A haven for displaced persons provided;

The most far-reaching measures in history adopted to aid the recovery of the free world on a basis of self-help and with prudent regard for our own resources;

And, finally, the development of intelligent plans and party team work for the day when the American people entrust the executive, as well as the legislative, branch of our National Government to the Republican party.

We shall waste few words on the tragic lack of foresight and general inadequacy of those now in charge of the executive branch of the national government; they have lost the confidence of citizens of all parties.

PLATFORM POLICIES

Inflation. Present cruelly high prices are due in large part to the fact that the government has not effectively used the powers it possesses to combat inflation, but has deliberately encouraged higher prices.

We pledge an attack upon the basic causes of inflation, including the following measures:

Progressive reduction of the cost of government through elimination of waste;

Stimulation of production as the surest way to lower prices;

Fiscal policies to provide increased incentive for production and thrift;

A sound currency;

Reduction of the public debt.

We pledge further, that in the management of our national government, we shall achieve the abolition of overlapping, duplication, extravagance and excessive centralization;

The more efficient assignment of functions within the government; and the rooting out of Communism wherever found.

These things are fundamental.

We must, however, do more.

The Constitution gives us the affirmative mandate "to establish justice."

In Lincoln's words: "The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty and we must rise with the occasion. As our case is new, so we must think anew and act anew."

The tragic experience of Europe tells us that popular government disappears when it is ineffective and no longer can translate into action the aims and the aspirations of the people.

DOMESTIC POLICIES

Therefore, in domestic affairs, we propose:

Defense. The maintenance of Armed Services for air, land and sea to a degree which will insure our national security, and the achievement of

effective unity in the Department of National Defense so as to insure maximum economy in money and manpower and maximum effectiveness in case of war. We favor sustained effective action to procure sufficient manpower for the services, recognizing the American principle that every citizen has an obligation of service to his country.

An adequate privately operated merchant marine, the continued development of our harbors and waterways and the expansion of privately operated air transportation and communication systems.

Federal Finances. The maintenance of Federal finances in a healthy condition and continuation of the efforts so well started by the Republican Congress to reduce the enormous burden of taxation in order to provide incentives for the creation of new industries and new jobs and to bring relief from inflation. We favor intelligent integration of Federal-State taxing and spending policies designed to eliminate wasteful duplication; and in order that the state and local governments may be able to assume their separate responsibilities, the Federal Government shall as soon as practicable withdraw or reduce those taxes which can be best administered by local governments, with particular consideration of excise and inheritance taxes, and we favor restoring to America a working federalism.

Small business, the bulwark of American enterprise, must be encouraged through aggressive anti-monopoly action, elimination of unnecessary controls, protection against discrimination, correction of tax abuses and limitation of competition by governmental organizations.

Collective Bargaining. Collective bargaining is an obligation as well as a right, applying equally to workers and employers; and the fundamental right to strike is subordinate only to paramount considerations of public health and safety. Government's chief function in this field is to promote good will, encourage co-operation and, where resort is had to intervention, to be impartial, preventing violence and requiring obedience to all law by all parties involved. We pledge continuing study to improve labor-management legislation in the light of experience and changing conditions.

Long-Range Program. There must be a long-term program in the interest of agriculture and the consumer which should include: an accelerated program of sounder soil conservation; effective protection of reasonable market prices through flexible support prices, commodity loans, marketing agreements, together with such other means as may be necessary, and the development of sound farm credit; encouragement of family-size farms; intensified research to discover new crops, new uses for

existing crops, and control of hoof and mouth and other animal diseases and crop pests; support of the principle of bona fide farmer-owned and farmer-operated co-operatives and sound rural electrification.

Resources. We favor progressive development of the nation's water resources for navigation, flood control and power, with immediate action in critical areas.

We favor conservation of all our natural resources and believe that conservation and stockpiling of strategic and critical raw materials is indispensable to the security of the United States.

We urge the full development of our forests on the basis of cropping and sustained yield, with co-operation of States and private owners for conservation and fire protection.

We favor a comprehensive reclamation program for arid and semi-arid areas with full protection of the rights and interests of the states in the use and control of water for irrigation, power development incidental thereto and other beneficial uses; withdrawal or acquisition of lands for public purposes only by act of Congress and after due consideration of local problems; development of processes for the extraction of oil and other substances from oil shale and coal; adequate representation of the West in the National Administration.

Veterans. Recognizing the nation's solemn obligation to all veterans, we propose a realistic and adequate adjustment of benefits on a cost-of-living basis for service-connected disabled veterans and their dependents, and for the widows, orphans and dependents of veterans who died in the service of their country. All disabled veterans should have ample opportunity for suitable, self-sustaining employment. We demand good-faith compliance with veterans' preference in Federal service, with simplification and codification of the hundreds of piece-meal Federal laws affecting veterans, and efficient and business-like management of the Veterans Administration. We pledge the highest possible standards of medical care and hospitalization.

Housing. Housing can best be supplied and financed by private enterprise; but government can and should encourage the building of better homes, at less cost. We recommend Federal aid to the States for local slum clearance and low-rental housing programs only where there is a need that cannot be met either by private enterprise or by the States and localities.

Consistent with the vigorous existence of our competitive economy, we urge: Extension of the Federal Old Age and Survivors' Insurance Pro-

gram and increase of the benefits to a more realistic level; strengthening of Federal-State programs designed to provide more adequate hospital facilities, to improve methods of treatment for the mentally ill, to advance maternal and child health and generally to foster a healthy America.

Lynching, or any other form of mob violence anywhere, is a disgrace to any civilized state and we favor the prompt enactment of legislation to end this infamy.

Civil Rights. One of the basic principles of this Republic is the equality of all individuals in their right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. This principle is enunciated in the Declaration of Independence and embodied in the Constitution of the United States; it was vindicated on the field of battle and became the cornerstone of this Republic. This right of equal opportunity to work and to advance in life should never be limited on any individual because of race, religion, color, or country of origin. We favor the enactment and just enforcement of such Federal legislation as may be necessary to maintain this right at all times in every part of this Republic.

We favor the abolition of the poll tax as a requisite to voting.

We are opposed to the idea of racial segregation in the Armed Services of the United States.

Communism. We pledge a vigorous enforcement of existing laws against Communists and enactment of such new legislation as may be necessary to expose the treasonable activities of Communists and defeat their objective of establishing here a Godless dictatorship controlled from abroad.

Legislative Program. We favor a revision of the procedure for the election of the President and Vice President which will more exactly reflect the popular vote.

We recommend to Congress the submission of a Constitutional Amendment providing equal rights for women.

We favor equal pay for equal work, regardless of sex.

We propose a well-paid and efficient Federal career service.

We favor the elimination of unnecessary Federal bureaus and of the duplication of the functions of necessary governmental agencies.

We favor equality of educational opportunity for all and the promotion of education and educational facilities.

We favor restoration to the States of their historic rights to the tide and submerged lands, territorial waters, lakes and streams.

We favor eventual Statehood for Hawaii, Alaska and Puerto Rico.

We urge development of Alaskan land communications and natural resources.

We favor self-government for the residents of the Nation's Capital.

FOREIGN POLICY

We dedicate our foreign policy to the preservation of a free America in a free world of free men. With neither malice nor desire for conquest, we shall strive for a just peace with all nations.

America is deeply interested in the stability, security and liberty of other independent peoples. Within the prudent limits of our own economic welfare, we shall co-operate, on a basis of self-help and mutual aid, to assist other peace-loving nations to restore their economic independence and the human rights and fundamental freedoms for which we fought two wars and upon which dependable peace must build. We shall insist on businesslike and efficient administration of all foreign aid.

We welcome and encourage the sturdy progress toward unity in Western Europe.

We shall erect our foreign policy on the basis of friendly firmness which welcomes co-operation, but spurns appeasement. We shall pursue a consistent foreign policy which invites steadiness and reliance and which thus avoids the misunderstandings from which wars result. We shall protect the future against the errors of the Democratic Administration, which has too often lacked clarity, competence or consistency in our vital international relationships and has too often abandoned justice.

Collective Security. We believe in collective security against aggression and in behalf of justice and freedom. We shall support the United Nations as the world's best hope in this direction, striving to strengthen it and promote its effective evolution and use. The United Nations should progressively establish international law, be freed of any veto in the peaceful settlement of international disputes and be provided with the armed forces contemplated by the Charter. We particularly commend the value of regional arrangements as prescribed by the Charter; and we cite the Western Hemispheric Defense Pact as a useful model.

We shall nourish these Pan-American agreements in the new spirit of co-operation which implements the Monroe Doctrine.

We welcome Israel into the family of nations and take pride in the fact that the Republican party was the first to call for the establishment of a free and independent Jewish commonwealth. The vacillation of

the Democratic Administration on this question has undermined the prestige of the United Nations. Subject to the letter and spirit of the United Nations Charter, we pledge to Israel full recognition, with its boundaries as sanctioned by the United Nations, and aid in developing its economy.

We will foster and cherish our historic policy of friendship with China and assert our deep interest in the maintenance of its integrity and freedom.

We shall seek to restore autonomy and self-sufficiency as rapidly as possible in our post-war occupied areas, guarding always against any rebirth of aggression.

We shall relentlessly pursue our aims for the universal limitation and control of arms and implements of war on a basis of reliable disciplines against bad faith.

At all times safeguarding our own industry and agriculture, and under efficient administrative procedures for the legitimate consideration of domestic needs, we shall support the system of reciprocal trade and encourage international commerce.

We pledge that under a Republican Administration all foreign commitments shall be made public and subject to Constitutional ratification. We shall say what we mean and mean what we say. In all these things we shall primarily consult the national security and welfare of our own United States. In all of these things we shall welcome the world's co-operation. But in none of these things shall we surrender our ideals or our free institutions.

We are proud of the part that the Republicans have taken in those limited areas of foreign policy in which they have been permitted to participate. We shall invite the minority party to join us under the next Republican Administration in stopping partisan politics at the water's edge.

We faithfully dedicate ourselves to peace with justice.

Guided by these principles, with continuing faith in Almighty God; united in the spirit of brotherhood; and using to the full the skills, resources and blessings of liberty with which we are endowed; we, the American people, will courageously advance to meet the challenge of the future.

The Communist Party Platform

In this crucial 1948 election the American people have a fateful decision to make: Shall America follow the path of peace or war, democracy or fascism?

Our boys returned from World War II with the hope that their war-time sacrifices had not been in vain.

Remember the promises: Fascism would be wiped out; the great-power unity that brought war victory would bring enduring peace; an economic bill of rights would provide every American with security.

These promises have been broken.

Instead of peace, there is war — in Greece, in China, in Israel.

Instead of peace, we witness feverish preparations for war.

Instead of peace, American boys are once again being regimented in the first peacetime draft in our nation's history.

Instead of security and abundance, we have sky-rocketing prices, lowered living standards and the shadow of an impending economic crash with mass unemployment. Farmers fear the inevitable collapse of farm prices. After three years our veterans are still denied housing. Our youth face a future of insecurity and new wars.

Instead of greater democracy, we witness lynch law, mounting Jim-Crowism and anti-Semitism, and a conspiracy to undermine our sacred democratic heritage. Anti-Communist witch-hunts, phony spy scares, the arrest and conviction of anti-fascist leaders, the hounding of government employees and former Roosevelt associates, the persecution of foreign-born workers, the adoption of anti-labor legislation — these are the methods by which the American people are step by step being driven down the road to a police state and fascism.

These are the chief issues of the 1948 elections.

America is a great and beautiful land, endowed with immense natural resources and a people skilled in producing abundance. Why then the fear of insecurity?

We are today threatened by no outside force. No nation on earth can attack us. Why then the war hysteria?

Control by Corporations. The answer lies in this simple fact — 250 giant corporations, operating through eight banks, control the economic

life of America. These in turn are largely owned by a few plutocratic families — Morgan, Rockefeller, Mellon, du Pont and Ford.

The nation's industries are operated not for the public welfare, but for the private gain and power of the multi-millionaire ruling class. Prices continue to rise because of vast military expenditures and because the monopolies, through price-fixing agreements and other devious devices, extract exorbitant profits.

They also make huge profits from war and from armaments. They extract super-profits abroad by forcing other nations into economic dependence upon Wall Street. This drive for foreign markets, for Wall Street domination of the world, is at the bottom of the war hysteria and war preparations. Big business, fearful of the growth and advance of democracy and socialism, hopes to crush the democratic and socialist movements of the world, in order to protect and swell its profits.

Big business seeks to re-establish the old Nazi cartels and use Germany as a military base for new aggression, but the failure of the bi-partisan foreign policy to achieve its main aim of world conquest has increased the frenzy with which Wall Street seeks to plunge the nation into fascism and World War III.

WAR AND PEACE

Responsibility for the sharpening tension in world relations rests neither on the American people nor on the Soviet Union. The responsibility rests squarely on Wall Street and the bi-partisan Truman-Vandenberg-Dulles atomic diplomacy. The Soviet Union, which has no I.G. Farben or du Pont cartels, but has instead a socialist economy, is the strongest bulwark for peace. Only the trusts and war profiteers want war.

The Communist Party calls for enforcement of the agreements arrived at by Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Soviet Union, based on a policy of collaboration with our great wartime Soviet ally.

End the "cold war," the draft, and the huge military budget!

Offer American-Soviet friendship, the key to making the United Nations an instrument for world peace!

Conclude a peace settlement for a united democratic Germany and Japan based on the Yalta and Potsdam Agreements. Guarantee the complete democratization and demilitarization of these countries.

Withdraw American troops from China, Korea and Greece.

Break diplomatic and economic ties with Franco Spain.

Scrap the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine. Furnish large-scale economic assistance to the war-ravaged victims of Fascist attack. Give this aid to the United Nations without political strings.

Lift the embargo on and extend full recognition to Israel.

Immediate unconditional independence for Puerto Rico.

Aid the economic development of the colonial and semi-colonial countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America without infringement of their national independence. Abandon economic, political and military pressures on the countries of Latin America.

LABOR AND LIVING STANDARDS

The trusts have inflated prices and battered down the real wages of American workers to 16 per cent below 1944.

Huge war expenditures amount to 15 billion dollars this year — one-third of the entire national budget. The American people are already paying dearly for this "cold war economy," through a heavy tax burden, speed-up and reduction in real wages. We will pay still more heavily as the inflationary boom speeds the day of the oncoming economic bust.

Big Business has decreed that labor's hands be tied and its rights destroyed. The Taft-Hartley Law and strike-breaking injunctions are weapons against the people's resistance to the monopoly drive towards war and fascism.

Defend the labor movement and unite the ranks of the workers and all progressives against this attack which threatens labor's very existence.

Repeal the Taft-Hartley Law and end strike-breaking injunctions.

Adopt a code of Federal labor legislation, including the best features of Wagner Act and the Norris-La Guardia anti-injunction laws.

Restore price control and roll back prices.

We join with all labor and progressive forces in the common demand for an adequate program for Federally financed low-rent housing, minimum wages, old-age pensions, adequate health insurance, and increased aid to education.

We call for increased security for the working farmers through up-to-date parity price and income guarantees, based on unlimited farm production. Such income guarantees require farm subsidies, effective crop insurance and sharp curbs on the giant food trusts and their marketing agencies. We further demand extension of Federal minimum wage and

social security laws to agricultural workers, including seasonal and migratory labor.

We call for heavier taxation on high incomes and excess profits, with increased exemption for the low brackets. We demand a capital levy on big fortunes and corporations to finance essential social legislation.

We support all steps to curb the power of the trusts, the fountain-head of reaction, fascism and war. The American people can make gains, even under capitalism, by mass resistance to the monopolies. We support measures to nationalize basic industries, banks and insurance companies, but point out that these can only be useful as part of the fight for a people's democratic government in the United States. Democratic nationalization of trustified industries requires guarantees of democratic controls, the right of labor to organize, bargain collectively and strike. This can only be accomplished by a people's government dedicated to curbing the power of the trusts.

We point out that capitalism cannot become "progressive" even by curbing the excesses of the monopolies. The basic causes of unemployment, economic crisis, fascism and war can only be removed by the establishment of socialism through the democratic will of a majority of the American people.

CIVIL RIGHTS

The destruction of the rights of the Communists is the classical first step down the road to fascism. The tragedy of Germany and Italy prove this. Therefore, it is incumbent upon all Americans who hate fascism to defend the rights of the Communists, and to help explode the myth that Communists are foreign agents or advocate force and violence.

We are no more foreign agents than was Jefferson who was also accused of being a foreign agent by the Tories of his day. We follow in the best tradition of the spokesmen of labor, science and culture whose contributions to human progress knew no national boundaries. We follow in the tradition of Abraham Lincoln, who said: "The strongest bond of human sympathy, outside of the family relation, should be one uniting all working people of all nations and tongues and kindred."

It is not the Communists who advocate or practice force and violence, but the monopolists, the KKK, the lynch mobs and the fascist hoodlum gangs. Reaction has historically resorted to force and violence to thwart the democratic aspirations of the peoples. In 1776, force and violence

were the weapons of King George against the American colonists seeking national independence. In 1861, force and violence were used by the Southern slave owners in an attempt to overthrow the democratic republic headed by Lincoln.

We are Marxists, not adventurers nor conspirators. We condemn and reject the policy and practice of terror and assassination and repudiate the advocates of force and violence. We Communists seek only the opportunity to compete fairly in the marketplace of ideas, asking only that our program and proposals be considered on their merit.

End the witch hunts, loyalty orders and phony spy scares.

Abolish the un-American Committee. Withdraw the indictments against the twelve Communist leaders and the contempt citations against the anti-fascist victims of Congressional inquisitions.

End persecution and deportation of the foreign born and lift the undemocratic bars to citizenship.

Outlaw all forms of anti-Semitism, anti-Catholicism and every other expression of racial and religious bigotry.

End all discrimination against the Mexican-American people in the Southwest.

The Communist Party calls for an end to any and all political, social and economic inequalities practiced against women and demands the maintenance and extension of existing protective legislation.

Extend the suffrage! Remove the bars directed against minority parties! Lower the voting age to 18 years in every state.

NEGRO RIGHTS

The hypocrisy of the democratic pretensions of Wall Street and the Administration are shattered on the reality of the Jim Crow system in America. The most shameful aspect of American life is the Jim Crowism, the terror and violence imposed upon the Negro people, especially in the South. Discrimination in employment, only slightly relaxed during the war, is once again widespread.

The Communist Party, which has pioneered in fighting for full political, economic and social equality for the Negro people, calls for an end to the policies of the Federal and state governments which give official sanction to the Jim Crow system in the United States.

We call upon all progressives, especially white progressives, to carry on an unceasing day-to-day struggle to outlaw the poll tax, lynchings,

segregation, job discrimination and all other forms of Jim-Crowism, official and unofficial.

We demand a national FEPC law, to be vigorously and fully enforced.

We demand that the Ingram family be freed and adequately compensated for the ordeals to which they have been subjected.

We demand that the Ku Klux Klan be outlawed.

We condemn President Truman's cynical evasion of the issue of segregation in the armed forces. We demand that he immediately issue an executive order ending every form of such segregation and discrimination.

We defend the right of the Negro people to full representation in government, and demand Federal enforcement of the 13th, 14th and 15th Amendments, so that the Negro people can participate freely and fully in the 1948 elections, North and South.

We call for an agricultural program which will give land and other forms of assistance to millions of Negro and white tenants and sharecroppers in the South.

Such reforms will help provide the material basis for the Negro people's advance towards full liberation from their national oppression, toward their full political, economic and social equality.

THE TWO-PARTY SYSTEM

Millions of American working people have come to realize the futility of any further support for the bankrupt two-party system of big business. Both major parties are committed to the bipartisan war program, reflected in both the Truman Doctrine and its New Look version, the Marshall Plan. Both major parties are united in this program of fattening the billionaires and bleeding the taxpayers.

Both major parties are responsible for runaway inflation. Both the Democratic President and the Republican Congress have done nothing to curb the powers of the trusts to hoard food, rig markets, boost prices and gouge consumers.

Both major parties are responsible for the atrocities committed against the Bill of Rights. Both helped pass the Taft-Hartley Law. Both the Democratic Congressional leaders and the cynical Dewey-Warren-Taft Republican leadership are responsible for the failure to enact civil rights legislation. Neither the Democratic platform nor President Truman's demagoguery will fool any enlightened American. The President's deeds belie his words. He has refused to end segregation in the armed forces and the Government and fire from his Cabinet those who maintain it.

Both major parties are responsible for the Hitler-like hysteria expressed in spy scares, loyalty probes, Government witch hunts and the arrest and indictment of Americans whose "crime" it is to oppose the Wall Street war plans. Both the Democratic-controlled Department of Justice and the Republican-controlled un-American Committee have equally been guilty of subverting the Bill of Rights.

Chief allies of the twin parties of big business in the ranks of labor and the progressive organizations of the people are those who pretend to criticize the corruption and decay of the two old parties while, in fact, keeping the people tied hand and foot to the two-party system. These include the top officialdom of the AFL, CIO and R. R. Brotherhoods and groups like the Americans for Democratic Action and the Social Democrats, such as Norman Thomas and David Dubinsky.

THE NEW PARTY

Millions of Americans, disillusioned with the two-party system, have given birth to a new people's party.

The new Progressive Party is an inescapable historic necessity for millions who want a real choice between peace and war, democracy or fascism, security or poverty.

The Communists, who support every popular progressive movement, naturally welcome this new people's party. We supported the progressive features of Roosevelt's New Deal. We helped organize the CIO in the 1930's, we have supported every democratic movement since the Communists of Lincoln's generation fought in the Union cause during the Civil War.

On most immediate questions before the people of the country the Progressive Party has offered detailed platform planks around which all forward-looking people can unite. Our support of the Progressive policies and campaign does not alter the fact that we have fundamental as well as some tactical differences with Henry Wallace and related third party forces.

The Communist Party is not nominating a Presidential ticket in the 1948 elections. In 1944 we Communists supported Roosevelt to help win the anti-Axis war. Similarly, in 1948 we Communists join with millions of other Americans to support the Progressive ticket to help win the peace. The Communist Party will enter its own candidates only in those districts where the people are offered no progressive alternatives to the twin parties of Wall Street.

The Progressive Party is by its very nature a great coalition of labor, farmers, the Negro people, youth, professional and small business people. It is anti-monopoly, anti-fascist, anti-war. By its very nature it is not an anti-capitalist party. It is not a Socialist or Communist party, and we are not seeking to make it one. It is and should develop as a united front, a mass people's party.

There is only one Marxist party in America, one party dedicated to replacing the capitalist system with Socialism — and that is the Communist Party.

Our firm conviction that only a socialist reorganization of society will bring permanent peace, security and prosperity is no barrier to co-operation with all other progressive Americans, in helping create a great new coalition in order to save our people from the twin horrors of war and fascism.

We seek no special position in this movement and will, of course, oppose any special disabilities because of our socialist views.

We Communists are dedicated to the proposition that the great American dream of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness will be realized only under socialism, a system of society in which the major means of production will be collectively owned and operated under a government based on the working class. Only such a society can forever banish war, poverty and race hatred. Only in such a society can there be the full realization of the dignity of man and the full development of the individual. Only such a society can permanently protect the integrity of the home and family. Only a Socialist society can realize in life the vision of the brotherhood of man.

Fellow-Americans: We live in grave times. The dangers of war and fascism are exceedingly great. Only the common people of America, and in the first place the working class, can change our nation's course and save it from disaster. The 1948 elections can help determine which way America shall go. Your vigilance, your united action in this election and in defense of your rights can strike a blow for peace and freedom. The future of our country lies in your hands.

The States' Rights Party Platform

We affirm that a political party is an instrumentality for effectuating the principles upon which the party is founded; that a platform of principles is a solemn covenant with the people and with the members of the party; that no leader of the party, in temporary power, has the right or privilege to proceed contrary to the fundamental principles of the party, or the letter or spirit of the Constitution of the United States; that to act contrary to these principles is a breach of faith, a usurpation of power, and a forfeiture of the party name and party leadership.

We believe that the protection of the American people against the onward march of totalitarian government requires a faithful observance of Article X of the American Bill of Rights which provides that: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people."

THE PRINCIPLE OF STATES' RIGHTS

We direct attention to the fact that the first platform of the Democratic Party, adopted in 1840, resolved that: "Congress has no power under the Constitution to interfere with or control the domestic institutions of the several states, and that such states are the sole and proper judges of everything appertaining to their own affairs not prohibited by the Constitution."

Such pronouncement is the cornerstone of the Democratic Party. A long train of abuses and usurpations of power by unfaithful leaders who are alien to the Democratic parties of the states here represented has become intolerable to those who believe in the preservation of constitutional government and individual liberty in America.

The Executive Department of the government is promoting the gradual but certain growth of a totalitarian state by domination and control of a politically minded Supreme Court. As examples of the threat to our form of government, the Executive Department, with the aid of the Supreme Court, has asserted national dominion and control of submerged oil-bearing lands in California, schools in Oklahoma and Missouri, primary elections in Texas, South Carolina and Louisiana, re-

strictive covenants in New York and the District of Columbia, and other jurisdictions, as well as religious instruction in Illinois.

PERIL TO BASIC RIGHTS

By asserting paramount Federal rights in these instances, a totalitarian concept has been promulgated which threatens the integrity of the states and the basic rights of their citizens.

We have repeatedly remonstrated with the leaders of the national organization of our party but our petitions, entreaties and warnings have been treated with contempt. The latest response to our entreaties was a Democratic convention in Philadelphia rigged to embarrass and humiliate the South.

This alleged Democratic assembly called for a civil-rights law that would eliminate segregation of every kind from all American life, prohibit all forms of discrimination in private employment, in public and private instruction and administration and treatment of students; in the operation of public and private health facilities; in all transportation, and require equal access to all places of public accommodation for persons of all races, colors, creeds and national origin.

PROPOSED FBI POWERS

This infamous and iniquitous program calls for the reorganization of the civil rights section of the Department of Justice with a substantial increase in a bureaucratic staff to be devoted exclusively to the enforcement of the civil rights program; the establishment within the FBI of a special unit of investigators and a police state in a totalitarian, centralized, bureaucratic government.

This convention hypocritically denounced totalitarianism abroad but unblushingly proposed and approved it at home. This convention would strengthen the grip of a police state upon a liberty-loving people by the imposition of penalties upon local public officers who failed or refused to act in accordance with its ideas in suppressing mob violence.

We point out that if a foreign power undertook to force upon the people of the United States the measures advocated by the Democratic convention in Philadelphia, with respect to civil rights, it would mean war and the entire nation would resist such effort.

The convention that insulted the South in the party platform ad-

vocated giving the Virgin Islands and other dependencies of the United States "the maximum degree of local self-government."

When an effort was made to amend this part of the platform so as to make it read that the party favored giving the Virgin Islands and the several states the maximum degree of local self-government, the amendment adding the words "these several states" was stricken out and the sovereign states were denied the rights that the party favors giving the Virgin Islands.

PAST LOYALTY

We point out that the South, with clock-like regularity, has furnished the Democratic Party approximately 50 per cent of the votes necessary to nominate a President every four years for nearly a century. In 1920 the only states in the union that went Democratic were the eleven Southern states.

Notwithstanding this rugged loyalty to the party, the masters of political intrigue now allow Republican states in which there is scarcely a Democratic office holder to dominate and control the party and fashion its policies.

NEW POLICY

As Democrats who are irrevocably committed to democracy as defined and expounded by Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson and Woodrow Wilson, and who believe that all necessary steps must be taken for its preservation, we declare to the people of the United States as follows:

1. We believe that the Constitution of the United States is the greatest charter of human liberty ever conceived by the mind of man.
2. We oppose all efforts to invade or destroy the rights vouchsafed by it to every citizen of this republic.
3. We stand for social and economic justice, which we believe can be vouchsafed to all citizens only by a strict adherence to our Constitution and the avoidance of any invasion or destruction of the constitutional rights of the states and individuals. We oppose the totalitarian, centralized, bureaucratic government and the police state called for by the platforms adopted by the Democratic and Republican conventions.
4. We stand for the segregation of the races and the racial integrity of each race; the constitutional right to choose one's associates; to accept

private employment without governmental interference, and to earn one's living in any lawful way. We oppose the elimination of segregation employment by Federal bureaucrats called for by the misnamed civil rights program. We favor home rule, local self-government and a minimum interference with individual rights.

5. We oppose and condemn the action of the Democratic convention in sponsoring a civil rights program calling for the elimination of segregation, social equality by Federal fiat, regulation of private employment practices, voting and local law enforcement.

6. We affirm that the effective enforcement of such a program would be utterly destructive of the social, economic and political life of the Southern people, and of other localities in which there may be differences in race, creed or national origin in appreciable numbers.

7. We stand for the checks and balances provided by the three departments of our Government. We oppose the usurpation of legislative functions by the executive and judicial departments. We unreservedly condemn the effort to establish nation-wide a police state in this republic that would destroy the last vestige of liberty enjoyed by a citizen.

8. We demand that there be returned to the people, to whom of right they belong, those powers needed for the preservation of human rights and the discharge of our responsibility as Democrats for human welfare. We oppose a denial of those rights by political parties, a barter or sale of those rights by a political convention, as well as any invasion or violation of those rights by the Federal Government.

We call upon all Democrats and upon all other loyal Americans who are opposed to totalitarianism at home and abroad to unite with us in ignominiously defeating Harry S. Truman and Thomas E. Dewey, and every other candidate for public office who would establish a police state in the United States of America.

National Platform Socialist Party—U. S. A.

PREAMBLE

Mankind is haunted by new fears. In the crowded metropolis and on the distant farm, men ask themselves whether, under freedom, depression can be avoided, poverty vanquished and war uprooted.

Starvation stalks much of the world, and in our own land men dread the insecurity that tomorrow may bring. While millions go in rags, the world's looms are again knitting the uniforms that will shroud new victims to be offered on the altars of nationalism, imperialism and tyranny.

In 1948, we face the elemental question of survival. The atomic revolution has burst upon the world and a new unity has been forged among the human race: men who have refused to be brothers one of another may now become children of a common doom.

... Unless we learn to reorganize our society for survival and not for mutual extinction;

... Unless we learn new techniques of co-operation to replace the old policies of competition;

... Unless we move rapidly toward socialization by which alone the individual can be preserved in the interdependent world of the turbine, the plane, the steel mill and the uranium pile;

... Unless we move rapidly to a world order without greed, profit and hate.

The American people, because of the accidents of geography, will make the decision for mankind. Our mines and factories were not devastated by the physical havoc of the last war. For America, and consequently the world, it is not too late.

Three forces today are competing for the loyalty of men. And in this race, the stakes are the survival of mankind.

On the one hand, an economic system calling itself "free enterprise" asserts that it can lead to the salvation of humanity. It has brought us repeatedly to depressions and wars, yet its spokesmen in the Democratic and Republican Parties still pretend they have solutions.

They have, in fact, betrayed the promises with which they woo the American people every four years. They offered prosperity and delivered depression. They pledged peace and delivered war. They promised to

increase our standard of living and are now raising the cost of living. They promised freedom to organized labor and hobbled it with new bonds.

They have sought partisan advantage and jeopardized national welfare. The dominant wings in their parties have combined to destroy price control and give us inflation, to undermine restraints on greed and give us shortage, to favor the rich and deny the poor, to cut the taxes of the wealthy and insult the common man with a crumb.

There is a second force in the world — which promises security and speaks of freedom but delivers only economic bondage and dictatorship. It is the force of totalitarianism. Yesterday its most sinister front was Fascism; today it is Communism.

In the United States, it marches under masked banners. It calls itself a “new party” and has pushed into the forefront well-meaning liberals who do not know the purposes of their Communist allies. And this alliance, though speaking for civil liberties at home, defends the most powerful tyranny in the modern world. It speaks of peace but is blind to the most aggressive imperialism of the present day. It speaks of one world but works for two spheres of influence. It urges the brotherhood of man but sanctifies the divisive principle of national sovereignty.

As against these forces, the Socialist Party of the United States speaks for the Third Force — democratic socialism, the principles of democratic planning and international order. This socialist program for the United States today includes these major goals:

BASIC SOCIALIST DEMANDS

1. The natural resources of the nation — minerals, oil, electric and atomic power — are the property of the people. Their preservation for future generations and their management by the people for social purposes can be achieved democratically under socialism.

2. The basic industries, public utilities, banking and credit institutions — all the economic facilities needed for the satisfaction of the fundamental requirements of the people — must be socially owned and democratically managed.

3. Socialism will democratize the economic life of the nation by the joint representation of workers, the working management and the consuming public, in the management of socialized enterprises: by the guarantee of popular control of enterprise through the maximum de-

centralization economically feasible and the use of various types of organization, particularly the public corporation and the voluntary co-operative; and by the preservation of the freedom of labor organization and of consumer choice.

With such control we can have democratic planning. The lessons of the last war have taught that only by planning, by large-scale government investment, by decisive national action, can production be increased to meet the goals set by the nation. In place of the destructive ends sought in wartime, the nation must now fix its peacetime goals — food for the ill-fed, clothing for the ill-clothed, homes for the ill-housed.

A nation that could fill the skies with planes and the oceans with warships can fill its streets and avenues with homes, schools and hospitals; swell its granaries and storehouses; bring joy to its people and the world. In the light of this Socialist program for democratic planning, we offer this platform to the American people in the 1948 elections. It can be achieved.

DOMESTIC PROGRAM

Raise the Standard of Living. It must be the constant task of the nation to raise the standard of living of its people. This can be effected only by a continually rising trend in production and wage levels, the stabilization of prices, and the immediate elimination of profits as the determining factor in production. In a period of inflation wage increases without price controls are delusions.

Expand the Productive Facilities of the Nation. The American standard of living and the needs of world economic rehabilitation make it essential that our national production be rapidly expanded. An economy based on profit will not expand so long as scarcity is profitable and inflation an easy road to gain.

The Socialist Party calls for government action to assure investment in new plant capacity through the establishment of public corporations for the production of ever-mounting quantities of steel, oil and other raw materials, and the utilization of the nation's water resources for the development of cheaper and more abundant electric power. A far-flung program of Tennessee Valley Administrations, Missouri Valley Administrations and Rural Electrification Administration co-operatives can effect the electrification of whole areas that are lagging far behind their agricultural and industrial potential. Only by planned growth in

our national output of civilian goods can we end the menace of inflation, which is now dangerously increased by our enormous expenditures on arms.

Expand Social Legislation. The intricacies of twentieth century living and the potentialities of modern technology have at last made it possible to guarantee a national minimum standard of living for the population. The Socialist Party advocates: ·

Expansion of unemployment insurance and social security. Millions of workers are as yet uncovered by the unemployment and social security provisions. The present law discriminates against farm labor, domestic servants and other working groups despite the constitutional guarantee of "the equal protection of the laws." Even so, the Democratic-Republican coalition in Congress has been whittling down the number of workers protected by the existing law at a time when extension of coverage should be the order of the day.

The age at which workers become eligible for old age pensions should be promptly reduced to 60, and the system should be financed by net progressive income taxation rather than by the regressive payroll tax. The benefits — now drastically cut by the current inflation — should be raised.

The Social Security law should be amended to include family allowances. The proper care of children is at least as important as the care of the aged.

Minimum wage. The present legal minimum wage under the Wage-Hour Law should be immediately raised to the 75 cents an hour demanded by organized labor, with progressive increases to occur periodically.

The number of employees protected by the Act must be increased by a redefinition of coverage; and the present reactionary drive to reduce the coverage must be defeated.

Health services. Legislation for comprehensive medical and hospital care, financed by a national contributory system of health insurance, must be enacted by Congress. The Democratic-Republican coalition has successfully blocked the health insurance bill. In contrast, the Taft health bill will not provide comprehensive medical care nor remove the economic barriers now depriving millions of proper medical service.

Only a national health insurance program can guarantee free access to medical care, freedom of doctors' choice and freedom for the medical profession within a framework of public responsibility.

Neither a fee-for-service system nor voluntary prepayment plans can

bring the benefits of modern medical science to all the people, regardless of race, color, creed, geography or economic condition.

Federal tax funds should be used to supplement an insurance program in creating a fully rounded national health service.

Public health services must be increased; the construction of new hospitals and clinics must be pushed. Federal action must be taken to stimulate research and public preventive medicine in cancer, heart diseases, mental illness, alcoholism and other ailments, as was done in the field of atomic fission. The maternal and child services provided by the Social Security Act must be extended.

Education. It is a national disgrace that the richest nation in the world does not have the best possible educational program from the nursery school to the university. America has subjected its children and youth to a shameful chronic emergency in this field. Higher standards of teacher training, enlarged and improved facilities, curricula better designed to meet pupil needs, adequate salaries, attractive conditions for superior professional work — all require that Federal contributions to public education be vastly multiplied without reducing local community initiative and existing State responsibilities.

At the same time, legislative efforts to divert public funds to private sectarian schools must be defeated. The principle of separation of church and state must be consistently applied in the use of public educational funds.

We propose passage of State and Federal laws aimed at eliminating racial, cultural and religious discrimination and segregation in education.

Veterans. Because of the special hardships war worked upon the veterans and conscientious objectors, we favor legislation to provide them substantial and adequate benefits in the form of education, medical care and loans; and full care for the families of those who did not return. We demand immediate steps to end the vicious discrimination and outright fraud now being practiced against Negro, Nisei, Spanish- or Mexican-American veterans by prejudiced local employees of the Veterans Administration, particularly in the South and Southwest.

Expand the Nation's Housing Facilities. Private enterprise has failed dismally to meet the challenge of housing the American people. Its boast that the lifting of controls on new construction would stimulate large-scale building has proved hollow. The lower income groups most desperately in need of housing, the young people — particularly our veterans — and the inhabitants of our evergrowing slums, are not in a

position to buy or rent the facilities that private contractors are willing or able to erect.

The Taft-Ellender-Wagner Bill should be passed — but only as the merest fraction of a beginning, precisely because its major reliance is on the private construction industry.

The Socialist Party proposes the creation of a Home Loan Bank to finance the purchase of homes, a Public Supply and Fabricating Corporation to set up factory units needed to produce materials and to develop large-scale prefabricated housing; the expansion of public housing activities in the field of low-income multiple dwellings; the expansion of publicly built, co-operative tenant-operated housing; the integration of national and local housing plans, including revision of municipal building codes; the development of a government program of bona fide collective bargaining with the building and construction unions, providing for a guaranteed annual wage to remove one of the worst evils of the building industry and for the development of apprentice-training programs.

We favor the extension and strengthening of rent control for the duration of the housing emergency. The people of America must call to account those legislators who are destroying rent controls, permitting eviction of tenants by subterfuge and so contributing to disastrous inflation in the field of housing.

Protect the Nation's Title to Atomic Energy Pending Internationalization. The United States has made a good beginning in reserving to the nation, rather than ceding to business, the ownership of atomic energy. But this principle is already being undermined by cost-plus contracts, granted to private corporations to exploit this new storehouse of power for profit as coal, oil and other resources have been in the past. Nuclear fission was not the product of private enterprise. It was financed by the nation and was achieved by co-operative scientific effort operating in complete disregard of the profit motive. As the peace-time uses of atomic energy begin to emerge, it becomes increasingly important that the constructive applications of atomic power be utilized only through non-profit public corporations.

Strengthen Civil and Political Liberties. Civil and political liberties are in serious danger today. The Socialist Party calls for greater vigilance and specifically demands:

- a. Repeal of the Taft-Hartley Act which undermines the right to strike, the right to organize, the right to sign contracts guaranteeing union security and furthering the economic interests of organized work-

ers; and which permits the power of the state to be used in behalf of employers and against workers with just grievances. The Socialist Party pledges its full support to organized labor in its effort to repeal the Taft-Hartley Act and similar state laws.

b. Elimination of the Committee on Un-American Activities which has pursued the dishonest tradition of the Dies Committee. The Committee has abused the legitimate democratic function of Congress to investigate and collect data on matters of national importance.

c. Defeat of any legislation that would force the Communist Party further underground and that would appear to give moral justification to its conspiratorial policies. The right to free expression of political views must not be impaired. But the existing laws against overt acts should be vigorously enforced.

d. Elimination of poll taxes and opening of the ballot to citizens regardless of income.

e. Full amnesty and restoration of civil rights for war objectors, several hundred of whom are still in prison and thousands of whom have lost citizenship.

Establish Racial Equality. Democracy cannot tolerate two classes of citizenship. Complete political economic and social equality, regardless of race, religion or national origin must be established.

a. Segregation must be abolished in the armed forces, in all public institutions and in housing.

b. Legislation for a Fair Employment Practices Committee, long overdue, should be passed.

c. Anti-lynching legislation must be enacted to wipe out the worst blot on the American scene.

d. Naturalization rights should be granted to Japanese immigrants who have demonstrated their loyalty, and indemnification should be given to Japanese immigrants and their American descendants who suffered property losses because of government policy during World War II.

e. All forms of discriminating barriers against immigration on grounds of race, color or national origin must be abolished.

f. Guarantee the right to vote to many citizens now robbed of suffrage. The 14th Amendment of the Constitution, depriving states of representation in Congress in proportion to the number of citizens deprived of the right to vote by virtue of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, should be promptly enforced.

Safeguard American Agriculture. The Socialist Party opposes the

absentee ownership of farms and its attendant tenancy in America. We reaffirm our position that occupancy and use should be the only rightful title to farmland. Where conditions favor family farming, the security of such farmers should be strengthened through co-operative credit purchasing and marketing, aided by government financing. Where modern techniques and specialization require large-scale farm enterprises, we call for social ownership and co-operative operation to replace the corporation farm which threatens both the security and freedom of farm workers.

We disapprove of the New Deal idea of agricultural scarcity, aimed at keeping prices up by limiting production. Our domestic needs and those of the world require an agricultural program based on maximum production.

We urge the continuation and expansion of the present conservation program to check destruction by floods, erosion of topsoil and depletion of farm fertility. Our obligation to our grandchildren demands a greater concern with the heritage we leave in productive farmland.

The proper distribution and marketing of food and fiber does not require gambling. Our present Board of Trade pricing of farm produce, with its poker game practices of buying on futures, must be ended.

Establish a Progressive Tax System. The Tax Law of 1948 is legislation for the direct and immediate benefit of the wealthiest group in the country. Their taxes have been drastically lowered without any real assurance that corresponding economic benefits in the form of additional equity capital for new production will result. The tax reduction for those in the lower income brackets is petty, and will disappear altogether after November if a Democratic or Republican Congress is elected.

We propose:

a. Raising the present exemption levels to equal the amounts necessary to sustain minimum standards of living.

b. Restoring the earned Income Credit in such form that it grants a tax benefit (with an appropriate maximum) to income from wages and salary in contrast to income from investment.

c. Tightening of the provisions of the Estate Tax section of the Internal Revenue Code by increasing the rates, lowering the exemption and plugging the loop-holes by which inherited wealth can be passed on for two and sometimes more generations, by means of trusts, without paying succession taxes. Corresponding changes must be made in the Gift Tax section.

d. Modification of the Internal Revenue Code's favored treatment of speculative and gambling profits, and encouragement of new equity capital for production by revision of the treatment of Capital Assets.

e. Financing of extraordinary government expenses through a capital levy, especially on the increase in private capital since 1939, so that those who benefited directly from World War II will bear the burden of the nation's war deficit.

f. We condemn the fraudulent joint-return provision of the new tax law as a device which enables the wealthy to minimize their share of the tax burden.

Financing the Socialist Program. The American people will be told that it is impossible to finance this program for economic security. The cost of World War II to the American people was some 350 billion dollars. It is fantastic to assert that we cannot afford to devote a fraction of that sum to the peace and happiness of the nation. On the basis of the program submitted to Congress by the Armed Forces, it is apparent that our military budget alone in 1952 will equal the present total national budget. The path to plenty lies in expanding our production and in reallocating our budget in the service of life and peace.

FOREIGN POLICY

Victory by the U.S. and its allies in two world wars has not established justice or peace. A third world war fought with atom bombs and bacteria will complete the ruin of mankind.

The major, but by no means the only threat of war, lies in the aggression of the Soviet empire and the international communist movement. That aggression has been invited and encouraged by the blunders of American policy from the Cairo and Teheran through the Yalta and Potsdam conferences. Disregard for those principles of peace which the Socialist Party has steadily urged since the campaign of 1944 has contributed directly to the present crisis. The problem of peace cannot be solved by any attainable superiority of American military might. The bi-partisan effort in Washington to achieve such superiority and the hysteria which accompanies it make war more likely, and threaten our internal democracy with a dangerous American militarism.

The road to peace lies neither through the policy of appeasement laid down at Yalta and now supported by Henry Wallace, nor through the confused military commitments of the Truman doctrine. Neither of

these contradictory policies can defeat international communism or the conditions that breed it.

A far better approach is the European Economic Recovery Program. It is a significant recognition that co-operative economic action must be taken if the European continent is not to pass into chaos and so into communist hands. But the helpful economic co-operation necessary to peace cannot be confined to Western Europe. In Europe itself vigilance is necessary lest the Recovery Program be subverted into an attempt to re-establish capitalist reaction or fascism, or to promote an American economic imperialism.

In addition to the proper conduct of the ERP a policy looking to the winning of lasting peace must include the following proposals:

Conscription. The representatives of the United States should immediately propose to the United Nations that peacetime conscription be outlawed by all nations. We are opposed to all forms of peacetime conscription in the U.S. Conscription contributed greatly to the growth of totalitarianism in Europe and has been sharply criticized as unnecessary even from the military standpoint.

Disarmament. The United States should propose the rigid limitation and international control of all armaments, to be followed by universal — not unilateral — disarmament; all such measures to be accompanied by the unlimited right of inspection through an authorized agency of the United Nations. The principle of unlimited international inspection must be recognized as a fundamental safeguard of world security.

World Government. The achievement of true democratic federal world government is the ultimate structure of peace. The U. N. as we have repeatedly pointed out is not by its nature such a government. Yet in the critical years before us it may serve a great interim usefulness if its constructive agencies are strengthened and if it is given power to deal with aggression by abolition of the veto in the Security Council. To the rapid achievement of these ends the Socialist Party pledges itself.

Atomic Control. The United States should renew its efforts for United Nations adoption of the Majority Plan, based on the Baruch proposals; a campaign of unceasing world education on the contents of the plan should be launched immediately; and meanwhile production of atomic bombs should be halted.

Raw Materials. All peoples of the world must be assured access to the raw materials now controlled by international, private, and state monopolies. For this, the area of operation of the world Food and

Agriculture Organization, in co-operation with the International Trade Organization where necessary, must be extended. At the same time, world planning is necessary to allocate materials in short supply on the basis of need. World production must be planned to meet the needs of world, not national, markets.

International Waterways. The United States should offer to join in the internationalization and demilitarization of the strategic waterways of the world, e.g. Panama, Suez, the Danube, the Dardanelles, Gibraltar, the Baltic, the Black Sea, the Arctic, etc., as part of the general program of world disarmament.

Police Force. The organization of world peace requires the existence of an international police or security force. Along with the principle of unlimited international inspection, an international police force is indispensable for the solution of such problems as Palestine, Kashmir, and other crises which may arise.

Colonialism. The United States should urge immediate action to begin the permanent liquidation of all colonialism — whether resting on military might, economic domination or political infiltration. The United Nations should establish commissions to supervise an early transition to self-government.

Trade Barriers. The United States should support all efforts to establish customs unions as a first step in the direction of a world-wide outlawry of trade barriers.

Refugees. The United States, whose greatness has been built by the creativity of generations of immigrants from all parts of the world, must open its doors to those displaced persons who have no home. At the very least, 400,000 such persons can be admitted under unused immigration quotas from the war years. Full support for the International Refugee Organization is essential as long as the present emergency exists, but the goal must be the free and unrestricted movement of peoples, according to their own choice, throughout the world.

Palestine. The present disastrous situation has been precipitated by the monstrous Nazi terror, conflicting promises to Jews and Arabs, and repeated betrayal of a pledged word. It is now the duty of the United Nations, with the wholehearted support of the United States, to establish order, to guarantee to the Jewish community in Palestine full self-government, and to protect the right of immigration since it has not reached a saturation point. Whether the political structure necessary to establish these rights is partition or a federation of cantons

somewhat on the Swiss model, the civil rights of minorities must be preserved within each district. In no event can immigration into Palestine be considered a complete and adequate answer to the problem of anti-semitism. Every country must be made a desirable homeland for those who live in it, regardless of race, creed or color.

Occupied Countries. Military occupation of conquered peoples is by nature inimical to democracy. American armies are now in occupation in Germany, Japan, Korea and various island outposts. Any attempts to use such occupation for economic advantage to American businessmen or for strategic military moves and counter-moves must be defeated. The encouragement of democratic self-government and functioning economies controlled by the people is the responsibility of occupying government, and as soon as this is done it must withdraw. Plans for fifty-year occupations have been mentioned; they must be defeated and dates for withdrawal set.

Economic Rehabilitation. The American government must increase its economic aid in the rehabilitation or development of all countries accepting the principles of political freedom, irrespective of the economic direction they choose for themselves in a free expression at the ballot box. Not only Europe but Asia, Africa and Latin America are in need of U.S. assistance.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

Above all, it is essential that the United States use its great resources to hasten the world on the road to democratic international organization. Even if any other power rejects the concept of a world sovereignty and continues to assert the outmoded principle of individual national sovereignty, the United States must continue to press toward the goal. It should invite all nations that agree with the program described here to join in a close and effective organization, leaving the door open to the others to participate at a later date.

In 1948, the American people will decide their course. A spirit of defeatism now will result only in defeat. A willingness to vote for your convictions and hopes can start America and the world on the road to peace, to freedom and to plenty.

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